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Abstract
The Irish in Britain are paradoxically Britain's longest 
established major ethnic group and also its least researched 
British sociologists influenced by the race relations para­
digm that has dominated ethnic research have ignored the 
Caucasian, English language speaking, Irish in Britain; 
dismissing them as having no specific ethnic linked problems 
This thesis strongly argues however that the Irish in 
Britain do have ethnic linked problems; essentially stem­
ming from the nature of the political relationship between 
Britain and Ireland. This thesis locates the 'uniqueness' 
of the Irish in Britain historical experience . in this bi­
polar relationship and in particular the anti-colonial 
struggle which resulted in Southern Ireland being the first 
British colony to win its political independence by mili­
tary means in this century. Very few other British colon­
ies repeated this experience and only in the Irish case 
did the colonial violence spill over into the metropolitan 
country in the form of organized 'second front' operations. 
Every generation of Irish immigrants in the last 120 years 
has seen some of its members participating in these 
activities; generating widespread macro societal hostility. 
This thesis focuses on the particularly traumatic 1916-23 
period . It makes a substantial contribution to the little 
explored political sociology of non-electoral participant 
organizations by its detailed investigation of the Irish 
Self Determination League: the largest ethnic political 
organization to emerge in England and Wales. This thesis 
also breaks new ground in evaluating the contribution made 
by the IRA units in Britain towards winning political inde­
pendence for Southern Ireland. This thesis also compares 
the response of the Irish in Britain to the anti-colonial 
struggle with that of the other Irish Diaspora communities; 
the Jewish and Cypriot communities in Britain and Algerians 
in France to similar events in Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria 
and France.
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Preface
Historical sociology must surely be the most difficult 
research field for sociologists particularly for those 
writing a Ph.D thesis. And quite frankly I only resorted 
to an historical sociological investigation when all other 
approaches had been blocked. My original intention was 
to research the comtenporary political sociology of the 
Irish in Britain but unfortunately my, then, known public 
relations role in the Irish Republican Movement prevented 
the satisfactory undertaking of a traditional questionnaire/ 
interview survey of the Irish community's response to events 
in Ireland. Subsequent developments then compelled me to 
abandon my pioneering participant observation study of 
the Republican milieu and investigation of its political/ 
military interface; when it proved impossible to document 
this research in the rigorous manner required for a Ph.D 
thesis. The collection of documents which could result in 
the deportation or even the imprisonment of people, especi­
ally those no longer actively involved, should pose major 
ethical questions for any researcher. In my own case this 
was not however an abstract problem as I was awaiting trial 
on serious charges in which the prosecution's case rested 
totally on the alleged handling of certain documents. (I 
was subsequently acquitted without a jury even being empan­
elled: the charges had been laid shortly after I instigated 
legal proceedings against the British Government and its 
forces).
I realize that mentioning such problems is probably un­
precedented in a thesis introduction but I do so because 
they are very relevant, dbo. understanding, the'research orientation 
my thesis finally took. My own political organizational 
experience has been a very useful secondary research tool 
in analyzing an earlier Republican milieu but it has also 
imposed major constraints even when I focused my investigation 
on events that occured over 60 years ago. These constraints
and not any personal ideological perspectives regrettably 
forced me to do little more than merely notice the exist­
ence of a strong Irish Unionist or loyalist pro-British, 
presence in Britain, particularly in Scotland. As even if 
I could have gained access to Unionist Party archives in 
Belfast - which given my political background is indeed very 
doubtful - I have unfortunately, until very recently, found 
it inadvisable to make anything but the briefest visit back 
to Belfast, my home town. And having required a police 
escort out of Glasgow after Orange Lodge members attacked 
a meeting I was addressing; I could hardly subsequently 
approach the Scottish Orange Lodges for permission to 
research their archives. I have also found it impossible 
to consult the surviving records of the Scottish Sinn Fein 
organization. Access to these is controlled by those 
who took a different direction when the Republican Movement 
split in 1969 and the ensuing bitterness has probably put 
them beyond my reach for ever.
My thesis centres around a detailed investigation of the 
Irish Self Determination League and so events in Ireland 
are only considered insofar as they influenced the ' ebb- 
flow tide sentiment1 that gave rise to the ISDL and then 
destroyed it. Similarly the attitude of organizations 
like the Catholic Church and the Labour Party to events 
in Ireland are only considered insofar as they intruded 
into the 'inter-organizational field' of the ISDL. For 
sociologists the most interesting stages in an organiz­
ation's life history are its birth and death. But whereas 
'mobilization' is a well explored topic, little attention 
has however been devoted to organizational disappearance.
And so I have not only examined in considerable detail the 
'death' of the ISDL I have also utilized the 'if' mode 
of investigation; constructing a possible alternative scen­
ario for the ISDL if it had been able to survive until a 
more propitious period. I have endeavoured within the 
requirements of sociologically analyzing historical pheno­
menon to retain a chronological approach to events except
in the case of my study of the IRA. This material is both 
sufficiently extensive in quantity and different in scope 
to require its own separate section. I have also tried 
to facilitate the reader of what is of necessity a very 
long thesis by grouping the chapters into eight parts; each 
introduced by its own overview.
This thesis will hopefully both make a useful, if modest, 
contribution to the sociology of non-electoral participant 
political organizations and encourage other researchers to 
explore the evolution of the Irish community in Britain 
during the last sixty years.
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Part 1 Historical Sociology: Problems and Perspectives
Part 1 commences with a brief essay tracing the evolution 
of historical sociology. Historical sociology while offer­
ing sociologists the valuable opportunities of researching 
types of organisations beyond the reach of contemporary 
investigation also presents a wide range of problems.
These centre around the the problems of sources in general 
and documentary verification in particular. Much of my 
source documentary material was produced by intelligence 
agencies. Few researchers seem however to have given much 
thought to the manner in which intelligence agencies pro-
T
duce their reports. My suggested outline approach to a 
possible sociology of intelligence stems from a professional 
interest in intelligence matters which has perhaps given 
me a heightened appreciation of the methodology of intel­
ligence collection and evaluation. In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
consider the theoretical problems and perspectives of my 
thesis which centre around the concept of ethnicity and 
the sociology of political organizations.
1 For example Susan Bruley; Socialism and Feminism in
the Communist Party of Great Britain 1920-3 9, unpublished 
London School of Economic Ph.D thesis (T980) has made 
very minimal use of the Home Office Intelligence reports 
that I have found invaluable. Bruley strongly argues 
that as these are mostly the product of 1 informers * they 
are very dubious and generally worthless.
1CHAPTER 1
Sociology and History:A Symbiotic Relationship
"The student of Sociology must know a good deal of history". 
This advice by Macrae is even more strongly expressed
in C.W. Mills’ observation: "History is the shank of 
2social study". While Messenger’s a-historical study of
3
an Irish rural community is a classical example of the 
pitfall; awaiting a social scientist who has ignored, 
at his peril, MacRae and Mills’ warning . Early European 
sociology was deeply permeated by the much longer estab-
4
lished historical tradition of research , and indeed most 
of the early sociologists like Weber actually began their
5
research careers as historians ; an evolution that led
some historians, notably Collingwood to suspiciously view
sociology as a serious threat to the survival of historical 
6research itself . This wary and often outright hostile
1 Quoted in P . J . Meghen, Sociological Survey Work in 
Ireland', (Tipperrary, 1973), 3.
2 C.W. Mills, The Sociological. Imagination ,11959):, 143.
3 John Messenger, Inis Beag: Isle of Ireland, (New.York,197 3) 
Is a social anthropological study of the ’decay’ of '
Irish peasant society on Arran Island in contemporary 
Ireland which almost totally ignores the historical 
reality that this society was the product of generations
of mass emigration.
4 For a review of the historical origins of early Euro­
pean sociology see Kenneth E. Bock, 'The Acceptance of 
Histories: Towards a Perspective for 'Social' Science ' , 
(Berkley, 1956).
5 For Weber’s evolution from historian to sociologist see 
Guenther Roth, 'History and Sociology in the work of 
Max Weber’, British Journal of Sociology, 27(1976), 306- 
18,
contd.,
2attitude on the part of historians,• especially in Britain, 
to sociology generated a counter opposition to historical 
research with the unfortunate consequences that British 
sociology1 developed an a-historical research tradition to 
a much greater extent than mainstream continental socio­
logy . A pattern of development followed even more 
rigidly in America where sociologists so resolutely 
ignored even recent historical events.; 'that in their 
scathing review of the content of American sociological 
journals, Gerth and Laundau ' vigorously protested such 
major political developments as the growth of Marxism and 
Nazism,with all their consequences for contemporary
society,hardly featured at all in the deliberations of
2American sociologists . Then in the late 1950-s some of
6 This suspicion clearly permeates R.G. Collingwood,
The Idea of History . For the a-historical devel­
opment of British sociology see Martin Blumer, 
Sociology and History: Some Recent Trends', Socio­
logy / Vol. 8(1974), 138-50, and Philip Abrams, The 
Origins of British Sociology, 1834-1914, (Chicago, 
1968).
1 For a stimulating account of why British sociology 
never produced, a Weber, Pareto, Lukacs, etc., see 
Perry Anderson, ’’Components of the National Culture' , 
New Left Review, (1968), 1-57, and Stefan Collini,
' Sociology and Idealism in Britain, 1880-1920' , 
Archives Europeenes De Sociologie, 21 (1980) , 3-50.
2 In the first fifty years of its existence, the 
American Journal of Sociology published only three 
articles on Marxism - none of them citing Lenin - 
and only two articles on Nazism between 1933-47J
see H. Gerth and S. Laundau:'The Relevance of History 
to the Sociological Ethos' in M. Stein and A. Vidieh 
(edt), Sociology on Trial , (New Jersey, 1963).
the American sociologists, notably Lipset1, conscious 
of the gap between European and American sociological 
traditions and aware of the manner in which European 
sociology had been enriched by historical research, 
began advocating a more historical approach to socio­
logical investigation. The result of this fundamental 
reorientation of sociological research was a flood of 
studies utilizing historical data, initially focussing 
around the contemporary American sociological preoccupation
with industrial socieital development as reflected in
2 3Bendix and Smelser's work’,but in the subsequent decade,
broadening out to encompass multi-societal comparative
sociological investigations as exemplified by Barrington
4 5Moore , and Swanson’s analysis of the Reformation. This
new emphasis on the importance of historical research
for sociologists was institutionally recognized by
American sociologists with the introduction, in 1976, of
1 Seymour Martin Lipset, fA Sociologist Looks at History1, 
Pacific Sociologica1 Review, No. 1 (1958).
2 Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry: 
Ideologies of Management in' the Course o:f Tndustriai- 
zation , (New York, 1956).
3 Neil J. Smelser, Social Change.in. the Industrial 
Revolution;, An Application of Theory to the British. 
Cotton Industry , (Chicago, ±959).
4 Barrington Moore Jnr. Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, (Boston, 1968).
5 Guy E. Swanson,' Religion and Regime: A Sociological 
Account of the Reformation (Ann Arbor, 1967) .
the Sorokin Prize for sociological works with an hist~ 
orical orientation and four years earlier in Britain, 
by the formation of an Historical Section of the British 
Sociological Association.
1
Today as Blumer shows in his review , historical research
is an accepted facet of sociological investigation in
Britain encompassing and transcending the various schools
2of research from Marxists like Anderson to functionalists
2 '■■ v'' 
like Goldthorpe ? While at the same time Biritish
historians like Thompson^ have encouraged the growth of a 
new dialectical relationship between history and socio­
logy taking up Carr's argument that this can only benefit 
both disciplines:
“The more sociological history becomes and the 
more historical sociology becomes, the better 
for both I' 5
In America this new interest by historians in the use
of sociological techniques as exemplified in the work
6of Sylvia Thrupp led to the publication of a journal
1 Blumer op. cit.
2 Perry Anderson, 1 Pas sages from Antiquity to Feudalism 
and Lineages of the Absolutist State, (1974), and 
W.G. Runciman, :lComparative Sociology and Narrative 
History? A Note on the Methodology of Perry 
Anderson’, Archives Europeehes De Sociologie, 21 
(1980) , 162-78.
3 J.H. Goldthorpe, ’The Relevance of History to Sociology’ 
Cambridge Opinion, 28(1962), 26-9.
4 E.P. Thompson, 'On History, Sociology and Historical 
Relevance', British Journal of 'Sociology, 27(1976), 
387-402.
5 E.H. Carr, What is History , (1961), 60.
6 Raymond Grew and Nicholas H. Steneck (eds) ,' '- Society and 
History: Essays by Sylvia Thrupp , (Ann Arbor, 1977)
1
Comparative Studies in gocxety ahd History specifically
to encourage this rapprochement between sociologists
and historians. With even military historians; who for
so long typified the traditional school of historical
2research^now employing sociological techniques there has 
developed a school of thought that questions the continued 
existence of history and sociology as separate disciplines. 
This approach is perhaps best seen in Wallerstein’s argu­
ment "to reify the motives of scholars in doing particular 
research into two disciplines -the first history, the 
second social science -is to give misleading substance
to the accidental and passing and to miss the intellectual
3
unity of the two enterprises" . For some, particularly 
those involved in the production of the History Workshop 
Journal, this question of the future relationship between 
history and sociology has already been decisively resolved 
in favour of a new historyj the construction of an hist­
orical science as advocated by Therborn^ and Stedman Jones 
who dismiss sociology’s ’scientific pretentiousness But
1 Founded in 1958.
2 For a review of this development see, Colin Jones,
'New Military History for Old? War and Society in 
Early Modern Europe’, European Studies Review,
12(1982), 97-108.
3 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy 
(1979) 3.3.
4 Gorun Therborn,' 1 Science, Class and Society; On the 
Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism' , 
(1976).
5 Gareth Stedman Jones, ’From Historical Sociology to 
Theoretical History’, British Journal of Sociology,
(1976), 295-305J also see Richard Johnson, ’Thompson, 
Genovese and Socialist Humanist History’, History 
Workshop 6, (Autumn, 1978).
6this new emphasis on sociological technique ha,s also 
presented historians with their own problems stemming 
from their realization of history’s largely a-theorectical 
orientation1. Unlike sociology, history evolved without
r
any real theorectical analysis;originally it was essentially \ f
L- ,A
the study of 'elites1 - monarchs, political leaders etc , 
often simply using the documentary records of the elites 
themselves and compiled in an almost totally narrative 
manner. In this historical tradition the masses were 
virtually ignored: their historical role seen by histor­
ians of a liberal viewpoint simply in terms of how they
benefited from the civilization process and as a potential
2
threat by the conservatives . Proctological history - 
literally ’history from the bottom up' - is a relatively
recent development if only because the lack of sources or
widespread distribution of available data has deterred 
less committed and often non-professional historians.
■ Thompson's seminal work on the English proletariat
For a review of these problems facing historians 
see Victoria E. Bonnell, ’The Uses of Theory; Concepts 
and Comparison in Historical Sociology', Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 22(1980), 156-73.
Daniel Chirot, 'Thematic Controversies and New Develop­
ments in the Use of Historical Material by Sociologists' 
Social Forces, 55(1976).
Arthur Stinchcombe, Theoretical Models in Social 
History, (New York, 1978) .
Leon J. Goldstein, 'Theory in History’, Philosophy of 
Science, 34(1967), 23-40.
For a concise but extremely readable account of the 
evolution of historical research see Bernard . S. Cohn, 
'History and Anthropology: The State of Play', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1980) ,
198-221.
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working 
Class , (19 78, edt.).
7showed what could be achieved through diligent research
by a determined individual working in an hitherto ignored
field. In France this focus of historical research was
more systematic and took its name, the 'Annales School ’,
from the journal, ’Annales1 Economies ,1 Societies and
Civilizations which first appeared in 1929, as an effort
to fuse not only the various subdisciplines of history;
economic, social and political, but in a manner that
utilized structuralist and functional theory1. This new
2history emphasized ’quantification’ but in a more total 
societal mode of analysis than the parallel development
3
in economics of ’Cliometrics or Econometrics’ and has
4
perhaps reached its peak in the work of Le Roy Ladurie
1 For the evolution of the ’Annales School’ see 
Michael Harsgar, 'Total History: The Annales School'',
Journal of Contemporary History, 13(1978), 1-13.
2 Jean Marczewski, 'Quantative History1', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 3(1968), 179-91, is a useful 
review of this subject.and see also,
Stephen Thernstrom, ’Notes on the Historical Study of 
Social Mobility’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 10(1967/68), 162-72,
Lawrence Stone, ’Social Mobility in England, 1500- 
1700,' Past and Present, 33 (1966), 16-55 j '
and Allan Bogue, tUSA: The New Political History} Journal of 
Contemporary History,3(1968), 5-28.
3 For the development of Cliometrics see John R. Meyer 
and Alfred H. Conrad, 'Economic Theory. Statistical 
Inference and Economic History'-, Journal of Economic 
History, (December, 1957) 524-44
4 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Territory of the 
Historian , (1979) .
who has employed !seria,lism! ^ the collection of a huge 
range of socio-economic statistics - to vividly recreate 
French medieval life1.
Yet this new ’scientific history’ while utilizing socio­
logical techniques.especially its emphasis on empirical 
research,does not represent a fundamental move in the
direction of an eventual unity with mainstream socio- 
2l°gy. r rather it is impressionistic social science/; more 
dependent on anthropology and pyschology than sociology. 
There is still a wide gap between sociology and history 
for despite the similarity of techniques employed by 
both disciplines the analytical focus is still very 
different . When the early historical sociologists were 
still dependent on published works by historians to 
provide them with their raw data /then this difference in 
the methodological approaches of the two disciplines 
tended to be overlooked but this ‘turning a blind eye’
1 See the magnificent reconstruction of the social 
environment in which the Cathar heresy flourished 
in 14th century Southern France; Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie, Montaiiiou, Cathars and Catholics in a 
French Village, 1294-1324, (1980) , and his attempt
to explore the socio-economic lines of social 
conflict in Carnival: A People’s Uprising in 
Romans, 1579-1580, (1980).
2 See Peter Flora, 'Quantitative Historical Sociology,
A Trend Report1', Current Sociology, 23(1975) , 7-242. 
Charles Moraze, ,:The Application of the Social Sciences 
to History'/ Journal of Contemporary History, 3 
(1968), 207-15. David Pitt, Using Historical Sources 
in Anthropology and Sociology^ (New York, 1972) , and 
K. Erikson, 'Sociology and the Historical Perspective' 
in W. Bell and J. Mau (edts.) . The' Sociology of the 
Future, (New York, 19 71).
9stance was not so sustainable when sociologists like
1 2 Tilly and Aminzade began doing their own in-depth
primary source research; often in fields ignored by 
historians. In this new situation it is no longer 
possible; if indeed it ever was, to simply interpret the 
essential methodological difference between history and 
historical sociology as stemming from the historians 
inductive investigation of primary data and the socio­
logists deductive investigation of secondary data. The 
different approaches to a common problem go back to the 
respective professional training of sociologists and 
historians•for whereas sociologists are broadly educated 
to select research problems in terms of their utility for 
evaluating theories and concepts so that they can, ideally, 
turn attention to any sociological investigation. 
Historians,
Mideally aim at becoming familiar with all aspects 
of the culture and period before singling out 
particular matters for investigation. This gives 
one hunches as to the points at which events, 
ideas, structures of relationships are taking 
a genuinely new turn, modifying or breaking with 
regularities and directions set in the past*. 3
And whereas sociologists talk in terms of theory formation
1 Charles Tilly, ' The Vendee , (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1964) is a seminal study of the resistance by the 
peasants of South West France to the 1789 Revolution.
2 Ronald Aminzade, ’The Transformation of Social 
Solidarities in 19th Century Toulouse’, in John 
Merriman (edt.), Class Consciousness and Class 
Experience in 19th Century Europe, (New York, 1979).
3 Sylvia Thrupp, History arid Sociology; New Opportunities 
for Co-operation, in Grew and Steneck, 'op, cit., .
299.
10
through hypothesis testing in a scientific manner so
even Sylvia Thrupp, an historian only too conscious of
the need to rigidly test historical ’propositions’/V
talks of ’hunches’ rather than hypotheses, and speaks of
testing hunches by wide general reading and some checks
of the primary sources of the proceeding period . But
these she admits are "counsels of perfection that in
2practice are often bypassed as too laborious " The use 
of computer techniques has revolutionized the ’quanti­
tative’ or ’serialist’ historian’s ability to evaluate 
3
a mass of data and vastly increase the research possi­
bilities^- but it has simultaneously highlighted some of the 
weaknesses in the largely a-theoretical approach advocated 
by Thrupp.
5
Skocpol and Somers have evaluated the growing American 
historical tendency to analyze comparative history in 
terms of concepts, if not yet full fledged theories,
1 Raymond Grew and Sylvia Thrupp, 'Horizontal History 
in Search of Vertical Dimensions', Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 8(1966), 250-64.
2 Grew and Steneck, ibid.
3 "if the bank is prerequisite for a capitalist economy,
then the data bank is the prerequisite for a socio­
logical history"- Cohn, op. cit.
4 Val R. Lorwin and Jacob M. Price (eds.), 'The 
Dimensions of the Past, Materials, Problems and
Qpportlfti'iti'e's' for Quantative Work in History,
(New Haven, 1972).
5 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, 'The Use of 
Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry'1,
Comparative Studies in Society and His to'rv. 22 (1980) . 
174-97.  ^
but even this has merely involved the formulat-ion of low 
level generalizations applicable to single or a small 
group of phenomena whereas sociologists aim routinely 
at deriving middle level generalizations applicable to 
at least a class of phenomena, if not universally. And 
even if sociologists and historians were employing essen­
tially the same conceptual and theoretical . tools of 
investigation, there would stillj argues Bonnellj1 be 
important differences in the manner of their utilization.
While few historians no longer uncritically follow the
i .^/
Rankian dictum, ’history should be the study of what 
2
actually was” , they are still primarily concerned with
relating the course of historical events even if their
interpretation and analysis utilizes sociological tools
3
of investigation . Early sociological pioneers like
Weber in his -The City* used their historical data to
4
formulate implicit sociological paradigms without loosing
5
their sense of historical continuity. Wittvogel and 
6Wallerstein have continued in this ’grand’' historical
1 Victoria E. Bonnell, I:The Uses of Theory, Concepts 
and Comparisons in Historical Sociology1,, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 122(1980), 156-73.
2 Quoted in Cohn, op. cit.
3 See Ivan Vallier, 'Comparative Methods in Sociology, 
Essays on Trends and Application , (Berkley, 19 71) , 
33-42.
4 Martin E. Spencer, "History and Sociology: An Analysis 
of Weber’s ’The City’, Sociology, 11(1977), 507-25.
5 Karl Wittvogel, Oriental Despotism , (Conneticut, 
1963).
6 Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., and 'A World System 
Perspective on the Social Sciences', British Journal 
of Sociology, 27(1976), 343-52.
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sociological tradition, which it might be argued, dates
even further back to V'-Dhs-- -FUpitai •. . And though located
at a more micro level, Tilly's use of historical data
to refute the Durkheimean analysis of social change1
and Bowen!s very original use of the ’Jesse James and
Younger Brothers’ saga to test the relative deprivation 
o
hypothesis are still essentially in the Weberian 
tradition of historical sociology.
However as C.W. Mills’ reference to the sociological
o
^uses of history” implies there is another school of
historical sociology, as exemplified in the work of 
4Smelser , in which historical events,as its partial title; 
:Sociological History indicatesyare treated as 
’nomothetic’ models. This highly abstract model of 
research has been criticized by historians, notably
1 Charles Tilly,' " The Uselessness of Durkheim in the 
Historical Study of Social Change , University of 
Michigan Working Paper No. 155, (1977).
2 Don R. Bowen, ’Guerrilla War in Western Missouri, 
1862-65: Historical Extensions of the Relative 
Deprivation Hypothesis’/ Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 19(1977), 30-51.
The James and Younger Brothers became outlaws as a 
result of their participation in a Confederate 
irregular unit - Quantrill Raiders and Bowen evaluates 
the socio-economic status of 194 members of this unit 
to test the relative deprivation hypothesis,
3 "Sociological imagination is founded on a sound 
appreciation of the ’uses of history’1 -C.W. Mills, 
op, cit,j143,
4 Neil J. Smelser, ’Sociological History: The Industrial 
Revolution and the British Working Class Family',
Jour rial' of Social History, (1967) , 17-36.
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Anderson1 for its preoccupation with sociological theory 
at the expense of normative historical research. Smelserfs 
approach effectively reduces historical research to the 
role of providing him with what he calls ,fempty theore­
tical boxes*1 , Yet in the sociological sense Smelser1s 
approach to history rests on rather weak theoretical 
foundations, for theory formulation requires repeated 
testing of concepts and hypotheses which in turn necess­
itates the employment of a very wide range of empirical 
data derived from several societies or alternatively 
the isolation of a small group of variables. And as 
Bendix has shown ,such a particular historical situation * 
is so rarely encountered that confronted by a combination 
of too many variables and too few relevant historical 
models, the best a sociologist can usually accomplish
in these circumstances is.the testing of concepts rather
2
than the formation of theory .
My journalistic background has given me an innate predis*- 
position to ’see a story’ as a unified totality with a 
beginning and an end though not necessarily recounted in 
a strictly chronological manner rather than an a-humanistic 
abstract account.related with little feeling for the 
significance of the event; so I freely admit to preferring 
Bendix's sociological "use of history” to Smelser*s,
1 Michael Anderson, 'Sociological History and the 
Working Class Family: Smelser Revisited”, Social 
History, (1970).
2 Reinhard Bendix, ’The Mandate to Rule: An Introduction”, 
Social Forces, 55(1976).
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And even ignoring my own personal preferences for a 
particular type of historical sociology/ my study of 
the political sociology of the Irish in Britain during 
the 1916-1926 period does not frankly lend itself to 
theory formation,for it is too specific and hence 
unfortunately cannot be compared in any scientific 
manner to other similar studies, as those simply do not 
exist in this particular field of research at the 
present time of writing, I will subsequently delineate 
the outlines of the fundamental differences between the socio­
political life of the Irish in Britain and the Irish 
in America, so here I only wish to point to the vastly 
different levels of research undertaken into both 
communities with particular reference to my own research 
period. In the United States one publishing company 
alone, the Arno Press, lists no fewer than forty two 
books covering the entire range of Irish-American life;
from biographies of political leaders^, studies of the
2 3ethnic press , relations with the Catholic Church
1 Marie Veronica Tarpey, The Role of Joseph McGarrltty 
in the Struggle for Irish Independence', (New York,
1976).
Ira B. Cross, Frank Roney, Irish Rebel and California 
Labour Leader, (New York, 19 31) .
2 William Leonard Joyce, Editors and Ethnicity: A 
History of the Irish-American Press:, (New York,
1976).
James Paul Rodechko, •Patrick Ford and His Search for 
Amer ica : A Case S tudy of Irish-American Journalism ’ ,
(New York, 1976). — —
3 Francis Bruce Biever, Religion, Culture and Values.
A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Motivational Factors
in Native Irish and American Irish' Catholicism ,
(New York, 1976).
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to the detailed local studies1 that are such a vital
source of material for compiling an overall account of
an ethnic community at a particular period. And having
compiled several excellent works; synthesising these ‘local.
political studies into an overall historical account
of the impact of the 1916-22 events in Ireland on the
2
Irish Americans ; scholars in the United States are now 
engaged in analyzing the manner in which the different
3
local expressions of Irish nationalism can be related
4
to specific places of origin in Ireland and explained 
in terms of their respective socio-economic appeal to
5
different social classes ,
1 John Patrick Buckley, The' New York Irish: Their View 
of American Foreign Policy,' 1914-21, (New York, 1976) . 
Michael F. Funchion, ’Chicago1 sIrish Nationalists, 
1881-1890, (New York, 1976).
The above titles have been listed simply to show the 
range of this one company^ publications, twenty-one 
of which appeared in one year (1976) alone.
2 Charles C. Tansill,' America and the Fight for Irish 
Freedom, 1866-1922, (New York, 1957).
F.M. Carrol, ' 'American Opinion and the Irish Question, 
1910-1923, (Dublin, 1978).
Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American' Relations, 
1899-1921, (1969).
3 See Thomas N. Brown, 'The Origins and Character of 
Irish-American Nationalism'1, Review of Politics, 
27(1963, 327-58.
Margaret Sullivan, 'The Irish in St. Louis: the Role 
of Nationalism in an Irish-American Community, 1880- 
19221', Papers of the American Committee for' Irish 
Studies, (1976) .
4 Victor A. Walsh, ':A Fanatic Heart: The Cause of Irish- 
American Nationalism in Pittsburgh during the Guilded 
Age' , Journal of Social History, 15(1981), 187-204; 
shcws-how the Fenians gained few recruits from the Irish 
speaking Gaeltacht part of Ireland.
5 Eric Foner, 'Class, Ethnicity and Radicalism in the 
Gilded Age: The Land League and Irish-America 1,
Marxist Perspectives, 1(1978), 6-43, suggests Irish 
American Nationalism was a by-product of working 
class radicalism.
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In comparison the paucity of research on the Irish in 
Britain during the first quarter of the 20th century 
clearly shows the impossibility of attempting anything 
other than the testing of a few concepts relating 
broadly to the integration/assimilation issue and the 
manner in which political organizations function. The 
two very generalized accounts of the Irish in Britain
offer little but a few pointers for this period with
1 2 O ’Connor contributing far less than Jackson . There
is even less specialized material available for this
3
period,for 0 'Day’s comprehensive work on Irish Nationalism
4in Britain stops in 1886 and while Wollaston continues 
his account of the United Irish League into the first 
decade of this century, it is almost totally devoid 
of empirical evidence relating to that organization’s 
socio-economic composition. O ’Connell's study of Irish 
Nationalism in Liverpool between 1873-1923 fails to live
5
up to the promise embodied in its title as the bulk of 
his research relates to the earlier years and he 
completely confuses the relationship between the Irish 
Self Determination League and.the Irish Republican
1 Kevin O'Connor, ' The Irish in Britain, (1972 ) .
2 John Arthur Jackson, The Irish in Britain, (1963).
3 Allan O'Day, The English Face of Irish Nationalism,
(1977).
4 E.P.M. Wollaston, The Irish Nationalist Movement 
in Great Britain, 1886-190 8, unpublished London. 
University MA Thesis, (1958).
5 Bernard O'Connell, 'Irish Nationalism in Liverpool' , 
Eire-Ireland, (1975), 24-37.
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Brotherhood1, Waller’s magnificently detailed work on
the political history of Liverpool is unfortunately
rather uninformative about Irish Republicanism in the
city though the Nationalist movement is comprehensively 
2
covered . And North’s thesis which should; to judge
from its research focus on the Catholic Press in Britain,
have been quite informative on the attitudes of the Irish
in Britain is unfortunately not; because of his decision
3
not to deal with such a controversial subject .
My own study of the Irish Self Determination League 
using a wide range of empirical evidence shows that the 
organization’s rank and file membership was predominantly 
working class but its leadership contained a disproport­
ionately large middle class element. Unfortunately there 
are no other empirical studies of the Irish in Britain,
I can compare my own findings with. Burchell suggests 
that the Irish in San Francisco accomodated to indigenous 
society much quicker there, than in the Eastern Coast
1 “A second militaristic organization was the Irish
Republican Brotherhood. It was the military wing of 
the Self-Determinationist League of Great Britain" 
O'Connell, op. cit., 35- 'The IRB in fact predated 
the Irish Self Determination League (not Self 
Determinationist League) by over half a century and 
played a prominent part in the formation of the league.
2 P.J. Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism - A Political 
and Social History of Liverpool, (1868-1939) ,
(Liverpool, 1981) .
3 M. North, Catholic Opinion on Selected Social Problems 
for 1900-33: As Expressed in the Catholic Press,
(London University, MA Thesis, 1951 ).
He says of post 1916 Ireland - "The confusion of 
motives and the lack of evidence other than hearsay 
and personal opinion makes the study of this Irish 
interlude interesting and at the same time unprofit­
able to study".
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cities owing to rapid urbanization outstripping the pace 
of ghetto building1. My own study shows that the United 
Irish League survived much longer in Liverpool ,the centre 
of the first major Irish settlement in Britain,than in 
London, where the immigrants were of a more recent vintage 
and that its replacement the Irish Democratic League 
failed totally to establish itself in London while 
managing to make a localized impact on the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Irish communities. But once again, unlike 
Burchell, there are no local studies to provide me with 
the essential comparative data to test this observation,
I will conclude this chapter by again observing that socio­
logists can only benefit from a closer relationship with 
historians: both disciplines can contribute much to each 
other. My own thesis would certainly not have been possible 
without the employment of a very wide range of historical 
data. But the availability of source material, the manner 
in which it was originally compiled and the contemporary 
problems encountered in analyzing and interpreting such a 
variety of source material posed many methodological prob­
lems, which I will now examine in chapter two.
1 R.A, Burchell, ' The San Francisco Irish, 1848-1880, 
(Manchester, 1979),
CHAPTER 2
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Methodological Problems in' F i n d i n g  source's f°r the 
Political Sociology of the Irish In Britain/ 1916-1926
Interpreting historical events is a process beset by many 
problems1 not least when the investigator is compelled, 
as I was, to spend a large proportion of research project 
time in discovering Primary source material owing to the 
virtual absence of secondary works of analysis relating 
to the central focus of my research; namely the Irish 
Self Determination League, Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican 
Army and the Irish Republican Brotherhood !in Britain.
I have probably used Primary source material to a far 
greater extent than most other sociologists working in 
Britain or Ireland and have certainly used a far greater 
range of this type of material than is customary in 
historical sociology. By Primary sources I mean British 
Government records and in particular the Intelligence 
records of the Home and War Offices, Irish Government 
records, especially the Dail Eireann departmental papers 
and Free State Army Intelligence records, Irish Republican 
Army records are listed as government records or organ­
izational records dependent on whether they are pre or 
post-Treaty. Other organizational records I have used 
in my research relate to the Irish Self Determination 
League, Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 
though strictly speaking these are usually located in the
1 For a review of these problem see Paul Rock, 'Some 
Problems of Interpretation Historiography’, British 
Journal of Sociology, 27(1976) , 353-69.
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private papers of people who played a prominent role in 
these organizations. Memoirs and autobiographies have 
provided useful background material to flesh out the 
material already listed and I have been fortunate enough 
to interview a few survivors who played an active organ­
izational role during the period of my research interest. 
And last, but not least, newspapers,both general and 
specialized (ie.) political organizational publications, 
have proved to be very informative. Some of these 
sources by their very nature have presented particular 
problems which I will now examine.
Lloyd George with his typical forthrightness once
declared; "I am not writing history as an historian but
as a solicitor in possession of the documents^ and his
political successors aided by civil servants,unwilling
to expose their power in the political decision making
process,have sought to ensure that many of the most
revealing documents do not get into the possession of
historians who might use them to challenge the sanitized
memoirs of the 'solicitors’. Sir James Craig is not
the only politician who hoped his negotiations on a
2sensitive issue would never be published . British
Government records are rigidly protected by a very
1 Quoted in Donald McCormick, The Mask of Merlin - 
A Critical Study of Lloyd George , (1963), 153.
2 See his comments on the Irish Boundary negotiations, 
Cabinet 57 (25) , 3/12/1925, CAB 23/51, (Public Records 
Office). . . .
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1
stringent Official Secrets Act f until the Lord Chancellor,
as the relevant authority under the Public Record Acts
of 1958 and 1967, decides to release them for consultation
2in the Public Records Office . He often exercises this 
power in a highly authoritarian manner; that permits 
virtually no effective appeal, as the ’30 year release 
procedure1 implicitly recognizes his powers under Section 
5(1) of the 1958 Act to withold, without giving any 
reason, any record or paper. Cabinet Minutes paradoxically 
often the least useful section of the Cabinet Papers, 
have been released in their entirety under the 30 year 
rule but a comparison of the sketchy nature of the 1919- 
23 Cabinet Minutes; often no more than a bare outline 
of decisions taken with no indication of why or whether 
they were the subject of an acrimonious discussion or 
approved unanimously, with the accounts of Cabinet
3
Meetings given by Thomas Jones , the Cabinet Secretary ., and
4Francis Stevenson , Lloyd George's mistress and confidante,
1 "all Government bureaucracies are doomed by an iron 
law of history to attach a grossly inflated importance 
to the secrecy of their past as well as present 
business - as witness the disreputable history of
the Official Secrets Act, whose reform is repeatedly 
promised and repeatedly postponed" - Christopher Andrews 
'Official Secrecy', Tnternational Affairs, (July,
1.977) . ;
For the legal side of the Official Secrets Act see 
William Birtles, 'Big Brother Knows Best: The Franks 
Report on Section Two of the Official Secrets Act,*
Public Law, (1973), 100-22 and Donald Thompson,
'The Committee of One Hundred and the Official Secrets 
Act 1911r , Public Law, (1963) , 201-26. And for an 
account of one who fell foul of the Act see Jonathan 
Aiken, 'Officially ,S.acr.e.t^ , (1971) .
2 D.C. Watt, 'Contemporary History: Problems and 
Perspectives'1 , Journal of the Society of Archivists,
3 (1969) , 516.
3 Keith Middlemas (edt.), ' Thomas' Jones Whitehall Diary ,
(1971), Vol. 3.
4 A.J.P. Taylor, Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: A
contd.,
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reveal just how much the official minutes fail to record.
And as Crossman has shown the problem is not just donfined
1
to what the Cabinet Minutes do not record but just as
importantly centres on the manner in which the Minutes
are written to facilitate a particular Cabinet Secretarial 
2
interpretation . Post 1922 Irish Cabinet Minutes are
*
.patterned on the British example but are if anything even
.  . V3
less revealing . Memorandums and Papers presented to 
the British Cabinet as information and discussion documents 
are usually a much more interesting means of■assessing 
the importance of an issue than the actual Cabinet 
Minutes but some of these, especially those relating to 
intelligence matters.have not been released. Departmental 
papers, often the most useful of all government sources, 
are even more likely to fall victim to the official 
censor. While one can perhaps appreciate the reasons 
behind the official decision to withold all files referring
to the ultra sensitive Philby, Burgess and MacLean
4 5affair or the ’Albanian sabotage debacle of 1951’ ,
it is rather more difficult to comprehend why the 1882
Irish-Welsh riots in Tredegar or the 1884 Cleaton Moor
Diary , (19 71)
1 R.H.S. Crossman, The Diaries of a' Cabinet Minister ,
Vol. 2 (1976) , 695.
r he
2 reveals how the Chancellor’s speech "was so terrifying 
that it was not revealed in Cabinet Minutes". Ibid,
Vol. 1 (1975), 103.
3 There is no procedure in Ireland for the regular release 
of Cabinet Minutes and those available for the 1920 s 
and 30‘s were simply given to the State Paper Office on 
the personal authority of the Taoiseach in 1976.
4 See the Observer,3 Jan.1981 .
5 Times,28 July 1981 .
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Catholic Protestant riots are still considered such 
sensitive matters as to require their inclusion in the 
Home Office HO 144 Class which is closed to researchers 
for a hundred years.
The Home Office does occasionally permit vetted rese­
archers access to their closed class files as Short 
explains in his study of the 1880's Fenian Bombing Campaign 
in Britain, which also benefited considerably from his 
equally privileged access to the 'closed MEP03' 
Metropolitan Police files . But the process of gaining
2permission is long and by no means an automatic procedure . 
I decided for several reasons not to approach the Home 
Office and Scotland Yard for access to their closed 
files on Irish politics in Britain; firstly because as 
my research period was focussed on events, considered 
still to be comparatively recent and hence probably 
subject to a greater reluctance to grant access. Secondly 
I believed that my own political background in Irish 
politics and in particular my successful legal action in 
19 71 for damages against the British Government, Army 
and RUC was likely to produce an unfavourable decision. 
Lastly but not without importance, a successful applicant 
is required to sign the Official Secrets Act and is
1 K.R.M. Short, ' The Dynamite- War:' Irish-Americart Bombers 
in Victorian Britain , (Dublin, 1979).
2 See Peter and Leni Gillman,’ Collar The Lot, How Britain 
Interned and Expelled its Wartime Refugees,(1980), XII, 
for an account of the problems they encountered in 
obtaining permission to see only a portion of the 
files they originally requested.
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obliged to submit in advance of publication any research 
utilizing these ’closed’ files. As a journalist special­
izing in the often sensitive defence/intelligence field,
I prefer not to sign the all encompassing Official 
Secrets Act. Such problems with departmental records are 
not encountered in the Irish Republic for the simple 
reason that no post 1922 departmental records have ever 
been released for public inspection. This climate of 
total secrecy has led to approaches from senior Irish 
civil servants to their British counterparts in an effort 
to ensure that no documents containing references to 
previous inter civil service discussions should be 
released1. These appeals seem to have met with considerable 
success^.
Scotland due to its own legal system is not covered by 
the 1958 and 1967 Public Record Acts and here the Scottish 
Office maxim seems to be; if a file in anyway refers to 
a ’Law and Order’ issue, close it; with the result that all 
the Irish records of any interest for my research period 
are closed files. An even more rigid system applies in 
the Northern Ireland Public Records Office where I was
1 For accounts of these negotiations see the Sunday 
Press, 7 Jan, 1979 and 22 July, 1979.
2 While studying the Anti-Partition issue I found that at 
least 14 Foreign Office 'W' Class files on Anglo-Irish 
relations had not been included in the ’1949’ releases, 
and according to Frederick Boland, the Secretary in 
1949 of the Department of External Affairs, his impres­
sion of reading the released papers was thatMan effort 
had been made not to embarrass me or other Irish 
officials involved1' Irish Times, 23 Aug, 1979.
permitted to consult the Reports made by Richa,rd Dawson1, 
the Irish Unionist Agent in London ,on the growth of the 
Irish Self Determination League in Britain: because his 
papers are a ’private collection’, but was denied access 
to the PM 7/1/2 papers which are their official equivalent. 
Indeed the situation at the Northern Ireland Public 
Records Office is even worse than that prevailing in 
Edinburgh for there have been claims, backed by consider­
able evidence, that many files originally opened have 
2now been closed and that other ’closed1 files have been
opened to researchers sympathetic to the Government while
firmly denied to reputable researchers who have opposed
3
Government policy . Evidently the Belfast staff believe
in the Phillips tradition^of research. Dublin Governments
have avoided the unpalatable prospects of future
researchers ploughing through their records by leaving
few hostages to history. It seems' from discussions
with sympathetic officials in the State Paper Office in 
5Dublin Castle that it has been customary for Governments 
to engage in wholesale file destruction after losing
1 D 9895/16 (PRONI).
2 According to Michael Farrell, several hundred files 
dealing with the early history of Northern Ireland state 
and opened to access in 1976 have now been closed,
Irish Times, 22 Aug, 1979.
3 See the Guardian, 6 Nov, 19 79. Hibernia, 15 Nov. 1979,(by
a former Stormont Minister) .. and also see Paddy '
Devlin’s review of Patrick Buckland, The Factory of 
Grievances‘, in^which he makes this claim in Hibernia,
24 Oct, 1979.
4 Alison Phillips, The Revolution in Ireland, 1906- 
1923 , (1924) a-unionist'historian was allowed free access 
by the British to Dublin Castle records before many of 
them were destroyed on the handover of power.
5 The Dublin State Paper Office may have the least number 
of files available for research but their staff is 
certainly the friendliest and most helpful of all the 
Records Office staff I have encountered.
26
elections . Yet paradoxically many Irish departmental 
files have not only survived but are now open to resear­
chers as the result of the foresight of former Irish 
Government Ministers who removed files from their depart­
ments and subsequently deposited them in university 
archives. This practice of withdrawing files from
official depositories is not of course unique to Ireland -
2
it occurred in Britain also. Whatever the ethics of such
practices I must admit to being extremely grateful for
the opportunity to consult the papers of General Richard
Mulcahy, the IRA leader and Free State Army Commander
in Chief and those of Hugh Kennedy,the first Attorney
General of the Irish Free State, in the University
College Dublin Archives. Much of Michael Collins'
communications with IRA units in Britain has probably
only survived because it was "borrowed1 by earlier
3authors and held by them for a long period , Other
1 -As one'.Dublin official told m©y "sure didnTt that crowd 
burn all their papers". Colonel Nelligan,the head of 
Dublin Special Detective Unit,(Irish equivalent of the 
Special Branch) admitted destroying 18,000 police 
files in 19 32 before he was forced to retire by the 
new Fianna Fail administration; see J. Bowyer Bell,
The Secret Army, The TRA, 1916-1979, (Dublin, 1979), 
452.
2 See A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-19 45 ,
(1981), 130, for an account of how the Cabinet Office
• staff made retaliatory raids on the private papers of 
Lloyd George and Lansbury.
K.R.M. Short, op. cit. has made extensive use of Sir 
William Harcourt's private papers which are really his 
Home Office files.
3 The Pall Eireann Class 2/530 file dealing with the arms 
supply network in Britain contains a note that "these 
files were out of Government hands for 30 odd years 
and may have been used by Frank O'Connor for a book
on Michael Collins".
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Collin^ papers passed into the possession of Mulcahy1 
as did Ernie O ’Malley’s important correspondence, with 
the British IRA units during the Civil War; following 
his capture and after Fianna Fail took office O ’Malley 
was permitted to 'borrow1' Free State Army records . inclu­
ding intelligence reports on the Irish in Britain,which 
are now preserved in the University College Dublin 
Archives.
>
Much of my thesis uses these various intelligence sources,
to a considerably greater extent than any other hist-
2orical sociological work I have read. Elkins has shown
how the use of British and American Intelligence reports
substantially changes our understanding of the evolution
of nationalist movements in the Caribbean. While in
3the last few years, a veritable Kuhnian revolution has 
transformed the historical interpretation and analysis of 
the Second World War as a result of the ever growing 
revelation relating to the Allies success in reading
I-.':..-The 'Collins Papersr.in this collection are catalogued 
as P7/A (UCD) to distinguish them from Mulcahy’s 
own papers which are P7/B (UCD).
2 W.F. Elkins, ’A Source of Black Nationalism in the 
Caribbean: The Revolt of the British West Indies 
Regiment at Taranto Italy', Science and Society, 
34(1970), 99-103, and Marcus Garvey, ’The Negro 
World and the British West Indies, 1919-20', Science 
and Society, 36(1972), 63-77.
3 T.S. Kuhn, ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , 
(Chicago, 1962):.
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the German Enigma,1 and Japanese ’Magic’ signals traffic1.
Yet even in the historical field there are still very
few British academics studying intelligence material
and the agencies which produced them, as research subjects
2
in their own right . Sociologists have found the study
of organizations and their associated bureaucracies a
very rewarding research field save apparently in one
particular sector, ’the Sociology of Intelligence’. This
simply does not exist as a research topic in British
Sociology (I could not find a single reference to this
issue in the British Journal of Sociology) and even in
the United States there have been very few exploratory
3
studies in this field, since Shils first investigated the
 \ .
1 F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra' Secret, (1974) was the 
first public revelation in Britain of the penetration 
of the German Enigma signals cypher system by someone 
personally involved in the operation. It was followed 
by several accounts by others also involved in the 
operations; see Edwin Montagu, Beyond Top Secret,
(1977) and F. Garlinski, Intercept The Enigma War,
(1981). Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War - The Secret 
Story, (1978) is the first work to use the actual 
Ultra signals released in 1977 to the Public Records 
Office. Lewin has recently published a similar 
study using American intercepts of the Japanese 
'Magic1 cypher, Ronald Lewin, The Other Ultra, (19 82).
2 See Anthony Rolands, Studies in British Naval Intell­
igence 1880-1945 - unpublished Kings College PhD
(1972) thesis.
Dr Christopher Andrews is doing some very interesting 
research at Cambridge into the evolution of British 
Intelligence judging from his recent series of BBC 
radio programmes and will hopefully later publish his 
work.
M.E. Occleshaw is also at present doing postgraduate 
research on British Military Intelligence in the First 
World War at Keele.
3 Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, (New York, 
1956).
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operation of intelligence agencies over thirty^five years.
Coser1 has briefly examinee! the counterproductive nature
of the intelligence community’s preoccupation with secrecy
and Lowry has made a very thought-provoking, if rather
brief, contribution ’Toward a Sociology of Secrecy and
2
Security Systems’ . It is possible that this lack of 
sociological interest in the activities of intelligence 
agencies is a product of the alienation between the two 
professions stemming from the academics unfortunate
3experience with the United States Army’s Project Camelot .
Yet intelligence reports, evaluations and assessments 
play a major role in the formation of most government’s 
foreign and defence policies while in some countries 
surveillance of opponents is an important component of 
internal or domestic politics. Intelligence collection 
and evaluation is the organizational activity, par 
excellency as the CIA's own definition of its functions
1 Lewis Coser, 'The Dysfunctions of Military Secrecy', 
Social Problems, VII(1963), 13-22.
2 Ritchie P. Lowry, 'Toward a Sociology of Secrecy and 
Security Systems' , Social Probi-ems-, 19(1971), 4 37- 
450.
3 Project Camelot was an attempt by the United States 
Army's Special Operations Research Office (SORO)
to utilize; without their knowledge the research of 
social scientists interested in South American society, 
for the purpose of devising counter insurgency 
programmes,, see Irving Horowitz (ed.), 'The Rise and 
Pall of Project Camelot; Studies in the Relationship 
between the Social Sciences' and Practical Politics, 
(Cambridge, Mass.,1967)';
Gideon Sjoberg, Ethics, Politics and Social Research, 
(Cambridge, Mass., (1967), preface.
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clearly reveals,
’’Intelligence has less- to do with cloaks and daggers 
than with the painstaking, generally tedious 
collection of facts, analysis of facts, exercise 
of judgement and quick, clear evaluation” .1
Organizational sociology ^ could benefit greatly from a
2study of intelligence agencies and their methodology . 
Sociologists interested in 'interorganizational fields’ 
could with profit investigate the multiplicity of intell­
igence agencies, examining why in most of the democracies 
there exists an organizational separation of the foreign 
and internal intelligence functions; so that in Britain 
there are separate Secret Intelligence and Security 
Services, the Bunaes /nachrichtendienst and Bundesamt fur 
Verfussungsschutz in West Germany, the Service de 
Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionage and the 
Direction de la Surveillance Territoire in France,
Mossad and the Sherutei Habehon (Shin Beth) in Israel.
This separation of functions is usually attributed to 
the democracies desire to prevent the emergence of an 
all powerful single service that might fail to distinguish 
between the different operational methodological require­
ments of foreign intelligence and internal security. And 
this is supposedly'further safeguarded by the existence of
1 CIA Recruiting Brochure: In t e H i  genc e , the Acme of 
Skill, (Washington, 1982).
2 Carl Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and 
Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 
1888-1940, (Stockholm, 1973) is a masterly analysis
of the different organizational, political, and 
economic constraints that influenced German Naval 
planning and offers a treasury of insights for 
organizational sociologists.
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separate civilian and military agencies in the foreign 
intelligence sector,yet both the Central Intelligence 
Agency and American Naval Intelligence have been discovered 
operating internally in the United States in recent years 
contrary to their organizational charters. In fact 
the existence of separate civilian and military intell­
igence agencies is almost universalfas shown by the 
existence in the Soviet Union of the Komit GosUdarstvennoy 
Bezopasnost, (civilian) and Glavnoye RazvedyvatelnOye 
(military) intelligence agencies, a division paralleled 
throughout most of the communist world.
Some of this’ multicipiicity of intelligence agencies
is the product of the increasingly specialized nature
of intelligence collection, the growth of signals
monitoring (Sigint), electronics surveillance (Elint),
aerial and space photography (Photo-int) requiring the
establishment of new technical agencies like the Government
Communications Headquarters in Britain and its American
equivalent, the National Security Agency. Yet many of
the agencies duplicate the work of others, and many seem
to have been simply created as the result of organizational
’empire building’, a tendency particularly strong during
periods of conflict, as in Northern Ireland where I
counted no fewer than fourteen separate intelligence
agencies financed by the British Government when researching
an article'1'. One inevitable result of this multiplicity
1 Michael Maguire, 'The Many Headed British Intelligence 
Operation in Ireland’, Camerawork, No. 23 (1981) and 
also see my contribution to Roger Faligot, Les Services 
Speciaux De Sa Majeste, (Paris, 1982), 307.
of intelligence organizations, according to one former 
CIA officer^ is that much of their activities are highly 
wasteful, merely duplicating work done elsewhere and 
another is inter-organizational conflict. Competition 
leading to conflict between intelligence organizations 
in the same country seems to be an inevitable consequence 
of such multiplicity of agencies as shown in studies 
of the tense relationships between the German Abwehr 
and Sicherheitsdienst and the British Secret Intelligence 
Service and the Special Operations Executive. Organ­
izational sociology could profitably benefit from merely ■ 
reviewing the published literature concerning the various 
intelligence agencies.
Examining the methodology of intelligence work could 
also prove fruitful to sociologists. Intelligence 
agencies produce a product, 'information1, used by those 
who pay for their large ,very expensive,establishments.
Yet while intelligence is crucial in warfare^and indeed 
many military reversals can be traced to poor intelligence 
as in the case of the 1916 Rising, when the senior British 
army intelligence officer reported only a few days before
1 Harry Rositzke,' The CIA1 s Secret Operation5; Espionage 
Counterespionage and Covert Action, (New York, 1977) .
2 L.L. Russell is at present researching1 Intelligence 
Failures and Surprise in War', at Reading University.
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the fighting commenced,
’‘The general state of. Ireland, apurt from recrui- 
ting and apart from the activities of the pro- 
German Sinn Fein minority is thoroughly, satis­
factory1 .
\
or a failure to act on the pas is of intelligence reports,
as when the American First Army ignored information
relating to a German build up in the Ardennes (Battle of
the Bulge). There is often a reluctance to- accept the
advice of intelligence officers,which sometimes speaks
volumes about the 'relevant organizations, their structures
and the status of the personnel. Thus the American
Secretary of State Stimson’s oft quoted declaration that
nGentlemen do not read each other's mail1’ reveals much
about the ethical code of the US Foreign Service and
State Department which was still in 1944 insisting on
stamping ’OSS’ on the passports of OSS officers sent to 
2
Stockholm . While; much of the field intelligence collected 
in France during 1917 was wasted, owing to Brigadier
3
General Charteris dislike of giving ’bad news’ to Haig . 
Sometimes personal antagonism between influential people 
results in intelligence sources not being properly 
exploited as in the case of Admirals Jackson and Hall 
during the First World War, Admiral Jackson,,the Royal
1 Quoted in D. Williams (edt.), The Irish Struggle 
1916-26, (1966),3.
2 Joseph Persico, Piercing the Reich , (1980) , 397.
3 According to one of Charteris subordinates, his 
superior's reluctance to worry Haig cost the British 
6,000 soldiers at Cambrai,* see' Guardian, 3 Oct, 1980.
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Navy Director of Operations., so disliked Admiral Hall, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, his response to the German 
use of a new cypher that Hall’s officers were unable to 
break was,
»'Thank God, I won’t have any more reports to read?
He also refused to transmit to the Fleet vital information 
that could well have affected the outcome of Jutland1. 
These incidents reveal how a fatal combination of personal 
factors and the rigid hierarchical organization of infor­
mation processing resulted in a failure to utilize the 
intelligence evaluated by subordinates.
2In this respect, Freeman and Hannan’s work on the commun­
ication process within organizations is particularly 
relevant to the 'sociology of intelligence' for they have 
shown that it is not a 'neutral process’ but one highly 
influenced by the hierarchical structure of the organi­
zation, with an inbuilt tendency to over condense raw 
information at the expense of important details and even 
a propensity for subordinates to modify their report to 
please superiors. Intelligence reports which fail to 
alter the preconceived views of political leaders; 
though they are often specifically tailored to fit in
1 Quoted by Christopher Andrews in his radio broadcast
The Profession of Intelligence on the BBC World 
Service, 5 Aug. 1982. 12:00 hrs.
2 John Freeman and Michael T, Hannan, ''Growth and Decline 
Processes in Organizations' American Sociology Review,
40(1975), 215-28.
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1
with the received opinion , are simply ignored.as happened
2
repeatedly to CIA reports on the Vietnam War , if 
Churchill was prepared to sack Admiral Godfrey, his 
Director of Naval Intelligence, for refusing to inflate
3
his estimate of U boats sunk for propaganda purposes ,
then no doubt many junior intelligence officers concluded
they should only produce the intelligence their political
masters desired. Hence if some of the Home Office Special
Intelligence Directorate Reports, I have used in my thesis
seem overconcerned about the extent of left wing activity
in Britain, it is because their author, Sir Basil Thomson
had learnt to provide 'intelligence1 tailored to his
political masters' views. Thomson records in his memoirs
how he displeased the Cabinet with one of his early reports
on Pacifism during the First World War,
"I handed in my report on the activities of the
pacifist revolutionaries1 societies to the War 
Cabinet, who were not disposed to take doses of
1 See Harry Howe Ransom, ;lBeing Intelligent About Secret 
Intelligence Agencies'1 , American Political Science 
Review, 74(1980), 141-48.
2 Whatever the Vietnam war was, it certainly was not a 
US Intelligence defeat as American Intelligence warned
as early as 1948 that the Vietnamese Liberation Front
was a popular and indigenous anti-colonial expression 
and repeatedly predicted that neither the French nor 
the subsequent Saigon regime could defeat it.
Daniel Ellsberg, The Pentagon Papers, (New York, 1977), 
and David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest,
(New York, 1972). For useful, wider ranging accounts 
of 'intelligence failures'1 see Harold Wilensky, 
Organizational ’Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in 
Government and Indus try, (New Yoik', 1967) and Anatol 
Rapaport ., 'Chicken a la Kahn'1, The Virginia Quarterly 
Review, 41(1965), 370-89.
3 See Patrick Beesly, Very Special Admiral, (1980) .
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soothing syrup in these mutters. Being persuaded 
that German money is supporting these societies, 
they want to be assured that the police are doing 
something. I feel certain there is no German 
money, their expenditure, being covered by the 
subscriptions they receive from cranks^.
Intelligence agencies in general exhibit a pronounced
tendency to both please their political masters and to
hedge their bets by playing safe with reports that often
fail to reach a definite conclusion. In this respect
their work is closely related to the supposedly more
2
academic 'Think Tanks1' ^ho as Smith has shown, invariably 
fail to submit the definitive final report,either out of 
fear that they will work themselves out of the research 
projector alienate the consumer. Gross'.: observations
concerning many organizations fascination with 'number 
magic' is particularly relevant to the methodology of 
the intelligence community. They are largely preoccupied 
with quantification, so much of their resources are 
devoted to the collection of intelligence. But intelligence 
collection is only part of the task of the intelligence 
officer; raw information has to be collated and then 
assessed for its accuracy and usefulness. The 'number 
magic' fetish can be clearly seen at work in the Sigint 
and Elint operations of the British GCHQ and the American 
NASA which have accumulated vast numbers of taped 
communications intercepts which,given the present state 
of the art of deciphering,are never likely to be evaluated.
1 Basil Thomson,' The Scene Changes, (1939)’, 359.
2 Bruce L.R. Smith, The Rand Corporation; Case Study of
a Non Profit Advisory Corporation, (Cambridge, Mass,1966).
3 Bertram Gross,' Organization's and Their Managing,
(New York, 1968), 293.
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This particular problem of course did not affect the 
intelligence community during the period I have been able 
to consult their intelligence files. The emphasis then 
was almost totally on 'humint', (human intelligence), 
with agencies largely dependent on their direct staff 
employees and their informers for the necessary raw 
intelligence but the same type of evaluation problem 
was still present particularly as Thomson frequently 
illustrated his Cabinet Reports with quotes from his 
informers.
Informers or ’touts’,as a result of their historical
role in exposing successive Irish revolutionary movements /
occupy a particularly low position in any Irish popular
ranking of socially prestigious occupations. Yet as a
Dublin magistrate once said:
"I have repeatedly heard it asserted that all 
informers should be shot. I can truly and 
deliberately declare it to be my own firm conviction 
that if all ;the informers of 1848 were so disposed 
of Dublin would have been decimated. There were 
in one great commercial establishment, forty 
confederates of whom ten were in communication 
with the police"1.
Informers have played major roles in many other countries ,
notably in Tsarist Russia were Malinovski, the leader of
the Bolsheviks in the Duma,and Azef,the director of the
Social Revolutionaries terror programme,were Okhrana
informers as was Father Gabon ,the agent provacateur who
led his workers organization into the bloody 1905
Petrograd massacre, Thomson's reports reveal that he had
1 F.T. Porter,' Twenty Years Recollections of an Irish 
Police Magistrate, (Dublin, 1880), 182.
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informants at the highest level of the Communist and 
Labour Parties hierarchies. Yet despite the key role 
played by informers and agent provocateurs, the subject 
seems to have been almost totally ignored by social 
scientists. I have been able to trace very few works 
dealing specifically with this issue; Gary Marx has
written a pioneering sociological study of informers and
1 2 3agent provocateurs while Zuckermann, Dedlger, and
4
Chandler have contributed useful historical studies in 
this field. Many informers contribute their information 
purely for monetary gain but others inform for much more 
complex and varied reasons. Some inform simply to revenge 
themselves on an organization they believe has failed to 
sufficiently recognize their own contribution. Organize 
ational leaders have been known to inform on rival organ­
izations or on potential threats within their own organ­
ization to their continued leadership. In short while 
informers are influenced by many motivations the under­
lying reason is of a nature that must inevitably seriously 
question the reliability of their information.
1 Gary T. Marx, ^Informers and Agent Provocateurs1', 
American Journal of Sociology, 80(1974), 402-42.
2 Fedric S. Zuckerman, 'Vladimir Burtsev and the Tsarist 
Political Police in Conflict, 1907-14', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 12(1977), 193-219.
Burtsev developed his own revolutionary (but non-party) 
counter intelligence organization to combat Okhrana 
agents.
3 Vladimir Dediger, A Guide to InfiItratOrs , Spokesman
4 F.W. Chandler, Political Spies and Provocative' Agents, 
(Sheffield, l93TjTi
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The same caution must a,lscr apply to intelligence collected
by the professionals or direct agency employees. Frolik1
is surely not the only senior intelligence officer to
discover that his underlings were enrolling ’ghost’
agents and submitting fictionalized reports to boost
2
their income. Falsehood is integral to the intelligence
community, agencies submit false reports to justify
3
unauthorized,or conceal, covert activities , their 
employees ’manufacture’1 ghost agents and reports to 
increase their salaries and inflate their perceived 
organizational value, while their informers sell false 
information, when they can discover nothing of interest. 
Spreading ’disinformation’ and ’black propaganda’ is 
often as important an activity as collecting and evaluating 
intelligence. Heydrich’s small team of forgers feeding 
Stalin’s paranoia, did more damage to the Soviet military 
than an Panzer army when they manufactured documents 
purporting to reveal negotiations between Marshal
1 See Josef Frolik, The Froiik Defection: The Memoirs 
of an Intelligence Agent, (1976) , 104-5.
Frolik,a Czech STB officer, served in London for 
several years.
2 Other British Government records were deliberately 
falsified during the 1931 Navy Mutinies; see Alan 
Greira, The Invergordon Mutiny, (1981).
Robert N. Kharasch, The' institutional Imperative:
How to Understand the United States' Government and 
Other Bulky Objects, (New York, 19 73) shows how non- 
intelligence government agencies ’invent' reports in 
order to avoid penalization for non-submission. •
3 Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, (New York, 
1976) . Smith a former CIA officer reveals many details 
of the deliberate production of false intelligence
to justify covert operations.
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Tukachevsky and the Nazis which sparked off the ’Great 
Purge1. A black propaganda operation seems to have been 
behind one of Thomson’s reports to the Cabinet on leaflets 
distributed outside Catholic churches, in which Charles 
Diamond the editor of the' Catholic' Herald is alleged 
to have said,
’’Bolshevik Russia today is the hope of the 
suppressed peoples of the world. It has risen 
like a star in the East to inspire and guide all 
those who fight for freedom1’1.
2Diamond indignantly denied he had ever written this 
and it certainly would seem to be the strange product of a 
pen, repeatedly wielded to attack left wing influence 
in the Labour Party,for whom Diamond stood for Parliament
as a ’non socialist’ candidate. But Diamond,as we will
subsequently observe,had frequently annoyed the Irish,
India and War Offices by his articles attacking colonialism.
If this leaflet was a fictional work by a section of 
British Intelligence then it was not the first time they 
had made use of fiction for their own purposes.' Indeed 
it could well be argued that the British Security Service 
really owes much of its early evolution to a fictional 
work. In 1906 the Military Operations Counter Intelligence 
Section, MO 5 - from which the present day Security 
Service (DI 5)-traces its lineal descent, scarcely existed 
as a meaningful intelligence organization: with a staff of
1 ROR 93. 17 Feb, 1921, CP 2620. CAB 24/120,
2 Catholic Herald, 22 Feb. 1921 .
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three working on an expense budget of £1,200 a, year'1' it 
could hardly be said to have posed much of a deterrent to 
the internal foes of the British state. While a recog­
nizable Military Intelligence Branch had existed in the
2
British Army since the 1880 s , MO 5 appears to have owed 
its origins to the 1903 Hardwieke Report on the Reorgarii-
3
zation of Military Intelligence . The fortunes of MO 5 
were substantially boosted by the appearance of a novel,
The Invasion of 1910 dealing with a future German 
conquest of Britain, considerably facilitated by a large 
espionage network. Le Queux wrote his novel with the aid 
and active encouragement of Field Marshal Roberts who 
was looking for a way to mobilize public opinion in favour
4
of a very much expanded army , But it was the Intelligence
1 See David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915r ,
Historica1 Journa1, 21 (1978), 355-70.
2 See Jock Hasswell, British Military' Intelligence,
(1975).
3 See W032/6922; The Hardwicke Report seems to have been 
motivated more by a desire to save money than to create 
an efficient Intelligence system. For example, having 
decided the defence problems facing the British Empire 
were extremely complex, it simply recommended a 
cessation of further strategical planning.. An 
establishment of three officers was considered sufficient
to monitor, Germany, Holland, most of Western Europe and the 
United States, while the librarian was given charge 
of’the cypher1.
4 It is not impossible that Le Queux1 s’ research1 for his 
novel, may have been aided by a recent (1907-8) War 
Office study of a ’hypothetical German invasion of 
the United Kingdom’, see WO 106/47B,* certainly Field 
Marshal Roberts would have had access to this file.
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service that really benefited from Le Queux1s fiction
which reached a very large audience when the Daily Mail
serialized it; with certain modifications, as Lord
Northcliffe decided the original 'German Invasion Route'
took them through too many smaill villages, so it was
altered to take in as many large towns as possible'1'.
The resultant public clamour for improved security led
to the Haldane Committee on the Intelligence service.
With his small staff, Lt Col Edmonds the dhief of MO 5 /
had been unable to discover much evidence of actual
German espionage in Britain but many of Le Queux readers
had sent the author information about ’German spies'; .
waiters were a particularly favoured ’cover occupation',
and so Edmonds simply ’wrote up' these names as the basis
of his submission on the 'German Intelligence Operation 
2
in Britain' for the Haldane . Committee. The result was 
a considerably expanded MO 5 and the passing of an 
Official Secrets Act, which the War Office had repeatedly 
failed to persuade the Government to enact.
This episode should serve as a salutary caution to all 
researchers studying official documents as it demonstrates 
the necessity to analyze and evaluate official papers 
stamped 'secret' just as rigidly as when investigating
1 This episode in which Daily Mail sellers were dressed 
in German uniforms and special local invasion issues 
published for the larger towns was satirized in
P.G. Wodehouse, Swoop, ( 1911 ) .
2 Filed by the War Office as WO 106/45/525.
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newspaper reports. On the outbreak of war in 1914,
MO 5, greatly expanded, became the Directorate of Special
Intelligence and extended its organizational tentacles
into many spheres of British society, including the
detailed monitoring of the Catholic press by a subsection
known as MI 71. MO 5 before the war had not however
been the sole agency to counter subversion in Britain.
Unlike the Secret Intelligence Service which can trace
its lineage directly back to Walsingham!s Elizabethan
espionage network, it is impossible to accurately
determine when an organized internal security service
first evolved in Britain. Henry VIII laid the foundations
of a quite efficient counter espionage system and certainly
by the time of Cromwell this was taking a sizeable share
of the budget. But after the Restoration, Charles TI,
distrustful of the entire state machinery he had inherited,
broke down the Cromwellian centralized intelligence
system into a number of agencies who while spying on each
other as well as everybody else, did this so covertly?
that Pepys at the Admiralty believed Charles II was only
spending "one percent" of what Cromwell had spent on his
2intelligence service . One of these agencies carried 
on the work started by James I when he established the
1 See The History of MI 7: WO 32/9304 and Retention 
of MI 7 After the War, W032/9297. The entire War 
Office Press Monitoring Service had reached a strength 
of 135 by the end of the war.
2 Charles aided by his secret French subsidy was actually 
spending more on intelligence than his predecessors, 
see Richard Deacon, The British Secret Service, (1980 ) .
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Royal Mail for the purpose of monitoring communications
after the Gunpowder Plot, The existence of a postal
monitoring service first became known to the general
public in 1844 following a Parliamentary row over the
interception of Mazzini’s mail, the contents of which
1had been communicated to the Austrians . Metropolitan
Police records reveal that their officers gradually took
over much of this postal investigation work with eighteen
officers seconded to the General Post Office Investigation 
2
Branch in 1912 . This Investigation Branch played an
important part in foiling the planned 1923 IRA offensive
in Britain and their communication intercepts helped
to convict the leaders of the Irish Self Determination
League at a trial which effectively ended this organizations
existence. This Investigation Branch’s activities were
evidently not confined to passive monitoring of the
mail as Thomson informed the Cabinet that a large number
of Irish Self Determination League letters to Branches
3from the Head Office "have been held up in the post” .
1 See F.B. Smith, 'British Post Office Espionage 18441 , 
Historical Studies, 14(1969/71), 189-203.
/
2 See MEPOL2/1505. According to a letter in MEPOL2/1500 
the seconded officers "should not be of conspicuous 
height, nor of such appearance to render them likely 
when in plain clothes to be taken for police officers.
The constable must be a smart intelligent man, capable 
of making confidential enquiries and preference will 
be given to one who is well educated or can speak 
French or German and who, from his general appearance 
is not likely to be readily recognized as a police 
officer*.
3 ROR 168. 17 Aug. 1922. CP 4164. CAB 24/138.
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In the period before the evolution of a proper police 
system in Britain the Home Office and the Army regional 
commands maintained an ad hoc intelligence system whose 
strength fluctuated according to the nature of the 
perceived threat to the Government. One of these main 
threats was Irish opposition to colonial rule; the 
Irish Administration in Dublin Castle controlled a large 
network of agents and R1C police officers were stationed 
in Britain,to watch the immigrant Irish in their principal 
centres of settlement. In the 1860 s the Fenians penetrated 
the British Army so extensively that a special twenty 
strong counter intelligence department had to be establ­
ished to combat this threat1. The killing of a Manchester 
police officer and the death of six people in the abortive
Clerkenwell Jail break explosion by the Fenians in 1867
2
greatly alarmed the public and the Prime Minister 
personally requested Lt Col Feilding, the chief of the 
anti-Fenian counter intelligence department to establish 
a new Secret Service Department. Feilding initially 
refused, arguing that the post of a ’spy’ was incompatible 
with his status as an ’'officer and gentleman'1 and only 
reluctantly accepted his new assignment as a f,seconded
3
army officer1’ . The new agency soon lapsed when it became 
apparent there was not going to be any organized Fenian
1 Leon O'Broin/ Fenian Fever/ An Anglo-American 
Diiemna, (1971) , 78.
2 166,000 British Special Constables were enrolled to
combat the Fenians in 1867; see Patrick Quinlivan and 
Paul Rose, The ■Fenians in England, 1865-1872,
(1982) , 96.
3 O ’Broin, op. cit. 212.
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campaign in Britain. And when the American Clan Na Gael
section of the Fenian movement, started a sporadic
bombing campaign in Britain in 1881, the Government this
time, instead of turning again to the Army, relied on
the Criminal Investigation Department at Scotland Yard,.
which had come into existence in the interim period since
the earlier Fenian attacks. In 1883, the CID officers
countering the Irish American bombers were formed into
the Special Irish Branch and despite having their office
bombed and much of their files destroyed'1'; they succeeded
in capturing so many of the bombers, that the campaign
was called off in 1885. Bunyan claims all of the first
2
twelve officers in this new Branch were Irish born and 
this tradition may well have continued as the Special 
Branch roster in 1918 listed 13 members with Irish
3
surnames including the two senior operational officers .
With the ending of the Irish bombing campaign the ’Irish’ 
part of its name was dropped in 1888 and the Special 
Branch devoted itself to combating anarchists, Indian 
nationalists and socialists etc. The appointment of 
Sir Basil Thomson as Head of the Special Branch signified
1 K. Short, op. cit. 184.
2 Tony Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain, (1976) , 
104.
3 The names of the entire Scotland Yard Special Branch 
(or at least the 99 permanent staff) were listed in
a letter from Col Kell of the War Office thanking them 
for their help in countering German espionage in the 
First World War; see HO45/10892/35729.
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its growing importance, A man of many talents ,including
prolific author1, Sir Basil had been in turn a colonial
*\
civil servant, the Prime Minister of Tonga and Dartmoor
Prison Governor before coming to Scotland Yard in 1913.
He seems to have owed his new appointment to his self
proclaimed expertise on anarchism. Dilnot in his history
of Scotland Yard claims that Thomson was appointed to
» 2"save England from 'Red Machinations’’1 . Thomson himself 
believed he could distinguish revolutionaries by merely 
looking at their ueyes (which) were dilated and shone as 
if from a dull fire withinM . This was the man who for 
almost a decade was to be the Government's main source 
of information on discontent within Britain.
It might seem, judging from the not very different levels
4
of the Special Branch establishments in 1914 and 1920 
that Thomson and his organization had played a relatively
1 Sir Basil Thomson wrote novels, plays and the following 
works based on his police career experiences;
Queer People, (1927) , My Experiences and Scotland 
Yard, (New York, 1923), Story of Scotland Yard, (1935) , 
The Scene Changes, (1933).
2 George Dilnot, Scotland Yard, (1929), 264.
3 Times, 2 Dec. 1921.
4 In December 1914, the Special Branch had an authorized 
establishment of 114 and applied to the Home Office 
for permission to increase this figure by 25 officers, 
(see MEP02/1643Jbut in June 1920 its authorized 
establishment was still only 137 officers and it 
again sought permission to recruit more officers to 
cope with its increased duties; see Re org an i z a t ion an d 
Augumentation of CID and SB, H045/11000/223532.
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unimportant role during the. First World War and had
failed to expand in a manner similar to MO 5. Some of the
Special Branch’s most experienced officers were however
sent to build up the new Field Security Police in France1
and as we have already observed war invariably brings
a proliferation of new intelligence agencies. Even the
new Ministry of Labour created its own Intelligence
section to report weekly on ’’stoppages, disputes,
settlements and labour propaganda” though its personnel
were forbidden to do anything ’'which might savour of
espionage” and so Scotland Yard, the Military Intelligence
section of the War Office and General Headquarters Home
Forces Intelligence were instructed to ’furnish them with
all reports bearing on Labour Intelligence received from
their agents . This last named military organization
was not the Directorate of Special Intelligence, the
successor to Mo 5, but a totally new agency; one of the ,
many that sprouted during the War. The primary function
of the GHQ Intelligence Organization was monitoring
industrial unrest and revolutionary activity in Britain
and its officers were instructed to "obtain information
from Chief Constables, employers of labour, branches of
the Labour Ministry, conversation with private acquaint-
*3ances and from the study of newspapers , ' Senior officers 
disliked this Internal Security role fearing that
1 Times, 12 Nov. 1921.
2 Memorandum by Minister of Labour on Intelligence,f r r ) f 
10 Oct. 1917. GT2274. CAB 24/28. j , j
3 Memorandum from the bhief Imperial General Staff,
18 Nov. 1919. WO 32/5553.
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’espionage1 at home would alienate the public and so the
Army Council disbanded the GHQ Intelligence Organization,
replacing it with a much smaller section of the Military
Operations Directorate, MO 4,which was to liase1 with
2Sir Basil Thomson’s Special Intelligence Directorate .
Once again despite the similarity of names this organi­
zation was not the successor to the pre-war MO 5 nor 
was it a new title for the Special Branch whose chief 
remained Sir Basil. Lloyd George at the Ministry of 
Munitions had operated his own intelligence service there 
to monitor industrial unrest and counter sabotage so 
he asked Thomson, when he became Prime Minister, to
v
provide him personally with frequent Special Branch 
reports to compensate for the loss of his own intelligence
3
agency . Thomson tever alert for an opportunity to 
extend his influence, started submitting reports on 
Pacifism to the War Cabinet, a subject which, as we have 
already observed, greatly troubled Ministers. Thomson’s 
reports were initially circulated to the War Cabinet by 
the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information 
but soon Thomson was reporting on his own behalf and 
broadening his field far beyond the pacifists with his
1 The Army still wanted information in case it might 
find itself summoned to aid the Civil Power but 
disliked the idea of its ’espionage’ becoming known 
so in general MO 4 was merely to use information 
supplied by Thomson. Provision was however made for 
MO 4 officers to recruit their own agents in ’’centres 
of possible aggravated disturbances1' ,* see MO 4 
Memorandum, 16 Dec. 1919, WO 32/5553.
2 Army Council instruction, 18 Nov. 1919, WO 32/5553.
3 As recounted by Thompson in his Queer People, (1922), 
264.
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Fortnightly Reports on Pacifism and Revolutionary
Organizations in the United Kingdom and A b r o a d ^ . The
ending of the War increased Thomson's work rather than
lessened it, for as he later recalled
^'February 1919 was the high water mark of revolut­
ionary danger in Great Britain. Everything was 
in favour of the Revolutionaries. Many of the 
soldiers were impatient at the delay in demob­
ilization. The discharged soldiers could not get 
housing accomodation. Russia had shown how 
apparently easy it was, for a determined minority 
with a body of discontented soldiers behind them 
to seize the . reins of power^'J
Thomson’s reports appeared to be invaluable but there was
a problem;, as Head of the Special Branch, he held the
rank of Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Police and
as such was technically subordinate to General Horwood,
the Commissioner with whom Thomson had frequent disputes.
Lloyd George solved this problem by putting Thompson in
charge of a new Special Directorate of Intelligence /
which in effect was mostly composed of Special Branch
members augmented by reluctant Military Intelligence
personnel and directly responsible to the Home Secretary,
thereby circumventing Horwood. On 30 April, 1919,
Thomson submitted to the Home Secretary, for circulation
to the Cabinet, Report on Revolutionary Organizations
in the United Kingdom, Number 1. Its opening paragraph
set the tone of the following 237 reports :
’‘The present state of quietude will come to an 
end as soon as unemployment benefit ceases and
1 Filed in the GT series, CAB’s 24/28, 24/34, 24/35, 
24/40, 24/42, 24/47, 24/50, 24/52, and 24/61.
2 Times, 2 Dec. 1921.
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the inflated wages give way before the laws of 
supply and demand1* ♦
He went on to predict trouble over beer shortages and
the licensing hours, informed Ministers that two named
MP s were out to secure revolution while advocating the
deportation of Russian immigrants whom he suspected of
being agitators. And in the first of an almost continuous
separate section on Sinn Fein in Britain, observed that
the;
"Merthyr Liberty League founded for the self 
determination of the smaller nations and the 
abolition of the Monarchy by Irish miners has 
now become a Sinn Fein Club'-*-".
Thomson’s pronounced xenophobia was clearly and frequently
visible in his reports; he was gratified that most of the
8,000 audience who attended an Albert Hall commemoration
of the Bolshevik Revolution was,
‘•composed principally of aliens, Jews, Sinn Feiners 
and degenerates'* 2.
Like most of his class, he was strQngly anti-semitic,
confidently declaring,
“there is now definite evidence that Bolshevism 
is an international movement controlled by the 
Jews"3.
Thomson like virtually all in the British establishment 
was obsessed by Bolshevism, though ironically one of his
1 Report on Revolutionary Organizations in the UK,
No. T~, 30 Apri 1 1919. GT 7195 CAB 24/78 — hereafter 
cited as ROR.
2 A Survey of 'Revolutionary Movements in Great Britain,
1920, CP 2455. 24/118.
3 ‘ Monthly Review of Revolutionary Movements Abroad,
No. 9, 16 July 1919. GT 7725. CAB 24/84.
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most senior aides was recently accused of being a long
serving Soviet.agent who warned the Soviets in advance of
1
the 1927 Arcos Raid and later transferred to MI 5
where' he used his very high rank, to infiltrate other
2
Soviet agents into that organization . No one could
ever make the same allegation about Thomson; hie constantly
harried revolutionaries,proudly informing'the Cabinet,
"as a result of information given to the Press 
by this department, the Secretary of the Inter­
national Socialist Club, the Headquarters of the
1 On the 12 May, 1927, the police raided the Soviet 
Trade Delegation premises at Arcos House, London, 
claiming they had evidence it was an espionage centre^ 
but apparently the Soviets had been tipped off about 
the raid and destroyed much of the incriminating 
evidence, see, Harriette Flory,*The Arcos Raid and 
the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927’; ,
Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (1977), 707-23.
2 Richard Deacon, the author of the British Secret 
Service, (1980) r and several other works on Intelligence 
services, who himself is a former Naval Intelligence officer 
(real name Donald McCormack) claims that Guy Liddell
who joined Scotland Yard in 1919 was a Soviet agent 
who transferred to MI 5 in 1931, ’vetted' Anthony 
Blunt and Kim Philby and recruited Guy Burgess into 
MI 5. Liddell eventually became Deputy Director of 
MI 5 and is alleged by Deacon to have constantly 
impeded investigations of these three spies; see his 
article in the News of the World, 29 March, 1981.
Chapman Pincher however strongly defends Liddell and 
names another person as Burgess’ recruiter into MI 5; 
see his Their Trade is Treachery, (1982), 27-29, 120,
130-32.
Whether one accepts Deacon's or Pincher's version, 
depends on one's acceptance or rejection of Pincher*s 
claim that the top Soviet agent inside MI 5 was Sir 
Roger Hollis ,the Director General,or Deacon's counter 
claim it was Liddell the Deputy Director. The entire 
recent 'spies' saga would seem to be a classic 
example of the Secret Intelligence Service and the 
Security Service using the media to discredit each 
other as part of their long running/ internecine feud 
and should serve as a cautionary warning when researching 
Intelligence organizations never to take their reports for 
granted.
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unemployables, has been asked by the landlord’s 
solicitor to vacate the premises1'*.
He sought whenever possible to infer revolutionaries
were common criminals, explaining that one left wing
bookshop was open only for two hours daily as its owners
"spent the rest of their time stealing valuable books
2from better class shops” . Like many Intelligence
chiefs, Thomson frequently suggested new laws should be
introduced against ’seditious’ literature and no doubt
he endeavoured to exploit the Cabinet’s concern about
the growth of the subversion he constantly referred to ,
for the purpose of obtaining more resources and funds
3
for his organization . But as his earlier experience 
with his Pacifism Reports reveals, he was only feeding 
the Cabinet the intelligence diet that suited their
4
appetites. Unlike most of the establishment Thomson 
himself was convinced the British working class was 
basically ‘sound1 and that it was only a relatively 
small number of agitators, mostly of foreign origin, who 
were inciting them. Consequently, he explained the
1 ROR 91. 3 Feb. 1921. CP 2541. CAB 24/114.
2 ROR 29. 13 Nov. 1919. CP 125. CAB 24/93.
3 A not uncommon practice according to former American 
Intelligence Officer William R. Corson, The Armies 
of Ignorance, the Rise of the Intelligence Empire,
(New York, 1977) . —
4 For an illuminating review of establishment attitudes 
see, Patrick Renshaw, ‘Anti-Labour Politics in 
Britain, 1918-27’, Journal of Contemporary History,: 
12(1977), 693-705, and J. White, ‘Ideological 
Hegemony and Political Control: The Sociology of 
Anti-Bolshevism in Britain, 1918-20’’ / 'Scottish 
Labour Society Journal, 9(1975), 3-20.
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Daily Herald*s increased circulation not in terms of an
upsurge of interest in socialism but simply because,
''unfortunately the sporting correspondent had the 
good fortune to spot several winners lately*11.
He believed the British workers were generally more
interested in sport than revolution,
"unfortunately no football match is advertized 
for the Chelsea ground on May 1st. If an attractive 
match could be arranged it would blow away a great 
many people from Hyde Park1'2.
Thomson shrewdly realized that whatever some of the
more militant Trade Union leaders thought about the
British reprisals in Ireland, very few of their members
were prepared to strike on this issued though by a
majority 1,124,000 votes, the special Trades Union Congress
passed a resolution advocating direct action on the Irish
question, this does not represent the general view of
n'3
individual workers . And only the previous month he
had observed,
^the annoyance of the average Englishman with 
Irish extremists, was in evidence at the Military 
Tournament, where the Leninster Regiment, usually ^ 
very popular, evoked neither applause nor sympathy .
Much of the information Thomson supplied to the Cabinet
on the Irish in Britain was highly impressionistic,
being little more than the almost verbatim publication
1 ROR 12. 17 July 1919. GT 7742. CAB 24/84.
2 ROR 46. 18 March 1920. CP 902. CAB 24/101. and in
ROR 47. 25 March 1920. CP 960. CAB 24/101, the author
observed ^it is hoped to arrange a football match
at Chelsea ground as a counter attraction'1 - (to 
May Day).
3 ROR 63. 15 July 1920. CP 1634. CAB 24/109.
4 ROR 58. 10 June 1920. CP 1444. CAB 24/107.
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of what he called his ’correspondents’ reports as when 
he wrote,
’*1 am informed that at Barrow-in-Furness where 
half the population is either Irish or of Irish 
descent, in certain public houses frequented by 
the Irish the toasts of ’Success to the Sinn 
Feiners'" and ’Success to the coming revolution 
is drunk nightly1* i.
And what significance one wonders did Cabinet Ministers
attach to a Special Branch report giving full details
of a church ceremony at which,
rta Communist Minister at Hurst Church baptized 
a child, Lenin de Valera Mackayw2.
Did Ministers see in this Irish mother’s choice of name
for her child a sinister indication of the influence
of revolutionaries on the Irish in Britain?
Sometimes the professional Intelligence officer in
Thomson thrust its way through the fantasies of his
informers, as when he commented on a claim that,
’'about 120 delegates are reported to have attended 
the second conference of the Irish volunteers at 
Coatbridge on February 26 (1920), there are said 
to be 2,000 volunteers armed'’
he observed underneath this report,
”this statement is probably quite at variance 
with the facts”3.
Yet two months later, Thomson’s organization was report­
ing without comment, there are ’90,000 Irish extremists 
in Glasgow...1,233 armed on April 20th” ^  and later on 
in the year the IRA strength in Scotland was further
1 ROR 32. 4 Dec. 1919. CP 256. CAB 24/94.
2 ROR 213. 5 July 1923. CP291(23). CAB 24/160.
3 ROR 44. 4 March 1920. CP 791. CAB 24/99.
4 ROR 53. 6 May 1920. CP 1239. CAB 24/105.
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grossly inflated:. •
llit is^reported that the Volunteers in Glasgow 
and in the West of Scotland number 30,000 and 
that 20,000 have revolvers and 2,000 rifles1'
This was simply ludicrous, if only’because as the entire
IRA armoury in Ireland at this time (October 1920)
contained far fewer weapons; it is highly unlikely
that units in Scotland would have been permitted to
retain so many weapons, particularly as the subsequent
IRA offensive in Britain centred around the use of
incendiaries for all stolen explosives were sent to."
Ireland.
Do such totally fantastic reports automatically invalid 
date all the information contained in the Reports On 
Revolutionary Organizations/ I would strongly argue 
no. Reading these reports is like panning for gold, 
sifting through the dross for the nuggets of hard reliable 
information. Much of the information in these reports 
was rubbish; the product of unscrupulous informers who 
made up the information,when they had nothing factual to 
sell.or the creative writings of Intelligence officers, 
reluctant to admit they had failed to penetrate the 
assigned target organization. Yet gems sparkle through 
this unevaluated intelligence bedrock for it is clearly 
evident the Special Branch had some very highly placed 
informers. I do not know enough about the detailed 
internal history of the Communist or Labour parties 
I ROR 77. 21 Oct. 1920. CP 1997. CAB 24/112.
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during this period to vouch for the accuracy of the 
intelligence material relating to these but I suspect 
the information, particularly that relating to high 
level disputes in the Communist Party and Soviet finan­
cing, could only have come from the top of the leadership 
hierarchy. I can certainly vouch for much of the intelli­
gence concerning the Irish Self Determination League's 
membership at specific times, and internal disputes as 
I have fortunately been able to countercheck this with 
the heavily documented ISDL files contained in the papers 
of Art O'Brien, the organization's leader. The 16 large 
steel boxes that contain the Art O'Brien collection in 
the National Library of Ireland are a veritable treasure 
trove, without parallel in the history of the Irish in 
Britain. Ranging far beyond the ISDL, encompassing 
a mass of detail on Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League and the 
everyday life of the Irish in Britain, they have been 
invaluable in researching this thesis. I have also been 
able to cross check the information in the' Reports on 
Revolutionary Organizations with the IRA files in the 
Collins, Mulcahy and O'Malley papers,whose existence 
and location has already been noticed. It is noticeable 
that the Special Branch reports on the IRA in Britain 
improved substantially as their campaign evolved and they 
became normally very accurate during the Civil War, when 
it would appear they were receiving much reliable infor­
mation from former IRA and IRB intelligence agents who
were now working for the Free State Army. / But no
! l
Intelligence officer no matter how professional their
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approach, can ever be right aii the time ; so all intelli­
gence material should be carefully considered in the 
light of already known evidence and if it does not fit, 
should be rejected by researchers. Thus I have dis­
regarded a Free State Army Intelligence Report that 
claimed Michael Carolan, the IRA Director of Intelligence, 
P.J. Ruttledge»the acting Republican President of 
Ireland and, Jim Larkin the Irish revolutionary socialist, 
had held a meeting in Liverpool with Ramsay MacDonald}the 
British Labour Party leader1. The timing of this alleged 
meeting, seems itself highly suspicious, 21 December,
1923. I cannot discover if the two Republican leaders 
were in England at this time but it is highly unlikely 
that MacDonald would meet the leaders of a defeated 
movement,only weeks before he became Prime Minister and 
if he had; then why did not the Free State Army fleak,: 
this to the British media which would have surely turned 
this incident into a major political row.
My earlier observations on the methodology of intelligence 
collection and presentation shows why so much information 
is often unreliable. Thomson's frequent references to 
his correspondents1 and frequent unevaluated quotations 
from their reports was designed to convey the impression 
of a large scale network of agents covering all of Britain. 
Government leaders appear to have a distinct preference 
for easily understandable intelligence, hence the huge 
budget given to the Office of Reconnaissance; the most
1 See P7a/87a, Mulcahy,
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secret agency in the American Intelligence Community, 
to provide satellite photographs whose real value has 
been grossly inflated. Thomson was working in the non 
technical age of intelligence; telephone tapping was 
obviously less valuable )when few people owned phones 
and the intercept technology was still very rudimentary. 
Virtually the only source of quantitative intelligence, 
Thomson possessed was his agents reports usually written 
in a language the Cabinet understood and often conveying 
information that buttressed their oven preconceived 
opinions of what was happening in British society. Many 
of the reports signed B.H.T were not personally written, 
at least in their entirety, by Thomson himself. They 
bear the hallmarks of different writing styles for 
Thomson was a very busy man indeed, submitting reports 
covering the entire intelligence spectrum at home and 
abroad. His first' Weekly Review of the Progress of 
Revolutionary Organizations Abroad carried reports con­
cerning the situation in France, Belgium, Switzerland,. 
Germany, Austria, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria,
Russia, Norway, Spain, Portugal, India, Egypt, China 
and the United States1. Thomson had established his 
own liasion with many foreign intelligence services.
He is unique in British Intelligence history for his 
Directorate of Intelligence succeeded, if only temporarily, 
in doing what Sir Maurice Oldfield failed to do in the 
mid 1970 s; combining foreign and domestic intelligence
1 1 May 1919. GT7196. CAB 24/78.
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into one agency. By spreading his wings so widely,
Thomson ensured he made many influential enemies in the
other agencies, violating their organizational parameters.
The Secret Intelligence Service and the Naval Intelligence
Division,with its traditional wide ranging interests,
even in the European land locked countries, actively
disliked Thomson's poaching on their territory. Military
Intelligence,particularly the Special Intelligence
Directorate reorganized again as MO 5, was so determined
to replace the Directorate of Special Intelligence and
in particular its Director, that Col Kell was prepared
to 'civiftanize'' his security service. General Horwood
had never liked the effective transfer of his entire
Special Branch and intrigued with Kell to get rid of
Thomson. (This objective was achieved in November 1921
and is examined in detail later in this thesis).
Sir Wyndham Childs then replaced Thomson as Assistant
Commissioner and head of the Special Branch which was
returned to Scotland Yard when the Directorate of
Intelligence Home Office was wound up following Thomson!s
dismissal. But the' Reports on Revolutionary Organizations
continued to be sent1 to the Cabinet until Labour took
power in 1924, MacDonald who was refused permission to
2see his own war time file apparently accepted the
1 ROR 134. 8 Dec. 1921. CP 3538. CAB 24/131, the first 
to appear after Thomson1s dismissal was titled 
Special Branch, whereas all previous ones, bore the 
legend Directorate of Intelligence (Home Office).
2 See A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit. 255.
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Special Branch advice that his new Cabinet should not 
receive reports, whose sources some of the new Ministers 
might identify. As a Minority Government Prime Minister, 
MacDonald was obviously reluctant to tangle with the 
Intelligence agencies and it has even been suggested 
that, at least a section of British Intelligence, passed 
totally out of the Governmental orbit and was financed 
by the Conservative Party during 19241.
So ended the unique seven year period when internal
2
security flies are accessible to researchers , unique 
because none of the files of the other agencies mentioned 
in this chapter have, or are ever likely to be released 
to the public. Intelligence agencies instinctively 
dislike the probing of their activities even by Ministers 
as Lord Beaverbrook,the Minister of Information, discovered 
when he requested access to some Intelligence reports;, he 
was told jointly by the War Office and Admiralty,
1 1 was told this by a journalist colleague who has
close contacts with the intelligence community. Sir 
Joseph Ball, the former MI 5 officer, who founded the 
Conservative Research Department about this time 
appears to have established extremely close links 
between the Conservative Party and British Intelligence 
before returning to reorganize MI 5 in 1940. See 
Chapman Pincher, op. cit. 117 and Arnold Belchman, 
'Hugger-Mugger in Old Queen Street: The Origins of
the Conservative Research Department', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 13(1978), 671-82.
2 The Reports on Revolutionary Organizations would seem 
to owe their accessibility to researchers due to their 
classification as Cabinet Papers, rather than depart­
mental papers and hence were routinely bound in 
chronological order into the very lengthy CAB 24 
bound volume series.
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’'It is hoped that Lord Beaverbrookfs knowledge 
of the activities and results of our Secret 
Service is very limited and that consequently 
he is not in possession of sufficient data on 
which to base any criticism. Otherwise a serious 
leakage must have occurred. The essence of the 
Secret Service is that it should be secret and 
no one not vitally concerned in it, should be 
aware of its organization and production!.
Lowry has described how when working for SORO, he
discovered a Project Cameiot bibliography with a very
low level security classification but following his
request for its declassification the US Army actually
raised its classification level. Lowry believes
bureaucrats use classification as a symbol of their power,
often against the real interests of the organization,by
2
preventing the circulation of knowledge . The lengthy
process involved in declassifying British War Office
papers,that have only the most minimal connection with
the Intelligence community graphically illustrates this 
3
point . Michael Howard has recently been refused permiss­
ion to publish his work on British deception operations
1 WO 32/5755; a note included in this file (dated
12 Oct. 1959) requests that the Cabinet Papers relating
to this issue should be withdrawn and disposed of.
This may explain why some volumes in the CAB 24 series 
have had papers1 cut out of them.
2 Lowry op. cit. and also see Gene Lyons and Louis 
Morton, Schools for Strategy, Education and R e s e a r c h
in National' Security Affairs, (New York, 19 65).
3 WO 32/11084 file,which is basically about the re­
patriation of prisoners of war, has a tag on it stating 
’‘this file has been referred to MI 6 and JIC (also
to DII6 and CSDIC) and has been cleared for release
to the PRO by them all” .
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during World War II1 even though Cave Brovm has; already
revealed much about these operations using the British
2
material in the Pentagon . Alas it is not possible in
Britain to follow Persico's example in simply requesting,
under the American Freedom of Information Act, the OSS
3
files he used for his illuminating work . True, official 
histories of several British Intelligence agencies have 
been published but Mr D. Foot,the author of one of these/
4
has freely admitted the limitations of official history . 
Unfortunately Anthony Simkins1 official history of MI 5,
1 As a former Intelligence Officer, Howard is still 
subject to the Official Secrets Act preventing 
publication based on his wartime experiences,* see 
Hugh Trevor-Roper's comment on this affair,' ,!the 
boneheads of our security services are back in power'' 
quoted in the Sunday Telegraph, 20 Dec. 1981.
2 Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, (1977)* see 
823-28 for an illuminating insight into the difficulties 
faced by those researching British Intelligence.
3 Persico, op. cit.
4 "Naturally 1 have tried to produce as complete, as 
accurate and as fairly balanced an account as time 
permitted. No one will be less surprized than 
myself if inaccuracies remain: for the whole published 
literature on the subject is pitted with them, and 
the unpublished archives are often contradictory •
as well as confusing and confused" - M.R.D. Foot,
SOE in France: An Account of the work of the British 
Special Operations Execut ive in France' 1940-4 4,
(19 68) Preface. Foot and J.M. Langley were more 
recently permitted to use the IS9(d) files denied 
to Airey Neave, op. cit. in their MI 9: Escape and 
EvasIon 1939-1945, (1979) and the ongoing Official 
history of British intelligence in the Second World 
War, (two vols. so far) being authored by F.H. Hinsley, 
E.E. Thomas, C.F.C. Ransom and R.C. Knight, has proved 
to be somewhat more illuminating than it was first 
thought when the project was announced.
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particularly important as most of its pre-1940 files
X
were destroyed by the Luftwaffe remains firmly under
lock and key in number four Curzon Street, accessible only
to senior Security Service officers. And even the
foreword by a former employee, Lt Col T. A. Robertson ,was
2officially removed, from West?s recent work on MI 5 .
With the exception of the Special Branch authored
Reports on Revolutionary Organizations, none of their
files are accessible to researchers except for tha small
number of files relating to their establishment,which
were classified as Home Office and Metropolitan Police
3Commissioner’s Office records. Thus it has not been
possible to examine important IRA files seized by the 
4police . A few Special Branch reports on Irish suspects
1 According to Ladislas Farago, The Game of Foxes,
(1971), 194, the MI 5 Central Registry temporarily 
transferred to Wormwood Scrubs Prison was destroyed 
by an incendiary bomb and it was subsequently 
discovered that most of the duplicate collection had 
been incorrectly micro-filmed.
2 Nigel West, MI 5; British Security Service Operations 
1909-4 5, (198l)is like John Bulloch's MI 5, (1963),
a non academic study.
3 A search through the index volume, listing the PRO's 
collection of Metropolitan Police Files revealed 
only twenty out of over 6,000 that appeared from 
their title to relate to the Special Branch. These 
twenty files, mostly concerning the establishment 
size of the Special Branch,were classified as part of 
the administration records in the Commissioners Office, 
(CO) .
4 For example, it was reported that the Metropolitan 
Police seized in 1926, much of the London IRA 1914-23 
operation files which had been left in a deposit box 
and never reclaimed; see 'Catholic Herald, 16 Oct. 1926. 
It could also be inferred from Commander Bob Huntley’s 
reminiscenses about his experience in the present Anti- 
Terrorist Squad that his discovery/ Scotland Yard had' 
not retained any records of the IRA 1939/40 bombing 
campaign, indicates Special Branch files are witheld 
from other police departments - Bomb Squad, (1977), 103.
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submitted to the 1923 Advisory Committee on the Depor-. 
tations are preserved in the Treasury Solicitor’s Papers1. 
Farago has frankly admitted he literally stumbled over
2the Abwehr files which form the centrepiece of his work , 
and I must also confess to a similar, almost accidental 
discovery of the Treasury Solicitor's Papers, but what 
a discovery! They include an invaluable breakdown of the 
occupations and incomes of the deported Irish Self 
Determination League national and local leadership, 
submitted as part of the deportees compensation procedure 
together with the only known surviving minute book of the
3
Roger Casement Sinn Fein cumman London. As Pyne has 
shown, it is often only possible to reconstruct defunct 
political organizations through the court cases they were 
involved in, which have ensured their records survived 
by becoming legal exhibits.
Using newspapers as a research source
Many researchers have used newspapers as a principal
4 5research source; some like Boyce and Roddiger have
1 Farago, op. cit, XI,
2 TS 27/181.
3 Peter Pyne, ’The Third Sinn Fein Party 1923-26' , Economic 
and Social Review 1(1969/70).
4 D.G. Boyce, •Englishmen and Irish Troubles; British 
Public Opinion and the' Making of Irish' Policy 1918-22, 
(1972 )." :
5 David Roediger, 'Racism, Reconstruction and the 
Labour Press: The Rise and Fall of the St. Louis 
Daily Press 1864-1866', Science and Society, 42(1978), 
156-77.
66
focussed their research on public opinion on specific
aspects, around a close detailed scrutiny of contemporary
1 2newspapers while others like Kantowitz and North have 
evaluated the influence of the more specialized press 
appealing to sectional interests. The methodological 
process involved in the collection of news, the manner 
in which it is transformed, often through a 'subbing1 or 
filtering procedure, into -the final copy read by the 
purchaser is similar in many respects to the methodo­
logical process of Intelligence collection, collation 
and evaluation which we have already discussed. Many 
researchers have commented on the problems involved 
in verifying the accuracy or reliability of newspaper 
articles and as a journalist myself, perhaps, I have an 
heightened appreciation of these problems. The old maxim 
never believe all you read or even, most of what you 
read, in the newspapers is, unfortunately, very good 
advice as is the dictum one should read as many and as 
varied newspapers as feasible to gain a proper understan­
ding of events. I freely confess that I personally have been 
faced on too many occasions with the highly undesirable 
combination of a tight lunch time deadline and a total 
inability to find any high level spokesperson available 
in Whitehall on a Saturday morning. In these circumstances
1 Edward R. Kantowitz, Polish-American Politics in 
Chicago , (Chicago, 1975). The author, never quites 
lives up to the promise of his title for while he makes 
extensive use of the Polish ethnic press, he fails
to properly analyze their internal politics.
2 North, op. cit.
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the journalist has no alternative but to resort to 
creative writing of the 'a source close to the prime 
Minister disclosed last night’ type, A recent journalistic 
experience of mine should serve as a cautionary warning 
never to take newspaper 'exclusive’ revelations for 
granted. Earlier this year the Standard, Britain’s 
biggest selling evening newspaper, devoted the entire 
front page and a further two inside pages to an account, 
purporting to be the disclosures of an ’IRA defector’ 
who claimed to have been actively involved, at a senior 
level, in the IRA bombing campaign in Britain1. If 
the revelations were accurate, then the story did indeed 
merit its 'exclusive' tag, the first Insider’s account 
of the IRA in Britain and as such precisely the type 
of information a future researcher would find invaluable. 
This story was widely picked up and republished in 
British and Irish newspapers as well as featuring on 
the radio news, but my Sunday newspaper news editor 
doubted its validity. In journalistic parlance it did 
not 'ring true', few names were mentioned; an almost 
essential characteristic of true exclusives of this 
type, and it read very badly , almost as if it seemed 
the disjointed paragraphs had been hurriedly pruned by 
an alert staff lawyer, as indeed it transpired they were.
So he decided to authorize a full investigation, checking 
and cross checking the entire story. I spent most of a 
week checking on the London end, talking to many people
1 ' The' Standard, 10 March, 19 82.
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who had known the supposed <defector’ and from their 
accounts I gradually built up a picture of a ma,n who was 
not only,on the balance of all available evidence not 
what he claimed to be, but a firm impression that this 
person had in fact behaved in a classic agent provocateur 
role and had almost certainly given information to the 
Special Branch over a period of several years. This 
conclusion was subsequently supported by the evidence 
collected by correspondents in several Irish towns 
which revealed this person was wanted for petty thefts, 
embezzlement etc. In short his exclusive revelations 
were almost entirely fiction; the few accurate details 
had been extracted from a cuttings library by a sub­
editor. But it took a major investigation of the type, 
a future researcher would be very unlikely to be in a 
position to undertake, to expose this masquerade1.
Recognizing all its limitations and taking due notice of 
the observed problems, it must be readily admitted that 
the use of newspapers as a documentary source is almost 
essential for the research of a defunct political organ­
ization like the Irish Self Determination League. Reading 
through sixty year old newspapers with a much smaller 
type face, presented in a much denser manner than is 
customary today is both, physically very demanding and
1 Our investigation was removed from the galleys just 
before the paper went to press not because the 
lawyers objected to its claims but as a result of 
the killing of a person exposed in another investigation 
and so the editor decided not to publish a similar 
exposure.
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highly time consuming. Indexes can of course he used to
spotlight the more potentially useful reports. In
Britain only two daily newspapers, the Titties arid the 
• '
Glasgow Herald are indexed; the former in a much more 
reliable manner than the latter, which I soon discovered 
omitted many reports, given quite sizeable coverage. 
Variations in and lack of access to all the different 
editions of the' Times can be extremely annoying but 
certainly using it with the' •Glasgow Herald as a supple­
mentary guide enabled the construction of an overview 
impression of the Irish in Britain during my initial 
research. Having established the potentially interesting 
events and their location it was then possible to turn 
to the regional publications, notably the Glasgow Herald, 
Manchester Evening News, Liverpool Daily Post and
Mercury for a more detailed coverage. The Freemans 
Journal was not only very helpful, concerning general 
developments in Ireland but I found its London corres- .1 
pondent to have presented a much more detailed account of 
Irish affairs in Britain than the rival' Irish Independent.
The periodical press, usually of a specialized nature, 
appealing to more sectional interests,is by its very 
nature of publication ie its much less frequent 
appearance, much easier to cover in greater detail than 
the dailies. It was thus possible to read every issue of 
the weekly 'Catholic Herald, effectively the Irish Catholic 
newspaper in Britain,for the period between 1916-1930, 
supplemented by dipping into the much smaller circulation
70
Catholic Times. A basic problem however in using 
newspapers for researching defunct political organizations 
is that their coverage of the organization’s history is 
by no means uniform. The general yardstick is that 
coverage is quite extensive for the period of an organ­
ization’s rapid growth, which of course makes it news­
worthy, but unfortunately much more limited when the 
organization is declining; yet that is perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of the organization’s life history 
to sociologists. So the Times is very informative for 
the Irish Self Determination League between 1919-1922, 
but after 1923 the League is virtually referred to only 
in the context of legal proceedings and while the decline 
in coverage in the regional press is not so noticeably 
as steep, they too, by mid 1924 had lost all interest 
in the fast fading League. The League so extensively, 
if very critically, covered in the Catholic Herald up 
to 1924 vanished from its pages after a successful 
libel action against the paper by one of the League leaders.
The political press is even more susceptible to organi­
zational ebb and flow; the short history of the Irish 
Exile published by the Irish Self Determination League 
will _ subsequently be explored in greater detail. The 
other various Republican papers, Sinn Fein, The Daily 
Sheet, Eire,Poblacht na h Eireann and An Poblacht were 
very useful for the later stages of the Irish Self 
Determination League but once again most of these had 
a short life, either being banned as subversive
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publications or unable to finance their continued existence. 
The Irish Freedom.which commenced monthly publication in 
1939 and changed its name to the Irish Democrat in 1945 , 
is the organizational voice of the Connolly Association.
This organization claims, without very much real justi­
fication,- (its origins are examined in a subsequent 
section of this thesis) to be a successor to the Irish 
Self Determination League. At the start of my research 
I read every issue of these two papers between 1939 and 
1974, intending to do a detailed study of the Connolly 
Association* which proved impossible to carry out for 
a number of reasons. This reading period was not however 
wasted as the papers occasionally published material 
pertaining to the Irish in Britain during the first third 
of this century and in particular published accounts 
of the League by former members which were quite infor­
mative. The Irish Post which began weekly publication in 
1970 is a general publication aimed at covering the entire 
spectrum of interest within the Irish community in 
Britain and has a readership of almost half a million, 
making it an extremely influential publication in the 
community1. It has also published very useful historical 
pieces and has played an important part in my research.
Many researchers have sought information from newspaper 
readers by writing letters appealing for help with their 
research to editors. This can be an extremely productive 
means of research if two problems can be overcome. - The 
researcher, first has to persuade an editor that the
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nature of the research is sufficiently likely to appeal
to readers as to justify space in the letters column
and usually as there are far more letters than space,
this will be at the expense of other letters often
dealing with contemporary events. Even when this hurdle
is surmounted, there is still the problem of the actual
readers themselves and their reading content preference.
In the course of my journalistic career I have learnt that
whether one!s article is read in its entirety by readers
is usually dependent on the opening paragraph which either-
seizes their attention or looses it; hence eye catching
headlines and snappy introductions. Even more chasteningly,
I have seen internal readership surveys which reveal that
many readers do not even scan all the editorial content,
so some never even get as far as that crucial opening
paragraph. Many readers so not seem even to turn to
the letters column and few appear to read those placed,
with much smaller captions beneath the more prominently
displayed letters; so unfortunately the researcher’s
letter may not be read by those who could provide the
necessary information1. I was substantially more
fortunate in my own research? discovering that the British
Library did not have file copies of the,Irish Post for
the early years, I approached the editor for permission
to consult his office file copies. Not only did he very
helpfully provide a desk in his office to consult the
1 If the majority of readers do not even look at the 
letters column, then why have such a feature?
Editors regard letter columns as a 'service facility’ 
and a cheap means of market research.
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early issues but suggested 1 should write articles based 
on my research for the' Irish 'Post, The first of these 
was luckily awarded a feature writing prize and the 
subsequent publicity brought my research and information 
requirements to the attention.of many of the Irish in 
Britain, With my articles always given a full tabloid 
size page and sometimes the entire double centrefold 
spread, I had a much better chance of attracting the 
readers attention than tucked away in the letters 
column. I always concluded my articles with an appeal 
for further information on the particular subject and 
the response was always very good. Some of my articles, 
notably on the Irish in Britain and their military 
service in the First World War, the Irish in Britain and 
the 1916 Rising,and the Paris Irish Race Congress of 
1922, with all its implications for the position of the 
overseas Irish communities, generated a very informative 
on-going debate within the letters column that continued 
for weeks. Other readers wrote personally to me about 
their own personal memories or related their parents1 
experiences, and much valuable information was obtained 
in this manner. Even those who wrote intending to 
criticize my articles;and that old maxim ’you can’t 
please all the people all the time1 is particularly 
applicable to journalism / often kindly included the 
necessary information to correct my mistakes, committed 
as a result of the earlier non-availabilty of this
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information. As a result of these articles I was able 
to personally interview a small but highly lmporta,nt 
number of old Irish Self Determination League, IRA and 
Sinn Fein members.
Interview Methodology
Thompson1 has commented on the problems inherent in 
conducting historical research through personal interviews 
with participants involved in the events so 1 will only 
briefly comment on the particular problems I encountered. 
These centred around the advanced age of the interviewees ; 
the youngest was seventy three, the oldest eighty six and 
unfortunately recollection of events that occurred over 
sixty years ago cannot be expected to be perfect or 
unaffected by subsequent events which altered earlier 
perceptions. I found that the production of a tape 
recorder or even a note book often affected the earlier 
spontaneity of the recollections so in these cases I 
dispensed with such tools, relying on my memory to write 
up the interview immediately after it was completed.
In later interviews I was able to use a micro-cassette 
recorder hidden in my pocket,connected to a very discreet 
tiny external microphone. Most of the interviewees 
had contacted me after reading my Irish Post articles 
and the others I had approached, furnished with recommen­
dations from contemporaries of theirs. 1 formed the 
distinct impression that the way I had written those
1 P. Thompson, 'Memory and History’, SSRC Newsletter,
6 (June 1969), 16-18.
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articles was a distinct factor in the decision to contact
me. Most talked freely of their experiences, even
the IRA but it was noticeable that those who had been
members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood were less
inclined to discuss that particular organization; such
is the power of that oath sworn at least sixty years 
1
ago . My youngest interviewee more than compensated
for his lack of detailed personal knowledge of the pre-
219 22 period with his own personal manuscript . I 
discontinued one interview with the widow of an IRA 
officer when I realized she had not known of his military 
activities and that to tell an old woman facing death, 
herself, that her husband had been personally responsible 
for a number of deaths would only have caused her 
unnecessary worry.
1 General Sean MacEoin, one of the most senior IRB 
leaders,refused to publish his typescript auto­
biography on the grounds to do so would viobate the 
IRB oath of silence, see Padraic 0 fFarrell, The Sean 
MacEoin Story, (Cork, 19 81), 16.
John Feehan,' Who Killed Michael Coll ins, (Cork, 1982),in his' 
Preface claims that he encountered much opposition 
when he tried to prove the IRB's involvement in Field 
Marshal Wilson's assassination.
2 The 'Jhere's a few words I wrote about my early life*1 
turned out be a hand written 14,000 word manuscript 
which I had typed up for him and retained with his 
permission a copy for my own use. This manuscript 
hereafter cited as the Harry O'Brien MS, may lack, 
due to the author’s relative youth, the type of 
organizational detail an older person would have 
known but it makes up for this with its portrait of 
everyday life in the Irish community in London between 
the First and Second World Wars..
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The problems presented by secondary sources
“No historian can feel perfectly safe in adopting 
the results of another’s work, as may be done 
in the established sciences, for he does not 
know whether these results have been obtained by 
trustworthy methods1".
Unfortunately while Langlois and Sernobos’ observation
serves as a warning to carefully evaluate all secondary
source material, it clearly shows its 19th century origins
when in many fields it was still feasible for researchers
to personally check all the documents and sources used
by others. Modern researchers just cannot do this/
especially within the prescribed time limits established
for completing a PhD thesis. After the time consuming
process of searching through the archives? how one
wishes for a guide to material in British and Irish
Government records of use for a study of the Irish in
2
Britain like Calkin’s guide to the American archives,
3or MacGiolla’s guide to the Dublin Archives ; reading 
the newspapers and ploughing through the memoirs and 
supplementary works of the period in the effort to 
reconstruct the history of the defunct organization. It 
is simply not possible to follow the same procedure for
1 C.V. Langlois and C, Sergnobos, Introduction to the 
Study of History, (1898), 230.
2 Holmer L. Calkin, ’The US Government and the Irish:
A Bibliographical Study of Irish materials in the US 
National Archives', Irish Historical Studies, VIII 
(1954), 28-52.
3 Brendan MacGiolla Choille, 'Fenian Documents in the 
State Paper Office', Irish Historical Studies, XVI 
(1968), 258-84,
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other organizations; one might wish to use us a compare 
ison. So the existing published studies of these have 
to be resorted to even though organizational studies 
seem to be particularly prone to highly subjective 
analysis and even occasionally outright bias . This problem 
is particularly acute when the author is either totally 
opposed to or totally enchanted with the particular 
organization and the ideological position it represents.
Lane in her very revealing examination of the various
studies of the 'Molly Maguires' (the Irish American
radical miners organization) has revealed both significant
differences and an over reliance on the mineowners and
Pinkertons’ records at the expense of Molly sources .
2Bernstein also comments on this problem, which was 
particularly noticeable in the heavily value laden studies 
of American Communism and Socialism during the 'cold
3
war' . While at the opposite end of this spectrum few 
histories of the Communist parties written by members,
4
approach Gramsci’s ’iconographic’ requirement , being
1 Ann J . Lane, 'Recent Literature on the Molly Maguires', 
Science and Society, 30(1976), 309-19.
2 Samuel Bernstein, 'Centennial Historiography of the 
First International', ibid, 29(1965), 312-9.
3 See Ralph E. Shaffer, 'Communism in California, 1919- 
241, , Ibid, 34 (1970), 412-29. Bryan Strong, 'Historians 
and American Socialism’ Ibid, 387-97 and Sally M. Miller 
'Socialist Party Decline and World War I, Ibid,
398-411.
4 A .Grams ci, Prison' Notebooks, (1971), 151.
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either simply Stalinist holography1 or at best factual
2but turgid, uncritical accounts like Klugman’s .. These 
problems have largely been avoided in Ireland as there 
are virtually no organizational histories for the 1916- 
26 decade. Thus there are no proper studies of the IRA, 
Sinn Fein and the Free State Army for this crucial period 
in Irish history; an omission that owes much to Rose’s 
observation,
•'Ireland is almost a land without history because 
the troubles of the past are relived as contemporary 
events^.
The violence of the last decade in the North of Ireland 
has not only spilled across the border onto the streets 
of Southern Irish towns; it has substantially influenced 
contemporary Irish historical research itself. Until 
a decade ago the term Civil War as used by Irish 
historians in their journal, Irish Historical Studies, 
invariably meant not the fratricidal, conflict of sixty years 
ago but the 17th century extension of the Civil War in
1 See Franco Andreucci and Malcolm Sylvers, 'The Italian 
Communists Write Their History', Science and Society, 
40(1976), 28-56, for an illuminating account of 
traditional Communist party histories. ■
2 James Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, 2 vols. (1967, 1968). Also see Eric 
Hobsbawn,> 'Problems of Communist History', New Left 
Review, 54(1969), 85-9, and Peter Latham, 'Methodological 
Approaches to Communist Party History1,, Our History 
Journal, 3 (Oct., 1978), for a frank discussion of these 
problems by two Communist Party members.
3 Richard Rose quoted in Frank Burton, ’Ideological
and Social Relations in Northern Ireland', British Journal 
of Sociology, 30(1979), 61-80.
England. This virtual exclusion of the War of Independence 
period from the subject field of Irish historical research 
could perhaps be justified by accepting an extremely 
narrow definition of what constitutes historical interest. 
Historians could to some extent justify their avoidance 
of this critical period not by frankly admitting their 
reluctance to investigate the state’s ’official mythology’ 
but by arguing researchers should wait until the official 
archives were opened to inspection. Though this argument 
should not have precluded the systematic collection 4 
col-lation, evaluation and analysis of the potentially 
extremely valuable personal reminiscences of participants.
But when the archives were opened, first the British and 
then the Irish, the political environment had greatly 
changed. Interpretations of the 1916 Rising; an episode 
in which a small group with no popular mandate? indeed 
their activities were in clear defiance of majority 
opinion, attempted a coup with the result that many more 
innocent civilians became casualities than the participants, 
are bound to be affected by the contemporary ongoing 
political violence in Ireland today. The furore caused 
by Robert Kee1s television series on Irish history clearly 
illustrates this point. 'Tt is the sort of nationalistic 
history we academicians thought we were educating*'people 
out of" said Professor Donald McCartney denouncing the 
series. He accused Kee of adopting "a typically English 
liberal approach to Irish history in attributing British 
Governmental reform to Irish violence" which he claimed 
supported the ’’caricature of Irish history promoted by the
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Provisional IRAn? 1,
Yet there is much evidence to justify Kee's historical
interpretation of the evolution of Anglo-Irish relations;
if McCartney wishes to formulate a different hypothesis
then he and other like minded researchers will have to
conduct an exhaustive search for evidence that will
substantiate a reinterpretation of the manner by which
Southern Ireland achieved statehood. Otherwise the
process of historical reeducation will merely replace
2
one ’official mythology1 with another . In a situation
where historians seem increasingly pressurized by official
and media opinion makers to interpret their research
primarily in the light of contemporary events, then it
is perhaps not surprizing that most of the recent works
dealing with the crucial but topically sensitive 1919-23
period have come from the pens of non Irish born writers,
like Curran',and Calton Younger's^ detailed studies of
the Civil War, a particularly sensitive period, resolutely
5ignored by many Irish historians. The work of Hatchey
1 Guardian, 5 Dec. 1980,
2 This concern has been publicly expressed by two leading 
Irish historians*, Liam de Paor; see the Irish Press,
20 April, 1976, and Gearoid O. Tuaithaigh, Ibid,
2 Sept. 1976.
3 Joseph M. Curran,' The Birth of the Irish Free State 
1919-1923, (Alabama, 1980).
4 Calton Younger,' Ireland's Civil War, (1968) .
5 Thomas Hatchey, Britain and Irish Separatism (Chicago, 
1977) .
81
and Dangerfield1 is essential for those wishing to really
understand the Anglo-Irish War of Independence while
2
the English historian Townsend’s seminal study of
British military policies during this period provides
an invaluable account of an episode previously only told
3
from the Irish point of view. Rumpf’s pioneering study 
of the social and economic influences behind this struggle 
stands on a pinnacle of its own, towering over the barren 
wasteland that is twentieth century Irish social history. 
And even the most stimulating biographies of the principal
4
participants are the works of outsiders . Conor Cruise
O ’Brien ,a leading proponent of the new revisionist school
of Irish historiography, has suggested that Irish history
5is ''tribal history" - • more accurately it has essentially 
been a conflict between rival nationalisms and internal 
disagreements over the manner in which these two nation­
alisms should be politically expressed. Yet while Irish 
nationalism was the official creed of the new Irish state, 
the ideology of this nationalism remained unexplored
1 George Dangerfield, The Damnable Question: A Study in 
Anglo-Irish Relations, (Boston, 1976).
2 Charles Townsend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 
1919-1921, (1975) .
3 Erhard Rumpf and A.C. Heburn (trans.), Nationalism and 
Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland, (Liverpool, 
1977).
4 See for example, T. Ryle Dyer, Michael Collins and 
The Treaty: -His Differences with De Valera, (Cork, 
1981), and B. Wilkinson, The Zeal of the Convert, 
(Washington, 1976) , a biography of Erskine Childers.
5 Conor Cruise O ’Brien, States of Ireland, (1972).
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until very recent years when the appearance of works
1 2  3by Cronin , Boyce and Garvin indicated a growing
academic interest in this crucial topic. The interpre­
tation of these rival nationalisms has particularly 
divided Irish Marxist historians: in a manner not seen in 
most other countries, with their ongoing debate focussing
around the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland separate
4political development ..
With the notable exception of the above scholarly works, 
most of the published Irish works on the 1916-23 period 
that I have consulted belong to what I call the 'bang, 
bang' school of Irish historiography, comprising the
5
memoirs, both in book and newspaper article format of
1 Sean Cronin,' 'Irish Nationalism, a History of its 
Roots and Ideology , (Dublin, 1981).
2 D.G. Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, (Dublin, 1982).
3 Tom Garvin,' The Evolution of Irish Nationalist 
Politics, (19 82).
4 The different Marxian interpretations of Northern 
Irish loyalism and the subsequent creation^ of a 
separate state can be seen from a comparison of 
Michael Farrell,Northern Ireland: The Orange State 
(1980); its title firmly places this work in the Irish 
Republican Socialist camp, and the work of Paul Bew, 
Peter Gibbons and Henry Patterson, The State in 
Northern Ireland, 1921-1972, (Manchester, 1980)
and Peter Gibbons,' ' The Origin of Ulster Unionism , 
who accept the legitimacy of the loyalist’s demand 
for their separate state.
5 Newspaper serializations of participants memoirs were 
particularly common in Ireland during the early 1950:s, 
a period of renewed official agitation on the Partition 
issue,but these accounts appeared much less frequently 
after 1956 when the IRA once again started to pursue 
its own anti-partition policy with a Border Campaign.
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the participantst Heggoy in his study of the Algerian 
War of Independence, a conflict with many parallels to 
Irelandfe, has commented on the problem of finding non-
X
committed source material . In Ireland there are 
additional problems relating to the circumstances in 
which the war was fought and its tragic aftermath of 
Civil War. The Irish struggle was largely fought in a 
highly decentralized manner and while most of the 
participants are too modest to inflate their own personal 
contributions, parochial pride has led them to emphasize 
local unit activities at the expense of the broader 
picture. Few participants/With the notable exception of 
Ernie O ’ Malley , have embodied any tactical analysis into 
their memoirs, but their greatest failing is often their 
selectivity; usually expressed not so much as the delib­
erate omission of events than of entire periods. The 
break up of the IRA in 19 22*the brutal severing of 
friendships in the fratricidal strife that followed left 
many participants unwilling to include this period in 
their memoirs. Even almost sixty years later, when the 
bitterness engendered by the conflict has substantially 
mellowed into a recognition by the surviving participants
1 A, Heggoy,' 'Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in 
Algeria, ( 1972) • XI-X1I..
2 Ernie O ’Malley, Oh Another Man's Wound, (1967).
' The' Singing Flame, (Dublin, 1978) ,
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that their opponents had, honour on their side too,
Comerford who supported the Treaty and Deasy who actively
led the struggle against it, still felt themselveis
unable to include their Civil War experiences in their
recent memoirs1. Desmond Fitzgerald ,whose position as
the first Free State Minister for External Affairs
afforded him much knowledge on the break up of the Irish
Self Determination League/Unfortunately decided to stop
his memoirs in 1916 so as not to "set down anything which
2might lay bare old wounds" .
Henri Michel, the doyen of European Second World War 
resistance researchers has scathingly referred to the
3
problem of the ’camphorated1 , those who joined the
resistance in the final days of the German Occupation. In
Ireland this type of person was known as a ’trucileer1; ’
who joined the IRA in such numbers that 40,000.of the
55,000 applications for Independence War Pensions were
summarily rejected as their ’service1 had occurred '.after
4the July 1921 Truce . Comerford has referred to the
1 James A. Comerford, My Kilkenny IRA Days 1916-22, 
(Kilkenny, 1978).
Liam Deasy, Towards Ireland Free, (Cork, 1973). 
Uinseann MacEoin, Survivors' , (Dublin, 1981) , spoilt 
an otherwise good book by deciding not to interview 
those who supported the Treaty.
2 See Desmond Fitzgerald, Memoirs, 1913-1916, (1968, 
Preface).
3 Henri Michel,’The Psychology of the French ResistorJ 
Journal of Contemporary History, 5(1970), 159-75, 
called ’camphorated’ because their 'uniforms’ still 
smelt of mothballs.
4 See Wolfe Tone Weekly, 5 March, 1938.
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problem facing authors who have been beset by people 
falsely claiming IRA active service1 but the small size
of the country and the paradoxical openess of the
2 3'secret1 IRA has with one exception saved Irish readers
4
from home spun ’Penkovskies' . However the following three
5titles ,Was John Keogh :an' inf drifter, ' Was: John Keogh an 
Informer - a reply to Fr Finnegan and The' Reality of the 
Anglo-Irish War 1920-21 in West Cork/ Refutations, 
Corrections' And Comments on Liam Deasy's Towards Ireland
7
Free , indicate the nature of the problems involved in 
sorting out the disputed claims and counter claims , 
honestly advanced by participants and researchers alike. 
These works contain only a few scattered references to 
the Irish in Britain during the 1916-26 period and there
1 Comerford, op. cit. 929.
2 Sean 0'Callaghan1s The Easter Lily. The Story of the 
IRA, (1956) seemed to include much more material than 
most other works on the IRA in Britain, but the 
veracity of this information is overshadowed by one 
reviewer who called it tfA' worthless book that cannot 
be recommended on any grounds'*, (Irish Independent,
6 April, 1957) while Bowyer Bell, op. cit. 461 suggests 
this reviewer "was being kind*1 .
3 As all the popular newspapers in Ireland devote an 
amount of space found only in the British 'quality' 
press to book reviews, approximate knowledge of a 
books contents reach a far greater audience than the 
actual book sales might indicate.
4 The Penkovsky Papers, (1965) purporting to be the 
diary of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky,a British agent in 
Russia,were a CIA concoction, see Chapman Pincher, 
op. cit. 189.
5 Francis Finnegan,Studies, 39(1950), 338-40.
6 Helen Landreth, Ibid, 325-38,
7 Tom Barry, (Tralee, 1974) .
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is virtually no published literature with the exception 
of a few articles in the' Capuchin Annual and An T-Oglach 
(the old IRA paper) specifically dealing with this issue. 
Padraic O'Farrell's recent Who'1 S/UWIl'cr in the War of Inde­
pendence only includes 13 British names in his several
1 2hundred long list . Brady is the only participant to have 
published in book form his experiences in the IRA in 
Britain but unfortunately the veracity of his book has
3
been seriously questioned by his former commanding officer . 
'IRA Pension* applications from the British based volunteers 
which would surely provide much valuable information have 
never been released, but Ernie O'Malley who was asked by 
some British applicants to substantiate their service 
records did personally interview these IRA members and
4thus preserved their valuable recollections for posterity .
Few researchers have studied the other Diaspora Irish 
in Australia ., S. Africa and Canada during this period. 
There is of course a very comprehensive body of literature
1 Padraic O'Farrell, Who's Who in the War of Independence, 
(Cork, 1979).
2 Sean Brady, TreTand's Secret Service in England,
(Dublin, 1928).
3 See Hugh Early's review of Brady's book in which he 
refutes Brady's involvement in many of the Liverpool 
IRA actions he describes,"his tenure of office as 
Acting OC lasted one week and then a solitary detective 
called and thus ended Mr Brady's career of glory as a 
Sinn Fein gunman". An Poblacht, 3 March, 1928.
4 PI7/b/100.
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on the Irish American response to events in Ireland during 
1916-26,1 but their position in America was substantially 
different to the situation of the Irish communities 
living in the British Empire Dominions. For comparative 
purposes the Diaspora Irish community whose situation 
embodied the closest parallels to the Irish in Britain 
were the Canadian Irish. They too also lived in a 
country where the majority of the population supported 
the link with Britain and like the Irish in Britain they 
too had experienced considerable hostility as a result 
of the military activities of their compatriots; for 
Canada was three times in the late 1860’s invaded by 
Fenian expeditions from across the border. This episode 
because of its military significance and its effect on 
the development of the Confederation of the Canadian
2Provinces has been well documented by Canadian historians . 
Unfortunately researchers have not shown the same 'interest 
in studying the Irish Canadian response to.the Anglo-
3
Irish War of Independence , an unfortunate omission as 
the Canadian Self Determination League encountered 
considerable hostility from British supporters. Davis’ 
study of the New Zealand Irish ,while providing useful
1 Much of this literature is directly cited where 
relevant in this thesis.
2 I have personally read over twenty works on this 
topic, and some of the more useful ones are listed
in:a: subsequent chapter.
3 A systematic search through Canadian journals revealed 
only one article on this period, John W. Boyle,
’A Fenian Protestant in Canada: Robert Lindsay 
Crawford 1919-221 , Canadian Historical' Review,
52(1971), 165-76.
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insights, is largely devoted to the pre-190Q period1 .
and while the 1916-22 period is somewhat better documented
across the Tasman Sea, it is difficult to effectively
distinguish the influence of events from the growing
strength of Australian Nationalism on such key issues as the
2
1916 Anti-Conscription movement .
The problem in trying to compare the Irish in Britain to 
the rest of the Diaspora Irish is that one is effectively 
forced to use the work of others who may often have 
conducted their research with rather different objectives 
than my own. This problem also materialized when I 
was investigating the influence of the 1916-22 events 
in Ireland and Britain on the position of Irish Catholics 
in Britain. This was such a sensitive period in the 
history of British Catholicism that North deliberately
3
excluded it from his research on the Catholic Press ;
and with even such a distinguished Catholic historian as
Denis Gwynn vastly exaggerating the influence of the
appointment of a Catholic as Irish Viceroy in bringing
4about the 1921 Anglo-Irish settlement . I found it 
necessary to conduct my own lengthy investigation into 
the Irish influence on Catholicism in Britain.
1 Richard P. Davis, Irish Issues in New Zealand Politics, 
1868-1922, (Dunedin, 1974),
2 See Michael McKernan, ’Catholics,Conscription and 
Archbishop Mannix' ,‘ Historical Studies, 17 (1977) , 
299-314.
3 North, op, cit.
4 Denis Gwynn, A Hundred Years of Catholic Emancipation 
1829-19 29, .(1929), 262;says of the appointment of 
Viscount Fitzalan as the first Catholic Viceroy in 
Ireland,
contd.,
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The relatively recent emergence of a real Irish Sociology;
for many years Sociology in Ireland was no more than
the academic wing of Catholic Social Action^ has effectively
minimized the appearance of sociological interpretations
of Irish history. Studies of the socio-economic
composition of Irish political movements have largely
been confined to Rumpf’s already noted pioneering work,
2Clark’s study of the Land League , Gibbon’s analysis
3
of the origins of Ulster Unionism, Fitzpatrick’s 
seminal research of the National Struggle in one Irish
county4, and Larsen and Snoddy's valuable occupational
analysis of the 1916 Rising participants f . Unfortunately
Padraic 0 ’Farrell, whose service in the Irish Army appears
to have given him access to records not available to
other researchers, has omitted the occupational details
of the participants listed in his already noted Who’s Who.
’‘within a few months of his arrival in Ireland, the 
situation improved remarkably and the policy of 
conciliation succeeded in producing a settlement 
which had never been even sought in the preceeding 
years”. This interpretation of the ending of the 
War of Independence is not supported by most other 
historians. Cardinal Logue who opposed the IRA, 
declared, wwe would as soon have a Catholic hangman” 
than a Catholic Viceroy (Comerford, op. cit. 602), 
while the London IRA tried to hang the new Viceroy, 
see P17/B/100.
1 Social Studies, the Irish Sociological Journal was for 
many years called Christus Rex.
2 Samuel Clark, Social Origins of the Irish Land War , 
(Princeton, 1979) .
3 Gibbons, op. cit.
4 David Fitzpatrick,' Politics and Irish Life 1913-21, 
(Dublin, 1978),
5 Stein Ugeluik Larsen and Oliver Snoddy, '1916: A 
Workingmen’s Revolution. An Analysis of those who 
made the 1916 Revolution in Ireland' ' 'Social' Studies, 
2(1973), 378-98.
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So my own socio-economic occupational analysis of both 
the leadership and rank and file members of the Irish 
Self Determination League may hopefully make a useful 
contribution to the development of a sociological inter 
pretation of Irish history. The foregoing discussion 
of my wide range of research sources and account of the 
methodological problems involved in using the different 
types of sources has I believe established that I have 
left no stone unturned in my attempt to reconstruct the 
political activity of the Irish in Britain during the 
1916-26 decade.
CHAPTER 3
The Political Sociology of the Irish in Britain 
1916-1923: Some Theoretical Considerations
The three principal theoretical areas of interest in 
my research are (1) Nationalism, (2) Ethnicity and 
Assimilation and (3) Organizational Sociology. This 
third sphere will be treated in substantially more detail 
than the other two as my research is constructed around 
a study of an Irish political organization, the Irish 
Self Determination League.
Anthony Smith, a very prolific writer on the theme of 
nationalism, has observed, "sociologists from Comte and 
Marx to Parsons and Dahrendorf have neglected nation­
alism” .1 His criticism is particularly applicable to * 
Ireland, where as we have earlier observed in our consid­
eration of methodological problems, the sphere of nation­
alism and its associated ideology has remained almost
2totally unexplored until the recent works of Cronin,
3 4Boyce and Garvin . The historian, E.H. Carr specif­
ically located the concept of the nation and its associ­
ated, ideological concept of nationalism to "certain
5
periods of history and to certain parts of the world".
1 Anthony, D . Smith, Theories of Nationalism,(1971), 3.
2 Sean Cronin, op. cit.
3 D.G. Boyce, op. cit.
4 Tom Garvin, op. cit.
5 E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, (1945), 39.
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Smith believes that historians have an overall better 
track record in researching nationalism than sociologists 
though they have been equally unable to explain the 
phenomenon. Smith complains that traditionally socio~ 
logists have simply interpreted nationalism as a reaction 
or response to societal tensions, particularly during 
modernization'1'. He identifies three broad usages of 
nationalism by sociologists ?
(1) As a nation building factor.
(2) Equated with national sentiment,
(3) Specifically perceived as an ideology .
Smith himself defines nationalism as an "ideological 
movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self 
government and independence on behalf of a group, some 
of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or
3
potential nation like others ".
4
Smith unlike other writers like Kedourie sees nationalism
1 See Anthony D. Smith. ’Nationalism. A Trend Report1, , 
Current Sociology, 21(1973), 7-176 for a compre­
hensive review of sociological research on nationalism 
and also see H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, (New 
York, 1967).
2 Anthony D. Smith, 'The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some 
Historical and Sociological Perspectives', British 
Journal of Sociology, 29(1978), 235-48 and also see 
His ’Ethnocentrism,Nationalism and Social Change", 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology,
13 (1972) , 1-20.'
3 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, op. cit. 171.
4 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, (1960).
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as an important socially integrative force. Marxists
also tended to disapprove of nationalism and as Davis
has observed perhaps Engel*s greatest contribution
towards the evolution of Marxism was to steer Marx
himself away from his pronounced ''leanings towards
racialism1*, * though the rise of the anti colonial national
Liberation movements has generated anew Marxist interest 
2in Nationalism . In Ireland as Rumpf has eloquently 
3
demonstrated , the socio-economic and cultural environment
was generally antagonistic towards the emergence of a
dominant socialist revolutionary tradition. Some
socialists did play a leading role in the Irish anti
colonial struggles: Davis regards James Connolly’s,
the executed 1916 Rising leader, fusion of socialism
with democratic nationalism as establishing the pattern
pursued by many later Third World National Liberation 
4Movements but generally speaking the socialists were
1 Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism:' Marxist 
and /labour Theories of Nationalism to 1917, (New 
York, 1967), 72-3. Also see Ian Cummins, Marx,
Engels and National Movements, (1980), Marx and Engels.
On Ireland, (1971) and Bernadette O'Sullivan, 'Marx, 
Ireland and the First International1 , Retrospect,
(1973/4), 20-41.
2 For the contemporary Marxian perspectives on nation­
alism, see, Horace B. Davies, 'Nations, Colonies and 
Social Classes: The Position of Marx and Engels*,
Science and Society, 29(1965), 26-43. Anquar Abdel- 
Malet, 'Sociology of National Movements and Imperialism1, 
Current Sociology, 22(1974), 177-88 and V.G. Kiernan,
'On the Development of a Marxist Approach to Nation­
alism' . Science and Society, 34 (1970), 92
3 Rumpf, op. cit.
4 See Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism, 
op. cit., 126.
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subsumed into the nationalist movement rather than
controlling it1. According to Gross the long history
of Polandfs struggle for national self determination
has generated an ’Insurrectionist’ ethos which has
evolved into a cultural complex reflected in the country’s
value attitudes, personality and general political life,
glorifying insurrectionism in its art, literature, arch-
2itecture and music etc . A similar all embracing nation-
3
alist ethos has emerged in Ireland and the Polish and 
Irish revolutionary traditions converge in other direc­
tions also. In Poland the original leaders of the 
Nationalist movement were the aristocracy but their 
leading role and participation sharply declined following 
the 1864 emancipation of the serfs and the growing
convergence of Russian and Polish commerce and industrial 
4development . In Ireland the original proponents of 
Republicanism, the most progressive aspect of the Irish 
nationalist tradition were the predominantly Ulster 
based Protestant Dissenters of the United Irishmen whose
1 See Michael Gallagher, 'Socialism and the Nationalist 
Tradition in Ireland, 1798-1918', Eire-Ireland, 12 
(1977), 63-102, for a concise account of the socialist 
contribution in the Irish national revolutionary 
movement.
2 Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party; Essays in the 
Sociology of Politics, (Connecticut, 1974), 124-6.
3 Interestingly the current 'revisionist' movement in 
Ireland seeking to 'demilitarize1 Irish history and 
culture has close parallels with the similar Polish 
’Positivist’ movement of the late 19th century, 
ibid, 126-7.
4 See Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 
op. cit. 127.
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Rising in 1798 was greatly influenced by the ideology of 
the French Revolution. But the uneven Irish industrial­
ization process subsequently created the very close 
interlocking relationship between Northern Irish and 
British capitalism that generated the economic base for 
a separatist state.
While economic factors underpinned the emergence of the
rival and deeply antagonistic nationalisms in Ireland
their primary ideological expressions centred around
religious identification, Protestantism in the case of
2
the Ulster pro-British element and Catholicism for Irish
Nationalism. Dr 0 TDonnell,the Australian leader of the
constitutional and non-violent United Irish League,
expressed this symbiotic relationship between Irish
Nationalism and Catholicism in his wish,
*‘1 want my descendants to know and feel though 
Australians by birth and fealty, they are Irish 
in blood. I wish them also to be unflinching 
in their fidelity to the Catholic faith. It 
ought to be part of their nature like their
1 See Peter Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism,
op. cit., Paul Bew, Peter Gibbons and Henry Patterson, 
op. cit., J.R. Archer, 'The Unionist Tradition in 
Ireland', Eire-Ireland, 15(1980), 47-59, and Peter 
Gibbon, ''Origins of the Orange Order and the United 
Irishmen'*': The Sociology of Revolution and Counter 
Revolution', Economy and Society, 1( 1972), 134-
2 See Frank Wright, 'Protestant Ideology and Politics 
in Ulster', Archives Europeenes De SocioTogle, 14
(1973), 213-80, for an interesting discussion of 
the role of Protestantism in forming the ideological 
foundations of the Northern Irish state, and also 
see John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: The 
Development of a Polarised Community, (Dublin, 1976) .
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nationality. Because they are Irish, they 
ought to be proud to be Catholic and they 
ouqht to be truly Catholic because they are 
Irish8.1
Herberg's dictum, *to be a Catholic was to be a true
2
Irishman, to be an Irishman was to be a true Catholic” 
is strikingly similar to the old Hungarian proverb,
‘’To be a Magyar was to be a Calvinist". In both cases 
religion and nationality were juxtaposed on a'Millet,;
4
type basis . Patrick O'Farrell goes so far as to claim 
that Catholicism has been a more important influence on
5
Irish history than nationalism and 0 ’Day, while arguing 
that in the late 19 th century the- immigrant- Irish 
community in Britain formed a sub-culture within British 
society , claims it was ’‘religion rather than nation­
ality (that) proved the greatest informal hurdle. «x.^e 
Protestant Irish had always been assimilated without 
difficulty and the way was also clear for those Irish 
Catholics who eschewed their religion” .
1 Quoted in Niall Brennan, Dr Mannix, (Adelaide, 1964) ,
66.
2 W. Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew, (New York, 1960) , 
146.
3 Quoted in B. Scharf, The Sociological Study of 
Religion, (1970), 42.
4 The Turkish or Ottoman Empire abscribed citizenship 
on a ’Millet1 basis, with full citizenship only 
given to those practising the state religion, Islam, 
see W. Cahnmann,' Sociology and History, (New YorkJ 
1964), 272, also see his ’Religion and Nationality’,
' American Journal of Sociology, 49(1943/4), 524-9.
5 Patrick 0 ’Farrell, Ireland's English Question: 
Anglo-Irish Relations, 1534-19 70, (New York, 1971) .
6 Patrick O ’Day, op. cit., 116-17.
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I am not entirely convinced that the Protestant Irish 
in Scotland and Lancashire were so easily assimilated 
but certainly 0 ?Day correctly observes that the Catholic 
religion was a barrier towards assimilation in a 
Protestant country.
Long before the Reformation there existed deep religious 
tensions between Ireland and England stemming from 
their structurally different modes of religious organ­
izations, with Ireland having a monastic system closely 
paralleling its clan based socio-economic system ,and 
following a pattern of worship based more on the Eastern
Orthodox rite1 than the Roman system adopted-after the
2defeat of the Irish missionaries-in England . The 
ostensible reason for the first English invasion of 
Ireland was the issuing of the Bull Laudabiltur in 1155 
by the English Pope Adrian IV empowering Henry II to 
'Romanize' the Irish Catholic Church , Kennedy suggests 
the result of this English Catholic intervention in
1 For early Irish Catholicism see K.Hughes r Early 
Christian Ireland: An Introduction to the Smirnes 
(1972), and the more concise, less specialized, 
account by Maire and Liam de Paor, Early Christian 
Ireland , (1964).
2 Northern England was converted by Irish missionaries 
but Southern England was a Roman province and in 
633 AD the Irish influence was defeated at the
Synod of Whitby, see Joseph'F. Kelly, 'Irish Influence 
in England After The Synod of Whitby ' , Eire-Ireland, 
10(1975), 35-47.
3 For the early Norman invasions of Ireland see
G. Orpen, Ireland Under The Normans, 3 vols., (1968).
98
Ireland generate such bitter resentment that "if
England had remained Catholic, the Irish would have
become Protestant1”. One result of the Reformation was
a considerable legitimization of the periodic Irish
struggles to tegain their freedom from England with
Ireland becoming part of the European anti-Protestant
coalition against England. Irish Catholicism thus
became identified as an implacable threat to the English
Protestant state, and the employment of Irish Catholic
troops by the pro-Catholic James;- II was a key factor
in launching the ’Glorious Protestant Revolution of 
2
1688’ Even in the pre-mass immigration period the
Irish Catholics living in England were periodically
3subjected to large scale attacks by Protestants and if 
these occurrences were not so" prevalent during the 
mass Irish immigration of the 19 th century, it was 
the result more of improved policing methods, than any
4
fundamental lessening of anti-Irish feeling,
1 R. Kennedy 'Single or Triple Melting Pot; Intermarriage 
Trends in New Haven 1870-1940', American Journal of 
Sociology, XLIX (1944), 331-39.
2 Hugh Shepe, the London agent of William of Orange, 
skillfully played on the English xenophobia with his 
'stories’1 of whole towns laid waste by the’child 
eating Irish’ see the Irish Post.3 June,*1972.
3 For example see, G.E. Alymer, ’St Patrick’s Day 1628 
Riot in Witham Essex' / Past and Present r 61 (19 73), 131- 
48. and for an account of the 1778 anti-Irish Catholic 
Gordon Riots see Major General A. Deane-Drumond, Riot 
Control , (19 75).
4 Dorothy George, London Life in the 18th Century,(19 25)#
133, claims the Irish in London were regarded as a 
police problem, a sanitary problem, a poor law problem 
and an industrial problem. Sheridan Gilley, 'English 
Attitudes to the Irish in England, 1790-1900’ in
C. Holmes (edt) Immigrants and Minorites in British..contd.
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Heiberg has postulated a theory of Nationalism for the 
1
Basques , a nationality with many parallels with the ir.ish
and Smith has constructed an elaborate theoretical
2framework of the diverse types of nationalism, but
several of his non-theoretically :: formulated observations
are I believe much more relevant to my research than
any theoretical critique, "It is impossible to tie
nationalism to the aspirations of any social groups in
- 3a consistent manner" and his views that the "emigrant
4
is the man (so) lightly touched by nationalism1’ that
5".emigrants do not generally make good nationalists” 
will be empirically investigated in my concluding chapter. 
Smith's observation that ”the emigrant exchanges one 
potential nationalism for another, but usually over 
generations, and without a clear perception of the 
process'’ is extremely relevant to any consideration 
of the assimilation process.
Very few sociologists, if any, today would agree with
Society,(1978), gives a concise account of anti-Irish 
feeling and Catherine Jones, Immigration and Social 
Policy in Britain,(1977), quotes at length from the 
various Parliamentary Poor Law Enquiries on the Irish 
in Britain. Also see Patrick Quinlivan and Paul Rose, 
The Fenians in England 1865-1872 ,(1982), for the
generalized anti-Irish feeling and periodic rioting 
in the 1860's.
1 Marianne Heiberg 'Insiders, Outsiders: Basque National­
ism' , Archives Europeenes de SocioTogie , 16 (1975),169-93.
2 Anthony D. Smith, 'Theories and Types of Nationalism' , 
Archives Europeenes De Sociologie,10 (1969), 119-32.
3 Ibid. Theories of Nationalism op. cit., 132.
4 Ibid, 139
5 Ibid, 109.
6 Ibid, 140.
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Zangwill view of the ”inevitability” of assimilation1;
the flood of works investigating the position of long
established ethnic groups in America from Glazer and
Moynihan's ’discovery’1, twenty years ago, that the
2
United States was still a multi ethnic society to 
Novak’s rather strident proclamation of a !new ethnicity’ 
among the 4th generation descendents of the 19th
3
century immigrants bears eloquent witness to the 
non-inevitability of the assimilation process. There v 
are numerous definitions of assimilation but Sauvy’s 
view that, ’’assimilation is achieved when a former 
immigrant or his descendants can no longer be distinguished 
from other nationals and are no longer conscious of
4
their original characteristics” and Gordon’s concept 
of assimilation as the ’’development of a sense of
5
Peoplehood based exclusively on the Host Society*1 
indicate that assimilation is a long term process; 
very unlikely as Patterson has observed to be completed
g
in one generation . Gordon breaks down the assimilation
1- Quoted in R.E. Park, Old World Traits Transposed (New 
York, 1921), 113.
2 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the 
Melting Pot, (New York 1963).
3 See Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics 
(New York, 1973) and ’The New Ethnicity’ ,' The Center 
Magazine,July 1974
4 Alfred Sauvy f 'Psycho-Social Aspects of Migration’ 
in Brinley Thomas (edt) Economics of International 
Migration,(1958), 299,
5 Milton Gordon /Assimilation in American Life,(New York,
1964), 71.
6 Shiela Patterson, Dark Strangers 1963), 15.
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process into seven sub processes which can be subsumed 
into two primary categories, .behavioural assimilation or 
acculturation and structural assimilation, the ethnic 
distribution in the societal socio-economic system, and
argues that once these two processes occur all others
1 2  3follow automatically . Parreti and Gallo argue that
assimilation is virtually synomous with structural
assimilation but Bierstedt regards assimilation instead
4as being synomous with acculturation , while Jones
bluntly rejected the entire concept of structural
assimilation in his argument that the only difference
between the Irish in Britain and the indigneous inhabi-
5 6tants is their lower socio-economic status , Richmond 
has suggested that the concept of structural assimilation 
has outlived its usefulness and certainly an additional 
factor is necessary when considering groups like the 
Irish in America who have above median income, educa-
7
tional attainment and occupational distribution levels
1 Gordon, ibid, 71-83.
2 Michael Parreti, ’Ethnic Politics and the Persistence 
of Ethnic Identification' , American Political Science 
Review, (1967), and also see R.E. Wolfinger 'The 
Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting', ibid, 
59(1965), 846-908.
3 P. Gallo, Ethnic Assimilation: The Italian Americans, 
(New York, 1974), 114.
4 R. Bierstedt, The Social Order, (New York, 1963) .
5 Philip Jones, The Segregation of Immigrant Communities 
in the City ofBirmingham (Hull University Department 
of Geography, 19 61).
6 A.H. Richmond, Migration and Race Relations in an 
English City: A Study in Bristol-^ (1973) .
7 See William Shannon, *The lasting - Hurrah' in David 
Colburn and George Pozzetta (edt), America a n d  the 
New Ethnicity, (New York, 1979) , 171-5.
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Castles and Kosack in their monumental study of immigrant
workers in Europe totally refute the use of concepts
like 'host society', 'adaptation', 'integration',
'assimilation', arguing instead that, immigrants do not
adapt to> but are 'assigned1 to socio-economic positions
in a non-equalitarian society1. They have very usefully
positioned the immigrant within the total social order,
unlike most American researchers who have traditionally
2been over-preoccupied with 'culturalism' . Lieberson
however postulated that cultural distinctions were
3
explicable in terms of environmental differences
while Yancey, Ericksen and Julian regard American ethnic
groups as the structural products of industrialization
4and urbanization , Gallo's view that "the Ethnic sub­
society is created by the inter-section of the vertical 
stratifications of Ethnicity with the horizontal 
stratifications of social class that we call Ethni-Class" 
is a very valuable linking of ethnicity to the wider 
social system but it does require some definition of what 
we mean by the terms ethnicity and ethnic.
1 Castles and Kosack, op. cit. 1-6.
2 See for example, Harold Abramson, Ethnic Diversity
in Catholic America, (New York, 1973), N.R. White, 
'Ethnicity, Culture and Cultural Pluralism'1, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 1(1978), and for the British 
tradition, see, E. Krausz, 'Acculturation and Pluralism' 
New Community, 1(1972).
3 Stanley Lieberson, Ethnic Patterns in American Cities, 
(New York, 1963).
4 William Yancey, Eugene Ericksen and Richard Julian, 
'Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation', • 
American Sociological Review, 41(1976), 391-403.
5 Gallo, op. cit. 22.
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Ethnicity as Horowitz has salutorily reminded Glazer and
Moynihan is not a pnew word”1. Pareto may have brusquely
dismissed the term ’‘ethnic as one of the vaguest known 
2to sociology* but Weber devoted considerable attention
to ethnic groups, ;
“we shall call ethnic groups those human groups 
that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type 
or of customs or both, or because of memories of 
colonization and migration: this belief must be 
important whether or not an objective blood relation-U 
ship exists. Ethnic membership "Gemeinsarkeit" 
differs from the kinship group precisely by being 
a presumed identity, not^a group with concrete social 
actions like the latter" .
Weber’s concept of group consciousness generating social
circles, or as he called them, ’’Soziale Verkehrsgmein-
schaft" has influenced Barth’s concept of ’ethnic
4
boundaries’ which also resembles some of Marx’s earlier
5
work on nationalism . Molohon, Paton and Lambert have 
elaborated on Barth’s work in their focus on ethnic
g
persistence rather than acculturation and assimilation .
1 See Irving Louis Horowitz scathing review in the 
American Journal of Sociology, 82(1976), .221-25, of 
Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (edt), Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience, (Massachusetts?, 1975) and also 
see Patrick J. Blessing, 'Ethnicity: Perspectives in 
History and Sociology', Comparative Studies in Society 
and History. 22(1980), 450-57.
2 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on 
General Sociology, (New York, 1963) , 1837.
3 Max Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit. 389.
4 See Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups arid Boundaries, 
(Boston, 1969) .
5 For example, see Karl Marx’s 'Essays on the Jewish 
Question' in T.B. Bottomore (edt), Karl Marx: Early 
Writings, (New York, 1964), 3-40.
6 Kathryn T. Molohon, Richard Paton and Michael Lambert, 
'An Extension of Barth’s Concept of Ethnic Boundaries'• , 
Human Relations, 32(1979), 1-12.
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Yancey, Eriksen and Julian have complained that American
research on ethnicity has been dominated by the ongoing
assimilationsist versus pluralism debate,with both
arguments essentially resting on cultural foundations'1'.
2Pluralists have virtually monopolized the ethnicity
3
field of research though more recently Marxists like
Saul have recognized the important role ethnicity plays
in many societies particularly in the post-colonial 
4era .
1 Op. cit. See also E.O. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism,
(New York, 19 73) , Leon Mayhew, 'Ascription in Modern 
Societies', Sociological Inquiry, 38(1968), 105-20, and 
G. De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (edt), Ethnic Identity: 
Cultural Continuities and Change, (Palo Alto, 1975) .
2 Pluralism as a sociological school owes much of its 
origins to J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, 
(Cambridge, 1948) ; its colonial ethos, (Furnivall
was a colonial administrator) have been repeatedly 
attacked. John Rex, 'The Plural Society in Socio­
logical Theory', British Journal of Sociology,
10(1954), 114-24, has strongly argued against its 
a-historical functionalist ignorance of socio­
economic inequality and uneven power relationships, 
while Malcolm Cross has complained "Pluralism (is) 
used so widely as to be almost indefinable” , see 
his introduction to the 'Special Issue on Pluralism'- ,
New Community, 1(1972) and his subsequent denunciation 
of its theoretical ’pretensions' and his claim that 
Pluralism is a typology not a theory; The Paradoxes of 
Pluralism: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations ' j  
Paper Presented at the World Congress of Sociology, 
Uppsala, 18 August, 1978. Also see Martin Brennan,
'Race Relations and Underdevelopment in Malaysia', 
University of Surrey, Seminar Paper (November, 1980) 
for a stimulating critique of Pluralism.
3 See Orlando Patterson, ''Ethnicity and the Pluralist 
Fallacy'-, Change, 7 (1975), 10-11, 4-7., and 70-72.
4 See John Saul, 'The Dialectic of Class and Tribe', 
Race and Class, 20(1979), 347-73.
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Hechter argues that ethnicity is not neccessarily 
cultural linked and usefully classifies ethnicity 
research into two main categories,1
(1) ’Functionalist theory’, as exemplified in Shils 
conceptualization of ethnicity as a ’primordial sentiment” 
which declines in intensity as industrialization prog­
resses.
(2) ’Reactive theory’, regarding ethnicity as the 
product of the saliency of cultural distinctiveness as
3
exemplified in Barth’s work . Hechter in a very inter­
esting example of the manner in which historical data 
can be used to test sociological hypotheses and concepts 
has examined these different interpretations by comparing 
the Celtic peripheral regions, Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland with England,to see whether industrialization 
did lead to a diminution of ethnicity in these peri­
pheral' regions. He concluded that the persistence 
of ethnic solidarity was not a ’primordial sentiment1 
but the manifestation of a ’high political consciousness’. 
Hechter postulates an ’internal colonialism’ model in 
which industrialization actually increases the original
exploitation of the peripheral ethnic groups, creating
4
political cleavage lines based on ethnic divisions .
1 Michael Hechter , ‘'The Political: Economy of Ethnic C h a n g e , 
American Journal of Sociology ,79 (1973/4), 1151-78.
2 Edward Shils 'Primordial, .Personal, Sacred, and Civ.il 
Ties', British Journal of Sociology ,8 (1957), 130-45.
3 Barth, op. cit..
4 See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic 
Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966,
(19 75) and 'Industrialisation and National Develop- 
ment in the British Isles’, Journal of ....contd.
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His methodology has been criticized by Page* while
Sloan has argued, with some justification, that Hechter's
model does not provide a satisfactory explanation for
2the particularistic development of Ireland but neverthe-
3
less the internal colonialism model combined with 
Gallo's concept of the ethnic class does provide a 
useful working theoretical framework for my research 
of the Irish in Britain.
Thirty-five years ago, Francis employed the term ethnic
group simply as the English equivalent of the corresponding
German, Russian and Greek terms, Volksgruppe, Narod 
4and Ethnos but since then researchers like Isajiw
have defined ethnicity in a much more rigid and conceptually
Development Studies, 8 (1972)^155-82. 'Towards a 
Theory of Ethnic Change', Politics and Society, 2 
(1971), 21-45. And 'The Persistence of Regionalism 
in the British Isles', American Journal of Sociology,
79 (19 73), 319-42.
1 See Edward Page, Michael Hechter's Internal Colonial 
Thesis: Some Theoretical and Methodological Problems,
(University of Strathclyde, 1977).
2 See William N. Sloan, 'Ethnicity or Imperialism?
A Review Article' Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 21 (1979), 113-25, and also see Hechter's 
'Response' to Sloan, ibid, 126-29.
3 See also Pablo Gonzales-Casanova 'Internal Colonialism 
and National Development'/ Studies in Comparative
In ter national Development, 1 (1965), 27-37, Joan. W.
Moore, 'Colonialism: The Case of the Mexican Americans", 
Social Problems.17 (1970)/643-72, and Robert Blauner, 
'Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt" ibid 16 
(1969), 393-408.
4 See,, E.K. Francis, 'The Nature of the Ethnic Group' , 
American Journal of Sociology, 52 (1946/47), 393
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tighter manner^. Etizoni' has postulated the existence
of different types of ethnicity from the 'totalistic'
ghetto community to the much less encompassing ’situational* 
2
ethnicity' . Fitzpatrick, Kasard and Jannowitz have
shown the importance of the community in the persistence
3
of ethnic solidarity and while with the exception
1 W. Isajiw 'Definitions of Ethnicity', Ethnicity 1
(1974), 111-24. Defines ethnicity as "an involuntary 
group of people who share the same culture or the 
descendents of such people who identify themselves and 
or are identified by others as belonging to the 
same involuntary group",
Yu. V. Bromley, ’Towards a Typology of Ethnic Processes', 
British Journal of Sociology ,30 (1979), 341 -52 Refers 
to the' ethnos or ’ethikos’ as an "historically 
evolved group of people, having an unique inherent 
set of common and stable cultural and psychic features 
as well as self identity, cognition and own given name 
or ethnonym". See also H. Abramson, 'On the Sociology 
of Ethnicity and Social Change: A Model of Rootedness 
and Rootlessness'■, Economic And Social Review, 8 (1976), 
43-59. M.E. Burgess 'The Resurgence of Ethnicity:
Myth or Reality?' Ethnic and Racial Studies,(1978),
J. McKay and P. Lewins 'Ethnicity and the Ethnic 
Group: A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation' Ibid 
R. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A 
Framework for Theory and Research, (New York, 1970) 
and for the social anthropological approach to ethnicity 
see A.L. Epstein, Ethos and Identity,(1978).
2 See, Amitai Etizoni 'The Ghetto: A Re-evaluation'
Social Forces, 39 (1959),. 255-62.
3 See, Joseph D. Fitzpatrick, 'The Importance of 
Community in the Process of Immigrant Assimilation', 
International Migration Review,1 (1966), 6-16, John
D. Kassard and Morris Jannowitz, 'Community Attach­
ment in Mass Society'", American Sociological Review,
39 (19 74),328-40. And also see Tamo tsu Shibutani 
and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative 
Approach,(Toronto, 1965) £or a very useful series
of comparative ethnic community studies.
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of some of the isolated mining villages of Lancashire,
Fifeshire and South Wales, no 'totalistic1' Irish ghetto
communities can be said to have been in existence in
Britain in the early 20th century;there were well
established and defined Irish sub communities in many
parts of Britain.1 Participation in St. Patrick's Day 
celebrations, Irish National Forrester and Ancient
Order of Hibernian Church parades and an interest in
Irish Home Rule and or Independence were all manifestations
of ’situational ethnicity’ . Smith's observation that it
is quite possible to have a nationalism different than
2the nation of residence; and the concept of 'patria', 
or the sense of 'belonging1 to the country of non­
residence, which is an expression of a high level of 
ethnic consciousness, stem from Meinecke's dichotomy
of the ’Staatsnation' (political identity and national
>
citizenship) and the 'Kulturnation' (psychological
3
nationalism). Together they help to explain jthe 
persistence of situational ethnicity beyond the first
1 See J.A, Jackson, op. cit., Kevin O'Connor, op. cit., 
Allan O ’Day, op. cit., E.P.M. Wollaston op. cit., Harry 
O ’Brien, op. cit., and E.D. Steele, 'Irish Presence
in the North of England'1, Northern History, 12 (19 76)/ 
220-41, R.D. Lobhan, 'The Irish Community in Greenock'
~ Irish Geography,6 (1971), 270-81, James E. Handley,
' The’ Irish in Modern Scotland, (Cork, 1947) and The 
.Navvy in Scotland ,(Cork, 1970).
2 Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism op. cit., 175. 
The Black Separatist Movement in the United States 
could be described as an example of 'nationalism 
without a nation' see, S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, 
Black Power,(New York, 1967), G. Llewellyn-Watson, 
op. cit., Michael Parenti, 'The Black Muslims: from 
Revolution to Institution'/ Social Research,31 (1964), 
175-94 and Haywood Burns, !'Black Muslims in America:
A Reinterpretation11, Race, 5 (1963), 26-37.
3 Fredrich Meinecke Weldburgertum und Nationalstaat 
(Berlin, 1919).
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generation and as assimilation is a long terms social- 
psychological process, rarely completed in one generation,
I expect to find in my research a high level of situational 
ethnicity manifestations among the Irish in Britain 
during the 1916-23 period.
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Chapter 4
Towards a Sociology of Irish Political Organizations 
in Britain
Larsen and Snoddy, in one of the few attempts to analyze 
the socio-economic . background of Irish revolutionary 
participants: suggest that social scientists have 
approached the study of revolutionary movements from 
three main directions1. Their first and second categories
2
which they call the "socio economic or ecological approach1'
3
and the "historical-cultural approach1' can be generally 
subsumed under a broader sociological category. But 
their third category, the "psychological or psychiatric
4
approach" is a mode of investigation favoured by few
sociologists, as most of the profession have rigidly,
perhaps too rigidly, followed Durkheim’s advice that,
"the psychological factor is too general to predetermine
the course of social phenomena. Since it does not
call for one social form rather than another, it cannot
i 5explain any of them"
1 Larsen and Snoddy, op. cit,.
2 As exemplified they claim by, Ted Gurr Why Men Rebel 
(Princeton, 1970) and Peter Culvert, A Study of Revolution.
3 As exemplified they claim by,Hannah Arendt On Revolution ,
( 1963 ) .
4 As exemplified they claim by, T.W. Adorno, The 
Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1950 )., And
Elton B. McNeil' The Nature of Human Conflict (New Jersey,
1965).  7
5 Emi]e Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Methody
(New York, 1964), 108.
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This Durkheimean inspired sociological rejection of the
psychological contribution towards understanding social
movements has inevitably generated a counter reaction
on the part of psychologists as exemplified in Argyris1
wholesale rejection of sociological interpretations of
organizational activity in favour of a behaviourist
social psychology1. Yet as Archibald has observed;
"it is perhaps a reflection of the intellectual 
insecurity of social scientists that they spend an 
inordinate amount of time and energy defining the 
’boundaries' of their respective fields, as if these 
were holy lands which have to be defended against
expansive, barbaric and heathen invaders,........
In Sociology this tendency expresses itself in the 
attempt to analyse social phenomena with a method 
which strictly excludes psychological theory and 
data'2«
3Langer has made a similar plea to fellow historians ,
with perhaps more positive results than Archibald’s call;
4 5if the pioneering work of Besancon , Mazlish , and 
6Buckman can be considered, not merely as seminal studies,
1 Chris Argyris, The Applicability of Organizational 
Sociology, (19 7 2j.
2 W. Peter Archibald, ’Psychology, Sociology and Social 
Psychology: Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbours’', British 
Journal of Sociology, 27(1976), 115-29.
3 William Langer called on historians to deepen their 
historical understanding by utilizing psychoanalytical 
interpretations, see ’The Next Assignment’, The 
American Historical Review, LXIII (1958), 283-304.
4 Alain Besancon, ’Psychoanalysis: Auxilliary Science or 
Historical Method’ , Journal of Contemporary History, 
3(1968), 149-62.
5 Bruce Mazlish, ’Group Psychology and Problems of 
Contemporary History’,' Journal of Contemporary History, 
3(1968), 163-77.
6 Alan C. Buckman, ’Hidden Themes in the Frontier Thesis: 
An Application of Psychoananlysis to Historiography" , 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8(1965), 
361-82.
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but marking the formation of a new historical school.
While Dixon’s fascinating study of military disasters1,
hopefully indicates a new willingness by psychologists and
psychiatrists to apply their expertise to new fields
of exploration. My own experience in Irish political
organizations has convinced me, that much of the internal
disputes, petty bickering and internecine conflict,
sometimes to the extent of bloody feuds, can often be
understood in a more satisfactory and insightful manner
from a psychological perspective rather than a mono
sociological mode of interpretation and analysis. Social
2 3psychologists like Davies , and Toch have usefully 
examined the original impetus towards participation in 
revolutionary movements and the structures of these 
organizations while Urry in his work on 'Reference 
Groups'" has combined psychological interpretations 
within an overall sociological framework^a Armistead 
examined the applicability of social psychological studies
5
to sociological research and certainly there is much to
1 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military 
Incompetence, (1978), examines the psychological 
factors responsible for bad generalship and subsequent 
defeats.
2 “it is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the 
tangible provision of *adequater or ' inadequate'1 
supplies o.f food, equality or liberty which produces 
revolution1'- James C. Davies, l,Towards a Theory of 
Revolution' , American Sociological Review, (1962), 6-19.
3 H.H. Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements, 
(New York, 1965).
4 John Urry, Reference Groups and the Theory of 
Revolution, (1973 )~.
5 Nigel Armistead, "Social Psychology for Sociologists’1 , 
Sociology, 6(1972), 275-78.
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be said for the old London University Sociology degree
course, that I did, which ensured that undergraduates
had at least some knowledge of elementary social psychology
through the enforced reading of Hollander and Hunt1, and 
2
Glen . The work of social psychologists is perhaps most
useful when it is used by sociologists as an aid to
studying organizations and indeed the study,of organ-
3
izations by social psychologists like Harshburger , and
4
Katz and Kahn , has become an important subdiscipline.
5
While recognizing the validity of Blackler and Brown1s 
criticisms, I tend to agree with Kunkel’s argument that 
a behaviorial approach to analysing social organizations 
does not necessarily lead to mere psychological reduc- 
tionism^.
The valuable social psychological contribution to
Hollander and Hunt, Current Perspectives in Social 
Psychology, (New York, 1971).
Frederick Glen, The Social Psychology of Organizations, 
(1975).
Dwight Harsburger, 'The Individual and the Social 
Order: Notes on the Management of Heresy and Deviance 
in Complex Organizations' , Human Relations, 26(1973) , 
251-69.
Daniel Katz and R.L. Kahn-, The Social Psychology of 
Organizations, (New York, 19 66) .
Frank Blackler and Colin A. Brown, 'Organizational 
Psychology: Good Intentions and False Promises1’,
Human Relations, 31(1978), 330-51.
John H. Kuntel, ’Some Behavioral Aspects of the 
Ecological Approach to Social Organization'', American 
Journal of Sociology, 73(1967/8), 12-29.
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organizational studies as exemplified by Pugh1 and 
2
Schein is particularly important for the study of radical 
political movements: a sphere, sadly neglected by most 
British sociologists. Benjamin sHeineman in his .study of the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, observes that 
while many might categorize CARD as a traditional 
pressure group, he personally believes that the organi­
zation can hardly fit into the normal pressure group 
3typology and certainly this observation is particularly 
applicable to organizations like the Irish Self 
Determination League, Sinn Fein, Irish Republican Army 
and the Irish Republican Brotherhood which hardly can be 
said to have operated . according to Dillon’s classical 
definition of pressure groups as"non partisan organizations 
of the people formed to exert influence upon the legis­
lature, the Executive or other governmental agency through 
public opinion for the enactment or the rejection of 
certain legislation or for the adoption, modification 
or discontinuance of a public policy^. The ISDL and 
Sinn Fein which resolutely refused all involvement in 
the British political system or the IRA and the IRB 
who actively endeavoured to overthrow that system can
1 D.S. Pugh, ’Organizational Behaviour: An Approach 
from Psychology", Human Relations, 22(1969), 345-54.
2 E.H. Schein, Organizational Psychology, (New Jersey, 
1965).
3 Benjamin Heinsman The Politics of the Powerless, 
the Campaign Against Racial' Discrimination, ( 1972). 
XIV.
4 Mary Dillon, 1 Anerican Government and Political Pressure Groups' 
American Political Science Review, XXXVI(1942).
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hardly be said to have much in common with Mackenzie’s 
view of pressure groups as, "organized groups possessing 
both formal structure and real common interests, in so 
far as they influence the decisions of public bodies*"
So unfortunately the rich vein of material on pressure 
2
groups offers few nuggets of value for my particular 
research.
British researchers have paid only- the minimum of attention 
to political organizations which have either refused 
to become involved in the normative electoral system or
do not fit into the traditional pressure group typology.
3 4With the exception of Thayer and more recently Fielding
little academic interest has been shown in the reemergence
of the extreme right, Fascist movement in Britain; while
despite the substantial volume of research in the late
1960s and early 1970;s into the position of ethnic groups
in Britain, De Witt’s study of the Indian Workers
T" W.J. Mackenzie,'Pressure Groups in British Government, 
British Journal of Sociology, 6(1955), 133-143.
2 See Graham Wootton, Pressure Groups in Britain 1720- 
1970, (1975). J.W. Grove, Government and I n d u s t r y  jn
Britain, (1962) .
Allan Potter, Organized Groups in British National 
Politics, (1961), Bridget Pym, 'The Making of a 
Successful Pressure Group', British Journal of 
Sociology, 24 (1973) , 448 , Brian Frost,' The Tactics
of Pressure, (1978), and Geoffrey K. Roberts, Political 
Parties and Pressure Groups in Britain, (1970).
3 George Thayer, The British Political Fringe, (1965).
4 Nigel Fielding, The National Front. (1981)
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Association^ remains one of the few published works on
internal ethnic political organizational politics. I
have searched, with no avail the entire series of the
British Journal of Sociology in an effort to discover
whether British sociologists expressed any interest in
the prolonged decolonization process with its ensuing
conflicts in Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, and even the longest
of all the conflicts, Ireland, has only attracted a
minimal research interest if publication in the Journal
2
is any reliable indicator . It could perhaps be argued 
that Kenya and Aden were not sufficiently 'valid’ problems 
to merit British sociological interest, though the 
presence of large immigrant Cypriot and Irish communities 
living in Britain at a time when some of their compatriots 
were waging a military struggle against the British 
Armed Forces, with all that implies for assimilation and 
indigenous societal reaction, might have been thought to 
have constituted an interesting sociological problem. 
British sociologists could with some justification argue 
that their non-familarity with the countries background 
and lack of personal access to the Kenyan and Cyprus
1 John De Witt, Indian Workers Associations in Britain, 
(1969).
2 David A. Roberts, '.The Orange Order in Ireland:
A Religious Institution", British Journal of Sociology, 
22(1971), 269, and Frank Burton, 'Ideological and 
Social Relations in Northern Ireland", British Journa1 
of Sociology, 30(1979), 61-80,are the only two articles 
in the British Journal of Sociology dealing with 
Ireland while its less established rival has so far 
produced one article on Ireland, see Gary Easthop, 
'Religious War in Northern Ireland', Sociology,
10(1976), 4 27-50.
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conflicts precluded research. The same could not be
said of British anthropologists, whose research was often
encouraged by the colonial administrators yet as Berman*
2and Krushner have shown, the few British anthropologists
who did investigate the Kenyan conflict, simply agreed
with the accepted opinion that the Mau Mau were merely
a savage cult without a political ideology or even
3socio-economic objectives .
This lack of British sociological interest in radical 
political organizations may possibly be a 'cold war' 
hangover and a rejection of the total instrumental type 
approach, particularly exhibited in the work of Americans
like Almond who studied the “neurotic susceptibility
4 - 5to Communism" for the purpose of encouraging defection .
1 Bruce J Berman, ‘Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: 
Colonial Adminis tration and the Origins of the
'Mau Mau' Emergency in Kenya'' , British Journal of 
Political Science, 6(1976), 143-75.
2 Gilbert Kushner, 'An African Revitalization Movement: 
Mau Mau' , Anthropos, LX(1965), 750-70.
3 For a revealing account of this episode in which the 
deaths of 11,503 Mau Mau, 95 Europeans, 1,920 'loyal 
Africans' and 29 Asians was largely ignored by British 
academics, see C.G. Rosberg, The Myth of Mau Mau: 
Nationalism in Kenya, (New York, 1966).
4 G. Almond, The Appeal of Communism, (Princeton, 19 65) , 
IX.
5 "If we can discover those aspects of the Communist 
experience which create dissatisfaction among party 
members and contribute to defection, we may be in a 
position to suggest the kinds of weaknesses and 
vulnerability which are to be found within the 
Communist movement". Ibid, IX.
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At the other extreme of the research spectrum, Castles
and Kosack frankly expressed their concern, for the
manner in which their research might be used by govern-'
ments'and others as a justification for omitting: all
reference to immigrant organizational politics1. In
Britain, with the possible exception of the Pacifist/
2Nuclear Disarmament field of research interest, the 
study of radical or non-normative organizations has
largely been confined to religious sects like the Watch
3 4Tower Movement , the Rastafarians or cults like
5 6Scientology and the Aetherius Society . Some of these
1 Castles and Kosack, op. cit., 9.
2 See, Barry Gordon Buzan, The British Peace' Movement from 
1919 to 1939. Unpublished London School of Economics 
Phd thesis,(1973).
Frank Parkin, A Study of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament. Unpublished London Phd thesis (1966).
Frank Myers, rCivil Disobedience and Organisational 
Change, the British Committee of One Hundred',
Political Science Quarterly ,86 (1971),92-112. And 
Christopher Driver The Disarrners: A Study in Protest, 
(1964).
3 James A. Beckford, 'Organization, Ideology and 
Recruitment: The Structure of the Watch Tower Movement1, 
Sociological Review, 23 (1975), 893-909.
4 G. Llewellyn Watson, 'Social Structure and Social 
Movements: the Black Muslims in the United States 
and the Rastafarians of Jamaica', British Journal 
of Sociology,24 (1974), 188-204 .
5 Roy Wallis, 'Scientology: Therapuetic Cult to 
Religious Sect1, Sociology, 9 (1975), 89-100.
6 Roy Wallis, 'The Aetherius Society: A Case Study 
In the Formation of a Mystagogic Congregation',
The Sociological Review, 22 (1974), 27
studies of course contribute knowledge'1' which- is of
use in analyzing radical political organizations but
it would be preferable to have a specific body of British
sociological research on these organizations rather
than being forced to use other, often not strictly
relevant information. Recently there have been some
encouraging signs of an interest in radical political
organizations displayed by postgraduate researchers who
have used their personal experience in the ’studfent
protest’ movement of the last 14 years as the basis for .
2their higher degree work. Lack of personal experience 
in, or access to radical political organization?may 
possibly account for the earlier lack of British 
sociological research in this field. Many radical 
organizations either bluntly refuse to permit researchers 
access to their membership or else only make this avail­
able under tightly controlled conditions. Bouchier’s 
comparative study of the International Marxist Group in 
Britain and the. American Students for a Democratic Society 
was dependent on a scrutiny of the IMG’s publications 
and an interview with one leader authorized to speak on
1 For example,. there is a useful review of organisational 
sociology in Britain in Robert Kenneth Jones,
’Sectarian Characteristics of Alcoholics Anonymous’, 
Sociology, 4 (1970), 181-95.
2 For example, Bernard Anthony David Bryant, The New 
Left in Britain: the Dialectic of Rationality and 
Participation.
Unpublished London School of Economics Phd thesis 
(1981) and Avishai Zui Ehrlich, The Leninist 
Organizations in Britain: And the Student Movement 
■ 1966-72.
Unpublished London School of Economics Phd thesis 
(1981).
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behalf of the organization. I certainly do not disagree 
with his theoretical conclusions relating to the concepts 
of delegitimation, dis-alienation and commutation but 
would challenge his observation, based on his minimal 
personal knowledge of the organization, that the IMG 
is “more rational'1 than most other left organizations'1': 
a conclusion not supported by the large quantity of 
their 'politbureau' (circulated only to their top 
leadership) documents that I obtained’duiing.. a journalis­
tic investigation of this organization.
In contrast to this relative paucity of British radical
political organization investigations there is a wide
and extensive volume of basic organizational studies
which have generated useful material. Unfortunately,
as both Schein1s social psychological definition of
an organization as the "rational co-ordination of the
activities of a number of people for the achievement
of some common explicit purpose or goal through division
of labour and functions through a hierarchy of authority
2
and responsibility" and Salaman's opinion that ua 
sociological approach to organizations addresses the 
question of the relationship between the design of 
work and control within employing organization and the
T David Bouchier, 'Radical Ideologies and the Sociology 
of Knowledge: A Model for Comp arative Analysis', 
Sociology, (1977), 25-46.
2 E.H. Schwein, Organizational Psychology„ (New Jersey,
19 6 5), 8.
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nature of the society within which they occur**1 indicate
organizational studies have almost become synomous
2with work studies and industrial sociology and psychology
3
as exemplified in the title of Silverman’s seminal review
4
of the various school of organization theorists. Huber
1 Graeme Salaman, ’Towards a Sociology of Organizational 
Structure1,' The Sociological Review, 26 (1978),
519-54.
Yet in the first paragraph of his article Salaman 
says, "this article is concerned to describe and 
advocate a genuine sociology or organization structure, 
to trace its major elements in the work of Weber and 
Marx".
2 For an indication of the diversity of work studies 
see, C. Perrow, 1 Departmental Power and Perspective 
In Industrial Firms' in M.N. Zald (edt) Power in 
Organizations ,(Vanderbilt, 1970) R. Likert,
The Human Organ iz ation, its Management and Values,
(New York, 19 67) , A. Chandler,' Strategy and Structure, 
Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, 
(Massachutets, 1961)■ , M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic- 
Phenomena, (1964) and Denis Pym (edt) Industrial 
Society,(1968).
3 David Silverman 'Formal Organizations or Industrial 
Sociology: Towards a Social Action Analysis of 
Organizations' , Sociology,2 (1968), 221-38, an 
interesting review of the various schools of thought 
and also see David F. Gillespie and Denis S. Milet, 
'Sociology of Organization', Current Sociology,
22 (1974), 189-200 and John Child, 'Organizational 
Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of 
Strategic Choice' , Sociology,6 (1972)/ 1-22, For 
critiques of the industrial dominance in this field.
4 For the various organizational theories see, D.S.
Pugh, 'Modern Organization Theory: A Psychological
and Sociological Study", Psychological Bulletin,
(1966), 235-51.
P.M. Blau "Theories of Organizations' in The Inter­
national EncyTopedia of the Social Sciences,Vol. 2 
(New York, 1968), 297-304.
V. Subramanram, 'The Classical Organization Theory 
and its Critics', Public Administration,44 (19 66), 
435-46. :
and W.L. Zwermart New Perspectives on Organization 
Theory: An Empirical Reconstruction of the' Classical
and Marxian' Analyses ^ (conn, 1970 ).
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has ingenuously applied socio technological theory to
analyzing the development of political consciousness
among American women workers1 but in general the sociologist
forced to use industrial orientated organizational
studies as a theoretical base for an investigation of
radical political organizations is faced with a task;
resembling gold panning, a large mass of dross has to
be painstakingly sifted through to reveal a few valuable
theoretical and conceptual nuggets. J.E.T, Eldridge and
2A.D. Crombie's A Sociology of Organizations is one of 
the very few works in this field that actually lives 
up to the promise embodied in its title.
3
Most of these organizational studies f centre around the
manner in which organizations achieve, or attempt to
4
achieve, their objectives, commonly termed ''goals'' , 
and much of the debate around the formation of goals,
1 Joan Huber, ‘Towards a Socio Technological Theory
of the Women's Movement' / Social Problems,23 (1975/6), 
371-85, an extremely interesting multi-disciplinary, 
biological, sociological, historical and political 
analysis.
2 (1974).
3 For a comprehensive review of the organization studies,
see Renate Mayntz, ’The Study of Organizations:
A Trend Report' , Current Sociology,13 (1964/65),
95-155, Peta Sheriff, 'Sociology of Public Bureaucracies, 
1965-75' , Current Sociology,24 (1976), 1-123, and 
also see Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological 
Paradigms and Organizational Analysis,(1979), classific- 
ation of organizational studies according to four 
primary paradigms; "functionalist", "interpretative", 
"radical humanist" and "radical structuralist".
4 Edward Gross, 'The Definition of Organizational
Goals", British Journal of Sociology,20 (1969), 277- 
94; Herbert Simon, 'On the Concept of Organizational 
Goals", Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 (196‘4j/2-*«‘-
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relates to their motivation factors, whether they are
basically the sum factor product of individual goals,
as suggested by Georgiou'1' or impersonal organizational
2goals as counter argued by Price . Yet much of this 
discussion is seemingly needless for organizations 
rarely attain their assigned goals, as these are rarely
unaffected by extra-organizational factors, being
\
essentially an interactional process with an ever changing
2political, social and economic environment . Hence,
• 3 4Freeman and Hannan, and Price argue, with much justific­
ation, that organizational research should focus, not on 
organizational efficiency in accomplishing assigned 
tasks but on their "effectiveness”.
Industrially orientated organization studies unfortunately 
pay little attention to the recruitment of the organiza- 
tional personnel as this is primarily affected by such 
factors as the competitiveness of the salary offered, the 
choice or non-choice of alternative jobs and the overall
1 Petro Georgiou, 'The Goal Paradigm and Notes Towards
a Counter Paradigm’ , Administrative' Science Quarterly ✓ 
18 (1973), 291-310, argues that organizational 
goals are simply the goals of individuals and that 
organizational functioning can be understood through 
evaluating the incentives it offers its participating 
personnel.
2 James Price, ’The Study of Organization Effectiveness’, 
Sociological Quarterly,13 (1972), 3-15. Also see 
James D. Thompson and William McEwan ’Organizational 
Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interactional 
Process’ / American Sociological .'Review, 23 (1958),
23-30, and Howard E. Aldrich and Jeffrey Pfeffer 
'Environments of Organizations', The Annual Review
of Sociology , Vol. 2 (1976).
3 John Freeman and Michael T. Hannan, op. cit..
4 Price, ibid.
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work environment. These considerations do not apply
to voluntary organizations and particularly as King"*- 
2
and Clark have observed, to social movements with
their primary goal of generating societal change rather
than servicing membership requirements. Sociologists
and political scientists have for many years paid much
attention • to the extent to which people become personally
3involved in societal political systems . Li^set and 
4
Jones investigated electoral turnout as an indicator 
of the ’democratic character of a society, though
5
Dahrendorf suggests that in Germany, at least, voting 
is very much a mechanistic sign of political participation. 
But however the various researchers interpret the 
'meaning' of the voting process it has long been accepted 
that only a minority of the population ever join a
political party. Kornhauser has elaborated these
/
observations into his 'theory of mass society’  ^ though
1 C Wendell King,' Social Movements in the United 
States, (New York, 1956).
2 Peter B. Clark, 'Incentive System; A Theory of 
Organization1,' Administrative Science Quarterly,6 
(1961), 121-66.
3 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (1960).
4 W.H. Morris Jones, ’In Defence of Apathyl;, Political 
Studies,11 (1954), 25-37 argues that acceptance of 
political apathy or its formal denial by enforced 
participation in the electoral process (compulsory 
voting) indicates the fundamental acceptance or 
rejection of the democratic ethos.
4 Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany 
(1968). -----------
5 William Kornhauser,The Politics of Mass Society , 
(1960).
/
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1 2others, notably Pinard and Newton have disputed the 
practical implications of Kornhauser’s theory. Etzioni 
has adopted a rather different perspective by refusing 
to consider low societal political participation as 
a "problem”, arguing instead it is highly functional 
towards the maintenance of a pluralistic democratic 
system.^
If so few people actually join political organizations
then it is apparent that organizations have to devote a
high proportion of their resources, particularly in
their formative periods to recruiting members, a process
4known as 'mobilization1, . Many British sociologists,
5
as Weingrod has noted, pay very little attention to
1 Maurice Pinard, 'Mass Society and Political Movements:
A New Formulation", American Journal of Sociology,
73 (19 67^ 3), 682-90 argues that paradoxically Kornhauser's 
theory is only really applicable to societies with 
few or no strains.
2 Kenneth Newton, op. cit., found that Kornhauser’s 
theory could not be applied to understanding the 
British Communist Party.
3 See Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations, (New York, 1961), 24. He argues that 
without political apathy there would be no "floating 
voters" and hence political rigidity and stagnation.
4 See, J.P. Netti, Political Mobilization ,(1967), and 
Amitai Etzioni., 'Mobilization as a Macrosociological 
Conception1', British Journal of Sociology, 19 (1968), 
243-53.
5 Alex Weingrod, 'Political Sociology, Social Anthropology 
and the Study of New Nations'1 , British Journal of 
Sociology, 18 (1967),121-34. Weingrod complains that 
sociologists concentrate on national political 
structures while anthropologist focus their research
on Politics Around the’ Village Pump ,(Princeton,* 1957), 
to cite the work of Barnes, whose example in concen­
trating on the micro political system, Weingrod 
believes, could be profitably followed by sociologists.
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the mobilization process, especially at grass roots level, 
an omission identified by Weiner as a primary source of 
the "growing gap between anthropological and sociological 
studies of politics"1. Yet most organizations, as
2
McKitterick has observed in his study of the Labour Party
are primarily dependent on active recruitment as the
source of new members
"The gaining of sympathizers or members rarely 
occurs through a mere combination of a pre-established 
appeal or a pre-established individual psychological 
bent on which it is brought to bear. Instead, 
the prospective sympathizer or member has to be 
aroused, nurtured, and directed and the so called 
appeal has to be developed and adapted. This takes 
place through a process in which attention has to 
be gained, interests awakened, grievances exploited, 
ideas implanted, doubts dispelled, feelings aroused, 3 
new objectives created and new perspectives developed'!
American social .scientists, perhaps because of the much
greater prevalence of political organizations and social
movements there, have fortunately, for my research
purposes, devoted a good deal of their attention to
4
studying the ’mobilization1, process. Zygmunt has very
1 Myron Weiner, "Politics and Social Change", American 
Sociological ■Review, 29 (1964), 432-33. Unfortunately 
Weiner ignores his own advice in Party Politics in 
India (Princetbn 1957)230 where after complaining of the 
lack of information on party recruitment, instead of 
undertaking his own research in this vital sphere, 
he merely interviewed party leaders and read their 
publications.
2 T.E.M. McKitterick, 'The Membership of the Party1 , 
Political Quarterly,31 (1960),312-23.
3 Herbert Blumer, ’Collective Behaviour1' in J.B. Gittier 
(edt), Review of Sociology, (New York, 1957), 148.
4 Joseph F. Zygmunt, "Movements and Motives: Some 
Unresolved Issues in the Psychology of Social Movements’ 
Human Relations,25 (1972),449-67.
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usefully categorized these studies, according to three 
primary methodological and theoretical perspectives; •,
(1) 'Motivational analysis* - the identification of the
psychological factors that render people initially
susceptible to membership, as explored by Fromm1 for a
specific movement or a generic type of movement as by 
2 3Fever or Toch's overall account of social movements.
(2) The 'Structural-functional* approach - seeking to 
identify the social conditions that are conducive to
4
the development of movements as pioneered by Selznick .
5
(3) The ‘Interactional* approach - as adopted by Lofland 
with his primary focus on the movement’s origins and its 
maintenance.
Weiss/ a social psychologist, has focussed his research 
not so much on recruitment to an organization as 
'defection'■ from an organization; which may or may not 
subsequently lead to recruitment into another organization. 
According to Weiss, defection can be interpreted by 
using four psychological factors, ’stimulus generalization', 
'extinction', 'displacement' and 'counter conditioning"^. 
Stimulus generalization exists merely as a predisposition
1 Erich Fromm Escape from Freedom (New York, 1941) .
2 L.S. Fever, The Conflict of Generations (New York,
1969).
3 H.H. Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements 
(New York, 1965).
4 P. Selznick, 'Institutional Vulnerability in Mass 
Society' , American Journal of Sociology 56 (1951 )>320-31.
5 J. Lofland Doomsday Cult (New Jersey, 1966) .
6 Robert F. Weiss, 'Defection from Social Movements and 
Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements" /Sociometry 
26 (1963) 1-20.
transformed by motivation1 into a decision to actually
join an organization. If similar organizations are in
existence, then defection may occur to these from the
original organization. Extinction - the non-reward or
non-recognition of contribution leading to decreased
interest and involvement is linked with displacement
but may not lead to recruitment into a similar organ-
zation particularly if there is a high level of punitive
social sanction v;, >*when punitive sanctions are so severe
that the gradient of avoidance is always higher than the
gradient of participation and belief then there will be
2
no displacement”,
Weiss used this theoretical framework to suggest that the 
Mensheviks lost many defectors to the Bolsheviks, a 
relatively similar but more attractive organization, 
while explaining why the Chinese Communists failed to 
generate widespread opposition to the savage smashing 
of the 1927 Canton Commune, partly because of the scale 
of the repression and partly because people recalled 
their original support for the Kuomintang.
3
Ash regards most American social movements as the product 
of the inequalities of the Capitalist socio-economic
1 See Judson S. Brown, 'The Generalization of Approach 
Responses as a Function of Stimulus Intensity and 
Strength of Motivation1' , Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 33(1942), 209-26.
2 Weiss, op. cit..
3 Roberta Ash, Social Movements in America,(Chicago, 1972).
system, and Gerlach and Hine* have explained the.attraction
of such diverse movements as the Pentecostalists and
Black Power, largely in these terms. Wallis specifically
rejects the notion that any single or mono causal
explanation, particularly the concept of ’relative
deprivation' can be used to account for why people join 
2
organizations while Walsh goes even further and rejects
the concept of ’discontent’ as an ever present constant,
strongly arguing instead that discontent should always
3be treated as a variable . Discontent would seem to 
play a very minor role in mobilizing support for any 
exile political organizations for while a low socio­
economic status might explain why a second generation 
Irish miner joined the Labour or even Communist Party in 
Lanarkshire, it can hardly be adequately employed to 
explain his subsequent membership of Sinn Fein or the 
IRA. Different types of movements require different 
mobilization processes and different levels of commitment. 
Smelser distinguishes two primary types of social 
movements; (1) norm orientated, seeking to reform social 
and political institutions in a manner that does not 
apparently seriously threaten the existing status quo 
and (2) value orientated movements, seeking revolutionary
1 L.P. Gerlach and V.H. Hine, People, Power, Change; 
Movement of Social Transformation (Indianapolis, 1970) . .
2 Roy Wallis, 'Relative Deprivation and Social Movements, 
A Cautionary Note', British Journal of Sociology, 
26(1975), 360-63.
3 Edward J. Walsh, 'Resource Mobilization and Citizen 
Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island',
Social Problems, 29(1981), 1-21.
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changes that involve major societal and political values1. 
The Irish Self Determination League, Sinn Fein, the Irish 
Republican Army and the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
clearly belong to the category of value orientated 
movements.
Smelser’s theoretical construct is essentially externalized, 
that is the character of the organization is determined 
by societal attitudes. A more internalized concept of 
political organizational investigation has however come
to dominate the work of younger American social scientists
2 3 4like Oberschull , Jenkins , and Turner , who basically
focus their research around the perspective of 'resource
mobilization'. McCarthy and Zald have established, what
5
they tentatively call a ’Partial Theory’ to conceptualize 
the work of their fellow researchers. Partial, is a 
highly appropriate title for they freely confess they 
have been forced to ignore such an important but highly
1 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour,
(New York, 1962), 277.
2 Anthony Oberschull, Social Conflict and Social 
Movements, (New Jersey, 1973).
3 J. Craig, Jenkins, 'What is to be done: Movement or 
Organization' .
Contemporary Sociology, 8(1979), 222-28, also see 
J. Craig, Jenkins and Charles Perrow, 'Insurgency of 
Powerless: Farm Workers Movements' , American Socio­
logical Review, 42(1977), 244-68.
4 Ralph H. Turner, 'Collective Behaviour and Conflict:
New Theoretical Frameworks’ , Sociological Quarterly, 
5(1964),122-32.
5 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, 'Resource Mobilization 
and Social Movements: A Partial Theory'-, American 
Journal of Sociology, 82(1977), 1212-1241.
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variable issue as tactics and strategy in constructing
their theoretical framework. This neglected sphere
has however been separately investigated by Turner1 and 
2Lipsky while Barkan has added their research findings 
to Zald and McCarthy’s work to produce a very interesting 
conceptualized organizational resource model. According 
to Barkan an organizations effectiveness is determined by 
its success in appealing to four, often mutually anta­
gonistic constituencies, its own membership, the media,
3the public, its target group or its opponents„. Barkan, 
perhaps because of the American environment, stressed the 
organization’s appeal to the media as the most important 
factor of the four. This appeal to the media, was clearly 
not as important in the case of the Irish Self Determination 
League and Sinn Fein in Britain who faced a virtually 
totally unsympathetic reception of their propaganda by 
the mainstream British media. Indeed the IRA’s main 
chance of publicizing its existence in Britain lay in 
committing the type of action that guaranteed widespread 
but unfavourable publicity. Barkan's observation that 
organizational appeals to the public and especially the
1 Ralph H. Turner, determinants of Social Movement 
Strategies1 in Tamotsu Shibutani (ddt), Human Nature 
and Collective Behaviour, (New Jersey, 1970), 145-64.
2 Michael Lipsky, ’Protest as a Political Resource’1 , 
American Political Science Review, 62(1968), 1148-58.
3 Steven E. Barkan, 'Strategic and Organizational 
Dilemnas of the Protest Movement Against Nuclear 
Power1,. Social Problems, 27 (1974), 19-37.
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the target group of possible sympathizers or potential 
members may alienate members who believe principles 
are being compromised is however very relevant to my 
analysis of the influence of the hardline Republican, 
mainly Sinn Fein members, influence in the Irish Self 
Determination League and their determination to consti­
tutionally prevent organizational participation in the 
British political system even if this alienated United 
Irish League members who supported their broader goals.
The Irish Self Determination League and indeed the other 
Irish Political and military organizations of the 1916- 
22 period essentially self destructed themselves in the 
internal turmoil and conflict that followed the signing 
of the 1921 Treaty and the ensuing Civil War, so internal 
conflict organizational studies are of particular utility 
to my research • Etzioni* observes that an organization 
experiencing a sudden influx of new members may undergo a 
"goal displacement" process when the newer members use
2
their strength to remodel the organization but Aldrich 
suggests that the influix of new members may be beneficial 
In an organization whose continued existence is threatened 
by a deep division of existing members into two antagon-
3
istic factions. Bittner acknowledges that new members
1 Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations, (New Jersey, 
1964), 10.
2 Howard Aldrich, 'Organizational Boundaries and Inter- 
Organizational Conflict’, Human Relations, 24(1971), 
239-93.
3 Egon Bittner, 'Radicalism and the Organization of 
Radical Movements’ ,' American Sociological Review, 
28(1963), 928-40.
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can sometimes ndilute” the original organizational goals 
and values but along with Useem1 argues that this is not 
an inevitable process and that the new members can 
become so radicalized by their involvement they accept 
the existing goals. Despite the fact that many political 
organizations and social movements are subject to highly 
damaging splits, Firey is one of the few sociologists 
who has even attempted the construction of a theoretical 
framework to analyze "schismogensis and factionalization”. 
A more recent attempt by Barrett to categorize 6000 
African religious schismatic movements according to 18 
variables has unfortunately been nullified to a consider­
able extent by his dismissal, of all "ungeneralizable"
3
factors as superficial phenomena .
• Power and its use inside an organization can be an 
important component of intra-organizational conflict. 
Perrow has examined the differential usage of power 
inside hierarchically structured organizations in
1 Michael Useem, ’Ideological and Interpersonal Change 
in the Radical Protest Movement1, Social Problems,
19 (1971) , 451-69.
2 WaltersFirey, ’Informal Organizations and the Theory 
of the Schism’. American Sociological Review,
13(1948), 15-24.
Daniel Druckman, Kathleen Zechmeis t, 'Conflict of 
Interest and Value Dissensus: Propositions in the 
Sociology of Conflict', Human Relations, 26(1973), 
499-66, suggest a number of theoretical constructs,
3 David B. Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa;
An Analysis of Six Thousand Contemporary Religious 
Movements, (Nairobi, 1969).
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industry'1' and Hickson et al, have attempted to formulate
2 3 4a relevant theoretical construct . Abell and Scott
have explored the use of power in a wider theoretical
setting while Clegg has provided a very interesting
5
Marxist theoretical critique of 'power studies'
g
But it is jukes' seminal work on 'Power1 which is 
undoubtedly the most significant publication in this
field. Lukes categorizes the existing perspectives on
7 8Power as the "one dimensional" or "two dimensional"
before arguing against these 'liberal' and 'reformist'
concepts of power in favour of his own 'radical' perspec
9
tive which he terms the "three dimensional view"„.
1 Charles Perrow, 'Departmental Power and Perspective 
in Industrial Firms' in Mayer Zald (edt), Power in 
Organizations, (Vanderbilt, 1970).
2 D.J. Hickson, C.R. Hinings, C.A. Lee, R.E. Schneck 
and J.M. Pennings, 'A Strategic Contingencies Theory 
of Interorganizational Power', Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 16(1971), 216-24.
3 Peter Abell, 'The Many Faces of Power and Liberty: 
Revealed Preference, Autonomy and Teleological 
Explanation' , Sociology, 11 (1977) , 3-24.
4 John Scott, 'Power and Authority: A Comment on Spencer 
and Martin' , British Journal of Sociology, 24(1973),
101 >
5 Stuart Clegg, The Theory of Power and Organization,
(1979) .
6 Steve Lukes, Power. A Radical View: Studies in1- 
Sociology, (19 74).
7 According to Lukes, the 'one dimensional view of power, 
is effectively the 'pluralist' perspective though he 
explicitly rejects the use of this term, arguing that 
their empirical research can produce non-pluralist 
conclusions as well, ibid, 11.
8 The 'two dimensional view of power' as exemplified 
Lukes claims by Bachrach and Baratz, 'The Two Faces of 
Power'1, American Political Science Review, 56(1962, 947- 
52.
9 Lukes own 'three dimensional view of power'' examines 
the non-actualization" of latent conflict issues and 
conceives that ’power1 is conceptually and ,
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Organisation theorists have often linked power and
'charisma1'1' in an almost interchangeable manner; too
2 3 4often in the view of Ake , Tucker , Theobald and
Worsley who suggests that charisma has become a sponge
word , too freely used to be useful as an analytical
5
tool . Weber, himself, originally defined charisma in 
a very specific and limited manner as an individual1s
g
claim to possess ’’specific gifts of body and mind'1 ,
but subsequently expanded this usage to the much wider
term of "Charismatic authority" which he defined as the,
"recognition on the part of those subject to 
authority which is decisive for the validity
of charisma" . 7
ineradically value dependent1 with its location firmly 
positioned in an '.equalitarian socio-economic and 
political system, Lukes, op, cit., 21-36.
1 For some contemporary perspectives on the theory of 
charisma see, Thomas E. Dow, 'The Theory of Charisma1', 
Sociological Quarterly, 10(1969), 306-18, his 'An 
Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma', British Journal 
of Sociology, 29(1978), 83-93, and Arthur Schweitzer, 
'Theory of Political Charisma", Comparative Studies
in Society and History, 16(1974), 162 and Martin 
E. Spencer, "What is Charisma", British Journal of 
Sociology, 24(1973), 341
2 Claud Ake, "Charismatic Legitimation and Political 
Integration', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 9(1960), 1-13.
3 Robert C. Tucker, 'The Theory of Charismatic Leadership' 
Daedalus, XLVII (1968), 731-56.
4 Robin Theobald, 'A Charisma Too Versatile', Archives 
Europeenes De Socioiogie, 19(1978), 192-98.
5 Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, (1970) .
6 Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, op. cit., 1112.
7 Max Weber,' The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, op. cit., 5.
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Weber personally believed that democratic leadership 
was a form of charismatic authority but Michels reinter­
preted his original definition and usage to justify 
his support for Mussolini and his joining the Italian 
Fascists1. Weber also postulated that the routinization 
of charisma increased the organizational tendency 
towards institutionalization and bureaucratization". 
Michels further elaborated Weber’s original work in this 
field and combined the routinization of charisma, the
institutionalization and bureaucratization concepts with
2
Mosca’s work on oligarchy and Pareto’s concept of
3
'elite circulation' into a synthesis that formed the 
basis of his own formulation of the 'iron law of
4Oligarchy' in his seminal work on ' Political Parties 
Whereas Weber focussed his research on internal organiz­
ational structures, Michels concentrated on organizational 
goals and in particular the concept of ’goal displacement’ 
which he suggested explained the transformation of 
formerly radical movements into parliamentary social 
democratic parties that accepted the continued existence
1 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'Max Weber and Roberto Michels;
An Asymetrical Partnership', Archives Europeenes De 
SocioTogie, 22(1981), 110-16.
2 See G. Mosca (edt. Livingston), The Ruling Class,
(New York, 1939) .
3 See V, Pareto (edt. S.E. Finer), Sociological 
Writings, (1966) .
4 Roberto Michels, Political Parties, (New York,1944) 
see, David Beetham "Michels .and. His critics'•, 
Archives Europeenes De Sociologie, 22(1981), 81-99.
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of the capitalist system. Michels suggested the com­
bination of oligarchization - bureaucratization, produced 
party officials anxious to preserve their vested interest 
and that this process is facilitated by the growth of 
the membership which leads to a switch from dispersed 
democratic decision making to an all powerful centralised 
leadership. Goal displacement,diffusion and transform­
ation occurs with the organization opting for pragmatic 
policies that prioritize the continued existence 
and maintenance of the organization. Michel's work 
has been theoretically elaborated by contemporary
sociologists like Chapin and Tsouderoos1 and Zald and
2 1 0
Denton , while the concept of the 'Iron law of oligarchy1
has served as the theoretical base for numerous studies
'S
of organizations as diverse as the Communist Party^to
4
the Cosa Nostra .
Yet while Weber's and Michel's work offers a very useful 
body of theoretical perspectives, its essential weakness 
stems from its dictum of inevitability, as expressed in 
the rigidity; implied in the very concept of the ’iron
1 See, F. Stuart Chapin and John Tsouderoos, 'The
Formalization Process in Voluntary Organizations”, 
Social Forces, 34(1956), 342-44.
2 Mayer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, ''From Evangelism 
to General Service: On the Transformation of the 
YMCAl, Administrative Science Quarterly, 8(1963) . 
214-34.
3 G.W. Grainger, 'Oligarchy in the British Communist
Party', British Journal of Sociology, 9(1958), 43-58.
4 Robert T. Anderson, 'From Mafia to Cosa Nostra:
The 'Mafia Bureaucratized' , American Journal of * 
Sociology, 71 (196^6), 302-10.
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law' . Organizations may often tend towards a conservative
acceptance of the dominant societal consensus yet,as
Zald and Ash have observed/this is not necessarily
an inevitable tendencytfor they argue this process may
be reversed either by internal conflict generating
a newer radical leadership,or other organizational
transformation processes, involving coalitions with
similar organizations, factional splits, or simply, its
total disappearance1. Adopting Selznick’s methodology
2of 'institutional analysis' , relating organizational 
transformation to environmental changes, Zald and Ash 
conceive social movements as operating in an organi­
zational environment that consists of two major segments, 
the ’broader social movement environment1' of similar 
organizations and with its membership who are potential 
recruits for the target organization and the general 
body of supporters and sympathizers of the particular 
cause espoused. The second major segment is the wider 
'societal environment' and Ash & Zald see its influence 
on the organization in terms of an 'ebb and flow tide 
of sentiments' representing changing attitudes towards 
the organization either by bringing about the attitudinal 
change which makes possible the attainment of the
1 Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, 'Social Movement 
Organizations, Growth, Decay and Change', Social 
Forces, XLIV(1966), 327-41.
2 Philip Selznick, 'Foundations of the Theory of 
Organizations', American Sociological Review, 13 
(1948), 23-35. Selznick regards conflict as an 
inherent factor at all levels of the organizational 
structure.
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organization’s goals so that it has no longer any 
raison d'etre or by generating such levels of hostility 
the organization finds it impossible to maintain its 
existence.
Zald and Ash categorize political organizations and 
social movements according to the two different types 
of 'membership commitment' they represents
(1) 'Inclusive' organizations have relatively low levels 
of membership commitment, symbolized by their low dues 
and minimal activity involvement.
(2) 'Exclusive' require a much higher level->o£ member­
ship commitment and often restrict their membership's 
participation in other organizations. Sinn Fein and 
the Irish Self Determination League which formally 
’excluded’ in its constitution participation in the 
British political (electoral) system could be categorized 
as 'Exclusive' organizations yet many members, particularly 
in the League, did little else than pay their dues and 
they were certainly not compelled to attend meetings
or sell the organizational publication: , which we shall 
observe sold less than one copy of the Irish Exile 
per three members. Zald and Ash readily concede that 
both types of membership commitment can be found in 
the same organization, sometimes the 'exclusive' cate­
gory is restricted to the higher level of the organization 
hierarchy. The Irish Republican Brotherhood is an 
organization that shows the difficulty in precisely 
classifying organizations according to specific categories,
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as its members could be ordered to do anything from 
infiltrating another political organization to trans­
porting arms. It clearly exhibited a high level of 
’exclusive’ membership commitment yet its members were 
normally not excluded from participation in other 
organizations and indeed were actively encouraged to do 
so. Zald and Ash suggest that the ebb and flow tide of 
societal sentiment tends to have a greater effect on
’inclusive’ organizations rather than on the Exclusive
(
ones but that while Inclusive organizations usually 
develop much quicker, they conversely also decline faster. 
They also suggest the ideal condition for organizational 
growth is a combination of a strong sentiment base 
and a low level of societal hostility towards the 
organization's cause; this was certainly not present 
in Britain during the Anglo-Irish War of Independence 
and thus the Irish Self Determination League was operating 
in a very unfavourable societal environment particularly 
after the IRA commenced active offensive operations in 
Britain itself.
Membership commitment is an extremely important factor 
in the development of a political organization especially
those operating in a hostile societal environment.
1 2 3Studies by BlondelL , Birch a.nd Benney indicate that
1 J. Blondel,' Patties and Leaders: the Social Failure 
of British Politics, (1963).
2 A.H. Birch, Small Town Politics, (1959) .
3 Mark Bennney, How People Vote, (1956).
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well under half of the membership of the main British 
political parties can be considered 'active1' members 
in any meaningful sense of the word. Voluntary organ­
izations are essentially dependent on the maintenance 
of their members enthusiasm; when this is present at 
a high level, members will often allow themselves to 
be influenced by peer group pressure as shown in a 
very interesting study of group pressure on the individual’s
perception of a physical event^. Nurturing and main-
2
taining the membership’s enthusiasm particularly
during adverse periods is an important leadership task
and unlike the Situation in formal organizations, ithe
leaders of voluntary political organizations have few
3effective sanctions available to them. Tannebaum 
has demonstrated the difficulties inherent in controlling 
voluntary organizations’ membership while Houghland and 
Wood have indicated in their study of religious organ­
izations a positive correlation between the Level.-of 
control and the merobfer^ ip.’s commitment levels^. Millham, 
Bullock and Cherett have shown the non-applicability
1 Lazaber Sherif, 'Group Influences Upon the Formation
of Norms and Attitudes' in Maccoby, Newcomb and Hartley 
(edt) Readings in Social Psychology,(1961), 219-32. 
Sherif demonstrated that while an individual will 
initially specify a certain distance for the 'movement' 
of a stationary light in a dark room, once they are 
placed in a group context, a ’norm’ distance quickly 
emerges as a consensus product.
2 See, B.G. Zimmers and A.H. Hawley, 'The Significance of 
Membership in Associations', American Journal of 
Sociology, 65(1959), 196-201.
3 Arnold S. Tannebaum, 'Control and Effectiveness in a 
Voluntary Organization'', American Journal of Sociology, 
67(1961), 33-46.
4 James S. Houghland and James R. Wood, ^Control, in 
Organizations and the Commitment of Members', Social 
Forces, 59(1980), 85-
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of most organizational theoretical perspectives on 
control to voluntary organizations as these have mostly 
been derived from formal organizational studies1.
Attempts to create a general theoretical . framework to 
analyze radical organizations have not been very success­
ful. Dawson and Gettys propounded almost 35 years ago, 
a ’natural history model’ of the ;'life'! of movements, 
commencing in a state of unrest, passing through a 
popular state of collective excitement into a third stage
of formal organization before finally becoming institut- 
2lonalized , yet what about those organizations that never 
survive to the third and fourth stages? Banks in his 
very informative review of social movements rejects 
the inevitability of the 'bureaucratization and routin-
3
ization of charisma' concepts but Levitas rejects both, 
what he calls, Bank’s ’voluntaristic model1 - man as the 
actor or creator of organizations,and SmeheD's ’determin­
istic’ functional model, in favour of his own‘dialectical 
model’ postulating man as both product and creator^.
Jessop not only doubts the value of such theoretical
/
models but questions if studies of social movements can,
1 Spencer Millham, Roger Bullock and Paul Gherrett,
'Social Control in Organizations**, British Journal of 
Sociology, 23(1972), 406-21.
2 C.A. Dawson and W.E. Gettys An Introduction to Sociology 
(New York, 1948) 690.
3 "See J.A. Banks, The Sociology of Social M o v e m e n t s ;
• Studies in Sociology, (1972), 38.
4 R.A. Levitas, 'Some Problems of Aim-Centred Models 
of Social Movements', Sociology, 11(1977), 47-63.
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"make any substantial contribution to the 
theoretical understanding of societies or to 
scientific knowledge of mobilization*.'
Zald and Ash have not yet formulated their own theory
of organizational growth and decline; they regard their
conceptual framework as merely a number of tentative 
2
propositions but 1 have found their work most useful 
in analyzing my own research target organizations. I 
have reduced and modified their ’seventeen propositions’ 
to eight, some of which combine several of Zald and 
Ash’s original concepts.
(1) Proposition One - The size of the potential organ­
izational support base considered in the light of a 
favourable or unfavourable societal environment, 
combined with whether the organization is primarily 
'Inclusive or Exclusive1, determines the organization’s 
chances of survival and growth.
(2) Proposition Two - Organizational goal and tactical 
transformation are positively related to the ebb and 
flow tide of sentiment.
(3) Proposition Three - Organizations created by other 
organizations are more likely to cease to exist following 
’success1, than those with their own membership base,
(4) Proposition Four - Organizations with relatively 
specific goals are more likely to disappear than those
1 Bob:Jessop> . iSocial Movements: A Review of the 
Literature’ , Sociology, -8 (1974), 515-17.
2 Zald and Ash, op. cit..
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with broader goals.
(5) Proposition Five - Inclusive organizations are
more likely to decline at a faster rate than the Exclusive 
which are more likely to adopt new goals.
(6) Proposition Six - Inclusive organizations with their 
looser affiliation criteria and lower doctrinal orthodoxy 
are more split-resistant than the Exclusive organizations 
and tend to retain their factions instead of splitting.
(7) Proposition Seven - The more heterogeneous the 
organizational membership, the greater the tendency 
to factionalsim but 'splits’ often produce higher 
internal consistency and consensus which enable radical 
goal transformation,
(8) Proposition Eight - l'If a leadership cadre are 
committed to radical goals to a greater extent than the 
membership at large, member apathy and oligarchical 
tendencies lead to greater rather than less radicalismM.*
In my concluding chapter, I will consider to what extent 
these eight propositions are applicable to my study of 
the Irish Self Determination League. 1 will also consider 
whether the 1SDL went through the bureaucratization, 
institutionalization and routinization of charisma stages 
as postulated in the classical organizational theory 
of Weber and Michels.
1 See Zald and Ash, op. cit., 339, where my Proposition 
Eight is their Proposition Seventeen,
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Part II The Growth of Irish Republicanism in Britain
In Part I we considered the methodological and theoretical 
problems posed by historical sociological research. In 
particular^in Chapters 1 and 2,1 commented on the paucity 
of research on the Irish in Britain in general and Irish 
political organizations in particular. I shall now endea­
vour to remedy this deficiency with a detailed investiga­
tion of the Irish in Britain during 1916-23. We have already 
briefly observed and investigated the origins of the histo­
rical tensions that have existed between Ireland and 
Britain. In Part II we shall observe these tensions inten­
sifying to new levels of hostility and examine their effects 
on the Irish in Britain during 1916-21. I commented in 
Chapter 4 on the paucity of British sociological research 
on extra parliamentary organizations while examining the, 
mainly American, theoretical work on political organiza­
tional sociology. And now in Chapter 6 we shall observe 
in some detail the mobilization process of the Irish Self 
Determination League and the structural mechanisms whereby 
diffuse interests and groupings were welded together into 
a mass membership organization. Ih Chapter 3 we commented 
on the 'millet' type juxtaposition of Irish Catholicism 
and Nationalism, this phenomenon will be further observed 
in Chapter 5: but this issue is of sufficient importance 
to merit a chapter of its own and so most of Chapter 7 
centres around the tensions generated among Catholics in 
England by the Irish conflict. Finally in Chapters 8 and 
9 we will observe the Irish Self Determination League, des­
pite the IRA campaign in Britain and consequent police 
repression, continue to expand until it peaked with the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921.
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Chapter 5
The Irish In Britain 1914-1918: Fighting Overseas for 
Irish Freedom -
In 1914 the United Irish League of Great Britain attained
its highest membership since its formation in 1873 as the
1 2 Home Rule Confederation. With 46,000 members it dominated
the Irish political scene in Britain, yet less than ten
years later the British Cabinet was informed that:
"In Liverpool and the North there are still a few 
active branches of the old UIL, but in London it’s 
practically defunct". 3
A detailed study of the history of the UIL up to 1914,
4in its various guises is beyond the time scope of this 
thesis, we will do no more than note several trends that 
contributed towards such a drastic reversal of fortunes. 
The UIL failed to evolve during its later years in a 
manner consistent with the changing nature of Irish
1 In 1873 some twenty local Home Rule Associations mostly 
located in the North of England and Scotland, were 
unified into the Home Rule Confederation of Great 
Britain . See the NATION , 30 Aug, 1873. By 1876 there 
were 95 branches, ibid, 29 Jan, 1876.
In 1883 the Home Rule Confederation evolved into the 
Irish National League of Great Britain and increased 
substantially in size during the 1880’s from 127 branches 
and 4,600 members in 1884 to 630 branches with a total 
of 40,985 members in 1890. See NATION , 18 Sept.,
1890. In 1900 the INL became the United Irish League 
of Great Britain .
2 THE IRISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN,
1886-1908 . E.P.M. Wollaston, London, MA Thesis, (1958),
77; .
3 ROR 192, 6 Dec. 1923. CP 91(23), CAB 24/158.
4 For the history of the UIL/INL/HRC see Wollaston op., 
ci-t. and
Allan O'Day, The English Face of Irish' Nationalism - 
Parneliite Involvement in British Politics'/ 1880-86 ,
(1977).
contd,
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settlement patterns in Britain. Yorkshire may well ha,ve 
been the “rallying ground of Irish nationalism in England111 
but the UIL was far too concerned with the already well 
organized North of England and West of Scotland to the
detriment of the organization in the Midlands and the
>5
South of England.
The tactic of forming electoral ad hoc alliances with the 
Liberal party, and after 189 5 with the emerging Labour 
political movement resulted in a gradual but distinct 
weakening of organizational identity.
Internal democracy within the UIL at policy formation
t
level was negligible. The organization was so dominated
and effectively controlled by the Irish Parliamentary
Party and in particular by T.p. O ’Connor, the Liverpool MP,
to the extent that when the 1918 General Election in
Ireland swept the Parliamentary Party into oblivion,the
UIL lacked the necessary internal dynamic leadership,
particularly at branch level, to keep the organization
together. The UIL was so closely linked with the
J. Denvir, 'The Ir i sh in Great Britain , (1892).
T.P. O'Connor, Memoirs of an Old Parliamentarian-,
2 Vols., (1929) .
W. O'Malley, Glancing Back-, (1933).
J. Boland, Irishman's Day ' , (1944).
All of these last four authors were UIL leaders.
The J.F.X. O'Brien Papers: Ms 9224-5, (NLI), the General 
Secretary of the UIL.
1 Speech made at the 1899 INL convention. „• quoted in 
Wollaston, 42.
2 Between 1873 and 1914 the HRC/INL/UIL held 34 conventions 
in Britain. Of these only eight were held in London
and the Midlands. See Wollaston, op. cit., 239.
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Nationalist organization in Ireland* that it could not 
survive the demise of the latter, its fortunes being so 
intrinsically bound up with the progress of the constit­
utional movement for Self Government in Ireland, with the
growth periods of the INL/UIL mirroring the enactment of
2
the respective Home Rule Bills.
Yet with all its inherent imperfections, the UIL spoke 
unequivocally in 1914 for the nationalist orientated Irish 
community in Britain. The opposition of the tiny more 
exteme separatist section led by Sinn Fein with only some
3
twenty branches in Britain amounted to little more than 
a pinprick. Most branches had the apparent patronage of 
the Catholic church in the shape of local clerical member­
ship .though the periodic conflict between the sometimes 
conflicting party alliances for denominational education 
and the enactment of Home Rule prevented any formal hier­
archical recognition of the UIL as the de facto political
1 For the historical relationship of the HRC/INL/UIL, 
the name changes paralleled similar title changes of 
the organization in Ireland, see
D. Thornley, Isaac Butt and Home Rule , (1964) .
C.C. O ’Brien, Parnell and his Party ,.(Oxford, 1957).
F .S .L . Lyons, The Irish Parliamentary Party ,(1951) . 
F.H. O ’Donnell, A History of the Irish Parliamentary 
Party , 2 Vols., (1910).
2 In 1884 the INL had 127 branches and 4,600 members}in 
1886 after the introduction of the Home Rule Bill it 
had increased to 13,000 members organized in 423 
branches. . See C.C. O'Brien, op. cit., 274.
1914 and the highest ever membership of the UIL saw 
the passing of the, never enforced, Home Rule Act.
3 See. Report of Col. Sir Neville Chamberlain, RIC 
Inspector General, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal 
Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland , Cd. 8311,
(1916) , 44.
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organization of.the Church in England,1 Many branches had 
considerable influence in local governmental affairs 
through their councillor members, though outside Liverpool 
and Glasgow, where the UIL functioned as a separate poli­
tical bloc, this influence by 1914 was generally exercised 
through the electoral machinery of the Liberal and to a
lesser extent the Labour parties even though such political
2role playing often violated the UIL constitution.
The UIL leadership advocated the accomodation of the Irish
community within British society: not its assimilation ,
which would have negated the influence of the organization,
■ 3though the fcsub-culture within British society’1 had
been substantially weakened both by the passing of time and
the change in Irish immigration patterns to Britain.
This development was welcomed and encouraged by the assim- 
ilationist Catholic Herald chain of papers, which procl­
aimed that:
“The Irish and Catholic people in Great Britain are 
citizens of England or Scotland, they can join with 
their neighbours and fellow citizens as Tories, or 
Liberals or Labour men. No person whatever has a 
right to stand for Parliament or for a local body in 
England or Scotland as an Irish canditate or as a
1 The INL in 1885 sought such formal recognition but 
Bishop Bagsiawe of Nottingham was its only supporter in 
the English and Welsh hierarchy; see Wollaston, op. cit.
128. In the event, with specific tactical exceptions as 
in 1885/86, the INL/UIL usually supported the Liberals
who generally opposed denominational education butthe hierarchy 
supported the Tories who supported the former and opposed 
the latter policies. Wollaston (171) argues that this 
division effectively prevented the formation of a 
nationwide Catholic lay organization in Britain.
2 UIL members were constitutionally forbidden to hold 
office in other political organizations but this was 
widely disregarded; see Wollaston, op. cit., 82,
3 O'Day, op. cit., 106.
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Catholic candidate",1
The influence of this chain of 33 papers, with a common
central editorial content and a localized news section
with its basic circulation in Glasgow, Liverpool,
2Manchester, Sunderland and Dundee , on the Irish community
is difficult to quantify for it essentially was the voice
of one man ; Charles Diamond, an embittered former 
3Nationalist MP and UIL leader. Diamond simultaneously
opposed the Nationalist leaders and the Catholic hierarchy;
supported the Labour party, for which he stood several
times as a parliamentary candidate, bun often scourged its
left wing and even the centre social democrats. An MO 
412 intelligence officer succinctly summed up the political 
line of the Catholic Herald chain when he reported that: _
;,Mr Diamond is up in arms against the Irish Nationalist 
leaders, the Sinn Feiners and the English Catholic 
section equally. It is difficult to give a name to 
his policy which is advanced radical labour, teetotal, 
anti-Lloyd George and anti-English Catholic about 
equally”. 5
Such individual eccentricity is difficult to mobilize as
1 Catholic Herald, 27 Sept., 1919.
2 See the Home Office file. HO 45 11009/20126 on the
Catholic Herald and in particular a memo by the Director
of Public Prosecutions,(1 Feb., 1919),and a report by 
the Liverpool Special Branch 7 April, 1918 . For the 
development of the Catholic Herald'chain see Catholic 
Herald, 4 Oct. , 19~TA ^
3 Diamond was elected as the Parliamentary Party repre­
sentative for Monaghan in 1892 but rejected by a party 
reselection conference in 1895.
4 The Military Intelligence department that carefully 
scrutinized the British Press during the First World 
War.
5 See Report 17 May, 1918 in HO 45, 110009/20126,
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a coherent political force and even the entrepreneur in
Diamond recognized the strength of the UIL’s position and 
*
later that of the Irish. Self Determination Leacfue, which 
he loathed even more, by giving very substantial coverage 
to their activities.
History however shows that Diamond was correct in arguing 
that no political movement in Britain should be controlled 
from Ireland. As the politically very different Connolly 
Association was later to argue, Diamond maintained that 
the socio-political environments were so distinct as to 
require different modes and types of organizations. In 
1913 the Nationalist Movement in Ireland formed a military 
wing, the Irish Volunteers. This was intended to function 
only as a bargaining counter, and was a reaction to the 
Ulster Volunteer Force. But the UIL followed suit uncrit­
ically though the potential value of such a military section 
in Britain was very different from that of the organization 
in Ireland. It was an extremely counter productive move 
from the UIL perspective for it conferred considerable 
prestige on the numberically small and hitherto little 
known Irish Republican Brotherhood in Britain1 who furni­
shed the Volunteer movement with many of its instructors.
The constitutional movement made overt militarism so 
respectable that the Volunteer movement in London soon 
had “numbers so large that instruction became a serious
1 Leon O'Broin, Revolutionary underground. The Story of 
the IRB. 1858-1924. (Dublin, 1976), 155, states that 
there were about 300 IRB members in Britain in 1912.
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difficulty''1 and, as we shall observe in a later chapter,
some very respectable people in London involved themselves
in the importation of a considerable quantity of arms
for use in Ireland. And after the outbreak of the First
World War, when the Volunteers split into two /camps, with
the larger Nationalist Volunteers actively preparing to
aid the British war effort, the much smaller, anti-British,
2
Irish Volunteers were still permitted to drill in the
3
grounds of St. Georges Cathedral, Southwark.
Undoubtedly the vast majority of the Irish Community in 
Britain, like their counterparts in Ireland welcomed the
4
declaration of war on Germany. The image of ^.defenceless
Catholic Belgium" was sufficiently evocative to generate
many recruits. The uil .channelled its energies into enlis-
. 5ting men for the 'New Armies’ and would appear to have 
had considerable success in the highly emotive early 
days of the War. At one Newcastle meeting addressed by 
T.P. O'Connor no fewer than 800 UIL supporters volunteered
1 A. O'Brien, Ms 8417, also see Ernie Yunnan, 'The
Irish Volunteers in London' , An £-Ogiach Autumn, 1966 .
2 See the depositions of two members, Martin Walsh and 
Tom McCormick,PI7a/l54, O'Malley.
3 A. O'Brien, Ms 8417.
4 T.P. O'Connor, "This War is a War for the liberation of
the masses of the German people as well as the liberation 
of Europe generally", quoted in Waller, op. cit., 273.
5 The Standing Committee of the UIL declared its willing­
ness to send UIL leaders to any town where the Irish 
Community wished to raise an Army unit. Times.
.18 Sept., 1914 .
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for the British Army.1 Ultimately all the male Irish.
residents of Great Britain between the ages of 18 and
51 were declared liable for military service, so it is
the pre-conscription period up to 1916 which is of
interest in considering voluntary enlistment as a
criterion of assimilation. Unfortunately no official
figures for the enlistment of the Irish born in Britain
2
were ever supplied. Statistics were of course frequently 
given but their very production should make us wary of 
them as during World War I. Irish recruitment statistics 
were used like verbal hand-grenades, flung across the 
floor of the House of Commons in the ongoing parlia­
mentary battle between the Irish Nationalists and the 
Government. Consequently such selectively employed and
3
and indeed sometimes contradictory figures must be 
regarded with extreme caution.
Redmond stated that up to the end of 1915, ”115,000 men 
of Irish birth in Great Britain'1 had enlisted in that 
country and "a large number had (from Britain) joined
4
Regiments in Ireland . T.P. O'Connor spoke of the
1 Ref. H.E. Harris, The Irish Regiments in- the First 
World War1, (Cork, 1968), 26.
2 A parliamentary question on this subject brought the 
reply that such information had not been collected.
110 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 3216.
3 In the course of a parliamentary debate, the Nation­
alist leader Redmond stated that 157,000 Irishmen 
had joined in Ireland, the military forces since the 
start of the War but the Prime Minister claimed that 
only 105,000 had done so, see LXXXVI H.C. Debs. 5,
Col. 652.
4 LXXV H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 544.
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situation before conscription when f'l00,000 of* my fellow
countrymen left the great county of Lancashire for the
Army and 30,000 from the city of Glasgow'1 though earlier
that latter statistic had been given for the total
2Glasgow enlistment to 'date. Another Nationalist MP,
J.O. O ’Connor, in 1918 appeared to reduce his namesake’s
statistics while vouching for the accuracy of the figures
that he now presented:
"No less than 115,000 Irish born men living in 
• England, Scotland and Wales joined the colours.
We kept a record of them. Our organizations 
were used for the purpose of following them and 
tracking them into the Army and we counted
115,000 men in Great Britain alone who were 
serving with the colours, not to speak of the 
large numbers forming the various divisions 
that were recruited in Ireland'.'3
Yet as Redmond, quoted the same figure in 1915 the impli­
cation must be that between 1915 and 1918 not a single 
Irish born man in Britain joined the Armed Forces.,which 
considering that conscription,with ever decreasing grades 
of medical liability had been in force since 1916 is 
obviously inaccurate. Perhaps aware of this glaring 
error, yet another Nationalist MP claimed later in the 
year of 1918 that "upwards of 200,000 Irishmen have 
joined in Great Britain".^
1 LXXXVI H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 61.
2 The Glasgow MP Barnes stated that "30,000 as has been 
said went from Glasgow including as I know many
Irishmen”. LXXXV H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1550.
3 101 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 574.
4 See Dillon’s speech, 110 H.C. Debs. 5, Col 710.
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If the rather atypical casualty ratio for those enlisted 
in Ireland throws some doubt on the accuracy of the 
official statistics1; then a comparison of these unof- ■: 
ficial figures for the recruitment of the Irish born in 
Britain and the Census population of the Irish born resi­
dents of Britain indicates that these Irish recruiting 
statistics in Britain must be treated as very suspect.
In 1911 there were 550,040 Irish born people living in
2Britain, 375,325 in England and Wales and 174,715 in
3 4Scotland. There were 60,313 emigrants from Ireland in
1912 and 1913 but as this was the total emigration figure
from Ireland to all destinations only a proportion of
those came to Britain. The proportional division of the
emigrants bound for Britain and elsewhere is a matter
of some argument. Jackson states that between 1820 and
5
1910, 84% of Irish emigrants went to the United States
1 According to the War Cabinet Report, CAB 24/86,
134,202 Irishmen enlisted in Ireland between 1914 and 
1918. At the start of the War, there were 20,780
serving in the Regular Army, 8,000 in the Royal Navy
and 3,098 Naval Reservists who were immediately 
called up - figures given in LXXXVII H.C. Debs. 5,
Col. 1554. Yet the Times 24 July, 1924 gave the 
official Irish War dead as 49,434. This suggests
a fatality ratio of over 30%, or more than double the 
fatal casualities of the rest of the British forces. 
Interestingly LXXXVI1HC Col. 1554 stated that up to 
then 130,241 Irishmen had enlisted, this would mean 
that during 1917 and 1918 only some 4,000 Irishmen 
enlisted but the 104 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 142 recruitment 
in Ireland figure for 1917 alone, is 14,023. Harris 
op. cit , 32, who has made a substantial study of 
this field states that an rtc census in 1919 showed
248,000 men returned to Ireland after demobilization.
2 1911 Census - Summary Tables - Table 75 . Cd. 7929,
(1915).
3 1911 Census - Scotland - Table XXXVIII. Cd. 6896, (1913).
4 Registrar General (Ireland) Reports, Cd. 6917, (1912),
Cd. 7528, (1913).
5 J.A. Jackson, The Irish in Britain , (1963), 5.
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but he gives only a figure of some 3,016' emigrants to
Britain for the 1912-13 period1 which would appear to
be a rather low figure, particularly as some of his other
2
figures are open to question. Redmond's figures were
clearly inflated for his figure of 115,000 Irish born men
in Britain voluntarily enlisted in the Armed forces
between 1914-15 represented some 39% of the Irish male
population in Britain at the time of the 1911 census, or
about 21% of the total Irish born population in Britain
as compared to the under 3% of the total British popul- 
3ation who had voluntarily enlisted by the end of 1914. 
Recruitment in the voluntary phase was confined to the 
19-35 year age group and quite high medical standards 
were prescribed thus further reducing the number of 
eligible Irish born males who would have been accepted 
into the army. Considering that in the British popul­
ation as a whole only some 46% of males in the military
age group had either volunteered or attested their
4willingness to do so by the end of 1915 , Redmond’s 
figures for recruitment in this period must therefore
1 Jackson, op. cit., Table VII, 91.
2 In Table VII Jackson gives a total of 5,233 emigrants 
from Ireland to Britain for the 1916-18 period yet 
between 1916 and June 1918 over 40,000 Irish came to 
work in the Government Munitions plants in Britain; see 
106 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 2349. Jackson does not explain 
how Table VII was compiled.
3 By the end of 1914, 1,186,337 volunteers had joined 
the British Army see Correlli Barnett, Britain 
and Her Army 1509-1970 , (1974), 377.
4 Report on Recruiting , (Derby Report), Cd. 8149,
(1916), 5-7.
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be regarded as highly suspect. O ’Connor’s references to
100.000 Irish born recruits from Lancashire hardly
equates with the 1911 Census figure of 129,587 Irish
born residents of both sexes in Lancashire and Cheshire.1
Similarly Glasgow with a 1911 Census population of
2
28,968 Irish born males could hardly have furnished
30.000 Irish born recruits in the period before the 
introduction of conscription. 30,000 Irish born recruits 
would have been a more than respectable proportion for 
the whole of the Irish born male population of Scotland 
as a whole.
Even after a period of ever increasing conscription 
limits only some 12.4% of the British population were
~ 3
m  the armed forces by the time the war ended. As we 
have already observed, Redmond's pre-conscription figure 
represented 21% of the Irish born population resident 
in Britain. The claim, we have already encountered, 
by Dillon of “upwards of 200,000" Irish recruits in 
Britain by 1918 represents an almost incredible 68% of 
the Irish born males resident in Britain or 36% of the 
total Irish born population of Britain. Dillon must 
evidently have included the second and third generation 
etc., Irish, and despite their comments Redmond and
1 The 1911 Census of England and Wales , General 
Report, Table CIV, 214. Cd. 8491, (1917).
2 1911 Census of Scotland’, Table XXXVIII. Cd. 6896, 
(1913).
3 Ref. J. Salt and B.J. Elliott, Brifash Society 
1870-1970 , (Buckinghamshire, 1975), 91.
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O ’Connor must have done the same. The problem is how- 
far back, generationally speaking, can one go to define 
a person born in Britain as ‘Irish’. Even taking the 
size of the first, second and third generation Irish 
in Britain as about 1.5 million,these recruitment figures 
were proportionally much higher than those for the rest 
of the population.
The UIL following its parent organization’s efforts in
Ireland, sought, but failed to keep its recruits together
in specific Irish units, its objective being a ’UIL
in uniform1. This policy was thwarted by the War Office
through a variety of strategems, all of which seemed to
indicate that; the officers in control of the War Office
did not wish to see the creation of Irish Nationalist
1
units m  Britain. While no new infantry regiments were 
formed during the War, many of the volunteers of 1914 
and 1915 were permitted and indeed often encouraged to 
join affinity units popularly known as ’Pals Battalions’ 
which were then attached to existing regiments.
1 General Parsons, CO 16th Division, rejected an offer 
by Crilly, the Secretary of the UIL Central Council, 
to open recruiting offices for his Division as he said 
this "would mean filling us with Liverpool, Glasgow 
and Cardiff Irish who are slumbirds that we don't 
want", quoted in Denis Gwynn, The Life of John 
Redmond‘, (New York, 1971), 400.
2 The standard Infantry Regiment of 1914 consisted only 
of two Regular Battalions, a thirds Reserve unit of 
ex-soldiers and a few Territorial Battalions. The
New Armies were organized in Service, Reserve or 
Garrison Battalions - depending on personnel's degree 
of medical fitness - which were then incorporated into the 
existing Regiments. Hence by 1918 the active service 
personnel of a Regiment was often greater than the 
strength of a Division. With up to 52 Battalions, as 
in the case of the Northumberland Fusileers, such a 
Regiment would have in pre-war days constituted an 
entire Army Corps if all its units had been permitted 
to serve as an single entity.
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The absorption of well over a million volunteers in
five months1 at a time when the bulk of the Regular Army
was already overseas was only possible because these
recruits effectively organized themselves on a town,
occupational, etc., basis. If public school graduates,
bankers, sportsmen, post office workers, Scottish and
Welsh men, living in England could organize such Pals
Battalions then why not the UIL? It tried to; but was
2prevented by the War Office and the only new Irish 
formation raised in Britain during the War, the 
'Tyneside Irish Brigade1 was created only as the result 
of a local recruitment competition between the Irish and 
Scots residents of Tyneside. This also encountered strong 
War Office resistance, and was only overcome by a com­
bined local political initiative. Even so the 'Irish'
4
title was not officially recognized in casuality lists.
1 By the end of 1914, 1,186,337 volunteers had enlisted; 
see Correlli Barnett, op. cit., 377.
2 The Monthly Army Lists for the month of January in 
1914 and 1916 were carefully examined and the catalogue 
the British Library consulted to establish this.
3 Officially the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 'Tyneside Irish' 
were known as the 24th, 25th, 26th.and 27th Service 
Battalions of the Northumberland Fusileers with Tyne­
side Irish in brackets .There was also a . 30th (Reserve) 
Battalion of the Tyneside Irish; there were about
5,500 men originally in these units.
4 See Gwynn Redmond , op. cit., 453. Redmond also 
complained that in the official reports of the Galli­
poli landings, where the Dublin and Munster regiments 
in the first wave suffered extremely high casualties:,, 
there was no mention of these units though many other 
units were named — LXXV H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 545.
T.P. O'Connor also complained of the lack of official 
recognition of the exploits of Irish units - LXXXV 
H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 2566. It was a source of much 
bitterness in Ireland among the nationalists that 
while the unit recruited largely from the Ulster 
Volunteer Force bore the title the 36th (Ulster) 
Division, the 10th and 16th Divisions recruited in 
the South of Ireland were not granted the official
contd,
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There were two established Irish units of the Territorial
Force in Britain located in Liverpool and London. The
8th (Irish) Battalion the Kings (Liverpool) Regiment was
expanded to three units but again there were complaints
that the 'Irish’ title,though in this case officially
recognized,was omitted from the published casualty 
2lists. The London unit, the 18th Battalion, The London 
Regiment (London Irish Rifles) recruited a second batta­
lion within a few days of the declaration of War. But
this old established rather socially elite unit founded
3m  the 'Volunteer1 period of 1859, by its very consti­
tution (that it was) open to “men connected with Ireland
4by birth> marriage or property" suggest that.it was nob
'Irish' title and denied their own flags and emblems 
as permitted to the former. It was also alleged, 
with considerable evidence, that while the 10th and 
16th Divisions' rank and file were predominantly 
Catholic, their officers were mostly Protestants.
See Gwynn Redmond , op. cit., 458.
1 The l/8th and 2/8th for active service and the 3/8th 
for Home Defence duty.
2 LXXIII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1969.
3 In 1859 there was a 'French Invasion S c a r e V o l u n t e e r  
Corps essentially of Upper and Middle class compos­
ition were formed, including the 16th Middlesex
(London Irish) with Lord Palmerston as one of its 
first recruits. These Middlesex volunteer units 1
though they were later .incorporated into the Terri­
torial London Regiment retained much of their social 
exclusiveness. For example recruits paid for a very 
distinctive uniform and a relatively high contribution 
towards unit funds (they purchased much of their own 
arms) was expected.
4 See. The London Irish Rifles. A Brief History of the 
Regiment and of its Work at the Front , (London, 1916, 
A Regimental Publication), and Ernest- May, Signal .
Corporal: The Story of the 2nd London Irish Rifles in
the T9-14-18 War , (1972)
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exclusively composed of the Irish born in London,who 
indeed were probably a minority.
The mere designation 'Irish’ should not be taken to 
denote that the unit was composed of Irish born.or even 
second or third generation Irish. An examination of the 
casualty- list of the ’Liverpool Irish’ in the pre- 
conscription period reveals many non-Irish names,’1' 
while in the competitive rush to see which unit would 
recruit the most men both the Tyneside Irish and Scots
2"had accepted men with no Scottish or Irish connections" .
Irishmen in Britain were often prevented from enlisting
in the Irish Regiments of the Regular Army though as
volunteers the recruiting officers were obliged to permit
3them to join the regiment of their choice. Many Irish
nationalists in Britain and Ireland believed,not without
reason, that in the War Office there were those with
Ulster Loyalists sympathies,who were determined publicly
to reduce the extent of the Irish nationalist contribution
to the war effort to the minimum possible level. In
particular, what appeared to be a deliberate policy of
1' see. Everard Wyrall, The History Vof the Kings .
(Liverpool) Regiment , 3 Vols: , (1928), 231, Vol. I, 
and Frank Forde, 'The Liverpool Irish Volunteers',
The Irish Sword, X(1971), 106-23.
2 See Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme , 
(1971), 267. Middlebrook further states that 75% of 
the Tyneside Scottish were 'Geordies', 12-13.
3 T.P. O ’Connor complained of this widespread practice 
in Britain. The responsible Minister assured him 
this was contrary to policy, LXXV H.C. Debs. 5,
Col. 553., but Redmond later claimed that this policy 
of preventing the Irish in Britain from joining Irish 
Regiments was still occuring, LXXXVII H.C. Debs. 5,
Col. 592.
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ignoring acts of Irish gallantry caused much bitterness
among the nationalists. The Irish Units after suffering
heavy casualties in the battles of 1915 and 1916 were
either allowed to be run down as in the case of the
’London Irish'1;1 severely diluted by non-Irish drafts as
2
happened to the ’Tyneside Irish1 and eventually disban-
3
ded before other ethnic units were. The few 'Irish’ units 
in Britain, the repeated omission of their titles in 
casualty lists and their eventual reduction created 
the impression among many that the Irish in Britain were 
not playing their full role in this war while the 
omission of the exploits of Irish Regiments in the 
censored press considerably reinforced this feeling 
that the Irish contribution to the war effort was sever­
ely lacking. If the Minister responsible for the Army 
did not know that there was an old ’Irish' unit in
1 Parliament was informed that a London Irish Battalion 
had been reduced to 250 soldiers;and it(was not 
prepared to significantly reinforce it-LXXXin hc' Debs 5 
Col. 354, (22 June, 1916) and it was eventually dis­
banded seerhe London Irish at War , (1949), 15.
2 Lloyd George, "Take the Northumberland Fusileers, there 
. were Irish Battalions raised there. I am informed
that not 5% of these Battalions are now Irish" . lxxxvi 
H.C. Debs. 5, Cols. 649-50.
3 The 2 7th Service Battalion (4th Tyneside Irish) was 
disbanded in 1917 while the Tyneside Scots still 
retained their four battalions, The Monthly Army 
List, January, 1918.
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London'1' then the ordinary public could hardly be expected
to be better informed. The difficulty experienced by
the Irish units was also experienced by Jewish units in 
2
the next war.
So when the 1916 Rising occurred the atmosphere in Britain 
towards the Irish had already been prejudiced by the 
perceived poor Irish war contribution. One minority 
group in the Irish community in Britain was indeed 
determined not to play any part in the British war 
effort, the militant Republican section of the Irish 
Volunteers. Some sixty London Republicans, quite a few 
of whom "had never before been on Irish soil'' , 
accompanied by the entire Liverpool Company of Irish 
Volunteers with contingents from Manchester and Glasgow 
decided,
"'Instead of occupying the less dangerous position 
of conscientious objectors in England to join 
their fellow volunteers in Ireland in armed
1 In response to complaints that the ’Irish' title of 
the 18th Battalion of the London Regiment had been 
omitted from the official casualty lists, Mr Tennent 
reading from his War Office prepared brief stated this 
was because as a unit which was part of a 'New Army' 
it was not permitted such a title;. lxxi H.C. Deb 
Cols. 705-706. Following corrections by MP s who 
outlined the unit's history, the Minister apologised 
for misleading the House. Ibid, Col. 956.
2 In 1939 the War Office rejected an offer by 86,000 
Jews who wanted to form British Army Units in 
Palestine, though several battalions of a Palestine 
Regiment were eventually raised for service in that 
country. Despite Churchill's personal support, the 
Cabinet's proposed 'Jewish Division* encountered such 
strong War and Foreign Office opposition that it took 
five years to implement the proposal and even then 
only a Brigade was actually formed. See Michael
J. Cohen, Palestine. Retreat from the Mandate-,
(1978), 99-103, and 117-124.
3 Rex Taylor, 'Michael Collins , (1958), 56.
164
resistance.’'1
They included a young post office clerk known then to
few but whose name several years later would blaze from
press headlines, Michael Collins. In Ireland the British
Volunteers formed the first active service unit of the
2new IRA and engaged in its first military action.
They.fought bravely and suffered proportionately heavy 
3casualties in the Easter Rising.
The Rising of 1916 -<occurred at a particularly crucial 
point of the war. At Verdun the bulk of the French 
Army was being so systematically processed through the
German mincer that it was already apparent the still
4 5underequipped and often poorly trained British Army
would have to undertake the major share of the future
fighting. The battles of 1915 - in particular Loos -
the "worst disaster which had ever befallen a British
1 Piaras Beasaii,. ' Michael Collins , (Dublin, 1926) , 73.
2 They killed a 'G Squad detective, - , (Political 
section of the Dublin Metropolitan Police) in a raid
on their Kimmage Camp. See an article by S.O. O'Connor 
in An Poblacht, 9 Feb., 19 29, and John O'Connor's 
account, An t Oglach, Autumn, 1966.
3 Six were killed in action out of a total of 56 
Republican fatal casualities. See Art O'Brien,
'Some Note's on the History of the Gaelic League in 
London1, Capuchin Annual, (Dublin, 1936), 116-126, 
and James Ryan, 'The GPO 1916' , Capuchin Annual,
(Dublin, 1942), 312-18. Also see my article in the 
Irish Post, 27 Mar., 1982. ; =. v
4 The 'Great Shell Scandal' of 1915, and the efforts to 
remedy this had not yet produced the required explo­
sives and the British Army was still greatly deficient 
in the field of heavy artillery.
5 General Haig, the British commander in France, wrote 
in March, 1916; "I have not got an Army in France 
really, but a collection of divisions untrained for 
the field Robert Blake (edt) , The Private Papers 
of Sir Douglas Haig ', (1952), 137.
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Army*1,* had shown just how unprepared the British Army.
was for the style of combat on the Western Front.
Attempts to seek an Eastern short cut, to end the war
had proved even more disastrous. After losing over 50%
2of its expeditionary force the British had been forced 
to evacuate the' Dardenelles. In the very week the 
Dublin Rising took place, an entire British Army Corps 
surrendered to the Turks, a supposedly inferior oriental 
enemy;
*Kut el Amorha was the most humiliating disaster 
to have befallen a British expeditionary force 
since the 1842 retreat from Kabuli 3
This chain of reverses had such an impact on recruitment
in Britain that the flood of volunteers in 1914, had by
the end of 1915 been so reduced that with less than 50%
of those of military age voluntarily enlisting^ and with
a dramatic 25% increase in the marriage rate caused by
5
men hoping to avoid early enlistment , it had been neces-
g
sary to introduce conscription.
The introduction of conscription had a considerable
1 David S. Daniel, World War I , (1971), 56.
2 Out of 410,000 British troops, 213,000 became casual­
ties. Correlli Barnet, op. cit., 385.
3 Russell Braddon, The Siege , (1969), 13.
4 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge, British Society and the 
First World War , (1965), 78.
5 Middlebrook, op. cit., 25. The Government had pledged 
not to conscript married men until all the single men 
of a particular age group had been enlisted.
6 The ’Military Service Bill’ of 5 Jan., 1916.
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impact on ail. spheres of British society, marking a 
definite watershed in the advancement of the State 
power at the expense of individual liberty.'1' Only one 
area of the United Kingdom was immune from conscription, 
Ireland, and here in the last week of April , 1916.rebel­
lion broke out. In itself compared to the casualties"
2
of the Western Front, the 450 dead and 2,600 wounded
were relatively insignificant. What did matter was
that at such a difficult time Irish rebels aided by a
3Knight of the realm had sought German aid. The very 
tone of the Easter Proclamation with references to ‘-her 
exiled children in America'*' (an America still neutral and 
likely to remain so) and supported by '"‘Gallant Allies 
in Europe” (which could only mean Germany and Austria), 
seemed to be a 'stab in the back' conjuring up all the 
old British fears of Ireland being the entry point for 
a foreign invasion of Britain.
The very fact that it took a week's hard street fighting 
supported by naval bombardment to regain control ofv 
Dublin from rebels with,only small arms, that 132
4
soldiers were killed and 397 wounded - an extremely 
unfavourable ratio to the rebel casualities - did not
1 Malcolm 1. Thomis> 'Conscription and Consent: British 
Labour and the Resignation Threat of January 1916' , 
Australian Journal1 of Politics and History, XXIII 
(1977), 10-18.
2 Casualties given in the White Paper, Documents ■
Relative to the Sinn Fein Movement •, CMD 1108,
(1921), 14-15.
3 Sir Roger Casement.
4 CMD 1108, 14-15.
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augur well for the success of the coming British offen­
sive against the stronger enemy in France. To put down 
the Rising, required the dispatch of reinforcements div­
erted from France, men who as one MP told Parliament, 
"voluntarily enlisted in order to fight for their country 
against foreign enemies and have been cruelly and treas­
onably slain during street fighting by Irish rebels in 
the United Kingdom1' .1 These sentiments were shared by 
many in Britain where support for Ulster Loyalism grew 
as sympathy for Irish Nationalism declined. Among the 
many influences of the ’Rising’ on British society was
the feeling by the leaders of the Army; that Irish
2
soldiers could never be fully trusted and a renewed 
determination to prevent the formation of any new Irish 
Nationalist units in the British Army.
Before considering the impact of 1916 on the Irish 
community in Britain, it is necessary to consider how 
it was received in Ireland. It is essential to separate 
fact from myth; to remember that the present public 
recognition of the 1916 leaders in naming railway 
stations etc., after them does not necessarily mean that 
this was the public attitude immediately after the 
Rising.
1 Sir J.D. Rees, LXXII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1964, and 
see Gerald Edwards, The Irish Rebellion. The 2/6th 
Sherwood Foresters’ Part in the Defeat of the Rebels 
in 1916 , (Chesterfield, 1960).
2 Events in Ireland in 1916 may have had an effect on 
Haig’s assessment of Irish soldiers. Middlebrood, 
op. cit., 100.
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The poetic vision of Yeats might have seen, "A terrible 
beauty is born” but the expression by Redmond of
X
"feelings of desolation and horror" was much more in 
tune with Irish thought. Certainly the ordinary 
Dubliner who tried to attack the surrendered insurgents 
did not welcome a ’Rising' in which, as is always the
2case, civilians had endured the heaviest casuaiities.
It was symbolic of the conflicting loyalties of Catholic 
Irishmen in 1916 that the Republican flag ''which was 
hoisted from the staff of the Post Office was shot down 
by an Irish soldier who has won the DCM in France’1.
Elements of four regiments recruited from Catholic 
Nationalists had been employed to crush the Rising.^
Taking the police into account there were more Catholic 
Irishmen fighting for the British in Dublin than the
1,500 or so rebels, while, the National Volunteers were 
locally mobilized in Limerick, Cork and Mayo to assist
5
the British forces.
1 XCII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 2512.
2 At least 250 civilians were killed, see CMC 1108, 14-15.
3 Times 4 May, 1916.
4 See the evidence of Col. Cowan, Assistant Adj. General
Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the 
Rebellion in Ireland Report , Cd. 8311, (1916), 69.
Also General Maxwell's 'Order of the Day' praising those 
Irish Regiments which have so largely helped to crush 
this rising, Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, (Dublin, 
1916),99.
5 LXXII H.C. Debs. 5, Cols. 938-9.
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If this was the immediate reaction in Ireland itself then
it is not surprizing that in England 400 Irishmen in
Chesterfield were prepared to offer their services as
a Volunteer army in Ireland on behalf of the Government
without pay.* The Central Executive of the UIL in Great
Britain, at a special meeting, denounced the "wickedness
2
and insanity of the recent Rising" . A Lancashire UIL . 
resolution spoke of the "treacherous outrage in Ireland" , 
while the Liverpool UIL Central Council requested Mr 
Redmond,
"to address a great public demonstration of his 
countrymen at the earliest possible moment in 
this the chief stronghold of Irish Nationalists 
in Great Britain".-3
to repudiate the recent events. However for a number of 
reasons it proved impossible to organize such a rally and 
instead the UIL convened a meeting of the Irish Societies 
in Liverpool which duly condemned the Rising but signi­
ficantly protested against 'any further wholesale shooting 
of misguided men and called for a searching inquiry into 
the origins of the outbreak, especially the provocative
4
causes arising out of the Carsonite illegalities . Here 
in this statement, we have the core of the dilemna that 
confronted the Nationalist movement in Britain and 
Ireland. Their condemnation of the Rising was essentially
1 Times'  ^ 1 May, 1916.
2 Ibid, 4 May, 1916.
3 Ibid, 3 May, 1916.
4 Ibid, 10 May, 1916.
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pragmatic because it weakened support in Britain for Home 
Rule for Ireland. Yet it was now apparent that the 
British Government was going to partition Ireland and 
that no degree of resistance by the Nationalist movement 
was going to alter that policy. Nationalists who strongly 
disagreed with the Republicans nevertheless did not see 
why Republicans should be executed for armed resistance- 
and seeking German aid when the Ulster Loyalists had a 
few years earlier pursued the same policy and now had 
their representatives in the British Cabinet.
The Royal Commission on the Rebellion succinctly summed 
up the duality of the traditional Irish ambivalence to 
the use of violence for the attainment of political 
objectives:
“Irishmen no doubt appreciate the maintenance 
of order but they appear to have an inveterate 
prejudice against the punishment of disorder*/*
(that is when it was politically motivated).
The problem was that the vast majority of the British
people at this critical juncture of the war did not
appreciate such subtle distinctions between pragmatic
condemnation and an emotional, traditional,dislike of
punishing the rebels. When shell-shocked youths were
being shot by firing squads in France, many could not see
why armed rebels should be spared. By seeking clemency
the Irish Nationalists in effect conferred a degree of
respectability on the Republicans just as their formation
1 Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland ,
Cd.“8279, (1916), 7.
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of the Volunteers in 1913 had given the IRB its opport­
unity. The heavy-handed policy of the British Army
1
shown by its raiding of the London Gaelic League
premises and that of the Glasgow police in their seizure
2
of a hall to prevent a meeting on Ireland, only succeeded
in alienating further many Irish Nationalists in Britain
who in response to a wide spread ban on Irish songs in
the music halls sang them defiantly at their own gather- 
3mgs. The presence of nearly two thousand Irish prisoners 
4and internees, many of them clearly innocent of any
i
involvement in the Rising, in various prisons and inter­
nment camps in Britain was a powerful emotive symbol.
Many Nationalists supported the Irish National Aid 
Fund-, covertly founded by the IRB, which looked after 
those prisoners and internees and within a short period
5
£820 had been raised in London alone. In London there 
emerged after the Rising, a UIL splinter group the Anti- 
Partition League of Ireland which was formed to prevent 
the exclusion of Ulster from any future Home Rule settle­
ment. On the day that Roger Casement was hanged this
1 LXXII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1127. Also see Reynolds 
News, 8 May,1916.
2 LXXXIII H.C. Debs. 5, Cols. 17-18. Also see INAD 
Reports Ms 24, 367, Ms 24, 369 and Ms 24, 387(NLI) 
for accounts of various prisons.
3 LXXXII H.C. Debs 5, Col. 1808.
4 According to the figures given in CMD 1108, op. cit.,
1,841 persons were sent from Ireland to Britain for 
internment and 145 imprisoned there after trial by 
court martial.
5 The INAD (it was also sometimes called the Irish
National Relief Fund) accounts in the O ’Brien Ms
8485 and 8427. Also see INAD Reports - London, Ms 24, 385, 
Ms 24, 324, Ms 24, 378, Ms 24, 338 (NLI).
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organization changed its name;to the Irish Nation 1 ■
League,1 and adopted the Sinn Feijn policy that the 
elected Irish representatives should withdraw from
2Westminster. A defence campaign in aid of Casement was 
spearheaded by George Bernard Shaw with considerable 
Nationalist support in Britain which like Shaw believed
3
that the very presence of ’’unprosecuted traitors’1 in the 
4prosecution against Casement showed the duality of 
English justice when applied to Ireland. The unscru-
5
pulous use of Casement’s diaries to prevent a reprieve 
further alienated many of the Irish in Britain.
As well as the Itish prisoners and internees in Britain
1 Times, 14 Aug., 1916,
2 For Casement’s life history and trial see Brian 
Inglis’ Roger Casement , (1973). Geoffrey de C. 
Parmiter, Roger Casement , (1936). Ben L. Reid,
The Lives of Roger Casement , (Yale, 1976).
Giovani Costigan, 'The Treason of Sir Roger Casement*,
American Historical Review, bXi?(4955) 283-302.
Galen Broeker, ’Roger Casement: Background to Treason1, 
Modern History, XXIX (1957), 237-45.
3 See Shaw’s letter in the Manchester Guardian,
22 July, 1916. The Casement case converted Shaw to 
Irish Nationalism and he donated royalties to the 
family of the executed James Connolly; see Stanley 
Weintraub, ’’The Making of an Irish Patriot: Bernard 
Shaw’’ , Eire-freland, 4 (1970), 9-27.
4 The Attorney General F.E. Smith had played a prominent 
part in the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
and sought aid from Germany to resist Home Rule just
before the start of the war.
5 For an account of how Admiral Hall ,the Director of 
Naval Intelligence,circulated copies of the diary
in influential circles in Britain and America and in 
doing so,dissuaded some from supporting an appeal for 
a reprieve, see Colonel Allison, . A History of Modern 
Espionage•, (1965), 100-2. Few subjects in Irish 
history have given rise to so much controversy as the 
Casement Diaries, popularly held to be British Intell­
igence forgeries and several works have been written 
purporting to show the Diaries* falseness;
Rene MacColl, 'Roger Casement: A New Judgement',
contd,
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there was another group of Irishmen very unpopular with 
many British people, Irishmen who had come over to 
Britain to replace workers called up for military service. 
Legally only those ’ordinarily resident in Great Britain1'1'
could be conscripted, but what constituted ’ordinarily
>
resident1, what period of residence was the determining 
qualification? That was decided by the local courts 
and in Motherwell they established a length of stay
2extending beyond 28rdays as eligibility for conscription. 
Irish seasonal harvesters in Scotland living in small 
tightly knit communities, where most of the men had gone 
into the army, were particularly vulnerable to arbitrary 
local police action^ and forcible enlistment^1,* even to 
totally illegal direct military arrest and enlistment
5
without the sanction of a court. Eventually after 50 
Irish harvesters were marched handcuffed through the 
streets of Mossend there was a full scale debate in
/r
Parliament on the subject. Assurances were given that
Irish harvesters would not be conscripted in future and
(1956). Alfred Noyes, The Accusing Ghost: Or 
Justice for Casement , (19 57). William J. Maloney,
The Forged Casement Diaries , (Dublin, 1936).
Fr. Gerard Smith, an Irish priest working in Peru, 
claims to have talked to a Peruvian who met two 
British agents seeking information on Casement in 
Peru in 1916, Irish Press, 20 Feb., 1974.
1 LXXXI H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1330.
2 LXXXV H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1546.
3 Ibid, Col. 12.
4 LXXXII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 2089.
5 LXXI H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 263.
6 LXXXV H.C. Debs. 5, Cols. 1516-54.
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that there would be no more military raids like the 
one on a London Irish meeting to arrest conscription 
evaders. Arrests however did continue and the Government, 
fearing a significant reduction in the number of migrant 
agricultural workers at a time when it was desperate to 
increase food production;since the submarine campaign 
substantially impeded the import of food stuffs, was 
forced to introduce a system of 'limited residential1
2
certificates guaranteeing immunity from conscription.
By mid 1916 the Government had become a substantial
employer of .manufacturing labour through its National
Munition Plants, and despite extensive female substitution
of labour there was still a considerable need for male
workers. So the Government directly recruited Irish
workers in Ireland, gave them a 'no conscription pledge'
and sent them to the English munition wofks where they
replaced English workers who were then sent to the
trenches. By June 1918 there were 40,000 of these Irish
4workers in Britain.- They were greatly resented by many,
5
for unlike agricultural workers,, the munition employees 
were relatively well paid. One MP was certainly speaking
the thoughts of many when he referred to
‘'Irishmen filling positions in England that
1 LXXXV H.C. Debs. 5. Col. 190.
2 Times, 15 Aug.,1916.
3 LXXX H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 607.
4 LXXXII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 2349.
5 See an article in the Manchester Guardian, 27 Mar. ,
1915, on the poverty of the agriculture labourers as 
their wages fell far below inflation rates.
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Englishmen have been compelled to forego and 
leave behind and are drawing wages which these 
Englishmen by their military service are being 
compelled to give up”1
There was much friction between these Irish workers and
the British inhabitants of the towns in which they were
billeted. Even more galling to many British people was
the War Office decision not to conscript those Irish
Republicans living in Britain who had been interned after
2the 1916 Rising and were now released. '
Ireland's freedom from conscription became a festering 
sore in relations between the two islands. Having
suffered at least 415,000 casualties . on the Somme in
3 41916, a further 350,000 at Passenchendale; the replace­
ments were increasingly being obtained by recruiting 
officers following the biblical injunction of bringing 
in'the halt, the lame and the blind'.^
The total number of voiuntafy enlistments in Ireland 
for the whole of 1917 was three thousand less than the 
British casuitiy figure for a relatively minor one day battle
1 LXXXVIII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1722.
2 After several court martials and forcible enlistments
the War Office decided that the determination of these 
Republicans was too strong to risk their presence
in any army unit where thor-r ’■M.aht well foim a subversive
nucleus, so they were released/~ see XC H.C. Debs. 5,
Col. 1628 and see Antoglach Autumn 1966. For the rea­
sons for this change of policy see Chief Secretary's
Office (Dublin) File 5648/26056 (S.P.O.).
3 See John Terraine The Mighty Continent(19 76) 102.But 
Correlli Barnet op. cit. 396, states the total British 
casualties might have reached 600,000.
4 See Marwick, op. cit., 191.
5 An Irish migrant in Scotland who because he was ... contd.
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.on the Messine Ridge.'1' Many': British people noted, 
most unfavourably, that Ireland with a population one 
tenth that of Great Britain's population had only
2
supplied two per cent of the armed forces of Britain. 
Nationalists in Britain who tried to outline the Irish 
contribution were, if listened to at all, reminded 
that it had been made in 1914, 1915 and 1916 but the 
war in 1917 showed no signs of eliding and the demand 
for recruits appeared unending. In these circumstances 
the Government which for very cogent pragmatic reasons 
did not wiSih to enforce conscription in Ireland was 
certainly out of step with the demand of the British 
public.
But in the Spring of 1918 the hitherto virtually static
Western Front was torn asunder by a massive final
gamble series of German offensives. In six weeks
3
the British lost a quarter of a million men, the entire
4
British Fifth Army was routed, seventeen year old
half trained boys were sent to stem the German advance
which had taken them back onto the River Marne where
_____
blind in one eye and therefore had been totally 
rejected previously for military service was now 
conscripted - XCVI H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1596. It was 
true that most of these hitherto medically unfit 
men were placed in Home Defence and Garrison units, 
but their very conscription indicates the shortage 
of manpower.
1 There were 14,013 enlistments in Ireland in 1917 
105 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 42. On the 7th of June 1917 
the British Army suffered 17,000 casualties in what 
was only a preliminary to the main offensive later 
that summer. Barnet, op. cit. 401. It was considered 
a very successful battle.
2 101 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 103.
3 Terraine, op. cit., 112.
4 William Moore See How they Run - The British Retreat of 1918
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they had been in the first month of the war. To 
reinforce a British Army literally fighting with its 
"back to the wall",1 there was as near total as poss­
ible enlistment of all crvxtiins under 25, while the
2age limit for conscription was increased to 55. With 
fathers now following their sons into the trenches,
Lloyd George told Parliament ’'It would be impossible 
without a deep sense of injustice and resentment 
in this country to carry through these drastic 
measures without enforcing conscription in Ireland!
The British public wanted, nay demanded, the con-
4scription of the Irish, 150,000 new soldiers to replace 
the decimated Fifth and Third Armies. The only problem 
was that the Irish nationalists who had long since 
ceased to regard the war as ’their war’ did not wish 
to be conscripted. The Irish Nationalist MPs with­
drew from Westminster to lead a mass campaign against ■ 
conscription in Ireland. Farmers threatened ’to
5
plough in their crops, workers went on strike, and
1 To quote Haig's ’Order of the Day' of 9 April, 1918 
James Edmonds, History of the Great War (1922-4 7)
Vol 10, 510.
2 104 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1135.
3 105 H.C, Debs. 5, Col. 1344.
4 This was the Cabinet estimate of the number that
could be obtained in Ireland — War Cabinet Minute
375 (2) of 27 March 1918.
5 For a detailed account of the Anti-Conscription 
Campaign in Ireland see Robert Kee The Green Flag 
(1972), 618-623 and Calton Younger, Irel'and’s 
Civil War (1970), 63-84.
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most ominously the Catholic Hierarchy was resolutely
opposed to conscription especially as it was also to
apply to the clergy. All the old English fears of
the 1 catholic threat1, , the r disloyal alien religious
minority1 were evoked in Lloyd George's statement that
'‘The Church as a body in Ireland associated itself
with a challenge to Imperial supremacy in that country' ,1
particularly so when he went on to imply a connection
between the Church's anti-conscription-campaign and
the alleged German Plot which had resulted in the
2
arrest ofn?many Sinn Fein members in Ireland. In reply
3
to a bitter editorial attack on Catholicism in the Times, 
Earl Denbigh wrote "It almost makes me ashamed of the 
word Catholic to see the action now taken by the Irish
4
Hierarchy to combat and resist the Law." The leader 
of the House of Lords, Lord Curzon, suggested that
1 107 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 962. According to Michael .
Kinnear The Fall of Lloyd George (1973), 14, Lloyd 
George believed the Roman Catholic church's opposition 
to conscription was a conspiracy against Britain
but King George V had warned him that the introduction 
of "Conscription in Ireland was bound to have the 
direst consequences in the near future... It could 
mean an end of Ireland as part of the British Empire'^ 
an opinion shared by Lord Middleton,,the Southern 
Irish Unionist leader,who told Lloyd George it 
was "one of the most foolish experiments ever attempted 
in that country" - Donald McCormick The Mask of 
Merlin: A Critical Study of Lloyd George (1963), 185.
2 106 H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 1963. Also see Sean O'Luing
'The German Plot, 1918' Capuchin Annual XXXVI 
(1968), 377-81.
3 Times 24 April, 1918 and 1 May, 1918. For the Irish 
Hierarchy's opposition to conscription see Tomas O'Fiach 
'The Irish Bishops and the Conscription Issue, 1918' 
Capuchin Annual XXXVI (1968), 351-68.
4 Catholic Herald 4 May, 1918.
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the Catholic Bishops h.nd threatened their flocks with
I
eternal damnation. The Catholic Union of Great Britain , 
a self elected aristocratic body, condemned the actions 
of the Irish Hierarchy for supporting wa movement•for
X
organized disobedience to the law:\ The already wide 
divisions between sections of the English and Irish 
Churches,stemming from very different views as to the 
desirability of Irish Home Rule opened now to chasm-like 
proportions and not just between the national churches.
The Bishops of Nottingham and Salford were only pre­
vented from publicly repudiating the Catholic Union 
by the last minute discovery that it was officially
permitted to act as a spokesman for the Hierarchy on
2political issues.
The inability of the German Army to consolidate its 
Spring offensive gains, the speed with which the 
American Army was transferred to France, the success 
of the reorganized French Army offensive of July 1918 
and finally the first major successful thrust by the 
British Army in the War, combined to negate the need 
for conscription in Ireland. But the wounds that this 
issue had opened in Britain remained open and festering 
for a long time afterwards. When a prolonged armed 
conflict later developed in Ireland many in Britain
1 Denis Gwynrt A Hundred Year s of* Catholic Emancipation 
(1929) , 259.
2 Ibid, 259-60. The Catholic Union had been given 
in the previous century this authority.
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would recall that the Irish had resolutely resisted 
conscription, played a relatively insignificant part 
in the British war effort but had secured some of the 
best paid jobs. Such would be the unfavourable image 
of Ireland’s contribution to the war.
What of the War's effect on Irish Nationalism in 
Britain? There was not a u.nited Irish League council 
which had not lost some of its best activists in the 
flooded trenches of Flanders, on the bloody beaches of 
Gallipoli or on the snowy heights of Serbia. We may 
dispute.the figures of Irish enlistment in Britain but 
the UIL contribution must be reckoned as sizeable.
In doing so the UIL effectively destroyed itself as a 
viable political organization.1 The combination of 
battlefield casualties and general disillusionment 
with British policy in Ireland sapped the strength
of the UIL to the point where a police officer in
its Liverpool stronghold could confidently write :
“Now every Irish Catholic; house in Liverpool 
have some members of the family either' / 
serving in the Army in France or risking
-heir lives at sea in merchant ships and
they are not influenced by the same tosh 
which, is written about Ireland as they used 
to be‘i
1 The UIL Executive Council of Great Britain attributed 
the poor state of its branches in 1918 to the 
numbers who had enlisted which it put at 200,000 
plus. See the Catholic News 17 August, 1918.
2 Letter from Supt. Dinkworth (Liverpool Special 
Branch) to the Home Office,7 April, 1918, reporting 
on Irish Nationalist support H.O. 45, Box 110009/ 
File 20126.
But Liverpool was to become the chief IRA centre in 
Britain. It did not necessarily follow that because 
a man had served in the British Forces he would be 
a subsequent opponent of Republicanism. Some of the 
most famous IRA members had been in the British Army.
The only two members of the IRA to be executed in 
Britain in the 1919-22 period were London born men 
who had voluntarily enlisted in the British Army in 1914 
and had been invalided out as a result of wounds. 
Loyalties were not necessarily static but variable 
elements influenced by changing environmental factors. 
Even before the end of the War Colonel Cowen/who had 
played a prominent part in recruiting for the 
Tyneside Irish Brigade in 1914,had organized a .Petition 
signed by 60,000 Irish persons living in Great Britain 
in favour of immediate Self-Government for Ireland.1 
This demand was reiterated by the Irish Nationalist 
Veterans Association of Scottish Ex-Servicemen when it 
was formed.^
In the 1918 General Election the prediction of T. Healy 
made in the previous year that the policy of the British 
Government had so weakened the status of the Nationalist 
Party, "so prejudiced our position that practically 
every man of us will disappear in a puff of blue smoke
1 Times 3 May, 1918.
2 Home Office Intelligence Report GT 1566 July 1919.
CAB 24/82 '
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at the General Electron1*, 1 was realized.
Before the Election the Nationalists had 69 seats.
They were now reduced to a rump of only. 7 seats (A"
of them held only because of a regional 'no contest
pact' with Sinn Fein, in Ulster) while Sinn Fein won
73 seats. T.P. O ’Connor was returned unopposed for
Liverpool Scotland which he had held since 1885.
At the last contest in 1910 he had obtained 78% of
2
the votes cast. in the one other constituency 
that the Irish Nationalists contested in Britain,
Liverpool Exchange, Austin Harford polled 8,225 votes,
3
a very creditable 45% of the poll considering that a 
high proportion of his supporters still in the
4British Army had been unable to cast their votes.
The Nationalist vote in Liverpool also indicates its
relative success in mobilizing the votes of many
electors, who had never previously had an opportunity
5
to exercise the franchise. Much of this electoral 
support was the product of the city's violent sectarian
1 XCVIII H.C. Debs. 5, Col. 7945.
2 F.W.S. Craig Minor Parties and British Parliamentary 
Elections, 1885-1974 (1975), 47.
3 Ibid.
4 Marwick, op. cit., 264. Estimated that 75% of the 
soldiers still serving were unable to cast their votes.
5 Kinnear, op. cit., 21, estimates that 80% of the 
electorate in 1918 had been newly enfranchised.
history; in 1909 one person was killed and hundreds
fled their homes when an outbreak of fighting between
Catholics and Protestants required the closure of many
schools1 and two years later two people were shot dead
2by troops called in to quell, renewed rioting. " The
Conservative Party in Liverpool was a defacto: Protestant
Party and in some of the local wards actually con-
3
tested elections under that 'banner. In this sectarian 
environment the fledgling Labour Party progressed con­
siderably slower than in most other large industrial 
cities, but whereas in the local government elections
4
of 1913 it had done very badly, by 1919 it had managed
to stabilise a bridgehead and captured several traditional
4Nationalist wards. Labour’s inroads into the Irish
-vote was substantially aided by the virtual demise
of the Irish Parliamentary Party. The Executive Council
of the United Irish League formally proposed closer
5
co-operation with the Labour Party and the Northern 
Irish Nationalist M.P., Joe Devlin, who-had briefly 
been the General Secretary of the UIL in 1904, actively 
encouraged the Irish in Britain "to go Labour"*?
1 E. Roberts Religion and Politics in Liverpool Since 
1900 .London University M.A. Thesis (1967) , 53-60.
P. Waller, op. cit., 250-55.
2 Ibid, 258. Roberts, 78.
3 Roberts, op. cit., 52.
4 Waller, op. cit., 266-270.
5 Catholic News 17 August, 1918.
6 Frederick James Whitford, Joseph Devlin':' Ulsterman and 
Irishman London University M.A. Thesis (1959), 137.
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a course of action also subsequently advocated when-
1
ever possible by the Scottish UIL Executive. "Whenever 
possible” however effectively meant ; unless no 
Nationalist candidate was actually standing and certainly did 
not imply uncritical support for the Labour Party who 
were to face Nationalist electoral challenges in 
Liverpool for another twenty years. But by 1919 the 
United Irish League in Britain resembled an expeditionary. 
army who having seen thir homeland conquered retreat 
into a fortress more intent on surviving than on sallying 
forth to fight for a defeated cause.
In this respect the UIL of Great Britain had at least
been more fortunate than its counterpart in the United
2States, which fell to pieces, in the aftermath of the 
1916 Rising when as one of its leaders acknowledged,
3
"at this junction moderation seems out of the game."
The Australian United Irish Leagues (organized on a 
States basis) initially followed their Irish, British 
and American counterparts* action in denouncing the 
Rising but quickly changed their position when it 
became apparent'- that the executions had aroused
1 Times 1 March, 1920.
2 For the collapse of the United Irish League in the 
United States in the wake of the 1916 Rising see 
J.J. Broderick (Washington Embassy official)
Memorandum on Irish Americans (19 January, 1917)
FO 371/3071.and Gwynn Redmond,op. cit., 420-1.
3 Quoted in F.M. Carroll American Opinion and the 
Irish Question, 1910-23. (1978), 129.
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substantial feeling a,gainst 3rita,in among the Irish
community.'1' This anti-^-British feeling fused with the
emerging Australian Nationalism - strongest among the
Irish community - and organized working class opposition
to the War, in a campaign that defeated the Government's
plan to extend conscription to Australia. A counter,
sectarian,backlash then developed among the pro-British^
largely Protestant^ section of the population. This
reaction also seemed at one point likely to produce
2
a schism in Australian Catholicism, on the part of
those Catholics who deeply resented Archbishop Mannix's
3
prominent role in the anti-conscription campaign.
Many of the UIL members in Australia actively involved 
themselves in this campaign and in the later pro-Irish 
Republican,Self Determination League while retaining 
their membership of the UIL which,unlike its American 
counterpart,survived both the First World War and the 
subsequent Anglo-Irish War of Independence. A pattern 
of dual allegiance and even dual membership repeated
1 Alan D. Gilbert 'The Conscription Referendum 1916-
1917: The Impact of the Irish Crisis'. Historical Studies 
14 (1969/71), 54-72.
2 Archbishop Kelly warned Archbishop Mannix that he 
risked causing a schism. See P. O'Farrell 'Archbishop 
Kelly and the Irish Question' Journal of the Australian 
Catholic Historical Society. 473 (1974) , 10.
3 Michael McKernan, 'Catholic Conscription and Archbishop 
Mannix' Historical Studies 17 (1976/77), 299-314,
also see T.J. Kiernan The Irish Exiles in Australia 
(Dublin, 1954), 101-114.
)
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to a lesser extent In the United Irish League of Great 
Britain.
The parliamentary tactics of the Irish Nationalsts 
may often have exasperated many British people, but 
while seeking a degree of change in the political relation­
ship between Britain and Ireland, they never denied 
the fundamental unity of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland. Unlike the new Irish political 
movement,Sinn Fein in Ireland and the various Self 
Determination Leagues throughout the British Empire,, 
which demanded a radical rearrangement of that 
traditional political link with some, especially the 
leaders, demanding nothing less than the cessation 
of all political links between the two countries. In 
the recent War, a Tsar, a Kaiser and an Emperor had 
been deposed, ancient Empires had been dissolved and 
replaced by new independent Republics but in Britain 
there was no significant popular demand for the 
abolition of the Monarchy or the creation of a new 
Republic in Britain's oldest colony, as Middlemass 
observes:
"To have considered the question of a Republic, 
outside the Empire, however associated, was 
impossible within the English party system, 
to believe otherwise was a dream1.' 1
Yet in pursuit of that 'dream1, almost 40,000 members
of the Irish community in England and Wales, living in
1 Keith Middlemas in his introduction to Jones'
Whitehall Diary op. cit., Vol. Ill, XXII.
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an environment already hostile to the Irish as a 
result of the conscription issue, were to join an 
organization: the Irish Self Determination League 
dedicated to ending British rule in Ireland and some of 
whose leaders,actively involved themselves in sabotage 
incidents in Britain itselftwhile providing much, of 
the arms and ainmunition the IRA required to wage its 
campaign against the Britsh forces in Ireland. The 
next three years were to be the most turbulent period 
in the history of the Irish community in Britain, 
generating considerable external tensions and creating 
substantial internal stresses as the United Irish 
League leadership stood by; powerless onlookers as 
the new Irish Self Determination League turned its back 
on the previous forty years' experience of working 
within the British political system.
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Chapter 6
The Emergence of the Irish Self Determination League
A political movement is a social product, created by 
the interaction of a complex, of environmental'and personal 
factors. To ascribe the 'birth1 of an organization to 
any one.,or a small group of individuals is to over-simplify 
a complex process that is too involved to be simplified 
in this manner. However members of a political organi­
zation can come to realize that their own group, for a 
variety of reasons, is unable or unlikely to make any 
significant progress and that a changed political envir­
onment requires a fundamental political realignment. This 
situation happened in the United States when the long 
established Irish Republican Clan na Gael organization 
realized it was too small and had too 'secretive' an 
image to mobilize the growing Irish-American support for 
the new campaign for Irish Independence. So Clan na 
Gael sponsored an Irish Race Convention in New York in 
1916 for the purpose of forming a much larger and 
broader based Friends of Irish Freedom organization.'1'
Clan na Gael exercised such a strong control over the 
Friends of Irish Freedom and directed its activities to 
pursuing its own very Irish-American brand of Republicanism 
to such an extent that the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland 
eventually found it necessary to create a new support 
organization more am.enable to its wishes. But the formation
1 Carroll, op. cit., 52.
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of the Friends of Irish Freedom had demonstrated what a 
small but highly organized group could achieve in the 
way of mobilizing a new upsurge of ethnic support. The 
pattern was to be repeated in England by Sinn Fein.
Sinn Fein in England in 1919, unlike the same organization 
in Scotland, was a relatively minor group "about half 
a dozen cumanns (branches)over here".1 It was a region­
alized phenomenon essentially located in Lancashire,
2m  particular the Liverpool-Manchester areas though m
3
1917 a'cumann had been established in London. Regional 
and personal disputes characterized the existence of 
Sinn Fein in England. Such an organization in a perpetual 
state of flux could hardly appeal to the growing number 
of disenchanted nationalists. Who then could organize the 
60,000 people who had signed the 1918 Petition which
called for immediate self-Government in what was basically
i ■
a one man initative? Certainly not Sinn Fein in England
since that very large proportion of Irish men in England
who had voluntarily or otherwise fought in the British
forces were constitutionally debarred from joining Sinn
4Fein. They could join the IRA but not Sinn Fein. Such
1 An account of the early Sinn Fein period recalled in a 
letter from the ISDL to Sinn Fein Head Office, O ’Brien, 
Ms. 8431, 16 Jan., 1925.
2 O ’Brien, Ms. 8435.
3 There was constant trouble between the London, and 
Liverpool Sinn Fein branches. See ’The Minutes of 
Roger Casement cumann , TS 27/179, 14-15.
4 Rose Killeen when told by the Deportees Compensation 
Tribunal, that the two executed IRA members Dunne and 
O'Sullivan were members of her (the Roger Casement)Sinn 
Fein cumann denied this. She said that as both had 
served in the British Army and were drawing disability 
pensions they were constitutionally disbarred from 
Sinn Fein membership. See, 'The Hearing of the Fifth 
Day’, TS 27/183.
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a purist organization could not become a mass movement, 
but properly used,its small groups could serve as the 
nucleus of a new movement. That was the argument advanced 
by two Sinn Fein leaders in England in the early months 
of 1919 who claimed that the Irish National Aid Fund 
had demonstrated the possibility of drawing in wider 
circles to support a Republican cause.
Art O'Brien, a London born civil engineer by profession
but publisher by choice1 though a member of Sinn Fein/
was relatively well known and.respected in the Irish
community having been for many years the President of
the London Gaelic League. His position within Sinn
Fein was immeasurably strengthened by his appointment as
the Dail Envoy(the assembly of the 73 Sinn Fein MP s
who refused to take their seats at Westminister) in
2London in February 1919.
3
The new Irish Republican Government (Dail Eireann) 
appointed O'Brien at the not then inconsiderable salary 
of £750 a year (plus £120 a month expenses) to be in 
effect their Ambassador, though of course he was not 
recognized by the British. The Dail Eireann London 
I:- Biographical details in 0:'Brien^ Ms~ ..8417...
2 Some confusion exists as to the precise date of his 
appointment, as both February and April are mentioned 
at different points in the O'Brien Ms. 8419.
3 For the formation of Dail Eireann in January 1919 see 
Maire Comerford, 'The First Dail , (Dublin 1969) ; 
Seamus O'Riain, 'Dail Eireann 1919' , Ca p Uchin Annua1 
XXXVI, (1969), 323-9; 'When the Dail First Met',
Irish Press, 20 Jan., 1980.
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Office (3 Adam Street)1 became an important component of 
the Dail's Foreign Ministry. O'Brien played a prominent 
role in establishing contact with foreign correspondents 
and later with foreign Government representatives, in 
London.^
The Republic's President, De Valera, personally charged
O'Brien with the formation of a mass movement in England
and Wales similar to the Self Determination Movements
then being organized in Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
South Africa and Argentina to publicize the Irish demand
3
for independence.
Before O'Brien could begin the process of establishing 
such an organization he had first to gain the support of 
Sinn Fein in England, to ensure they would not jeopardize 
its formation by a public campaign against it in the 
crucial early stage. In this,task O'Brien was greatly 
aided by Sean McGrath (MacCrait) who since emigrating to 
London in 1908 had become an important figure in the IRB, 
and a confidant of Michael Collins. McGrath who had 
fought in Dublin in 1916, been interned, and served a
1 The brass nameplate with the title "Delegation of the 
Elected Government of the Republic of Ireland",
3 Adam St., is preserved in the O'Brien Ms. Box 
8457.
2 For O'Brien's relations with the Dail Department of 
Foreign Affairs see DE 1/1 and 1/2.
3 For a detailed account of O'Brien's career as Dail 
envoy see 'Ireland's First Ambassador in London'”,
M. Maguire's prize winning entry in the feature 
article section of the Listowel 1979, Writer's Week 
Competition, in the Irish Post, 22 Dec., 1979.
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prison sentence in 1918 for arms smuggling, had a 
Republican record that few in Sinn Fein dared to openly 
challenge.1
Yet it is an indication of the extent of Sinn Fein's 
resistance to the suggestion of a new organization which 
would undoubtedly supplant its influence in England, and 
an explanation of why later, Sinn Fein members were so 
determined to wind up the Irish Self Determination 
League, that it required a delegation from Sinn Fein 
Headquarters in Ireland finally to persuade their English 
members to accept the necessity for a new organization.
At a conference of Sinn Fein delegates in Manchester in
2March 1919, the presence of Harry Boland and Laurence
*3
Ginnell TDs (as the Sinn Fein MPs. were now titled) 
representing the organization leadership/convinced the 
participants,reluctantly,to sanction the creation of a
4
new organization. The presence of Ginnell, a former 
Nationalist MP was particularly apt for he had given the 
farewell speech to the London Volunteers en route to 
Dublin in 1916.
1 Biographical details from information his family 
supplied to Father Gaughan and published in J, Anthony 
Gaughan, Memoirs of Constable Mee , (Dublin,-1975) ,
188.
2 Boland was to become somewhat of a specialist in 
launching 'exile' support movements; he helped re­
organize the Clan Na Gael movement in America; see 
A.J. Ward, The Irish Question as a Factor in Anglo- 
American Relations 1899-1921 , London University PhD 
Thesis, (1967 ), 284.
3 TD means Teac Dail, member of the Dail.
4 See article by S. O'Connor in An Pohlacht. 9 Feb., 1929.
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The minutes of this conference have not survived r.^ and 
an unusual degree of security seems to have been observed 
for the meeting appears not to have come to the attention 
of British Intelligence. This conference did however 
impose a number of important pre-conditions before giving 
the new organization their reluctant sanction. The 
delegates insisted it must ‘'not be affiliated or officially 
connected with the Sinn Fein organization in Ireland", and 
as Sinn Fein in England was to remain as a separate 
organization, constituting the English section of the 
Republican movement, the new organization was not to 
incorporate the title "Republican" in its name.
A non-Republican image would have been very desirable
for the new organization as it would have facilitated
the recruitment of the many former nationalist supporters,
not yet convinced that Ireland should become a Republic.
But that was not the motivation behind the Sinn Fein
demand. They were determined that the situation in
Ireland where many Nationalist politicians “had realized
that Sinn Fein was going to win and had come over to it 
2
en :masse", would not be repeated in Britain. Their 
insistence that the new organization neither take part in 
British Parliamentary politics or ally itself with other 
parties so involved, was aimed at excluding the UIL
1 The only details that 1 could trace of this conference 
are contained^'in a letter from Art O'Brien to Liam 
MacMahon 24 June, 1919, Ms. 8435.
2 P.S. O'Hecjarty, ‘The Victory of Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 
1924), 29. “
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leaders, who as the influence, of their organization 
declined, were now seeking an accomodation with the 
Labour Party.’1'
2
Four titles were suggested for the new organization, the 
"Irish Republican League" was rejected by Sinn Fein for 
the reasons given above. It was felt that the proposed 
name "Irish National League" was too reminiscent of the 
UIL which had formerly used that name. A third:! suggestion 
"Irish Independence League" implied an organizational goal 
which precluded the mobilization of that considerable 
number, probably the majority of the Irish in Britain, 
who still believed that a re-negotiation of the political 
union between Britain and Ireland was still the maximum 
possible attainable objective. "Self Determination" 
embodied in a titley conveyed that element of goal un­
clarity and ambiguity of objective that best accomodated 
the tactical differences and conflicting perspectives of 
the organizers of the new movements. Moreover the chosen 
name "Irish Self-Determination League of Great Britain" 
suggested that it was part of the world wide chain of 
organizations similarly named.
To secure the maximum possible support the initial
1 The UIL at its August 1918 Executive Council meeting 
had decided to cooperate with the Labour Party in 
areas where such tactical alliances were possible, 
Catholic News, 17 Aug., 1918.
2 See an undated discussion document in the O'Brien 
Ms. 8435.
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objectives of the new organization were confined to 
two aims sufficiently ambiguous in definition and 
humanitarian in scope to be widely accepted. The ISDL’s 
objectives were proclaimed as:
(1) "To secure the application of the principles of 
Self Determination for Ireland" ;
(2) »*To secure the release of all Irish political 
prisoners" - a very popular demand."1'
"Two thousand to two thousand five hundred and many
2hundreds not able to be accommodated" attended the 
inaugural meeting of the 1SDL held in London, in May, 1919, 
justifying the Irish Labour leader, Johnson's observation 
that “it was quite evident there was a widespread 
desire on the part of workers of Irish descent and birth 
to organize and have some connection with the movement
3
m  Ireland." There was indeed a substantial reservoir 
of support that could be tapped given the selection 
of reasonable aims and a good organizational structure.
In the week previous to this London inaugural meeting, 
a number of Irish miners in Merthyr (Wales), former UIL 
supporters, not knowing of the planned formation of 
of the ISDL, had founded 'The Merthyr Liberty League for
1 a 'release the Prisoners' meeting in Liverpool was 
described as "one of the largest and most enthusiastic 
gatherings of Irishmen and women ever held in the 
city". "Hundreds were unable to gain admission" Catholic 
Herald, 25 January, 1919.
2 Letter from Art O'Brien to Mac Mahon (9 May, 1919)
MS 8435.
3 Report by Thomas Johnson, Secretary of the Irish Labour
Party, to the Congress of the Irish TUC in August, 1919;
quoted in J. Clarkeson Labour and Nationalism in Ireland
(New York, 1925) , 413.
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the self-determination of the:smaller nations and the 
abolition of the Monarchy'1.1 This soon became an ISDL
branch and a month later the ISDL had spread to “Newport,
2Bargred and Cardiff" .
The Government ordered the seizure of a "Seditious
3
leaflet to the Irish in Britain- from De Valera"
appealing to them to join the ISDL which the Cabinet
was informed was a Sinn Fein initiative “to interest
4British Labour in Irish affairs'.1 The co-operation
between Irish and Labour organizations in Battersea
where seven Irish candidate contested the council election
was attributed to the influence of the new Self
5
Determination League
The ISDL spread rapidly across England and Wales. 6,000
were present at its first public meeting in Manchester 
6
in July, 1919. By October the growth of the ISDL to
3,823 members organized in 54 branches required a full
time secretary and office staff to administer the 
7organization.
1 ROR 1, 30 April, 1919. ,GT 7195, CAB 24/78.
2 ROR 7, 12 June, 1919. GT 7463, CAB 24/81.
3 Ibid.
4 -ROR 8, 18 June, 1919. GT 7534, CAB 24/82.
5 ROR 26, 23.October, 1919. GT 8400, CAB 24/90.
6 ROR 15, 7 August, 1919. GT 7933, CAB 24/86.
7 Letter from A. O'Brien to MacMahon, MS 84 33.
At this period of time the ISDL had a Provisional 
Executive Council . For tactical reasons Art O'Brien 
held the position of Vice-Chairman having persuaded 
P.J. Kelly, a leading, if rather independently-minded 
Liverpool Nationalist Councillor, to accept the position 
of Chairman. Liam MacMahon an IRB member from Manchester 
who had drafted the two formative objectives of the 
ISDL1 was the Honorary Secretary though ill health 
reduced his effectiveness. Branches sent their dele­
gates to meetings of this Council but by July, 1919 
there were sufficient branches in London to necessitate
the formation of an ad hoc local administrative structure
2by creating a London District Committee. The Intelligence
Department of the Home Office, no doubt accustomed
to regarding Lancashire as the main area of Irish
political activity, seemed to have been particularly
surprised by the expansion rate of the ISDL in London,
but they were still confident that the ISDL had made a
major tactical error in booking the Albert Hall for a
public rally in February, 1920 and predicted a small 
3
attendance. In the eventfas the Intelligence officers
4
Had the courage to admit, they were very wrong.
1 O'Brien Ms 8435. See also Sheehy Skeffington Papers - 
Ms 24, 691, 24,110, 24,111, 24,112, 22,692, 22,693, 
22,694, 22,695, 22,696, 24,113, 24,114, 22,698,
22,699, 24,008 (NLI) for details on the early period
of the Irish Self Determination League, which duplicate 
the above references.
2 :0'Brien, Ms 8435.
3 ROR 39, 29 January, 1920. CP 523, CAB 24/97.
4 ROR 41, 12 February, 1920. CP 620, CAB 24/98.
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"Admission was by ticket and it was stated that appli­
cation had been made by 50,000 people. The hall accom­
modated 10,000 and the great building was filled to 
overflowing,'11 so that an overflow meeting was held 
outside the hall. The complexity of Irish politics in 
19 20 was shown by the fact that the speakers included a 
Mrs. Despaxd, the sister of Lord French, the British 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Two months previously 
an equally impressive meeting had been held by Manchester 
ISDL. "In addition to the Free Trade Hall, the New
Queens Theatre had to be secured and a meeting was
2also held in the open air close by'J
In February 1920 the ISDL had 86 branches with a total
3
of 7,300 members; a month later the Cabinet were 
informed that they had recruited another 1,755 members
4
and added eleven new branches to the organization.
The decision of the small Irish Labour Party based
on the Tyneside not to affiliate to the ISDL was only
5
a momentary set back. At least unlike the UIL, it
1 Times, 14 February, 1920.
2 ROR 32, 4 December, 1919. CP 256, CAB 24/94.
3 ISDL Executive Committee Minutes (February, 1920) 
O ’Brien, Ms 8433.
4 ROR 50, 15 April, 1920. CP 1086, CAB 24/101.
5 For an account of the Irish Labour Party Conference 
at Gateshead see ROR 48, 30 March, 1920, CP 1009,
CAB 24/103. For the location of its few branches in
Jarrow, Gateshead, Newcastle see ROR 47, 25 March,
1920■, CP 960, CAB 24/101, and ROR 51, 22 April,
1920 , CP 1129, CAB 24/104.
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was not going to ;side with the Labour Party (British)
at the expense of the ISDL.1 There was a considerable
2
increase of new members in April, 1920, due at least
in part to the publicity gained during the Wormwood
Scrubs Hunger Strike when 150 Irish internees, arrested
3m  Ireland and taken to Britain, staged a mass protest 
action. The ISDL organized a series of marches and
meetings, outside the prison, attended by crowds of up
4
to 20,000 people. Attacks on these meetings by anti- 
Irish elements were resisted by a force of “over 1,000 
men (who) marched to Wormwood Scrubs in military form­
ation and formed a protective cordon around women
5
demonstrators as opponents stoned them/ the casualty
toll of 150 injuries in one protest gives an indication
* 6of the violence employed an these occasions. As the 
condition of the hunger strikers worsened, the protest 
spread to other areas and took new forms of action.
A deputation from the influential and well organized 
Irish Societies in Liverpool met the Lord Mayor and 
threatened to bring the port to a standstill if the
1 At a Scottish UIL Conference a resolution was passed 
"that it was in the best interests of the Irish to throw 
in their lot whenever possible with the Labour Party" 
(British) Times, 1 March, 1920.
2 'A Survey of Revolutionary Movements in Great Britain 
During 1920' , CP 2455, CAB 24/118.
3 128 hc Debs. 5, Cols. 833-4.
4 See Art O ’Brien letter Ms 8427, 26 April, 1920 also 
Harry O'Brien Memoir, 34-35 and DE 2/320.
5 Times, 2 9 April, 19 20.
6 ROR 53, 6 May, 1920; CP 1239, CAB 24/105.
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prisoners were not released within two days.1
In a parliamentary debate on the issue, T.P. O ’Connor,
the Liverpool Irish Nationalist M.P. stated
"Many of the Liverpool dockers are Irish men 
who naturally sympathized with their Irish 
country men'.'5 2
Another M.P, Mr. Sexton, who was also the Secretary
of the Dockers Union, while admitting he had received
"numerous letters to call an executive meeting to
consider the question of the Irish prisoners1' categoric’-'
ally warned that if
"Sinn Fein workers struck, they would do so 
without authority from their union and would 
receive no strike pay'i ^
Two thousand dockers did come out on strike in Liverpool
on the 29th April, 19204 and in Parliament Sexton
condemned this . “use of the industrial weapon of the
strike for political purposes",referring to the unrest
in Liverpool which “affected him as a responsible trade
union leader and also as a British citizen” . Significantly
however, in view of the strong inference from O'Connor's
remarks that there was considerable concern among the
Irish in Britain on this issue, Sexton did ask for the
1 Times, 28 April, 1920. See leaflet issued by the
Irish Workers' Vigilance Committee; "48 hours has
been allowed to the Authorities to release the 174 
interned Irishmen nowon Hunger Strike in Wormwood 
Scrubs". Pamphlet No. 95 (ILB 300)12 (NLI)).
2 128 hc Debs. ,5, Col. 1340.
3 Ibid, Col. 1343.
4 Times, 30 April, 1920.
5 12.8 hc Debs. 5..
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release of the internees. The Hunger Strike was not 
officially resolved but fizzled out, as strikers became 
weaker they were paroled to hospitals from whence, 
as the section on military incidents illustrates, they 
were smuggled out and hid among the Irish community in 
London.
An even stronger and more intensive community response
was evoked during the 74 day long hunger strike of
the Cork Lord Mayor Terence McSwiney in Brixton later
that year. In McSwiney's case the Cabinet, perhaps
because of what happened ' in Wormwood Scrubs and after--'.
wards in the hospitals, decided to pursue a firm
unyielding approach;1 and so created the incident
which more than anything else in 1920,solidified the
determination of the majority in Ireland to secure
their independence,while generating a massive shock
wave of publicity that reverberated around the world.
The Times could "recall no parallel in the history of
this country to the duel now reaching its climax in
2
Brixton Prison.*'
The ISDL was very active throughout the long drawn out 
affair, organizing protests. One march to Brixton was 
broken up by a mounted baton charge which was '‘met with
3
volleys of stones and bricks*' . The ISDL helped to
1 Cabinet Conference, 25 August, 19201 CAB 23/22.
2 Times, 2 6 August, 1920.
3 Ibid.
create a strong lobby for McSwiney?s release,1 and 
London’s Labour Lord Mayors who supported • thi-s appeal 
informed the Prime Minister that ’’they would not hold 
themselves responsible for any outbreaks arising from 
the cruel vindictiveness of the policy of H.M, Government
3
McSwiney died on the 25 October, 1920, his body was 
taken to nlie in state” in Southwark Cathedral where 
’'for many hours before arrival at the Cathedral large 
crowds had gathered”. They had come to mourn, weep 
and bring floral tributes; ”the wreathes or sheaves, 
often brought by poorly dressed people, almost without 
exception consisted of white and yellow chrysanthemums, 
the colours of the Irish Republic.1’  ^ The Requiem Mass 
the next morning was celebrated by Archbishop Mannix, 
Bishops Amigo• and Cotter. The congregation included 
the Labour Party leaders Henderson, Clynes and J.H.
Thomas as well as the Mayors of Southwark, Poplar, 
Stepney, Fulham and Lambeth.
The Times described the funeral procession that followed:
s,a mile long was a low estimate and though it 
walked quite briskly took quite half an hour to 
pass.... First came bodies of mounted and
1 ROR 60, 24 June, 1920. CP~l535, CAB 24/108.
2 Times, 1 September, 1920.
3 For the hunger strike see: ‘Terence McSwiney: Diary 
Extracts’ Capuchin Annual (1941), 308-11; Moirin 
Chavasse Terence McSwiney (Dublin, 1961)- DE 2/4 
Correspondence on McSwiney.
4 Times, 28 October, 1920.
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pedestrian police who were followed and the 
contrast seemed an epitome of the complete scene *- 
by an advance guard of Irish Volunteers (IRA in 
uniform).... Line after line of priests: walked 
immediately before the two hearses.... The crowds 
around the Station (Euston) were so large that 
the police had trouble in keeping the way clear'!1
The Times correspondent a very observant individual, if not
a budding sociologist, remarked that in the procession
"the old were few, the mature were rather numerous
while young men and women who had scarcely passed beyond
boyhood and girlhood were the majority1! As we shall
later observe emigration from Ireland in this period
was relatively low so the inference must be that
many of the young people were not born in Ireland. The
correspondent noted that while
'"Some of the men looked comfortable and prosperous, 
the women were more often poorly clad and 
barehead'I
2This scene in London which amazed many spectators '..arid 
frightened some of them,was repeated throughout Englandv 
40,000 marched in Manchester, 12,000 attended an open 
grave ceremony in Liverpool, 40 00 in Newcastle and the
3
same number in Bradford.
1 Ibid, 29 October, 1920. See also the Police File 
on the Funeral - MEPOL 2/2465.
2 "Are we to take it that all these people are Sinn 
Feiners, said one man to his neighbours as he 
stood on the pavement. It is rather a serious 
thing for London isn't it. I never guessed we 
had so many of them right in our midst". Daily 
News, 29 October, 1920.
3 ROR 79, 4 November, 1920. CP 2067, CAB 24/114.
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The emotional response of the, Irish community to McSwiney's 
death reached a level of intensity never before seen 
and never since equalled, while a considerable section 
of the British public, including members of Parliament,1 
regretted McSwiney1s death even if they did not sym­
pathize with his motives. Others regarded the Republican
2demonstrations of support as blatant provocations
and’ some employers sacked their Irish workers for 
3
attending them.
The ISDL played a very active role in this affair. It 
had by far the largest contingent of the organized 
groups in the funeral procession and benefitted from
4
the publicity gained which increased the flow of recruits.
5
In 1920 the ISDL as an organization raised £26, 399/1/1% 
and the Irish National Aid £13,425/7/3.^
In November, 1920 when the ISDL held its first conference
7
it claimed a .membership of 26,000 . The planned venue 
of the conference was Manchester but the police there 
prohibited it so the conference went across the river
1 134 HC Debs. 5, Col. 180
2 Ibid., Col 73 \ . Col.
3 Ldtter in the Irish Post, (24 March, 1979) by the 
daughter of a man so dismissed, written as a result
of my article on 'McSwineysFuneral' - Irish Post,
10 March, 1979.
4 ROR 65, 29 July, 1920^ CP 1706, CAB 24/110.
5 A. O'Brien, Ms 8432.
6 Ibid, Ms 8433.
7 Manchester Guardian, 25 November, 1920.
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to Salford in a different police area. Here a police 
prohibition was also issued but as the ban legally 
could not come into effect for 4 8 hours the conference 
was able to proceed.1
The conference minutes were lost in the uproar that 
followed the IRA Liverpool arson attack (discussed in 
another chapter) but the main business of this Conference 
appears to have been the ratification of a Constitution 
which had already been employed by most branches in 
a de facto manner. A Constitution of any political 
organization is usually a composite document embodying 
various compromises which link together the largest
2possible number. In the case of a 1 Limited Platform' 
or ' Solidarityf; type of organization, to which category 
the ISDL belonged, the constitution must either be 
sufficiently flexible in operation or defined in an 
extremely ambiguous manner. Alternatively the Constitution 
may be of such simplicity that in fact it consists 
of no more than the delineation of its principal 
objectives. In theory such a constitution is possible; 
in practice the only form of organization that can exist} 
within- such , a constitutional framework is a 'Mass Movement'1
1 Vaughan Mee , op. cit., 193.
2 As used in the sense of a 'minimum programme1 as 
employed by Felik Gross, The Revolutionary Party - 
Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Connecticut,
1974), 78.
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as so defined by Parkin.1
The founders of the ISDL had certainly not envisaged 
an informal structured organization, based on the 
category of ' supporters' rather than 'members'5 for as we 
shall see the Sinn Fein delegates had established a 
number of organizational preconditions.
2We can modify Clews’, analysis of the membership of
’Communist . Party Fronts’1, for the ISDL could reasonably
be described as, at least partially, falling into the
category of a 'Front', so as to define the membership
or potential membership as consisting of three groupst
3
(1) Those already members of a political organization - 
the precise nature of which will be discussed later - 
the 'Politicos’.
(2) 'Supporters' of political organizations but not 
actual members either through lack of commitment, or 
some form of personal impediment eg. age, infirmity, etc.
(3) The Innocents' , constituting by far the largest 
category of ISDL members; these had been drawn in on 
the strength of the current political situation, and 
the ISDL's widespread campaigning.
1 See Frank Parkin- ,' A Study of the Campaign For 
Nuclear Disarmament, The Social Base of a Political 
Mass Movement. London University PhD Thesis,
(1966).
2 John Clews, Communist Propaganda Techniques, (19 64), 
94-95.
3 Principally Sinn Fein.
The constitution therefore had to incorporate the 
not always mutually agreed interests of these groups 
and wherever possible to mediate between conflicting 
objectives. Ostensibly the Constitution primarily 
had to satisfy the largest category of members - the 
'Innocents'1 - hence the two objectives , "Self 
Determination" and "Release of Prisoners". The first 
appeared reasonable by virtue of its ambiguity, the 
second to be a humanitarian objective eminently real­
izable considering that the 1916 Prisoners had all 
been rel_e.as.ed. in 1917.
The ' Politicos'' insisted and the ’ innocents1’ concurred 
that membership of the ISDL should be determined by 
ascription • criteria. A preamble to the Constitution 
stated that vThe League is open to all people of Irish 
birth and descent’’ but without actually defining ’’descent’1 
Given the environment in which the ISDL operated in 
a country de facto, if not de jure,at war with the 
country it was supporting, then such * Membership 
Exclusiveness’5 or as Wilson called it "Selective Recruit­
ment"1 was not unusual.
The equivalent Self Determination organizations in the
rest of the world, operating in a very different
1 John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New 
York, 1973) shows how many racial and ethnic minority 
groups deliberately repudiate any aid from the 
members of the -oppressor society they are 
struggling against.
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environment, of course welcomed the help of any person;
in the USA 50 Chinese applied to join a branch of one
organization.* While the ’Politicos" undoubtedly
wished to ensure that the control of even local
branches of the ISDL would not pass into the hands of
non-Irish elements, the "Innocents’ could hardly object
to a policy which even the UIL had adopted though in
a more limited manner.(It had restricted the membership
of the non-Irish to 25% of the total branch member-
2ship and formally barred them from holding office ).
The Irish Self Determination League’s constitutional 
emphasis on '’Membership Exclusiveness1 would have in 
these circumstances seemed quite reasonable to members, 
particularly as the issue of ’’Irish descent” was never 
formally defined and was flexibly interpreted by 
many branches in a highly pragmatic manner. But a 
proposal by the Bradford Number Three Branch Kthat
3
English Catholics also be admitted as members” was 
defeated.
s
Sinn Fein before, reluctantly, sanctioning the formation 
of the Irish Self Determination League had insisted 
the new organization must, rigidly pursue a strategyI
of 'Political Isolationism' and Art O'Brien assured
1 The Times, 7 July, 1919 reported that 50 Chinese 
persons had applied to join the Ro.ckway Long Island 
branch of the Friends of Irish Freedom Society .
2 \See, Wollaston, op. cit., 82.
3 O ’Brien, Ms 8435.
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a doubtful Sinn Fein member that the ISDL constitution
would specifically include a clause to this effect;’1'
"The League takes no part in British politics and is
not allied to any political party in England’* . The
unambiguous tone and clarity of wording was in marked
contrast to the manner in which the ’’Self Determination
for Ireland" principle was written into the Constitution.
This clause which symbolized the new organization's
rejection of the long standing Irish political tradition
of alliances with English parties was publicly explained
as a sign of the ISDL's determination not to associate
itself ''with English Parties who use the Irish population
2
in this country for their own purposes" One important 
intention behind this particular clause was the exclusion 
of the old Nationalist leadership, in particular T.P. 
O'Connor who had defined ’Self Determination to my 
mind and to those with whom I am in agreement, is such 
a measure of liberation, as can be expected in our day 
and generation and by methods which we consider more 
practicable in the end than resort to revolutionary 
methods... but all have the right to work which way
1 See. letter (19 May, 1919) from O ’Brien to an unnamed 
Sinn Fein member reassuring him that. Sinn iFein1 s 
objection to participation in British politics 
would be incorporated in the new organization's 
constitution - Ms 8435.
2 Irish Exile (June, 1922)# Charles Diamond the editor
of the Catholic Herald and a bitter,irreconcilable
foe of the Irish Self Determination League, had
earlier been denounced as a 'political opportunist1; 
"To a man who has one eye on the English Parliament
as a prospective candidate and the other on the 
Irish people in Great Britain, such an ordinance of 
self-denial is very disagreeable7' - Irish Exile,
March, 19 22.
they wishJ'1
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Art O'Brien with his long experience of Irish organizations
in Britain was clearly familiar with T.P. O'Connor's
tendency to dominate organizations and certainly did
not wish to see him as a member of the ISDL. But the
ISDL's policy in respect of the United Irish League
and its membership was rather ambiguous for while Art
O'Brien wrote "I think our attitude towards the United
Irish League should be that of ignoring the existence
2
of the organization* , many of the ISDL branches were 
welcoming rank and file members and even local UIL 
leaders into their organization.
3
Thompson and McEwan show that this ' co-option’ process 
is necessary if an organization is to mobilize all 
potential resources and certainly many ISDL branches 
benefitted from the organizational experience of 
former UIL branch leaders, Others found that recruiting 
Nationalist or Labour local authority Councillors 
considerably facilitated their use of public halls
4for meetings and fund raising events.But studies by Selznick
1 T.P.*0’Connor to T. Moore of the Leeds ISDL branch 
(5 June, 1919);O'Brien, Ms 8435.
2 O'Brien to MacMahon (19 June, 1919) Ms 8435.
3 James D. Thompson and William J. McEwan 'Organizational 
Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction 
Process', American Sociological Review 23 (1958), 23-30.
4 Phillip Selznick TVA And the Grass Roots (New York,
1966) .
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and Aldrich1 show that ? co-option1' can substantially
affect and modify the existing organizational structure
while Etzioni suggests an influx of new members may
'contaminate1' the 'purity' of the organization's
2programme and substantially weaken it. Many of the 
former UIL members certainly brought a moderating 
influence to the ISDL when they joined it and some of 
these, Alderman Kelly in particular, later strongly 
opposed efforts by the Republicans to commit the ISDL to
- i
aq Anti-Treaty position;but this was not always the case
and other former UIL members became radicalized through
their participation in the ISDL in a manner similar
3to Useem's study of American students.
The inclusion of a 'political isolationist' clause in 
the Irish Self Determination League's 'Constitution ensured 
that former United Irish League members could not 
join an ISDL branch and use it as a springboard for 
electoral intervention. In the event this prospect
of electoral intervention was actually one of the least 
important sources of internal tensions that developed 
inside the ISDL. Th.fese basically centred around Sinn Fein's 
determination to comr it the League to an openly Republican
1 Howard Aldrich 1 Organizational Boundaries and Inter- 
Organizational Conflict'', Human Relations 24 (1971), 
279-93.
2 Amitai Etzioni A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations (Glencoe, 1951), 103-4 .
3 Michael Useem 'Ideological and Interpersonal Change in 
the Radical Protest Movement' , Social Problems, 19 
(1971), 451-69. Useem shows how previously non-radical 
American students underwent a radicalization process
as a result of their participation in the Anti- 
Vietnam War Protest Movement.
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position even though this was not specifically advocated 
in the Constitution.
c
We can best consider the conflict between the different
sectional interests in the ISDL and the contradictions
inherent in the resulting compromises, if we examine
a particular statement of aims and objectives that
appeared in the Irish Exile after the treaty was
signed. In this particular paragraph we will observe
how the Constitutional flexibility of power structure
and policy formation permitted the public presentation
of an extremely elaborated, not to say extrapolated,
interpretation of ISDL policy and objectives, which were
delineated as being: "To band together the Irish 
1
residents m  Great Britain m  order that they shall as
a body support their compatriots in Ireland...
and use every means in their power to 
secure the application of the principles 
of Self Determination for Ireland and the 
recognition of the Irish Republic proclaimed 
in Dublin in Easter 1916 and confirmed by the 
representatives of the people of Ireland at 
the first meeting of the Dail. Eireann in 
January 1919 and further in the meanwhile 
to render all and every assistance to any
Irish subjects imprisoned for political
offences in Great Britain and Ireland and
to do other acts which will further the
cause of an Independent Irish republicz*
(My own underlining for emphasis).
1 Note the use of the term "Irish residents" rather than 
the 'Irish in Britain1, implying a minimal connection 
with British society.
2 Irish Exile, May, 1922.
It is very clear that this declaration went a considerable 
distance beyond the original 'Two objectives^ of the ISDL. 
The phrase '‘recognition of the Irish Republic", particularly 
when it was augmented with ,ran independent Irish Republic',1 
was straight out of the 1917 Constitution of Sinn Fein1 
and was the central plank of the bridge which had
2linked the traditional dual Monarchists of Sinn Fein
3
with the Volunteers of 1916. It is interesting to 
note that in the United States where Sinn Feirt did not 
have its own organization, the movement closest to its 
policy took the name \ the American Association for 
the Recognition.of the Irish Republic . Sinn Fein 
itself was constitutionally pledged to the "Recognition 
of an Independent Irish Republic" but its constitution^ 
also somewhat contradictorily declared that "Having 
achieved that status, Irish people may by referendum
4
freely choose their own forms of Government.11 What 
if the Irish people voted to abolish that Republic, 
to accept, however'reluctantly, membership of the 
British Empire, and recognize the British Monarch?
When that situation did occur , the Sinn Fein party 
split, civil war occurred in Ireland and the ISDL 
fragmented in England.
1 D. Williams (ed.) The Irish Struggle 1916-22 (1966), 34.
2 See R.M. McEvatt 'Arthur Griffith and his Early 
Sinn Fein Policies' , Capuchin Annua1 (1971), 232-38.
3 See Michael Laffan 'The Unification of Sinn Fein in 
19i7", Irish Historical Studies XVII (1971), 353-79.
4 Williams, op. cit., 34.
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To committed Republicans, recognition of the Republic 
and Self Determination were not mutually inconsistent 
terms. But the majority of the ISDL membership were 
not committed Republicans; they pragmatically interpreted 
the Self Determination principle in a manner similar 
to that formulated by T.P. 0*Connor. Thus the organ­
ization's organ, the Irish Exile, was not expressing 
the views of the majority of its members on this issue.
Other contradictions are contained in the phrases that 
I have underlined above. It is clear that these 
centred on the issue of legal and illegal activities.
Some prominent members of the ISDL had, as we shall 
observe later, been involved in the organization of 
prison escapes in Britain. Indeed one of the prisoners 
who escaped from Lincoln in December, 1919, Sean Milroy, 
had spent some time in England organizing new ISDL 
branches while "on the run".1
The phrase "rendering all assistance" could, and indeed1 
was, by many interpreted as implying more than just 
humanitarian aims. To an extent therefore this declar­
ation clashed with the ISDL's repeated professions of 
its legal nature.
"The ISDL is a perfectly open organization; 
its aims, objects and operations are absolutely 
legitimate". 2
1 Gaughan • Mee1 ~r op. cit. , 194. v*
2 Irish Exile, July, 1921.
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"The League courts publicity and has nothing 
to hide, not even a Strickland Report*.
These repeated declarations of "legality" were probably
necessary to reassure the 'Innocents'1. For the ISDL
was, as we shall observe, very much of interest to
the Police who were to deport a considerable number of
itSmembers in two separate periods of the organizations1s
existence.
Figure 1 is a diagramatic representation of the Power
Structure of the ISDL; this was structured on four
levels. At the top there existed the supreme policy
making Annual Conference. However for all practical
purposes tactical policy was formulated by the Central
Executive Coundil * and m  particular by the much
smaller Standing Committee. Branch members potentially
had direct access to the Annual Conference, but only
indirectly to the Central Executive Committee via the
District Committee. This governing structure’ was the
compromise outcome of the 'Politicos' desire to influence
the Central Executive Council . and the Standing Committee
and the necessity to permit the rank and file the
appearance of exercising some influence within the
organization. The provision of a Special Conference
on . the demand of twenty-five per cent of the Branches
was intended as a reassuring safeguard which would be
1 Irish Exile, April, 1921,- The 'Strickland Report' 
was an investigation by the British Army into the 
Burning of Cork by the Auxilliary RIC Division 
which was never published.
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Fig. 1 Diagramatic Representation of the ISDL Power 
Structure (1920-1922).
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difficult in practice to implement.
Conferences, in fact, were relatively trouble free until 
after the signing of the :Treaty when the divergent 
views could no longer be contained within the pre-treaty 
structure of the ISDL.
The Conference agenda was effectively confined within 
parameters established by Sinn Fein and so we shall 
discuss in somewhat more detail the position of Sinn 
Fein when we investigate the Interorganizational Field 
of the Irish Self Determination League in Part III. The 
determination of the 'Politicos' to constitutionally' 
enshrine an isolationist orientation and exclusivist 
strategy, was considerably facilitated by the 'Inno­
cents'' dissatisfaction with the attitude of the British 
Labour Movement to Ireland and so we shall also consider 
this aspect in Part III.
We earlier observed the 'millet' type relationship 
between Irish Catholicism and Nationalism. This 
relationship was clearly exhibited in the Funeral 
of Terence McSwiney; an event which considerably 
boosted the League's reputation. Incidents such 
as this however exacerbated the traditional strains 
between English and Irish Catholics. Most Irish 
political movements had in the past been attacked by 
the English Hierarchy and we shall now observe in 
Chapter 7 how the Irish Self Determination League, 
with the aid of a visiting Australian Archbishop,
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responded to a particularly serious attack.
t
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Chapter 7
Catholicism in Britain and the Irish War of Independence
The Irish Self Determination League had now some twenty- 
six thousand members organized on a nation wide basis with 
a clearly delineated communications structure linking the 
most geographically isolated branch to the Central 
Executive Council. The prospects of a considerable member­
ship increase appeared very encouraging although the 
political environment had become rather more hostile 
following the recent widespread arson incidents, at the 
end of November 1920, in Liverpool. Sectarian passions in 
that city had reached new levels of intensity^ and the 
police fearing that a proposed Sinn Fein meeting would 
provoke widespread outbreaks of fighting between Loyalist 
and Republican supporters persuaded the Home Secretary to
ban all the meetings in the city for the next fourteen 
2
days. Ten thousand people lined the Liverpool funeral
route of William Ward, the teenage son of Irish parents,
shot while trying to help the police capture one of the
.arsonists. The presence of all the city's Nationalist
Party (United Irish League) Councillors at the Requiem Mass
was a visible reminder that many, probably the majority,
of the Liverpool Irish disapproved of the introduction of
3a military campaign into their city.
1 ROR 84, 9 Dec., 1920. CAB 24/116.
2 135 HC. Debs., 5‘. Cols. 650-55.
3 Times, 4 Dec., 1920.
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The Catholic Herald adopted (what was for that publication)
a very restrained attitude to the new military campaign.
It reported the Liverpool arson under the headline "Rodds
to Disaster1'^* but with little editorial comment and the
following week it inferred that the arson may have been
committed by ’Agents Provocateurs' to destroy the image of
2
the Irish political organizations, while several months
elapsed before these incide'nts ■ were condemned as a "crime
3
against the cause’.' Charles Diamond, the editor and pub­
lisher of the Catholic Herald, during a speaking tour in 
Wales, suggested that as the Labour Party now supported 
Self Determination for Ireland' there was no reason why 
it and the League should not work together jointly. This 
suggestion although strenously opposed by the leadership 
of the League was supported by local branches like the
4
Clydach on Towe branch in Wales. Some branches of the 
League like the one in Manchester, which sold one hundred 
and twenty copies of the Catholic Herald weekly were 
supporters of Diamond's line on Irish/Labour co-operation. 
The price of the rapid expansion achieved by attracting 
former United Irish League organizers like John Brown to
g
the new Felling League Branch was the grafting of elements
1 Catholic Herald, 4 D e c . ( 1920.
2 Catholic Herald, 11 Dec., 1920.
3 Ibid., 14 May, 1921.
4 Ibid., 29 Jan., 1921.
5 Ibid., 8 Jan., 1921.
6 Ibid., 20 Nov., 1920.
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of the old Irish political organizations onto the new 
and with the subsequent deportations of some of the most 
important members of the League leadership, a considerable 
degree of political unorthodoxy among the membership 
flourished unchecked in many areas. Art O'Brien himself 
was forced to 'go on the run' and forced to maintain a 
very low profile as far as the day to day running of the 
League was concerned for several months'*" but he still 
remained in the London area operating as the Dail Envoy.
The Irish Self Determination League at this crucial point
fortunately gained a very influential propagandist in
2the person of Dr Mannix , the Archbishop of Melbourne and 
the Titular head of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia. 
The Australian Catholic Church had still in 1920 a very
3
pronounced Irish character, following the triumph of the
1 According to ROR 93, 17 Feb., 1921. CP 2603. CAB 24/120 
"Art O'Brien the President of the Irish Self Determ­
ination League is still in hiding", and the Catholic 
Herald of 23 July, 1921 stated "the annual meeting of 
the London District Committee welcomed back its 
President (Art O'Brien) who attended after a very long 
absence owing to a cause which he had no control over". 
Subsequently the Catholic Herald implied that Art 
O'Brien "was on the run in well known London hotels"
(4 March, 1922). Detective Inspector Cosgrove told the 
Deportees Compensation Tribunal that in late 1920 an 
arrest warrant had been issued for Art O'Brien but he 
was unable to apprehend him, see TS 27/183. 95
2 See Niall Brendan Dr Mannix (Adelaide, 1964) and Frank
Murphy, Daniel Mannix :__Archbishop of Melbourne ,
(Melbourne, 19 38).
3 For example Dr Mannix had been elevated to the Melbourne 
See while he was still serving in Ireland as the 
President of Mcynooth Seminary and his ' transference1' 
was by no means unique; see A.P. Cosgrove, 'Australia:
The Influence of the Irish on the History of the Church 
in Australia', Irish Ecclesiastical Record, IXIX (1944), 
883-95.
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Irish clergy over the English. Benedictines, a conflict
that had dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth
century history of Australian Catholicism.^ Irish
Catholicism in Australia had a long history of opposition
to British rule, having originally developed illegally in
2the convict settlements. The Catholic Hierarchy and 
clergy, like their counterparts in Ireland, had spear­
headed the campaign against World War I conscription in
3
Australia. Their opposition to conscription had so 
antagonized non-Catholics and staunch supporters of the 
British connection that the aftermath of the controversy 
was still influencing Australian politics long after the 
war was over. One episode in this ongoing conflict, an 
attempt to impose the very symbol of British rule - the 
Union Jack - on .a Irish Catholic demonstration ironically 
rebounded on the pro-British Melbourne Council.^
Archbishop Mannix who declared "I was an Irishman before
1 For the development of the Catholic Church in Australia 
see Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church in Australia, 
(1969), and also his Documents on Australian Catholic 
History, (2 Vols., 1969).
2 Catholic priests were originally excluded from the 
convict settlements but subsequently the authorities 
paid English missionaries, mostly Benedictines,from the 
Police Fund to counteract the influence of Irish clergy 
who had arrived in the colony without permission;
.O'Farrell, op. cit., 16.
3 See Gilbert, op. cit., McKernan, op. cit., and O'Farrell
Kelly , op. cit.
4 The Melbourne Council insisted that the Union Jack had 
to be carried at the head of the city's 1921 St. Patrick 
Day's parade but Bishop Phelan subsequently wrote, "He 
was proud of the fact that no Irishman could be got to 
to carry the Union Jack, no Irish Australian would carry 
it either, when they got a man (who was a well known
contd.
223
I was an Archbishop and I remain an Irishman although I
am an Archbishop',*'^ had already incurred the wrath of the
British Government as a consequence of his strident p
leadership of the Anti-Conscription movement in Australia.
He now decided to travel to Ireland, via the United
States of America where a series of fiery speeches in
favour of an end to British rule in Ireland brought forth
demands from some Conservatives that he should, at least,
2be charged with sedition if not actually treason. The
British Government, concerned about American Irish opinion,
wisely decided to ignore these demands but declared that
Archbishop Mannix would not be permitted to enter Ireland.
Ever defiant to British rule, Archbishop Mannix boarded
an Irish bound liner which was intercepted in mid-ocean by
a Royal Navy destroyer which removed him from the liner
3
and conveyed him to Britain, a decision the British 
Government probably later regretted. Archbishop Mannix 
the Titular head of a National Catholic Church in a 
Dominion of the British Empire could not, without inflaming 
world opinion, be refused entry to Britain although his
habitual drunkard) to carry it, they had to pay him 
for the 1 service1 and the flag was continually booed 
during the parade11, O'Farrell, Catholic Church, 
op. cit., 234.
1 ROR 74, 30 Sept., 1920. CP 1908, CAB 24/112.
2 Brendan, op. cit., 193-7.
3 For an account of these events, see Thomas E. Hachey, 
1 J?he Quarantine of Archbishop Mannix: A British
Preventive Policy During the Anglo-Irish Troubles', 
Irish University Review. I (1970), 111-30.
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1
Exclusion Order from Ireland also applied to Lancashire.
Three hundred priests from the dioceses of Westminster,
Southwark, Portsmouth and Brentwood signed a letter of
protest against the Government's ban on Archbishop Mannix
2
entering Ireland. Three hundred and fifty clergymen
3
attended a London hotel reception to welcome Dr Mannix, 
who was rapidly becoming the focal point around which a 
large number of British priests and even bishops organised 
their opposition to Cardinal Bourne's support for the 
British Government's Irish policy: a support almost so 
uncritical that Cardinal Bourne angrily rejected the right 
of the International Committee for Catholic Studies even to 
discuss the Irish situation which he declared to be, "a
4
British domestic issue".
Archbishop Mannix's first major public engagement in 
England was his participation in the concelebrated Requiem
5
Mass for Terence MacSwiney, which we have already observed 
was a major propaganda/publicity manifestation for the
1 The Home Secretary was jointly petitioned by the Chief 
Constables of Lancashire, Birkenhead, Liverpool, Bootle 
and Wallasey to prohibit Archbishop Mannix from entering 
these areas. T. Jones, opJ. cit. , 43-44.
2 Tablet, 2 Oct., 1920.
3 ROR 74. 30 Sept., 1920. CP 1908, CAB 24/112.
 ^ Irish Exile, Sept., 1921.
5 Mannix visited McSwiney in Britain. See O'Brien to 
Collins, 25 Oct., 1920. DE 2/4. (McSwiney file).
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Irish Separatist movement in Britain in general and the 
Irish Self Determination League in particular. His parti­
cipation in the MacSwiney funeral might possibly have 
been interpreted as merely performing a priestly duty but 
a few weeks later Dr Mannix embarked on a prolonged series 
of public meetings throughout Britain,designed to mobilize 
support for the Separatist cause,which left no doubt about 
his willingness to play an active and very political role 
in Britain.^* He was the principal speaker at a meeting of 
five thousand people in Leeds (November 12, 1920) and two 
days later addressed four thousand in Bradford; the next
2week over five thousand people heard him speak in Bolton. 
The already noted police prohibition, prevented him from
3
attending the Bootle 'Manchester Martyrs Commemoration1 
but some eleven thousand "Sinn Feiners" marched and the 
intelligence officers report of the event particularly 
noted that many of them "were wearing the costume of the
4
Irish National Forresters". The significance of this
1 Art O'Brien had earlier realised the potential influence
of Mannix on the Irish in Britain and suggested the 
Dail Government should discreetly encourage the Irish 
Hierarchy to issue the formal invitation to Mannix that 
Church protocol required,(see Memo., 16 Aug., 1920.
DE 2/452.,)for his visit.
2 ROR 81., 19 Nov., 1920. CP 2116, CAB 24/115.
3 The 'Manchester Martyrs' was the name given to the
three Fenians hanged in Manchester in 1867.
4 ROR 82. 25 Nov., 1920. CP 2169. CAB 24/115.
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observation is that the Irish National Forresters, 
originally a cultural organization which had evolved 
into a 'friendly benefit society',^ paying allowances to 
unemployed and sick members, was traditionally identified 
as an important element in the constellation of organi­
zations that revolved around the United Irish League. Its 
presence at this march was therefore an indication of the 
extent to which long established Irish organizations were 
moving away from the influence of the United Irish League 
and into the orbit of the Separatist movement spearheaded 
by the Irish Self Determination League. It is interesting 
to note that Archbiship Mannix's first public meetings 
were in Lancashire and Yorkshire, the traditional heart­
land of the United Irish League, and that most of them 
were organized by the Irish Self Determination League who 
realized the important role such an influential clergyman 
could play in attracting the vital support of the . 
'Innocents' and drawing them into the League.
Art O'Brien's own status within the Separatist movement was 
further enhanced by his mediating role in the abortive 
peace negotiations of the last month of 1920-between 
Archbishop Cluae of Perth and Lloyd George when O'Brien 
communicated the views of Dail Eireann on the proposals
1 The Irish National Forresters was founded as a break­
away from the English Forresters when the parent 
organization opposed a tribute by their Irish members 
to dead Fenians in 1876, see Catholic Herald, 27 Oct. , 
1928.
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advanced.^ His involvement in these talks together with
his undoubtedly exhaustive efforts on the international
2propaganda front enabled him to successively ward off an
attempt to set up a specific Department of Propaganda
3
office in London separate from his control. The opening 
months of the new year of 1921 saw a continuation of the 
steady expansion of the Irish Self Determination League 
across the country. The Merthyr branch recorded an
4
increase of sixty members in a single month and more 
significantly the oldest Irish organization in Manchester
5
(the Shamrock Club) became a branch of the League. In an 
attempt, at least partly designed to counteract the growing 
influence of the Irish Self Determination League, Charles 
Diamond gave a five hundred pound contribution towards the 
expenses of promoting the new Labour campaign on Ireland.*^
1 Tom Barry Guerilla Days in Ireland , (Tralee, 1969), 
178.
2 See the large and detailed file on the opinions of 
the Spanish, French, German, Dutch, Norwegian, South 
American, Swedish, Greek, Australian and American 
foreign newspaper correspondents based in London on 
the Irish situation, O'Brien, Ms. 8427.
3 See letter from O'Brien (27 Dec., 1920), to Fitzgerald 
(Dail Director of Publicity) rejecting his suggestion 
to set up a new Publicity office in London and 
Fitzgerald's reply (3 Jan., 1921) confirming that London 
contact with foreign newspaper correspondents was to 
remain O'Brien's responsibility; O'Brien Ms. 8427,
also see correspondence in DE 2/11, 2/436, 2/437 and 
S 155.
4 ROR 87. 6 Jan., 1921. CP 2429, CAB 24/114.
5 Times, 16 Feb., 1921.
6 ROR 92. 10 Feb., 1921. CP 2574, CAB 24/120.
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which attracted an audience of six thousand to a meeting 
in the Albert Hall.^
The British Government or at least one of its intelligence
agencies, was also endeavouring to counteract the growth
of the Irish Self Determination League and the influence
of Art O'Brien by means of a ’Black Propaganda' campaign
in which its agents and informers in the different Irish
organizations implied that O'Brien was building up the
organization to further his own political ambitions to
2
obtain a seat in the Westminster Parliament and insinu­
ating that he was covertly "carrying on a flirtation with 
1 3Mrs MacSwiney" (the widow of the recently deceased Lord 
Mayor of Cork). The British Government also took more 
direct action against the Irish Self Determination League , 
Its General Secretary, MacGrath, was deported to the 
Ballykinlar Internment camp,^ after a series of arson 
incidents in the London area. An intelligence report sub­
sequently informed the Cabinet that the: "recent arrests
1 Times, 15 Feb., 1921.
2 This 'opinion' was expressed in the London letter of the 
Irish Independent 4 Sep'H, ,,,1920 a publication supporting 
the United Irish League ana the Nationalist Party. We 
have already observed, earlier in this thesis, that 
such a viewpoint was totally at variance with O'Brien's 
demonstrated objections to an alliance with any organi­
zation involved in British Parliamentary politics.
3 ROR 93. 17 Feb., 1921. CP 2603, CAB 24/120. This ' 
thesis is not an appropriate place to speculate on 
O'Brien's sexual affairs or even on his sexual orientation, 
However my research indicates that he never married or
had any apparent close relationship of any length with 
any woman. It would however be a logical assumption to 
suppose that if O'Brien had been having an affair with 
Mrs MacSwiney, which would certainly have offended 
Republican supporters, it would have featured in IRA/IRB 
intelligence reports. I can find no trace in these
contd.
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are causing the more responsible Irish people to hold aloof
from the Irish Self Determination League although they
continued to contribute towards its funds’1.^ The League
however maintained its steady rate of expansion. There
were now so many branches in Durham that the area was
removed from the control of the Tyneside District Committee
2and a new county District Committee was formed. Forty 
members joined the newly formed Mountain Ash (South Wales) 
Branch.^
Archbishop Mannix continued to draw large audiences, four
4
thousand in Edinburgh, three thousand in Greenock, and 
at Burnley the League officials who organized a meeting 
"attended by over two thousand people were forced to close 
the hall doors on a large crowd unable to be accomodated
5
inside". Dr Mannix was now to play a very important role 
in protecting Irish Separatism in Britain, from Cardinal 
Bourne's onslaught. Cardinal Bourne having observed with 
considerable concern the involvement of members of the 
clergy in the Irish Separatist movement decided to
cont...
records of any such liason.
4 138 HC Debs. 5 Cols. 1432 and 1988.
1 ROR 92. 10 Feb., 1921. CP 2574, CAB 24/119.
2 Catholic Herald, 9 Feb.,1921.
3 Ibid., 5 Mar.-, 1921.
4 Ibid., 26 Feb., 1921.
5 ROR 94, 24 Feb., 1921. CP 2631, CAB 24/120.
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counteract its growing influence by reissuing Cardinal 
Manning's 1867 St Patrick's Day Pastoral letter condemning 
Fenianism. This letter when it was originally read had 
produced such discontent in some parishes that it "caused 
collections to drop to almost nothing"^ and fifty four 
years later when it was reissued there were again many
2"cases of Irishmen leaving the churches as it was read". 
Manning's anti-Fenian Pastoral Letter was in fact relatively 
moderate in tone when compared to the denunciations r; of 
Irish Bishops, notably Bishop Moriarty (Kerry) who had
declared that: "Hell is not hot enough nor eternity long
enough to punish such miscreants". Cardinal Bourne however 
added a personal - - letter to the original Pastoral letter 
proclaiming,
"The name Fenianism is no longer in use, but the 
activity that it connotated is still alive, and 
the denunciation of the second Archbishop of 
Westminster applies in unchanging measure to
that activity today by whatsoever name it may
be called".3
He ordered both letters to be read in churches throughout 
the diocese of Westminster. Cardinal Bourne appears to 
have considered the situation so far advanced that he could 
not even wait for another month until the more appropriate 
St Patrick's Day to reissue the Pastoral Letter. The 
incident of Bourne's Pastoral is an appropriate occasion to 
examine the impact of Irish immigration on the Catholic
1 G.A. Beck (edt), The English Catholics 1850-1950- 
(1950, 136.
2 ROR 93. CP 2603, CAB 24/120.
3 Francis Olameadow, Cardinal Bourne , (1944), Vol II, 
182-3.
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Church in England. We have already observed that during 
the 1918 'Conscription Crisis', the resolute and deter­
mined opposition of the Irish Hierarchy to the introduction 
of conscription in Ireland had generated considerable anti- 
Catholic sentiment in Britain. In response to this, influ­
ential sections of the British Catholic Establishment 
had consciously sought to publicly disassociate British 
Catholicism from the Irish anti-war movement. The tensions 
generated by this incident were still very visible in the 
reaction to Cardinal Bourne's Pastoral.
It was almost inevitable that conflict should develop 
between the British and Irish members of the Catholic 
Church in Britain. Membership of the same religion does 
not necessarily promote harmonious relationships between 
different ethnic communities residing in the same country, 
particularly if one community is the product of recent 
immigration. In their 1760 'Loyal Address' to George III, 
the long established Sephardic Jewish community in England 
went to considerable pains to distinguish themselves from 
the more recent Ashkenazie Jewish immigrants.^* The sub­
sequent large scale Jewish East European immigration of the 
late nineteenth century was initially ignored by the establi­
shed Jewish community until they realized that the main­
tenance of their socio-economic position was largely depen-
o
dent on their efforts to 'anglicize' the aliens. Similar
1 See Chaim Bermant, Troubled Eden. An Anatomy of British 
Jewry, (1969), 19.
2 See L.P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England, (1960) 
210; B. Garner, The Alien Invasion, (1972) and J.A. Garrard, 
The English and Immigration, (1971) .
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hostility between the established London Greek community 
and the newer Cypriot immigrants resulted in- the Cypriots 
building their own Orthodox Catholic churches.^ The deve­
lopment of Catholicism in the United States during the
1880's was plagued by the bitter controversy between the
2German and Irish clergy. In part its origins were ideo­
logical, with the German clergy influenced by strongly 
anti-liberal refugee Bishops who had fled Bismarck's 
'Kulturkamf'. But much of the dispute and the motivating 
force to form a separatist 'German Church' in America 
stemmed from the German community's resentment against 
the two to one ratio of Irish and German Bishops in the 
United States during this period. While the Irish Bishops 
were in overall control; in several areas, particularly in 
Milwaukee, the local German Bishops tried to exclude all
1 See Nakis Nearchov, The Assimilation of the Cypriot 
Community in London, University of Nottingham
MA thesis,(1960), 126-8.
2 For the early origins of the German/Irish Catholic 
controversy in the United States see, Jay Patrick Dolan, 
The Immigrant Church, New York's Irish and German 
Catholics, 1815-1865, (Baltimore, 1975), C. Barry,
’ German Catholics and the Nationality Controversy1- in 
P. Gleason (edt), Catholicism In America (New York,
1970), and Philip Gleason, The Conservative Reformers, 
German American Catholics and the Social Order, (Notre 
Dame, 1968). For the unsuccessful attempt to establish 
a separate German Church see Matthew A. Pekar, 'The 
German Catholics in the United States! in Records of 
the American Catholic Historical Society, 36(1925), 
305-58, and Emmet H. Rothan, 'The German Catholic 
Immigrant' in Thomas McAvoy (edt), Roman Catholicism 
and the American way, (Notre Dame, 1960), 188-203.
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non-German clergy from their dioceses. These attempts
provoked Bishop McCloskey to protest to the Vatican
"if these German Prelates are allowed special 
legislation as Germans, great injury is likely 
to follow to the interest of religion. We will 
be looked upon as a German Church in an English 
speaking country".!
McCloskey's comments could equally as well have been applied 
by English Catholics to voice their fears that mass Irish 
immigration in the second half of the nineteenth century 
bought with it the potential danger of Catholicism in 
Britain being identified as contiguous with Irish immi­
gration. In Australia and the United States the Catholic 
Church was by definition an immigrant church, with rival 
immigrant groups competing for institutional control. But 
in Britain this ethnic religious cleavage embodied the even 
more potentially divisive issue of a tiny indigenous 
minority desperately determined not to be swamped by a
foreign influx; many of whom resolutely opposed the host
2societal political system. The 'Recusant' period of
1 Quoted in Coleman Barry, The Catholic Church and the 
German Americans, (Washington, 1953), 67.
2 Recusant is the generic term for the post reformation 
English Catholics though originally it only referred 
to a refusal to attend Church of England services.
234
post reformation English Catholicism has been examined at
length and in great detail:^" certainly to a much greater
extent than most of the more modern period but none of the
recusant historians have yet been able to satisfactorily
refute Cardinal Newman's description of a once dominant
and powerful institution reduced to a few adherents of the
old Religion, "moving silently and sorrowfully about, as
2
memorials of what had been". Disproportionately concen­
trated in the higher social classes these Old English
Catholics were subject to far less state persecution than
3
their Irish co-religious and subsequently exhibited far 
less communal enthusiasm for the Emancipation so
1 For an account of the English Recusants see; P. Hughes, 
The Catholic Question, 1688-1829, (1924), G. Machin,
The Catholic Question in English Politics, (Oxford,
1964), B. Magee, The English Recusants, (1938), M. Leys, 
Catholics in England 1559-1829. A Social History (1961),
D. Matthew, Catholicism in England (1955). While the 
more recent works in this sphere; John Bossy's The 
English Catholic Community 1570-1850, (1975) and J.C.H.
Aveling, The Handle and the Axe. The Catholic Recusants, 
in England from Reformation to Emancipation, (1976) ,
are certainly much less orientated towards the ’Marty- 
rological' interpretation, they nevertheless are still 
far too dependent on local Recusant archives at the 
expense of State Papers.
2 See J.H. Newman, Sermons Preached on various Occasions, 
(1968),172.
3 Comparatively few English Catholics were executed, even 
at the height of the Elizabethan persecution; see,
Arnold Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism in Elizabethan 
England, (1979) and they were never subject to the 
degree of economic, social, political and cultural 
discrimination embodied in the Irish Penal Laws which 
according to the Lord Chancellor did "not suppose any 
such person as an Irish Roman Catholic to legally 
exist", quoted in D. Connery, The Irish, (1968), 25.
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determinately pursued by the Irish.^ The mass Irish immi­
gration of the mid-nineteenth century transformed 
Catholicism in England from a tiny religious sect to a
mass Church, yet this increase threatened the societal
2position of the indigenous Catholic population and adversely
affected the emerging pattern of disillusioned Anglicans
3defecting to Catholicism. The Irish influx was largely
responsible for the 1850 Restoration of the English Hier- 
4archy; a move resolutely resisted by many of the Old
1 See D. Gwynn, The Struggle for Catholic Emancipation 
1750-1829, (1928) , 41-58, for a concise account of 
English Catholic opposition to Emancipation.
2 See Mrs Charlton's declaration that she was an "English 
Catholic, not an Irish one, which is all the differ­
ence in the world. English Catholics are responsible 
beings who are taught right from wrong, whereas Irish 
Catholics, belonging to a yet savage nation, know no 
better and are perhaps excusable on that account", 
quoted in D. Gwynn 1 The Irish Immigration1 in G. Beck 
(edt), English Catholicism, 1850-1950, (1950), 270.
3 Many of these converts, notably Newman and Manning'who 
both subsequently became Cardinals originally belonged 
to the Oxford Reform Movement in the Church of England. 
The act of conversion to Catholicism became popularly 
known as "going over to the Irish"; see D. Fennell,
The Changing Face of Catholic Ireland, (1968), 51, 
though the number of converts was never more than "a 
trickle compared to the Irish torrent", see E. Watkin, 
Roman Catholicism in England, ( 1957 ) , 181.
4 Upon the death of the last pre-Reformation consecrated 
Bishop the English Hierarchy ceased to exist as a 
Vatican recognized body, though subsequently Vicars 
Apostolic were appointed for administrative purposes.
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Catholic elite^" and one which produced a strong public
2and state counter-reaction. Unfortunately for the public 
position of English1 Catholicism this new upsurge of anti—
3
Catholicism occurred at a period when many of the 
Catholic clergy in England had departed from their previous 
staunch public support of their country's foreign policy 
to champion the unpopular cause of the Papal State's 
opposition to the Italian Reunification movement which had 
gained the enthusiastic support of both the British Govern-
4
ment and public.
The subsequent loss of the Papal States generated a siege 
mentality in Catholicism with the Papacy physically with­
drawing into the Vatican from which flowed a stream of 
Papal Encyclicals condemning the growth of liberal and 
secularist ideology and further isolating Catholics from 
the mainstream of society. The English Hierarchy's defence 
of the doomed Papal States did however boost their influ­
ence at the Vatican which despite British support for
1 The Duke of Norfolk denounced this "apotheosis of Papal 
aggression" and ceased to practice his religion, see
V. McClelland, English Roman Catholics and Higher 
Education 1803-1903, (Oxford, 1973), 120.
2 See G. Albion, 'The Restoration of the Hierarchy' in 
Beck, op. cit. Parliament in the wake of several anti- 
Catholic riots passed the 1851 'Russell Act' forbidding 
the new Catholic Bishops from taking pre-Reformation
. Diocesan titles.
3 See, E.R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England, 
(1968).
4 See, D. Beales, The Risorgimento and the Unification 
of Italy, (1971), and I. Scott, The Roman Question and 
the Powers 1841-1865, (Hague, 1969).
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Italian Reunification now sought to improve its relations, 
albeit unofficial, with the British Government. Inevi­
tably Ireland featured prominently in the British Govern­
ment and Vatican exchanges with the English Hierarchy
invariably supporting the efforts of their Diplomats'*' to
2influence Vatican policy on Ireland and in particular
1 Officially the British Government did not have any 
diplomatic representation with the Vatican until World 
War One but frequent exchanges were conducted throughout 
most of the nineteenth century by British consuls 
stationed in neighbouring states like Tuscany for this 
purpose. Their negotiations with the Vatican and the 
extent of their influence on Irish affairs are clearly 
detailed in the Foreign Office Class FO 43, 79, 170
and 913 papers and also in the Granville Papers,
(PRO 30 Class). Much of the British negotiations with 
the Vatican on the Fenian issue are however included, 
in the Clarendon Papers in the Bodelian Library 
(Oxford). For the biographical details etc., of some 
of these British Diplomatic representatives see, Alec 
Randall, 'A British Agent at the Vatican: The Mission
of Oao Russell1, Dublin Review, No. 479(1959), 40-48, 
and Rachael Weigall (edt), The Correspondence of Lord 
Burghesh, (1912).
2 For a very readable account of the British influence 
on the Vatican's Irish policy see John Broderick, The 
Holy See and the Irish Movement for the Repeal of the 
Union with England, 1829-194 7, (Rome, 1951). British 
influence at the Vatican was not confined to its diplo­
mats in the adjoining states and the representatives
of the English Hierarchy, for according to McClelland., 
op. cit. , 120, the unofficial but high'yinfluential 
representatives of the English Catholic aristocracy 
successfully interfered in the appointment of several 
mid-nine/teenth century Irish Bishops. While in 1883 
George Errington, a leading Old Catholic layman acting 
on a secret private mission on behalf of the Foreign 
Secretary, claimed to have been instrumental in securing 
the appointment of Edward McCabe, as Archbishop of 
Dublin against much Irish Episcopal opposition; see
C.J. Woods, 'Anti-Irish Intrigue at the Vatican', 
Eire-Ireland, 42(1969), 87-92.
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the appointment of pro-British Bishops in Ireland: an
interference deeply resented by the laity and Hierarchy
in Ireland."*- Vatican co-operation with the British
Government was particularly strong on the Fenian issue
in the 1860's with the Papacy clearly identifying the
Irish Fenians as posing the same threat to British inte-
2
rests that the Garibaldians posed to Vatican interests. 
Fenianism was also strongly denounced by the Irish Hierarchy
who detested its revolutionary ideological connections with
3
the radical European movements and disliked its secret
4
society organizational format; though it attracted the
5
support of many of the junior clergy.
1 The Vatican was forced to withdraw its proposal that 
the British Government should have a formal 'veto' on 
the appointment of Irish Bishops as a result of its 
hostile reception by the Irish laity, clergy and Hier­
archy; see Broderick, op. cit., 68 and Watkins, op. cit., 
156-161.
2 Papal, Curial and Vatican official declarations clearly 
indicate that their condemnation of Fenianism was moti­
vated more by political than religious considerations; 
with the official Vatican organ, Correspondence de Rome 
proclaiming "Fenianism was a punishment from heaven for 
the revolutionary policy of Great Britain on the Conti­
nent" quoted in FO 43/101 Dispatch No. 8.
3 See Donal McCartney, 'The Church and Fenianism', Univer­
sity Review, IV (1967), and Tomas O'Fiaich, 'The Clergy 
and Fenianism 1860-1870', Irish Ecclesiastical Record,
109 (1968) for an account of the Irish Hierarchy's 
attacks on the Fenian movement.
4 See Donal McCarthy, 'The Church and Secret Societies', 
in T. Williams (edt), Secret Societies in Ireland,
(Dublin, 1973), 74.
5 This clerical sympathy for Fenianism so concerned the 
British Army that the Queens Regulations incorporated a 
procedure by which officers were to remove their troops 
from Catholic Church parades if the priest used "sedi­
tious or inflammatory language"; See H. Hanhan, 'Religion 
and Nationality in the Mid^-Victorian Army in M Foot 
(edt), War and Society, (1973), 159, and also see A.J. 
Semple, 'Fenian Infiltration in the British Army' ,
Society for Army Historical Research Journal, (Autumn 
1974).
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But when after their failure to incite insurrection, many 
Fenians turned to political agitation and supported the 
land reform movement, a serious difference of opinion 
arose' between the Irish and English Hierarchies parti­
cularly following Pope Leo XIII's denunciation of the 
Land League.  ^Land reform was fervently supported by the 
Irish peasantry who constituted the bulk of the Church 
and hence their socioeconomic aspirations could not be
easily ignored by the Hierarchy even if this brought them
2
into conflict with the Vatican. Irish Republicans have 
frequently, if rather polemically, condemned the Irish 
Hierarchy for their support-, for British rule in Ireland. 
Certainly the Hierarchy consistently condemned militant 
Republicanism but in general it supported the constitu­
tional Home Rule or Nationalist movement. Unlike the
3
Cypriot Orthodox Catholic Episcopacy/ the Irish Hierarchy 
never placed itself in the forefront of the resistance to 
colonial rule but neither did it support British coloni­
alism in the same enthusiastic manner pursued by the
1 See, David Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 
1898-1921, (Pittsburgh, 1973),10.
2 See C.J. Woods, 'Ireland and Anglo-Papal Relations 
1880-1885', Irish Historical Studies, 28(1972), 29-60.
3 See T. Adams, Akel: The Communist Party of Cyprus, 
(California, 1971), for the leading role played by 
the Church in the Independence movement.
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Maltese Hierarchy.^ The overall attitude of the Irish 
Hierarchy to the fact of British colonial rule was essen­
tially a cautious but highly pragmatic acknowledgement of 
the status quo, combined with tacit support for constitu­
tional reform.^
The late 19th century emergence of a mass Irish Home Rule 
movement, cautiously supported by the Irish Hierarchy, 
further strained its already tense relations with the 
English Hierarchy. Irish Home Rule was not only a deeply 
divisive issue in British politics, fiercely opposed by
1 The British conquest of Malta removed it from the 
ecclesiastical control of the unpopular Sicilian 
Hierarchy and consequently the Maltese Hierarchy sup­
ported the British Colonial rule to such an extent that 
the Archbishops accepted honorary Major Generalships
in the British Army. This traditional close identi­
fication of the Hierarchy with Colonial rule has gener­
ated in Malta and among Maltese immigrant communities 
a bitter anti-clericalism of a virulence not found in 
Ireland; see G. Dench, Maltese In London - A case study 
in the Erosion of Ethnic Consciousness, (1975).
2 For the influence of the Hierarchy and clergy on the 
evolution of the Irish Nationalist movement see, Emmet 
Larkin, The Making of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Ireland, 1850-1860, (Carolina, 1980)? Miller, op. cit.,
E.D. Steele, 'Cardinal Cullen and Irish Nationality',
Irish Historical Studies, 19(1975/6), 239-60. Jacqueline 
Hill, 'Nationalism and the Catholic Church in the 1840's1 
ibid., 371-95. Kevin Nolan, 'The Catholic Clergy and 
Irish Politics in the 18 30's and 40' sf: Historical
Studies, 9(1974), 119-35. J.H. White, English Histori­
cal Review, 75 (1960 ). David Schmitt, Catholicism and 
Democratic Political Development in Ireland', Eire 
Ireland, 9(1974), 59-72. Joseph MacMahon, 'The Catholic 
Clergy and the Social Question in Ireland, 1891-1916', 
Studies, LXX (1981), 263-88 and Fergus 0'Ferrall,
'The Only Lever? The Catholic Priest in Irish Politics 
1823-29/ ibid., 308-24.
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the English Hierarchy^ and most of the non-Irish catholic 
2
community but its championship in a 'Millet1 type manner 
by Irish catholics in Britain also seriously impeded the 
English Hierarchy's efforts to make denominational educ­
ation a major electoral issue. Unfortunately for the 
English Hierarchy4the party favouring denominational 
education, was the party detested by most Irish Catholics 
who repeatedly at the poll refuted Disraeli's dictum that
3
"Catholics and Tories were natural allies". The Irish 
Nationalist movement in Britain, often with the tacit i
4
support of the Irish Hierarchy, almost invariably
1 Even Cardinal Manning, the senior member of the Hier­
archy most sympathetic to Irish national aspirations, 
denounced Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill as "a 
Catholic and worldwide danger", quoted in Ayearst 
Morley, The Republic of Ireland, (New York, 19 70), 19.
2 See Thomas R. Greene, 'The English Catholic Press and 
the Home Rule Bill, 1885-86', Eire Ireland, 10(1975), 
18-37.
3 Quoted in J. Dwyer, 'The Catholic Press' in G. Beck 
(edt), op. cit., 484; and also see K. Hoppen 'Tories, 
Catholics and the 1859 General Election', Historical 
Journal,13(March, 1970), and Gilbert A. Cahill, 'Irish 
Catholicism and English Toryis.m' , Review of Politics 
19(1957), 64. A small group of English Catholics did 
support the Liberals, see J. Altholz, The Liberal 
Catholic Movement in England, 1848-1864, (1962).
*4 In the 1885 Election, Parnell advocated a tactical 
anti-Liberal vote and many Irish Catholics in Britain 
did temporarily switch their support to the Conser­
vatives as instructed by the Nationalists; see 
R. Howard, 'The Parnell Manifest) of 21 November, 1885 
and the Schools Question', English Historical Review, 
62 (1947}, 42-51.
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solicited the Irish vote in Britain on behalf of the 
Liberals; the party most amenable to Home Rule but opposed 
to a religious controlled educational system.^ A similar 
situation occurred in New Zealand where the Irish community 
tended to electorally support the pro--Home Rule but secu­
larist Labour Party despite efforts by that country's Hier­
arch to mobilize a Catholic bloc vote on the schools 
2
issue. Relations between the Irish and English Hierarchies
were further strained by Cardinal Newman's abortive
efforts to 'take over' the new 'Catholic' University
College in Dublin and transform it into an 'Oxford1 for
3
the English Catholic elite.
The hostility exhibted by the old established Sephardic 
Jewish community in England towards the Ashkenazim; though 
doctrinal differences and issues of religious practice 
were involved, largely centred around their, disparate 
socio-economic status and an instinctive fear that the
1 Gwynn's observation that the Catholic Church in 
Britain "could always count on the Irish vote when­
ever its religious needs were involved" in Beck, op. 
cit., 286, is not empirically supported in any consi­
stent manner by the detailed electoral studies of 
Roberts, op. cit., Howard, op. cit., and P. Whitaker, 
'The Roman Catholics and the Education Act of 1944', 
Political Studies,4(June, 1956).
2 See R.P. Davis, Irish Issues, op. cit., and also his
'Sir Robert Stout and the Irish Question 1879-1921',
Historical Studies, 12(1965/66), 417-34.
3 This episode is dealt with at great length in V.
McClelland, op. cit., but also see W.N. Field,
'Newman in Ireland1, Catholic World, CXII, (1978 ), 
28-35, and Roger McHugh, 'Newman's Irish Years', The 
Bell, X(1950 ), 661-68, for a summary of the intra- 
Hierarchical tensions generated by this incident.
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social position of the Sephardic would be endangered by 
the 'Alien' Ashkenazim influx which had aroused such deep 
xenophobic feelings in Britain. Similar tensions between 
the older Greek and newer Cypriot orthodox Catholic 
communities in London were almost totally the product of 
disparate socio-economic status. The deep divisions 
between the English and Irish Catholic communities in 
Australia were however fundamentally rooted in the poli­
tical relationship between England and Ireland. All of 
these factors, disparate socio-economic status, xenophobia 
and anti colonial nationalism contributed to the tensions 
that plagued the uneasy relationship between Irish immi­
grants and English Catholics. In the United States the 
dispute between the German and Irish Catholic communities 
basically centered on the German resentment to the Irish 
dominated Hierarchy. This tension also emerged in the 
English Catholic Church, though in a rather different 
form than in the United States.
English Bishops, regarding themselves as the lineal 
descendants of the Reformation Martyrs,deeply resented the 
proselytizing attitude of the Irish Hierarchy towards their 
country, the often, unrequested, dispatch of Irish mission­
ary priests, as if England was just another mission field 
of the British Empire where Irish clergy were building 
their 'spiritual empire'. For their part the Irish Hier- ‘ 
archy deeply resented the combined political influence 
wielded by their English fellow prelates and the British 
Government at the Vatican in purely Irish ecclesiastical
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affairs. The highly disproportionate number of Irish 
born members of the English and Welsh Hierarchy in rela­
tion to the proportion of Irish clergy^ and laity in the
o
English and Welsh Church; a much greater disproportion
than the ratid of German to Irish Bishops in the United
States, was a further source of underlying tension between
the Irish and English Hierarchies. In the first 125 years
since the Restoration of the English Hierarchy in 1850,
3 'there have been 115 bishops ;of these 12 were born in
4
Ireland. For the earlier period the ratio of Irish born 
appointments to the Hierarchy was even more dispropor­
tionate; 3 out of 47 bishops in the 1850-1899 period.
1 J. Bossy, op. cit., 354-60, claims that 12% of the 
priests working in England and Wales in 1840, i.e., 
before the famine influx, were Irish born, but unfor­
tunately there do not seem to be any similar figures 
available for the remainder of the century.
2 In 1851, 520,000 of the 700,000 Catholics in England 
and Wales were Irish born but thirty years later the 
proportions of Irish born had declined to only a third; 
source:Census and Catholic Directory for relevant years.
3 Diocesan bishops (SedL in Residentus) there have also 
been,,since 1876, Auxiliary bishops (Sedi Titular 
Infedilius Partibulum).
4 The places of birth for 114 of the 115 individual 
bishops was obtained from studying the following 
publications, The Catholic Directory, (London, 1850- 
1976), Annuario Pontifico, (Rome, 1860-1871), La 
Gerarchia Catholica Ela Famiglia Pontifica, (Rome, 
1872-1911), Annuario Pontifico, (Rome, 1912-1976) .
J. Delaney and J. Tobin, The Dictionary of Catholic 
Biography, (1962). There have also been 4 Irish born 
Auxilliary bishops out of the 32 appointed in the 1876- 
19 75 period, though the first Irish born Auxilliary 
was not appointed until 1967.
Gwynn advances several explanations for this dispropor­
tionate ratio, particularly in the 19th and early 20th 
century period. His suggestion that the Irish clergy in 
England had mostly only parochial experience and therefore
could not reasonably expect elevation to adminster a
1 2 diocese cannot be satisfactorily substantiated. His
observation that one of the criteria influencing many
of the earlier diocesan appointments was social status
3
and the availability of a private income is however
probably correct;but Gwynn undoubtedly identifies the real
root of the failure of Irish priests to gain ecclesiastical
promotion as their possession of “political sympathies that
were scarcely compatible with promotion to the Episcopacy 
4in England".
1 See D. Gwynn, 'The Irish', -i - in Beck, op. cit., 
289-90.
2 According to P. Hughes, 'The Bishops of the Century',
in Beck, ibid., 187-88, two thirds of those appointed
to the Hierarchy in the 1850-1950 period had only 
experience of parochial work.
3 Gwynn, ibid. Many of the early bishops came from a
small coterie of upper class families. The Vaughan
family alone produced three 19th century bishops.
4 Gwynn, ibid. A. Spencer, 'The Catholic Community as 
a British Melting Pot', New Community, 2(1973), 
refers to this problem but his conclusions regarding 
the influence of the Irish on the control of the 
Catholic Church in Britain are rather different than 
mine. In the case of the Westminster Archdiocese, the 
premier post in the Hierarchy, even more than com­
patible political sympathies appear to have been the 
criteria when the name of Merry del Val was deleted by 
the English bishops from their 'ternia', (nomination 
list to the Vatican) as Cardinal Vaughan's successor 
on the grounds that he was a "non British subject", 
see Beck, op. cit., 213.
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Politics bedevilled relations between the Irish and 
English Hierarchies, and divided the Catholic communities 
in Britain. The long drawn out crisis of the various 
Home Rule Bills was followed by the open rebellion of the 
Irish Hierarchy against the British Government's proposal 
to enforce compulsory conscription in Ireland when 
relations between the two Hierarchies reached a new nadir.^ 
It was rather unfortunate that the most influential mem­
ber of the English Hierarchy during this early 20th
century critical period had gained the reputation of being
2
very "unsympathetic" on Irish issues. Cardinal Bourne 
was elevated to the Archdiocese of Westminster from the 
adjoining Southwark diocese in 1903 but his early attempts 
to merge both dioceses antagonized his former clergy and
3
flock, many of whom were Irish. An even more ambitious 
proposal,that the Vatican,should ecclesiastically recognize 
the subordinate political relationship between Ireland and 
Britain,by elevating the sixty year old see of Westminster 
above the thousand year old See of Armaghfinfuriated the 
Irish Hierarchy:though Bourne's move almost backfired when 
an annoyed Pope Pius X counter-proposed that Armagh should 
be elevated to the status of a Patriarchy over all the
4
British Isles. Cardinal Bourne's determination to train
1 Even during the early war period when the Irish Hier­
archy was supporting the British war effort a dispute 
developed with the English Hierarchy over who should 
supply Army chaplains, see Miller, op. cit., 312.
2 Quoted in Beck, op. cit., 176.
3 See D. Gwynn, 'Cardinal Bourne and Ireland' Irish
Ecclesiastical Record LVI(1940), 87-101.
4 Catholic Herald, 26 Mar., 1921.
his own clergy rather than import priests from Ireland 
further antagonized the Irish Hierarchy.'*' His efforts to 
obtain a Papal Rescript against the Catholic Herald, a 
publication advocating the assimilation of the Irish in 
Britain, was a classic example of his highly authoritarian 
approach and refusal to brook criticism that so needlessly 
alienated potential supporters. His refusal to permit 
the celebration of a mass for Michael Davitt, who as a 
teenager had used his IRB pistol to prevent a mob burning 
down a Lancashire Catholic church and who subsequently 
became a respectable Nationalist leadertoffended many 
Irish Catholics."*" While his objection to a special St. 
Patrick's Day mass in Westminster Cathedral indicated a near 
total failure to recognize the importance of the* Millet* - 
type juxtaposition of Catholicism and nationalism in 
Ireland even though his mother was Irish born. Or perhaps, 
he had indeed learnt from his mother the situational 
ethnic significance of this dual link and instinctively 
shrank from any action that might offend English Catholics.
Cardinal Bourne was almost certainly aware that he had 
not been his fellow prelates first choice for the 
Westminster See and that he had only emerged as the com­
promise candidate after Merry del Val had been eliminated 
for political reasons. The Old Catholic aristocracy 
deeply resented a middle class successor to the
1 Catholic Herald, 29 Oct., 1921.
aristocratic Vaughan^ and often ignored or even snubbed 
his views in the course of their 'defence' of Catholic 
interests in the House of Lords. Bourne himself was 
certainly a conservative on political issues - he sub-
2sequently condemned the 192 6 General Strike as a "sin" - 
but for the sake of Catholic education (his main interest 
in church affairs) rather bravely formed a tactical alli­
ance with the Irish Parliamentary Party to amend the 
1906 Education Bill. But this temporary alliance with 
their traditional Irish opponents infuriated many
3
Catholic conservatives. Two years later Bourne enraged
the Liberal Government when he publicized a private
instruction by Prime Minister Asquith forbidding any
public procession during the 1908 Eucharistic Congress in 
4London. An infuriated Asquith then publicly denounced,
"this gang of foreign cardinals taking advantage 
of our hospitality to parade their idolatries 
through the streets of London, a thing without 
precedent since the days of Bloody Mary".
In the ensuing public uproar, the Liberals failed to hold
1 George Scott, The Roman Catholics, (1967), 240, quotes 
one aristocrat, Vaughan "had been succeeded by 
Cardinal Bourne with whom relations had been impossible
2 "a sin against the obedience which we owe to God", 
quoted in Beck, op. cit., 178.
3 See Gwynn, Redmond, op. cit., 120 and Miller, op. cit. , 
153-9.
4 See The Annual Register, (London, 1908), 195-7, for 
this exchange of correspondence.
5 Quoted by Liam de Paor in a Radio Telefis Eireann 
broadcast as reported in the Irish Times, 16 Jan., 1977
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a Newcastle constituency after the United Irish League
successfully mobilized an anti-Liberal Irish by electoral
backlash against this "anti Catholic insult".^ But many
English Catholics believed that Bourne had displayed a
serious error of judgement;breaking the traditional low
2public profile of English Catholicism when he published 
Asquith's reminder of the existing anti-Catholic legis­
lation. ^
Bourne was certainly not however prepared to confront 
the Lloyd George government on its Irish policy, when 
criticized for not supporting the Irish Hierarchy's de­
nunciation of 'Official Reprisals', Bourne argued,
"I am an Archbishop in England and in London...
I cannot forget that, in any public statement I 
make. In Ireland, it is Ireland that counts. In 
England it is not only Ireland but also England 
and the whole Empire... You have to expect a
1 Irish Catholic, 26 Sept., 1908.
2 Some Catholics however publicly tried to defend Bourne 
see' Catholic Processions, a Defence of the Right of 
Roman Catholics to Hold Public Processions, (Guild of 
Our Lady of Ransom, 1908).
3 In 1931 a police officer investigating a report that 
a Wimbledon Catholic procession had broken the law 
by merely walking under eighty yards from one church 
entrance to another wrote "it appears that the carrying 
of the Host and the wearing of vestments in public 
places is contrary to the 1829 Act", MEPOL 2/303, and 
also see MEPOL 2/3062 for a similar incident in 1938.
In 192 6 the Cabinet decided not to support a private 
member's Roman Catholic Relief Bill which would have 
abolished the 154 9 provision against keeping Roman 
Catholic books in the realm, the 1791 injunction against 
Catholic churches having bells or steeples and the 
1549, 1791 and 1829 provisions outlawing all foreign 
religious orders, see Cabinet 33(26), 19 May, 1926.
CAB 2 3/5 3.
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slightly different point of view on the Irish 
question from one whose duty it is to be English 
as well as a Catholic and a Archbishop11.^-
This was a reasonable, and even an honestly frank admis­
sion of the political pressures bearing on the head of
a national church. The French Hierarchy faced similar
2pressures during the Algerian conflict and even Cardinal
Gibbons,while privately supporting the Irish cause;per-
suaded the 1920 National Conference of American Bishops
not to issue any public statement on the Irish conflict;
after the Foreign Office intimated that they might permit
American missionaries to replace the expelled German
3
priests in Palestine, India and East Africa. In Ireland
itself, only Bishop Fogarty displayed any real enthusiasm
for the politics of Sinn Fein; most of the Hierarchy
condemned IRA actions in far stronger tones than they
4castigated the British Official Reprisal Policy while
1 Quoted in Francis Oldmeadow, Cardinal Bourne, (1944), 
Vol. 2, 184-5.
2 See W. Bosworth, 'The French Catholic Hierarchy and 
the Algerian Question1, Western Political Quarterly, 
-(Dec, 1962).
3 See, Thomas E. Hachey, 'The British Foreign Office.
A New Perspective on the Irish Issue in Anglo-American 
Relations', Eire Ireland, 11(1972), 3-13, and also his 
'The Irish Question - The British Foreign Office and 
the American Political Conventions of 1920', ibid.,
8 (196.8),; 92-107.;;
4 For a detailed account of the Irish Hierarchy's attit­
ude to the IRA see, Roger McHugh,‘The Catholic Church 
and the Rising', in Owen Dudley Edwards 1916, op. cit., 
196-201. John Newsinger, 'I Bring not Peace but a 
Sword: The Religious Motif in the Irish War of Inde­
pendence' , Journal of Contemporary History, 13(1978), 
"609-28 and D. Miller, op. cit., 452-84.
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the Bishop of Meath actually placed the "curse of God"
on the IRA**" and Bishop Cohalan even excommunicated the
2
entire Cork IRA.
But when members of the Irish Hierarchy attended a function 
organized by the Rome Representative of the Government 
of the Irish Republic a Times editorial asked whether the 
Vatican "realized what feelings such an open act of sedi-
3
tion is calculated to produce in loyal British subjects". 
The passions aroused by Ireland flowed at a very high 
tide level throughout the Catholic Church in Britain in 
the early 1920's. The Belgian Cardinal Mercier who had 
been lionized by the English Catholic establishment during 
the War was now bitterly reviled by Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Kerr, the President of the Catholic Union, for sug­
gesting that Ireland like Belgium was entitled to its
4
independence. The "lies and deliberate falsehoods of
5the Tablet" were denounced by Bishop Fogarty of Kerry at
a Harrowgate clergy reception to greet Archbishop Mannix,
though that leading English Catholic journal had strongly
6condemned the Official Reprisal policy. English members 
of the congregation walked out in protest when a London
1 Freemans Journal, 3 Nov., 1919.
2 But apparently not a single IRA member resigned in t i i e  
face of this injunction; see T. Barry, op. cit., 65. •
3 Times, 7 June, 1920.
4 Catholic Herald, 8 Jan., 1921.
5 Ibid., 20 Nov., 1920.
6 Tablet, 2 Oct., 1920.
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priest offered prayers for the dying MacSwiney.^ After a
similar incident an irate English parishioner sent his
Irish born parish priest £5 to say masses for "RIC men
murdered by the IRA" only to hear him subsequently announce
2masses for "Irish policemen who have recently died". The 
Catholic Young Men’s Society of Great Britain refused to 
discuss Ireland at their Annual conference; allegedly under
3
pressure from Cardinal Bourne.
Cardinal Bourne's Pastoral letter however produced the most 
serious counter reaction of the Anglo-Irish War of Inde­
pendence. To many in the Irish community, he was reviled, 
though wrongly, as having vetoed Roger Casement's admission 
to the Catholic Church just before his execution until he
4
renounced his 'treason'. Bourne had however instructed the 
Wormwood Scrubs Prison Chaplain to refuse the sacraments
5
to hunger striking Irish prisoners. His Pastoral letter 
now alienated many more of the laity and clergy. There 
were mass resignations from the Westminster Catholic
1 Catholic Herald, 27 Nov., 1920.
2 Quoted in D. Gwynn, 'Bourne', op. cit., 93.
3 Catholic Herald, 28 May., 1921.
4 See D. Gwynn, ibid., 95, who denies the reports and 
also his 'Roger Casement's last weeks', Studies liv 
(1965), 63-73, where he claims Casement had been bap­
tized by his Catholic mother and therefore did not need 
to be 'received' into the Church.
5 See report in DE 2/135, according to Art O'Brien;
Fr Musgrave the Chaplain refused to obey Bourne's order.
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Federation^ and reports of large scale walkouts by angry
members of the congregation when Bourne's Pastoral was 
2
read. One London priest prefaced the Cardinal1 S. Pastoral
with the observation "my brethren as far as I can see this
is a political letter. I however have been enjoined to
read it to you. I shall do so and you can form your own
3
opinion of it". Father O'Gorman of the Church of the 
English Martyrs in Tower Hill read out the Pastoral and
4
tnen collected £30 for Irish Relief from his congregation.
The Catholic Herald expended many column inches in a
theological effort to show that Cardinal Bourne's Pastoral
letter was not binding on Catholics and the men of the
Church of Our Lady of Compassion (East Ham) convened a
5meeting to protest against the Cardinal's action. Many 
of Cardinal Bourne's most vociferous critics could not 
have been described as Republicans. The Nationalist MP 
Jeremiah MacVeagh wrote to the Times denouncing this 
"political manifesto" and bluntly informed Cardinal Bourne 
that when,
"Catholics of Irish birth or sympathies need 
guidance on faith or morals they will receive 
it at the hands of their own episcopacy and not
from an English Cardinal  Cardinal Manning
was a democrat, worked for the cause of temper­
ance and was a devoted and fearless friend of
1 Catholic Herald, 26 Feb., 1921.
2 ROR 93. ' 1 1 Feb., 1921. CP 2603, CAB 24/120.
3 Catholic Herald, 19 Feb., 1921.
4 Ibid..
5 Catholic Herald, 19 Feb., 1921.
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Ireland. I fail to discern any points of 
resemblance between Cardinal Mannix and Cardinal 
Bourne
This blunt public repudiation was but the forerunner of
the major onslaught on Cardinal Bourne, launched by
Archbishop Mannix who as the head of a National Church
had equal status with the Cardinal. Archbishop Mannix
deliberately chose a luncheon attended by a hundred and
twenty members of the Lancashire clergy to attack his
fellow prelate and though he did not name Cardinal Bourne
directly, the inference in his remarks was clear:
"there were men today who in their references 
against Ireland quoted Cardinal Manning. Cardinal 
Manning was a friend of Ireland, a friend of the 
people and if he was alive today he would be on 
the side of Ireland".^
Dr Mannix formed a focal point around which members of the
clergy, dissatisfied with Cardinal Bourne's Irish views 
3
rallied. In 1921 there were three Irish born members of
4
the English Hierarchy. Bishop Cotter of Portsmouth was 
one of the concelebrants of the MacSwiney Requiem Mass and
5
had received an Irish Self Determination League delegation. 
He actively aided Archbishop Mannix and was subsequently 
presented with three hundred guineas by the Melbourne
1 Times, 15 Feb., 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 26 Feb., 1921.
3 Cardinal Bourne described Self Determination for Ireland 
as a "foolish catchword", Catholic Herald, 19 Feb.,
1921.
4 The country of birth was ascertained by consulting the 
Catholic Directory (1920-1) and Annuario Pontifico,
(Rome, 1920-1).
5 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
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clergy in recognition of his help.^" Bishop Kelly of
Plymouth appears to have kept a very low profile on the
issue of Ireland and I can trace no speeches by him on
this subject but Bishop Lacey of Middlesborough antagonized
the Cabinet when he wrote a letter to his local Irish
Self Determination League branch supporting their objec- 
2
tives. Some non-Irish-born members of the Hierarchy also 
showed their dissension from the policy of their Govern­
ment in different ways. The Bishop of Nottingham in his 
Advent Pastoral Letter commented that the "present condi­
tions of affairs in Ireland is a public scandal" and 
stated that "things would be very much worse if it was: not 
for the fundamental strength of Irish Catholicism'1 which
3
restricted the degree of resistance to the British forces. The 
Archbishop of Birmingham, whose mother, like Cardinal 
Bourne’s, had been born in Ireland, played a prominent role 
in the formation of the Committee of British Catholics for 
Reconciliation between Great Britain and Ireland. This 
Committee sent a Memorial to the Prime Minister stating 
that,
"Ireland in virtual rebellion is a drain on our 
military strength and military resources.... 
social unrest in Great Britain is seriously 
aggravated by the disaffection with His Majesty’s 
Government of the masses of British workingmen 
of Irish extraction owing to the troubles of 
Ireland".
1 Catholic Herald, 4 March, 1922.
2 ROR 66, 5 Aug., 1920. CP 1743. CAB 24/110.
3 Catholic Herald, 4 Dec., 1920.
4 Tablet, 30 Oct., 1920.
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Bishop Amigo of Southwark was responsible along with
Archbishop Clune of Perth for a particularly crucial
personal intervention at the Vatican which persuaded the
Pope not to release a prepared statement condemning Sinn
Fein in Ireland.'*' This Gibraltar born prelate, who wished
2
however he was "an Irishman"f concelebrated in his 
Southwark Cathedral the Requiem Mass for Terence MacSwiney 
which provided the Irish Republican'political organizations 
in Britain with such an important opportunity of demon­
strating their new strength. He also appeared on the plat-
3
form at several of Archbishop Mannix1s public meetings.
Considerable sums were raised by the Catholic Church in
Britain in response to the Northern Irish bishops appeal
for aid for the five thousand Catholics forced out o.f. the
Belfast shipyard. Archbishop Ilsley sent £1000, .Bishop
Cotter £550 and many individual parishes were included in
4the long list of donations. But many Irish Catholics noted 
with bitterness that Cardinal Bourne who had been so ener­
getic in raising post war relief funds for central Euro-
5
pean distress did not subscribe to the Irish appeal.
Bourne .found himself increasingly out on a limb.
1 See report from Gavan Duffy, the Dail Representative in
Rome to De Valera (21, Feb., 1921, DE 2/441).
2 Catholic Herald, 7 May, 1921.
3 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
4 Catholic Herald, 1, 15 Jan., 1921.
5 See letter from Jeremiah MacVeagh, Times, 19 Feb., 1921.
The Daily News claimed Cardinal Bourne had not only 
failed on his visit to the Pope to gain a strong condemn­
ation of Sinn Fein but had been told by the Pontiff to 
moderate his stance on Ireland which was apparently embar­
rassing the Vatican.^ Whether this instruction did modify
2Cardinal Bourne's views cannot be ascertained but at
the annual meeting of the Hierarchy a month later,
Cardinal Bourne was requested to communicate the bishops
“unease on the Government's' Irish policy to the Prime 
3Minister'.' The Hierarchy collectively issued a joint 
pastoral letter stating that "events are daily occurring 
which perplex and shock the public conscience of both
nations", and called for the month of May to be a 'month
\
4of prayer' for peace in Ireland. r,Thus reluctantly and 
with some misgiving did the Romen Catholic Church in 
England join the ranks of denominational bodies expressing 
their opposition to Government policy in Ireland'! Several 
weeks before this Pastoral Letter, seven Anglican bishops 
and the leaders of the fourteen Nonconformists Churches 
wrote to the Times supporting the Archbishop of Canterbury1
7
denunciation of the official reprisal policy while Bishop
1 Daily News, 2 March, 1921.
2 I can find no record of this incident in T.E. Hachey
(edt), Anglo-Vatican Relations, 1914-39, (1978 ).
3 Times, 7 April, 1921.
4 Ibid., 25 April, 1921.
5 Boyce, op. cit., 79.
6 Times, 6 April, 1921.
7 House of Lords Debates, vol.. 44, Cols 80-94.
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Gore and other influential Anglican clergymen formed a
Church of England Peace League to intervene in the Irish 
1issue.
The leadership of the Irish Self Determination League un­
doubtedly one of the organizations that Cardinal Bourne 
associated with latter dayfenianism , organized a series 
of public meetings to condemn the Pastoral Letter. The 
Poplar and Wapping branches marched en masse complete
with pipe and fife bands, to a local church for a Mass to' ;
2
honour Kevin Barry. The Chorley Branch of the League
formed a Catholic Truth Society and recommended other
3branches to do the same. A large protest meeting in the
4Kingsway Hall (London) was subsequently reported as a 
"spontaneous outburst of protest by men and women who were 
wounded in their deepest religious and patriotic feelings 
by the unwarranted attack made by Cardinal Bourne on the 
Irish Cause". The twin notes of religion and nationality 
were clearly and distinctly struck from the very opening 
of the meeting which began with the singing of "Faith of 
our Fathers living still in spite of danger, fire and 
sword". Liam McCarthy who chaired the meeting told the 
audience that they were "engaged reluctantly in a solemn 
task and that only a sense of duty to their fellow country­
men and the cause of Irish freedom induced them to
1 Church Times, 3 Dec., 1920.
2 Catholic Herald, 1 Jan., 1921.
3 Ibid., 12 Nov., 1921.
4 Ibid., 26 March, 1921.
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undertake that meeting". Councillor Purcell moved the 
resolution: "We warn Cardinal Bourne that whilst as
dutiful Catholics we will respect and obey the Church 
in matters of faith and morals, we will not suffer any 
ecclesiastical dictation or interference in political 
matters"- P.D. O'Harte seconding the resolution reminded 
the audience that the "layman was just as much entitled 
to his political opinions as the Cardinal "and expressed 
his gratitude to the "Archbishop of Canterbury, Bishop 
Gore and the Bishop of Peterborough for their outspoken 
condemnation of the barbarities perpetrated in Ireland".
The meeting then concluded with the singing of 'God save 
the Pope1 and 'the Soldiers Song1 (the Republican anthem) 
The Irish Self Determination League considered the chal­
lenge of Cardinal Bourne to be sufficiently important 
to warrant a two page account of this meeting in the Irish 
Exile, (April, 1921) while another page was given to an 
interview with Archbishop Mannix, entitled "the Vatican 
and Ireland" in which the readership were assured that the 
Pope did not share Cardinal Bourne's viewpoint.
An Intelligence officer reported that "revolutionary senti­
ment is damaging the influence of the Roman Catholic Hier­
archy"*1' and the tidal wave generated by Cardinal Bourne's 
actions continued to ripple through the columns of the 
Irish Exile for months. The alienation of many Irish
1 ROR 66, 5 Aug., 1920, CP 1743, CAB 24/110.
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Catholics from the viewpoint represented by Cardinal
Bourne was expressed in a very strident manner in an
article, entitled, "A Contemptible Clique, English Catho-'
lies and Irish Nationality".^ This article expressed the
frustrations of those who believed that,
"We Irish are the Catholic Church in this 
country. Without us the Churches and the 
altars would be deserted"  "we have sub­
scribed out of our poverty to raise edifices 
to the Almighty in a Pagan land.... what's our 
reward, the malignant hatred of the Norfoiks".^
The refusal of Church authorities in some areas to allow
the Irish Self Determination League to use church halls
as meeting places provoked the bitter criticism that "we
have little or no voice in the affairs of the churches we
have built, which we maintain, and we are refused the use
3
of Catholic halls because we are Irish" The writer of 
this article was only partly correct,for an examination 
of the columns of the Irish Exile and the Catholic Herald 
reveals, that the Irish Self Determination League branches 
reported more instances of permission to use church halls 
than refusals and more examples of local priests arranging 
special masses at the request of the League,to commemorate 
events with a definite Irish political connotation than 
refusals. The article does however illustrate Denis Gwynn's
Irish Exile, August, 1921.
2 The Duke of Norfolk was bitterly disliked by many in 
the Irish community in Britain. A fervent Unionist he 
had chaired a rally, in support of the Ulster Loyalists, 
at which he had presented Carson with a gold sword/ see
D. Gwynn Redmond, op. cit., 211.
3 Irish Exile, August, 1921.
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view that "very deep divisions did emerge in the Church in
■j
Britain over the issue of Ireland during 1920-21'!^
The proposal in the Irish Exile that the Irish Catholics
should form a separate Irish Church in Britain was never
a feasible proposition. The Vatican would never have
sanctioned such a divisive and controversial change and
the British Hierarchy would never have tolerated such a
political move fraught, with profound consequences for
the relationship of the Church in Britain to the wider
society. There may not have been any specifically Irish
Churches in Britain like the Belgian Church of Our Lady
2of Hall in Camden, or the Polish Church of Our Lady and
. 3
StCasimir. in Shadwell., But in many churches where the 
congregations were predominantly Irish and the clergy 
were Irish priests prepared to say masses with definite 
political connotations, there existed 'de facto' if not 
'de jure' Irish Churches. In many other churches the 
clergy permitted collecting and the congregations contri­
buted generously to the various Irish Relief funds. This 
strength of feeling was often too intense for individual 
bishops to attempt to curb and the divided opinions of the 
Hierarchy in Britain prevented any efforts by individual
1 Gwynn, Beck, op. cit., 262.
2 Catholic Herald, 28 June, 1922.
3 Ibid., 24 Dec., 1921.
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bishops to discipline their clergy for involvement in the 
Irish Separatist Movement in Britain during the 1920-1 
period.
Cardinal Bourne's attack on the ISDL and the deportation 
of some of its leading members had shown the extent to 
which both Church and State were concerned about the influ­
ence of the League and its ideology on the Irish in 
Britain. The response of the League and its new supporters 
in the nationalist movement, towards Cardinal Bourne's 
onslaught indicated that the ISDL and its members were det­
ermined not to be intimidated by the Hierarchy: just as 
the continued influx of new recruits, despite the deporta­
tions, indicated a determination by many in the Irish com­
munity to resist the efforts of the State to discourage 
support for the Irish cause in Britain. We shall observe 
this continuing expansion of the ISDL in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8 0
Victory in the Air: The Pace Quickens
St Patrick's Day (March 17) 1921 was celebrated more soberly 
than usual by the Irish community in Britain. In defer­
ence to the situation in Ireland, many of the traditional 
banquets were cancelled in favour of concerts held to 
raise funds for the White Cross Fund.^ At the Gaelic 
League Queens Hall concert attended by four thousand people
there was a ten minute long standing ovation for Archbishop 
2Mannix. The Catholic Herald remarked that "a remarkable 
feature of the St Patrick Day celebrations in London was 
the number of coloured people from all parts of the world 
who showed an anxiety to identify themselves with Irish
3
national sympathies" by attending the masses and con­
certs. The Birmingham area of the Irish Self Determination 
League jointly organized a large rally in the town hall in 
co-operation with the Irish National Forresters and the
4
local Irish Institute but their choice of speaker, Charles 
Diamond the editor of the Catholic Herald, no doubt was 
not approved by the League's leadership whose policy was
1 Catholic Herald, 19 March, 1921. This was an Irish 
Relief Fund whose trustees included Cardinal Logue and 
Michael Collins.
2 Ibid., 26 March, 1921.
3 Ibid.
4 Catholic Herald, 26 March, 1921.
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to exclude Diamond from all platforms whenever possible.
The Irish Self Determination League continued to expand.
At the March (1921) meeting of the Executive Council it
was reported that since December 1920 the League had
gained fifty one new branches and twelve thousand recruits
and had sent three and half thousand pounds from its
central funds to Ireland.^" The Halifax Branch had now
almost five hundred members, a local Anglican vicar addres-
2sed the Leicester Branch meeting and the Dowlais Branch
3
built its own Irish Club. The first edition of the new 
Irish Exile (March 1921) produced by the London District 
of the League reported encouraging signs of growth through­
out the London area. The Walworth Branch had doubled its 
membership, to one hundred and twenty members, since the 
beginning of 1921. Fulham's membership had increased from 
sixty four, in May 1920, to three hundred and fifty. The 
Central London Number Four Branch was reported as having 
two hundred and fifty members. Southwark, Balham and 
Battersea had three hundred and forty, two hundred and 
five and one hundred and twenty members, respectively.
The Poplar Branch with four hundred members had the largest 
recorded membership but Forrest Gate with over three
1 Catholic Herald, 12 Mar., 1921.
2 Ibid., 5 Feb., 1921.
3 Ibid., 26 Mar., 1921.
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hundred and twenty members reported that: "it is not yet 
fully representative of the Irish population of the dis­
trict".^ The Peckham Branch decided to appoint a "can­
vassing committee to go through the local register (the 
report does not specify whether this was an electoral roll
or some other directory) and call upon all Irish residents
2and invite them to join the Branch".
The growth of offensive IRA operations in Britain had 
resulted in many Irish Self Determination League branches 
being denied the use of local halls: "Since last November
3
it was almost impossible to secure halls for our meetings".
This report by the Central London Branch was echoed by
the Forrest Gate, Wood Green arid Canning Town branches.
The central direction of the League was impeded by the
actions of the authorities who withheld; mail, from :the
4branches to the head office and frequently raided the
premises. The League officers however glossbd over these
difficulties with a stirring appeal to
"fill up the ranks and show the Government that 
they more they fill Ballykinlar (an Irish intern­
ment camp to which League officials were deported), 
the more they fill the Irish Self Determination 
League".5
1 Irish Exile, March, 1921.
2 Irish Exile, March, 1921.
3 Ibid.
4 See a large file of correspondence from Art O'Brien to 
the Post Office complaining that his mail was being 
delivered days late, if at all; O'Brien, Ms 8427.
5 Irish Exile, March, 1921.
266
"By the spring of 1921 an influential body of political,
ir
intellectual and ecclesiastical opinion was ranged against 
the conduct of Government policy in Ireland".’*' The 
British Government had lost the all important propaganda 
battle in Britain and the ramifications of this defeat 
extended to the British Army in Ireland where the GOC rep­
orted his, "Soldiers (were) disillusioned by propaganda
2
in Britain, meetings and House of Commons debates". The 
hard line advocate of crushing Republicanism by military 
means, Sir Henry Wilson, (Chief of Imperial General Staff) 
confessed his reservations about the wholesale imposition 
of Martial law to all Ireland: "unless England was on our 
side, we would fail, and if we failed, we would break the
3
army". With the exception of small ineffective pro-unionist
4organizations like the Truth About Ireland League the 
Government had few public defenders, a situation which 
one commentator ascribed to the fear of inviting attacks
5
by the IRA in Britain. Lloyd George's harsh military 
policy had been intended to restore sufficient order to 
permit elections to be held in Ireland. But according
1 Quoted By Boyce, op. cit., 81.
2 GOC Ireland Weekly report, 23 May, 1921. CP 2965,
CAB 24/123.
3 Quoted in C.E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. 
His Life and Diaries, (1927), Vol. 2, 295.
4 They confined their efforts primarily, to showing films 
on 'Sinn Fein atrocities1 to selected audiences - 
people were asked to send "their visiting cards and 
five shillings for a ticket", Times, 22 June, 1921.
5 See Richard Dawson, 'Weekly Reports', 18 April, 1921.
D 989, 5/16 (Belfast PRO).
6 For the British policy in Ireland see C. Townsend,
contd.
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to his Cabinet secretary,
"March (1921) proved to be the worst month for 
murder - intimidation and attacks on the Royal 
Irish Constabulary were extended to England11.!
The Cabinet's intelligence advisor also gloomily reported
that in Ireland: "it cannot be conscientiously said that
any headway has been made against the IRA and there is a
2
feeling among the people that Sinn Fein will win". The 
army, however, still expressed its confidence that it could
3
still win a military victory and embarked on a new policy 
of executing all rebels taken in arms.
The Irish Exile reported the growing list of executions 
under the banner headline "They died for Ireland. Execu-
4
tion of Prisoners of War". The mother of one of the men 
executed, Thomas Whelan, a former 1917 Frognach camp 
internee, was presented with a crucifix from Hammersmith 
Catholics which was brought by a girl dressed in Republican
5
colours to Archbishop Mannix for his blessing. Thomas 
Whelan was executed for his involvement in the shooting of 
fourteen British Intelligence officers in Dublin
op. cit., J.M. Curran, 'Lloyd George and the Irish 
Settlement 1921-1922' , Eire-Ireland, 7 (1972) , 14-46, 
and Tom Bowden, ’The Irish Underground and the War of 
Independence, 1919-21', Journal of Contemporarv History, 
8, no. 3 (1973), 3-23.   ■-------
1 T. Jones, op. cit., 53.
2 ROR 100, 7 April, 1921. CP 2811, CAB 24/122.
3 GOC Ireland report, 12 April, 1921, CP 2826, CAB 24/122
4 Irish Exile, May, 1921.
5 Ibid.
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(November 11, 1920) and Archbishop Mannix's gesture could 
have been interpreted by many in Britain as an expression 
of support for the actions which had led Whelan to the 
scaffold. Whelan's execution along with five other men 
aroused strong feelings of opposition in the Irish commu­
nity in Britain. The Irish Nationalist Party members 
of the Liverpool City Council convened a special meeting 
on the eve of the executions to denounce the "barbaric 
policy of the Government" and declared that the men's 
"only crime is that of striving for the freedom of their 
own country".’*' The Southwark League Branch officers 
were received by Dr Mannix and Bishops Fogarty and Cotter 
when they presented the Archbishop with an illuminated
address, made by a local nun., in recognition of Dr Mannix's
2
services to the Irish Self Determination League. Over 
three hundred ecclesiastics attended a farewell dinner 
for Archbishop Mannix and his departure from London was 
turned into a striking manifestation of the strength of 
the Irish Separatist Movement in England:
“Distinguished members of the Irish and English 
Hierarchy, Irish priests and thousands of Irish 
residents in London, assembled at Victoria Station 
to wish God speed to His Grace, who was deeply 
affected by the touching and impressive demons­
tration so peculiarly Irish in character. Repub­
lican colours were much in evidence and one of the 
most remarkable features of the send off was the 
singing of the 'Soldiers Song" which the Archbishop, 
Bishops, priests and laymen honoured by uncovering 
their heads".3
1 Catholic Herald, 19 March, 1921.
2 • Irish Exile, June, 1921.
3 Ibid 1 and see Catholic Herald, 14 May, 1921.
Archbishop Mannix returned to ..Australia via Rome where 
he performed one more valuable service to the Irish 
cause by persuading the Pope to make a public donation to 
the White Cross Fund accompanied by a letter he had draf­
ted for the pontiff.’* The Irish Self Determination League 
must have regretted losing the valuable services of their 
most effective propagandist/Who had spearheaded their 
recruitment drive in the old United Irish League strong­
holds in Lancashire and Yorkshire,with such success that 
the Blackburn Branch had now five hundred members and had 
collected over three hundred and fifty pounds in under a
year, while the Bolton Branch had formed a Gaelic Athletic
2Association club. The Swansea No. 13 Branch had collected
3
over six hundred pounds since July 1920, and the four 
hundred and seventy members in Poplar had raised three
4
hundred and seventy pounds. A bazaar held by the Fulham 
League Branch in the local town hall and opened by the 
Mayor and Mayoress of the Borough raised over a hundred
5
pounds. Almost the only area in the Irish Self Deter­
mination League to report a decline in membership during 
April 1921 was Wigan where "over two hundred young men 
of the district had returned to Ireland owing to the
1 See D. Keogh, Irish Times, 12 Feb., 1981 and Catholic 
Herald, 23 April and 21 May, 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 23 April, 1921.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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coal trouble."^
The leadership of the League endeavoured to maintain its 
political isolationist stance stressing that its proposed 
May Day "demonstration is entirely distinct from any other
2
gathering which may be held in Hyde Park on the same day".
3
Over seven thousand people attended the League rally, and 
the Peckham Branch refused an invitation to particpate
4
in a Labour Party meeting on Ireland on the same day. The 
Standing Committee, at its May meeting, in a move designed 
to isolate further the Ldague from other political influ­
ences decided that
"propagandist literature issued by branches shall be 
subject to the approval of the District Committee 
and that propagandist literature issued by the 
District Committee shall be subject to the censor­
ship of the Executive Council".*
Some of the League leaders were concerned that several
branches had sent delegates to a Communist organized con- 
£
ference. The Standing Committee also decided, "to render 
all and every assistance to any Irish subjects imprisoned 
for political offences in Great Britain and Ireland", and
1 Catholic Herald, 25 April, 1921.
2 Irish Exile, April, 1921.
3 Catholic Herald, 23 April, 1921.
4 Irish Exile, April, 1921.
5 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
6 The Northern Section of the British Bureau of the Red 
International of Trade Unions (Profintern) had a con­
ference on March 5, 1921 at which several League branch 
delegates were present ref. ROR 96, 10 March, 1921.
CP 2698, CAB 24/120.
to "assume responsibility f or legal defence fees, of the 
twenty one Irishmen in Manchester arrested and on remand, 
on Treason Felony charges".1 This decision had consid­
erable political implications for the League, which fol­
lowing the deportation of the Irish Exile editor (Fintan
Murphy) had challenged the police to show even the sligh-
2
test link between the League and the IRA. The Manchester
arrests had occurred following a weekend which had started
with a wholesale series of major arson incidents in the
city and concluded in a late night shooting encounter at
the Erskine St* Club (an Irish Self Determination League
Branch meeting place) which left one IRA volunteer dead
and another along with three police officers, wounded.
Twelve pistols, grenades and a considerable quantity of
explosives were found in the club where all the twenty one
3
men had been arrested.
The arrested, in the opinion of many, could only be des­
cribed as being charged with 'political offences' if one 
believed that setting fire to seven buildings and shooting 
at the police was a political action. Several League 
members were deported in May 1921 following a series of 
armed attacks on the relatives of RIC members living in 
London which resulted in one fatality. The Cabinet were 
informed that as a result of the police raids and arrests,
1 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
2 Ibid.
3 ROR 100, 7 April, 1921, CP 2811, CAB 24/123.
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"Irish people who have hitherto been outspoken in their 
sympathy for Sinn Fein have become reticent".^ But 
the Very Rev. D.O'Meara (administrator of Southwark Cathe­
dral) wrote to the press condemning their attributions of 
the arson incidents to Sinn Fein stating that: "that kind
of thing is apt to lead to condemnation of what is itself
2a perfectly legitimate and good movement". There were
few branch reports in the April edition of the Irish
Exile, the copy having being seized in a police raid but
the new London organizer, Councillor Purcell reported the
next month that new branches had recently been formed in
Kennington, Finsbury, Shepherds Bush, Charlton and that
fourteen other branches were in the course of formation
3
throughout London. The Stepney Branch, founded in 
June 1920, had now almost two hundred and fifty members.^ 
At a meeting of two hundred members of the Forrest Gate 
Branch twenty five pounds was collected for the 'Derry
5
Election Fund'.
The June 1921 issue of the Irish Exile appeared with the 
banner headline: "The Great Republican Victory". Its 
victory context was, that despite dozens of raids, which 
had resulted in the deportation of Brian O'Kennedy (Acting
1 ROR 107, 28 May, 1921, CP 2979, CAB 24/123.
2 Irish Exile, May, 1921.
2 Irish Exile, May, 1921.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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General Secretary of the Irish Self Determination League) 
C.B. Dutton (Treasurer), Dermot O'Brien (Organizer) and 
four other officials, the League was still expanding but 
there'was a much wider context perhaps not then fully 
realized by the Trish Exile's editor. There had indeed 
been a victory, though it could not literally be described 
as a Republican victory. Under the Government of Ireland 
(1920) Act elections were held in May 1921 for the pro­
posed new Northern and Southern Irish Parliaments. In 
the North the Unionists obtained forty seats to the Nation­
alist's and Sinn Fein’s twelve but in the South, Sinn Fein 
swept the board in one hundred and twenty four consti- • 
tuencies (the other four, Trinity College seats were taken 
by the Unionists)^. Partition in Ireland had become a
virtual reality which the IRA was not strong enough to 
2
defeat. The British Cabinet had prior to the elections 
decided on a nine to five vote not to have a truce during 
them for fear of weakening their military position. On 
the day before the elections, General Macready (GOC) 
warned the Government that with the morale of his forces 
at such a low level, "unless the rebellion is effectively 
smashed by October  practically the whole of the troops
4
will have to be relieved". The day after the elections
1 Kee, op. cit.,713.
2 See Joseph Curran, 'The Consolidation of the Irish 
Revolution, 1921-23', University Review. 1(1968),
and T. Bowden, op. cit., for IRA military position in 
1921.
3 T. Jones, op. cit., 70.
4 GOC1s Weekly Report, 2 3 May, 1921, CP 2965, CAB 24/123.
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(May 25) one hundred and twenty IRA volunteers launched 
a 'Tet' style offensive. In broad daylight they burned 
the Customs House (the administrative centre of the British
1
Civil Service in Ireland) situated in the centre of Dublin.
It took almost another two months of bitter bloodshed and
fighting before a truce was arranged. The Government,
while tentatively negotiating indirectly with De Valera
2and others through its officials, still seemed to favour 
a hard line policy of declaring the South of Ireland to 
be a Crown Colony and the imposition of Martial law.
Many people were involved in the tortuous road to the 
truce so that it is difficult to single out any one indi­
vidual.
Art O'Brien given his position as Dail Eireann represen­
tative in London undoubtedly knew of the tentative peace
1 See Oscar Traynor (who led the attack), 'The Burning 
of the Custom House', in Dublin's Fighting Story , 
(Tralee,N.D), 162-8. The IRA lost five dead and eighty 
volunteers were captured but like the 'Tet Offensive' 
in Vietnam (1968) an apparent military defeat was a 
shattering pyschological victory
2 For the convoluted history of the often tortuous course
of those pre-truce overtures, see R.S. Churchill, Lord
Derby, 'king of Lancashire?-! 1959) Lord Derby was a British 
diplomat wno met D^vaieia in April. John Wheeler- 
Bennett, John Anderson( 19’620 72-7 . Anderson
was the Under Secretary, I re lane!.' C.u. Street, Ireland 
in 1921•, op. cit., (chap. 5) - Street was a Dublin 
Castle Intelligence officer. Ormonde Winter, 'Winters 
Tale , (1955), - Winter was the chief of British Intel­
ligence in Ireland. W.A. Phillips, The Revolution in 
Ireland , (1923), 204. The Diaries of Mark Sturgis,
(PRO 30/59/4). Lord Longford and T.P. O'Neill,
DeValera~ , (1970), 115-25.
3 Cabinet meeting 24 May, 1921, CAB 23/25, and a dis­
cussion document on Martial law, 27 May, 1921, CP 2483,
CAB 24/123.
proposals but there was no mention of them in either the 
June or July issues of the Irish Exile. His main efforts, 
other than countervailing the effects of the deportations, 
which had now reached the figure of twenty one, were 
devoted to preparations for the forthcoming Second Annual 
Conference of the Irish Self Determination League.
O'Brien and his supporters apparently hoped to persuade 
the Conference to modify the communications channels of 
the League in a manner that would have substantially 
weakened the influence of the branches outside London.
The Central Executive Council consisting of over seventy 
delegates from the District Committees met four times a 
year at a cost of eight hundred pounds - "clearly un- 
wieldly and expensive".^It was now proposed to create a 
much smaller Council consisting of the President, Vice 
President, Treasurer, Secretary, with ten delegates elected 
to represent the five 'Areas', into which England and 
Wales were to be divided. In effect this proposed 
Council would only have been marginally larger than the 
Standing Committee. The League would have been much more 
closely controlled by the central group of 'Politicos.' . 
in London. The ordinary branch membership would ultimately 
have had considerably less influence in the formation of 
League policy but were to be persuaded to accept the change 
by employing the emotional argument that it would reduce 
"expenses by five or six hundred pounds a year which would
1 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
276
be saved for Ireland".^
In the event this controversial proposal was never put to 
the Conference which met on the 25th of June (1921) in 
Clerkenwell Hall (London). Shortly after the Conference 
commenced a large squad of detectives accompanied by short 
hand writers entered the hall and announced their intention 
of observing the proceedings. Only routine administrative 
matters were then dealt with and there were no specific 
references to the strength of the Irish Self Determination 
League. The outgoing officers - Councillor P.J. Kelly 
(President), Art O'Brien and Hugh Lee (Vice Presidents), 
Martin Maloney and Liam McMahon (Treasurers) were re-elected 
without a contest. President Kelly in his address to the 
delegates, referred to the police presence in the hall and 
reminded them that although their first Manchester Confer­
ence was prescribed,many of their officers deported and 
their premises constantly raided, the League now had 
"upwards of three hundred branches and a membership greater
than any of the previous Irish organizations in Great 
2
Britain". Kelly reaffirmed the 'Political Isolationist' 
foundation principle of the League remarking that "Our 
attitude towards British Labour is the same today as when 
I addressed you at Manchester. Whilst grateful to British 
Labour and other English organizations for their sympathy... 
we must still maintain our attitude of complete and
1 Irish Exile, June, 1921.
2 Irish Exile, August, 1921.
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absolute independence of English organizations".^ The
bitterness of the controversy provoked by Cardinal Bourne's
Pastoral Letter resurfaced during Kelly's subsequent
remarks. He praised the attitude of the Protestant
Churches before referring to the:
"silence of the Hierarchy of the Church to which 
the majority of us belong has been totally in­
consistent with the high moral principles which 
that Church propounds... it has been a shock to 
many of us who have always looked to the Hierarchy 
of the Catholic Church for leadership when questions 
of morality and righteousness were involved, . ' 
to smite the wrong doers no matter how mighty or 
exalted. Here we have looked and looked in vain".^
The sense of alienation from many of the Hierarchy that 
pervaded these remarks was to appear in an even stronger 
form during the subsequent history of the Irish Self Deter­
mination League. Speaking of the rumours of new peace 
proposals, Kelly said "the vital factor in any measure, 
the complete control of the fiscal system is absent and
a nation which does not control its fiscal system controls 
3
nothing". Shortly after concluding the Presidential ad­
dress, Kelly was arrested and detained for two days, an 
event which provoked a number of questions in Parliament
by members of the House who believed the police action was 
4
uncalled for. “ The Conference ratified the practice 
already adopted in some areas, of naming branches after
1 Irish Exile, August, 1921.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 143H: Debs 5, Col. 2173.
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dead patriots and permitting^District Committees at the dis­
cretion of the Executive Council to make their own 
'bye'“laws’. The delegates, the next day, attended a 
large demonstration in Trafalgar Square"*" at which the pre­
sence of numerous tricolours was said by several MPs to
o
have caused "great irritation to loyal citizens". Other
MPs adopted a different stance. Several weeks prior to
this incident, in a furious debate on Ireland, Jack Jones,
who spoke at many League meetings was ordered out of the
House after referring to the Chief Secretary of Ireland
as "the Chief Assassin" and Oswald Mosley spoke of "the
organization of a murder gang under the auspices of an
3English Government". Oswald Mosley "shocked by the 
excesses of the Black and Tans crossed the floor of the
4
House". He was not the only one to desert the Government
5
benches on the issue of Ireland.
And when the Government narrowly won a vote on its Irish 
policy in the House of Lords^(normally a Government
1 Times, 27 June, 1921; The Catholic Herald 2 July, 1921
described it as the "largest Irish meeting ever seen 
in Trafalgar Square".
2 1432H2Debs. 5, Cols. 2329-31.
3 Catholic Herald, 13 June, 1921.
4 Robert Rhodes James, The British Revolution, British 
Politics (1880-1939) Volume II, From Asquith to 
Chamberlain (1914-1939), (1977), 146.
5 Other notable figures were, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord 
Henry Cavendish-Bentwick, Brigadier General Sir George 
Cockerill: see Boyce, op. cit., 63.
6 House of Lords Debater. .,Vol. 45, Cols.' 659-7 03.
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stronghold) the: ultimate arbitrator in the British poli­
tical system decided to make a rare direct political inter­
vention. The history of how King George V's rejection of 
a Government prepared speech for the opening of the new 
Northern Ireland Parliament, in favour of his own appeal 
for conciliation finally broke the Government created 
logjam of intrigue, duplicity and double-dealing and thus 
cleared the way to the establishment of a truce has been 
recorded often. But historians have seemed strangely reluc­
tant to speculate to what extent the King intervened to 
counteract, what he considered to be the mistaken policy 
of his Government. Was the undoubted direct pressure he 
exerted on his ministers’*" also accompanied by an unprece- ■ 
dented series of officially (Palace) inspired 'leaks* to
foreign newspapers making public the King's disagreement
2with his Government?
On the 24th of June, 1921, two days after the King's 
speech at Stormont, Lloyd George invited DeValera "as the
3
chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland" 
to attend a conference in London. After further discussion
1 See Sir Harold Nicolson, : King George V , (1967) , 348- 
54.. Lord George Riddle, Intimate Diary of the Peace
Conference and After1, (1933), 302. Winston Churchill,
• The Aftermath•, (1929), 294-5.
2 The story behind the New York Times headline ‘Irish
Peace Offer Ordered by the King* was intensively invest­
igated by Donald McCormick, op. cit., 192-4. His work 
cannot be regarded as forming part of the mainstream
of academic history but nevertheless offers revealing 
insights which historians have tended, for their own 
reasons, not to explore.
3 D. MacArdle, op. cit., 471.
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a meeting in the Mansion House (Dublin) on the 8th of 
July agreed to establish a truce^ to come into effect at 
midday on 11th July. The armed conflict with the British 
forces in Southern Ireland ended on the morning of 11 July 
1921 in a manner strikingly similar to its commencement 
on the 19th January 1919. The first two members of the 
British Forces to die at the hands of the IRA had been 
Catholic policemen; the last two to die were also long 
serving Catholic policemen. In between these events a
2long list of casualties (never satisfactorily counted) 
had either produced a dramatic swing in public opinion,or 
so hardened many that they had become indifferent to 
the everyday reality of violent death. Whichever of these
1 General Cecil Macjraadyj, Annals of an Active Life , 
(1929), Vol. II, 25-72. Michael Collins, 'The Path 
to Freedom , (Dublin, 1922).
2 James gives the figures of 752 Irish civilians killed 
.i.e., including IRA volunteers, civilians shot by the
British forces deliberately and by accident, civilians 
shot as 'spies' by the IRA and accidentally; killed 
and 866 wounded. His figure for British losses.is 
176 police and 54 soldiers killed, 251 police and 118 
soldiers wounded. All figures are for the period 1 Jan, 
1919 to 11 July, 1921;,James, op. cit., 149. Kee 
gives the Crown Forces casualties (British Army and 
RIC) as 525 killed and 935 wounded for the same period. 
Kee op. cit., 699. The Freemans Journal , 12 July, 
1921, claimed that 707 'civilians'had been killed and 
756 wounded between the period 1 Jan., 1919 to ll'July, 
1921. Comerford using IRA GHQ figures states that 
109 IRA volunteers and sympathetic civilians were killed 
and over 800 wounded for the period Jan., 1919 to April 
1921 - James J. Comerford, My Kilkenny IRA Days , 
(Kilkenny, 1978). James' British casuality figures are 
much lower than Kee's and his 'civilian' figures are 
also proportionately much lower than those of the 
Freeman's Journal while Comerford's statistics of 
course exclude civilians shot by the IRA as 'spies' 
whom Kee reckons as "well over a hundred", 699.
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explanations is preferred, the reactions to the first and 
last deaths were very different. For whereas the 
Soloheadbeg incident had evoked a massive outburst of 
clerical condemnation, very evident general public dis­
pleasure, disquiet among the Sinn Fein membership and even 
unease in the ranks of the IRA, there was no such reaction
to these last-minute killings,^ despite the particularly
2dubious circumstances surrounding one of them.
A fortnight prior to the Truce in accordance with Dail
3
Eireann directives, a large number of census forms were
collected from Irish residents in Liverpool and publicly : 
4burnt. Now the streets in the Irish areas were decorated
5
in Republican colours (although the IRA had been instru-
£
cted to discourage any such celebrations).
1 "Whereas the killing of Constables MacDonnell and O'Connell 
at Soloheadbeg had shocked the Irish nation , the deaths
of Sergeant King;'and:'.Constable Clarke barely chused;;.the 
flicker of an eyelid except among those who mourned them'.' 
Kee, op. cit., 717. .
2 Constable Clarke, with thirty four years service in the 
RIC, was shot dead while digging his garden in Skibbereen 
Irish Times, 12 Jan., 1921. Skibbereen was one of the 
least Republican towns in Southern Ireland. Out of a 
population of 3,000, it had a dozen Sinn Fein members 
and only four IRA volunteers (three of whom were in 
prison at the time of the truce)..Tom Barry, op. cit.,
85, was very scathing about Skibbereen's militancy or 
rather lack of it and of Clarke's death.
3 Dail Decree, 11 March, 1921, DE 2/8, forbidding Irish 
citizens from aiding the British census.
4 Times, 22 June, 1921.
5 ROR 115, 21 July, 1921, CP'3154, CAB 24/125.
6 IRA GHQ issued a directive: "Men under your command are 
not to hold celebrations. Civilians in your Brigade area 
are to be discouraged also from holding celebrations. 
Victory has not yet come to our arms". Quoted in 
Comerford, op. cit., 823.
CHAPTER 9
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Truce to Treaty: The False Dawn
From the moment the Dail delegates, De Valera, Griffith,
Barton, Stack, Childers and Plunkett disembarked at
Hollyhead^ pier (14‘ July 1921) they were greeted with f3r.-
vent enthusiasm by many of the Irish community in Britain.
One delegate,,later recalled that: "all the Irish in London
2seemed to be waiting for our train at Euston" , "thousands 
of Irishmen and women from all parts of the city and sub-
3
urbs cheered themselves hoarse" as they welcomed their 
leader to the historic meeting between the Prime Minister 
of Britain and the President of Dail Eireann at Downing St.
(14 July 1921). Contemporary photographs show row upon row of
4
Irish people kneeling outside Downing St , praying for the 
success of the negotiations that commenced inside Number 
Ten with Art O'Brien,in his capacity as the Envoy of the
5Dail Eireann, introducing the Dail delegates to Lloyd George .
The meetings of the 14th,, 15th., and the 18th. of July bet­
ween Lloyd George and De Valera amounted to little more than 
a 'sizing up' assessment process^ by the, two men, one deter­
mined to demonstrate the might of British power, the other
1 See report in the Catholic Herald, 16 July, 1921.
2 Gaughan, Austin Stack:Portrait of a Separatist op. cit., 155
3 Irish Exile, August 1921.
4 See the photograph in Calton Younger, op. cit..
5 See T. Jones, op. cit., 89.
6 See Longford, ibid., 71.
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equally determined not to be overawed by it. De Valera and
his fellow Catholic delegates, in a calculated snub to
Cardinal Bourne and Westminster Cathedral, attended Sunday
Mass in Southwark Cathedral where a large force of police
were unable to hold back the huge crowd who insisted on
carrying the delegates shoulder high from the church doors 
1
to their cars. One Catholic in London, however, did not 
share his co-religionists' jubilation at the course of 
events and Colonel Archer Shee, the Member of Parliament 
for Finsbury, showed his displeasure at the Truce and the
2negotiations by resigning the Coalition Government's Whip.
De Valera and the other delegates met the Executive Council 
and London District Committee officers of the Irish Self 
Determination League, the officers of the Roger Casement 
Sinn Fein Club, the Irish National Relief Fund and the Irish 
National Aid Fund, at a reception to assess the position
3
of the Irish organisations in Britain. Later than evening
(19th July 1921), Art O'Brien and Robert Barton were given
(by Sir Edward Greig, the Prime Minister's secretary) the
4formal proposals of the British Cabinet. Lloyd George was 
essentially offering a modified form of Dominion Home Rule 
with severe limitations on Ireland's defence policy and the 
implied acceptance of the permanency of partition. De - 
Valera rejected the proposals, which, with the exception
1 Times, 18 July, 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 23 July, 1921.
3 Irish Exile, August 1921.
4 Times, 20 July, 1921.
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of the modifications on Tariffs and Customs, were remark­
ably similar to the Treaty terms several months later and 
returned to Ireland to formulate counter proposals.
An editorial in the Irish Exile angrily rejected any form 
of partition: "Ireland will refuse to recognise the right
1of any six counties, north, east, south, west, to secede".
2
Art O'Brien was however aware that De Valera had frankly
told Lloyd George that,rather than be responsible for causing
a civil war on the issue of Irish unification he would "rat-
3
her let Northern Ireland alone" and that he was prepared 
to favourably consider dropping the claim to a 'Republic' 
and recognise the King if that would assure the peaceful
4
unification of Ireland. It is extremely unlikely that such 
an explicit editorial would have been printed in the Irish 
Exile without the knowledge of Art O'Brien who knew that 
partition had virtually been 'de facto' if not 'de jure' 
accepted by the most influential leaders in the Dail. His 
motives for permitting the publication of this editorial 
may have been to exert pressure on these Dail leaders alth­
ough! that would seem to have already become a hopeless
1 Irish Exile, August 1921.
2 See T. Jones, op. cit., 90.
3 Cabinet 60 (21), 20 July, 1921. CAB 23/26.
4 T. Jones, ibid., 90. Yet De Valera on the 13th November,
1921 was advising the Plenipotentiaries to make the 
Conference 1 break' on Ulster despite having earlier con­
veyed to Lloyd George the impression 'Ulster' was cert­
ainly not an important short term issue. See DEI/3. Acc­
ording to T.Ryle Dwyer (who is currently writing a book 
on the Treaty Negotiations) De Valera "stunned" a secret
Dail session in the summer of 1921 by conceding that par­
tition was now a reality. See Irish Press. 3 July, 1981.
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task. Or perhaps he was simply exploiting the emotive char-
1
acter of the Belfast issue. 'The Pogrom' in Belfast had
resulted in the deaths of fifteen Catholics, over a hundred
wounded and a hundred houses burnt on the day the Truce came 
2into effect and it showed no signs of abating its fury.
We have already observed that considerable sums were raised 
in Britain particularly through collections in, or outside 
churches for the relief of the 'Belfast Pogrom' and 
League branches like Wallasey,which collected forty-four
3
pounds on one Sunday m  local churches, continued to find 
that the 'Belfast Pogrom' was a very emotive cause. Art 
O'Brien may have believed that, any public diminution of the 
Irish Self Determination League's position on the unific­
ation of Ireland might have resulted in a decline in this 
fund raising.
The annual meeting of the London District Committee of the 
Irish Self Determination League was told that during the 
year the number of London branches had increased from twenty
4
three to thirty six. The Fulham Branch had now over four 
hundred members, Bermondsey had two hundred and fifty, 
Walworth had tripled its size since its formation in April 
1921 and Shepherd Bush ;, formed only in May 1921, had
1 'Pogrom' is a word with emotive connotations but it is
the term still used by Belfast Catholics to describe the
events of sixty years ago (and also of the 1969 sectarian 
onslaught).
2 Catholic Herald, 16 July, 1921 and also see reports in
DE 2/247-8.
3 Catholic Herald, 16 July, 1921.
4 Irish Exile, August 1921, and Catholic Herald, 23 July, 
1921.
already doubled its membership.^ Satisfactory progress was
reported by League branches across the country. The Mid-
Durham District Committee only formed in April 1921 had
already established eight new branches and the Durham Annual
Irish Gala organized that year by the League attracted an
2
attendance of at least ten thousand people. Altrincham
had recruited eighty four new members in two months and had
raised over two hundred and forty pounds in the last six
months while Rawtensall had raised ninety pounds in two 
3
months. The Chester League Branch after existing for seven
months without a meeting place was now permitted to use the
4
local Labour Party hall but many of its members had by now 
left the area because of the very high unemployment rate
5
in the locality. The Newport Branch collectively marched
to church for a 'Truce Communion' in aid of peace in
Ireland.^
A speaking tour by the Deputy Lord Mayor of Cork, Barry
7Egan , and Professor Stockley, a Dail deputy, on behalf 
of the Irish Self Determination League attracted large
1 Irish Exile, August 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 6 August, 1921.
3 Catholic Herald, 23 July, 1921.
4 Catholic Herald, 2.July, 1921.
5 Ibid., 23 July, 1921.
6 Ibid..
7 See Daniel Corkery, 'Professor W.F.P. Stockley, 1859-
1943', Capuchin Annual, (1947), 257-67 . Stockley insti­
tuted libel proceedings against the Daily Mail on their 
MacSwiney coverage - DE 2/80.
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crowds in Manchester. The hall which held three thousand
proved totally inadequate and a large outdoor overflow meet-
1
xng had to be held sxmultaneously. The London District
Committee of the League held a conference of branch officers
to counteract the growing pressures of the British Press
and formerly sympathetic organizations like the Peace with 
2Ireland Councxl that Ireland must accept Dominion status.
The officers were instructed that the League's fundamental
principle, that "Ireland has precisely the same right to
3freedom as England herself", should be constantly asserted 
at meetings. Branches were recommended to approach all the 
Irish residents in their area and personally exhort them 
to join the League. Organizational isolationism was reaff­
irmed, members were to be kept in a "purely Irish atmosphere" 
but the key instruction was that the League membership should see 
the Truce merely as a "temporary measure and prepare for
4
a new struggle". The Irish Self Determination League lead­
ership were not the only ones who apparently thought that 
the Dail Executive would reject outright the Dominion status 
proposal and that the Truce would be terminated. The War 
Office drew up its plans to renew the conflict-These invo­
lved a massive expansion of prison accommodation in
5
Brxtaxn and the IRA stepped up their arms purchases in
6Britain while losing a volunteer when a Greenwich bomb
1 Catholic Herald, 16 July, 1921.
2 See Boyce, op. cit., 147.
3 Irish Exile, August 1921.
4 Irish Exile, August 1921.
5 See War Office 'Preparations for renewed War in Ireland',
20 July 1921 CP 3164/CAB 24/126.
6 ROR 115, 21 July, 1921, CP 3154, CAB 24/126.
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factory exploded.^
The introduction of the Truce did not see the end of Repub­
lican trials in Britain. In the week that followed, eighteen
men were sentenced in Manchester to terms of imprisonment
2
from three to fifteen years. In Glasgow many thousands
and "an avenue of Sinn Fein flags" welcomed Father MacRory
back to his presbytery after he was acquitted of the death
3of a policeman in the attempted seizure of a prisonvan,
and he was subsequently presented with a gold chalice and
4a large cheque from his panshoners» A potentially serious
conflict.between Church and State in Australia was averted
when the Commonwealth Government, in deference to the Truce,
announced that it would not now compel Archbishop Mannix
to take the oath of allegiance as a precondition of his
5return to Australia.
The Dail Cabinet's rejection of the British proposals, sub­
sequently ratified by the new Second Dail, were conveyed, 
by hand, to the British Government by Art O'Brien, Robert 
Barton and Joseph McGrath on August 11th., 1921^ But Art 
O'Brien, who did most of the talking, refused to regard the
1 Michael Mclnerney was killed on the 28th. July, 1921,
see ROR 124, 22 September, .1921, CP 3333, CAB 24/127 and
Catholic Herald, 13 August, 1921.
2 Times, 15 August, 1921.
3 Catholic Herald, 30 July, 1921.
4 Ibid., 12 November, 1921.
5 Ibid., 6 August, 1921.
6 Calton Younger, op. cit., 157; Jones, op. cit., 95;
Longford, op. cit., 76
situation as critical and said that "all negotiations require 
plenty of time".'*' Art O'Brien's comments on this occasion 
might be simply dismissed as diplomatic small talk but the 
next day in an interview with Tom Jones (Lloyd George's 
secretary and confidant), O'Brien further elaborated on the 
reply from De Valera and his Cabinet. The reply, O'Brien 
maintained, should merely be regarded as a step in the nego­
tiations intended to educate the British people as to what 
Sinn Fein stood for.' "He went on to'say that we could 
offer nominal 'Independence' to Ireland as we had done in 
Egypt/ putting it in the first clause of the Treaty, so as
to speak and taking it away piecemeal in the rest of the 
2
clauses". It is inconceivable that on such a fundamental 
issue as Ireland's relationship to Britain that O'Brien 
could have been expressing a purely personal position, cer­
tainly not to the personal advisor of Lloyd George,nor could 
his remarks simply be described as amplifying De Valera's
letter. De Valera's reply referring to "amicable but abso-
3
lute separation" had little in common with O'Brien's sugg­
estions . .So the question then arises was this letter a 
personal reply of De Valera's or a compromise proposal coll­
ectively written by a cabinet.divided on the issue of the 
acceptance or rejection of Dominion status and Partition?
1 Jones, op. cit., 96.
2 Jones, ibid., 96-7.
3 For the full reply see Proposals of HM Government for 
an Irish Settlement, Letter number II, 10 August, 1921, 
Cmd. 1502, (1921).
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Whether De Valera, the previous month had informed Field
Marshal Smuts that he was prepared to accept Dominion sta-
1tu.s is open to question but he certainly admitted, priv-
2ately, "that a Republic was out of the question" and he 
devoted much time during July 1921 to formulating the con-
3
cept of Ireland's 'External Association' to the British 
Empire,as a means of getting out of the "strait jacket of
4
the Republic" , while retaining the support of the committed
Rspublicans in the Dail Cabinet. The recognised standard
account of the negotiations, that took place between July-
December 1921 (Longford's), does not refer to the visit that
Art O'Brien made to Dublin and the long discussion that he
5had with De Valera at the end of July. If De Valera wan­
ted discreetly to let Lloyd George know that a protracted 
period would be required to bring some of his Cabinet around 
to his position, then Art O'Brien was a more suitable mess­
enger than Robert Barton, who had spent most of 1920 and 
1921 in Portland Prison, or Joseph McGrath, then regarded 
as a rather junior figure. O'Brien's references to the 
envisaged protracted nature of the negotiations and his 
emphasis on the importance of 'Symbols1 to the Dail set the 
tone of the ensuing correspondence between De Valera and
1 Nicholson, op. cit., 356.
2 Forrester, op. cit., 196.
3 Longford and O'Neill op.cit., 139.
4 O'Hegarty, op. cit., 87.
5 See report in the Times, 1 August, 1921.
1Lloyd George. In the sixteen letters and telegrams that 
were exchanged between the two leaders during the next two 
months, De Valera sought to extract recognition from Lloyd 
George of Ireland’s sovereignty,while the British Prime 
Minister endeavoured to make Ireland's recognition of the 
fundamental indissolubility of the link with the Empire, 
a precondition to any conference to negotiate the future 
relationship of the two countries. At a point in time when 
it seemed that the proposed conference would never take place, 
owing to Lloyd George's emphasis on the question of allegi­
ance to the Crown as a precondition to negotiations, the
Crown itself intervened and its pressure together with majo-
. . . . 2rity opinion m  the British Cabinet proved sufficiently
strong to be a moderating influence on Lloyd George's pre­
viously intransigent stance.
On the 29th. September, 1921 he invited De Valera to attend 
a conference for the purpose of "ascertaining how the asso­
ciation of Ireland with the Community of Nations known as
the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish National 
3aspirations". De Valera immediately accepted the invita­
tion which in referring to him as "spokesman of the people
1 See Cmd. 1502, op. cit., and Further correspondence, Cmd. 
1539 (1921); Official Correspondence Relating to the 
Peace Negotiations: June - September 1921 (Dail Eireann).
2 Rowland, op. cit., 551.
3 Cmd. 1539 (letter, 29 September, 1921).
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whom you represent" certainly did not recognize the exist­
ence of an Irish Republic or even an independent state,* and 
so by accepting this invitation De Valera tacitly agreed, 
in the opinion of many, particularly the British people, 
that Ireland was none of these things. If Art O'Brien informed 
any of the other Irish Self Determination League leaders 
about De Valera's real strategy, the news certainly did not 
percolate downwards to the rank and file membership. The 
Irish Exile scornfully dismissed the British 'Dominion
Status' proposals as a "ridiculous claim" and carried seve-
1
ral detailed articles refuting their specific clauses.
The Catholic Herald.which only a few weeks previously had
2stridently proclaimed its Republicanism, now however dec­
lared that it had no counsel to offer the Irish people,
"they must take the responsibility of accepting or rejecting
3the English proposals". These proposals were described
4
as "a gross insult which could never be accepted" by
Father McNiff, the President of the Moorthorpe Branch while
Morton O'Connor, a barrister of the Inner Temple, told a
large Poplar League meeting that they should: "be prepared
to fight on for another twenty five years rather than accept
5any humiliating measure from the English Government".
The October meeting of the Standing Committee of the League
1 Irish Exile, September 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 2 July, 1921.
3 Ibid., 13 August, 1921.
4 Ibid., 27 August, 1921.
5 Irish Exile, August, 1921.
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was informed that during the past year over seven thousand 
and six hundred pounds had been sent to the various relief 
and election funds in Ireland.'*' This donation from central 
head office funds excluded the contributions that many bran­
ches sent individually to Ireland. The Rochdale Branch had
raised six hundred pounds in a year, mostly from church door 
2
collections. One such collection had yielded thirty six
3
pounds for the Darwen Branch and a house to house collec-
4
tion by the Wigan Branch had raised forty seven pounds.
In Newport the branch had now become so large that a second
5
one was being formed. The new Bow and Bromley Branch elec­
ted Major Hogan (a former RAMC officer) as its President, 
in continuance of the practice of selecting a ’local worthy1 
for such a position.^ The Leeds League Branch President,
Dr. Wiseman was given a Republican funeral and his tricol­
oured coffin carried through the streets followed by a large 
7
crowd , while the Richmond Branch charted a river steamer
o
complete with tricolour flag for a trip down the Thames.
The Chorley Branch now had two hundred and ninety members
9
while Southampton had passed the hundred and twenty mark.
1 Catholic Herald, 15 October, 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 10 September, 1921.
3 Ibid., 17 September, 1921.
4 Ibid..
5 Ibid., 8 October, 1921.
6 Ibid., 17 September, 1921.
7 Ibid., 23 July, 1921.
8 Irish Exile, September 1921.
9 Ibid..
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The London Branches organized a series of well attended
1
local meetings, to reject the Dominion proposals, while
the Hull Branch trained its members as "orators"to inform
2the English people on Ireland's rights. The Standing Com­
mittee, in contrast to its previous policy of increasing the 
influence of the central leadership over the local branches,
decided not to intervene in a dispute over the boundaries
3of the Lancashire District Committees.
Another decision by the Standing Committee proved to be 
more controversial. It proposed that from the November 1921 
issue, the Irish Exile, hitherto the publication of the 
London District Committee, was to become the responsibility 
of the central organization and the national publication 
of the League. Some branches rejected this proposal. Wigan
4
declared that it would be "an unnecessary expense" as there
were already papers like the Catholic Herald and the Self
Determinator adequately covering the League's activities.
The Liverpool No. 1 Branch bluntly declared that they would
not sell the new publication, preferring the established
5
local Sinn Fein paper, the Self Determinator. No discip­
linary action was taken against the branches and others who 
followed suit. The Irish Self Determination League leaders 
realized that the price of the rapid expansion of the
1 Catholic Herald, 24 September, 1921, and Irish Exile, 
September, 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 17 September, 1921.
3 Ibid., 15 October, 1921.
4 Ibid., 10 September, 1921.
5 Ibid., 1 October, 1921.
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League and its nationwide branch coverage involved a degree 
of local autonomy,with periodic manifestations of branches' 
determination only to accept central authority when they 
chose so. The Irish Exile episode was the forerunner of 
a slowly emerging tendency towards the political decentral­
ization of the League that gradually emerged during the 
uncertainties of the Truce period and gathered momentum when 
the Treaty was signed.
The Irish Self Determination League was deprived for over
a month, of the services of some of its most active local
leaders in London when Alderman Scurr, his wife, Councillors
O'Callaghan and Kelly were sent to prison, saying "It will
be an honour to find myself within the walls of Brixton,
1
where Terence MacSwiney was martyred"; when the entire 
Poplar Council was jailed for refusing to pay the police 
rate precept. The League leadership were also somewhat emb­
arrassed when Michael Hickey was killed at work in the 
Woolwich Arsenal while trying, illictly, to remove explos­
ives from shells. He, his wife and son were all members
2
of the local branch, but much greater embarrassment was 
to follow the next month.
The arrival of the Irish delegates, on the 8th. October,
1921, for the twice postponed conference was once again a 
major occasion for the Irish in London. The delegates were 
met by a pipe band and large crowds at Euston:
1 Catholic Herald, 10 September, 1921; ROR 123, 15 September 
1921, CP 3309, CAB 24/128.
2 ROR 124, 22 September, 1921, CP 3333, CAB 24/127 .
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"it seemed to the delegates that every Irish man and 
woman in London.'had come there to call a blessing upon 
their efforts anu to cheer them for their task".
Hymn singing crowds assembled outside Downing Street for
2the first session of the conference. This time De Valera
was not present, having argued that his dual position as
head of State and Government necessitated his remaining in 
3
Dublin. Collins, Griffiths, Barton, Duggan and Duffy who 
though given the title of plenipotentiaries were required
to obtain the approval of the full Dail Cabinet before sign-
4 .m g  any agreement, faced an uphill task m  trying to pre­
serve the Irish Republic: for British opinion was virtually 
unanimous that Ireland must recognize the Crown and remain 
within the Empire. The hitherto sympathetic Times declared 
that Ireland "must understand that there can be no settle­
ment of the Irish problem except on these conditions - Crown
5
Commonwealth and Strategic Safety of the British Isles" 
and on this occasion the Times was speaking not only for 
the Conservative and Liberal parties but also for the Labour
•0  4- 6Party.
1 Macardle, op. cit., 485 and see the detailed reports in 
the Times, 8 , 10 October, 1921.
2 Times, 12 October, 1921.
3 A Dail Cabinet meeting of 27 July, 1921 decided that 
President De Valera should not take part in the Conference 
- DE 1/3.
4 Longford, op. cit., 88.
5 Times, 31 October, 1921.
6 Arthur Henderson described total independence for Ireland 
as "simply fantastic nonsense", Times, 8 August, 1921
and Clynes urged the "recognition of Irish Nationhood 
within the Empire", Catholic Herald, 29 October, ,1921.
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The course of the two month long negotiations has been reas-
1
onably adequately charted by the participants, and onlook—
2
.ers, described by those who subsequently interviewed the
3 4negotiators and analyzed by historians who have consulted
5
the official records, so that we shall not concern our­
selves here with the details, save where they intrude on 
the position of the Irish in Britain in general and the Irish 
Self Determination League in particular. Lloyd George com­
menced the Sixth Plenary Session (October 21st., 1921) by 
gravely informing the delegates that a "serious conspiracy" 
to send arms to Ireland and perhaps even cause explosions 
in Britain itself had been discovered and that some of the
1 Sir Charles Petrie, Life and Letters of Sir Austen 
Chamberlain (2 vols, 1939-40); Winston Churchill, The 
Aftermath, op. cit.. None of the Irish negotiators sub­
sequently recorded their experiences; most were dead 
within a year of the negotiations.
2. T. Jones, op. cit., and Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let 
Candles be Brought (1949) were both British civil ser­
vants. On the Irish side, two junior aides of the nego­
tiators have preserved, or written, their recollections; 
see Kathleen•Napoli McKenna 'In London with the Treaty 
Delegates, Personal Recollections1, Capuchin Annual 38 
(1971) 313-32 and the Lily O'Brennan Papers, ;P 13/2 (UCD).
3 Longford, op. cit., and Frank Gallagher, The Anglo-Irish 
Treaty (1965).
4 Boyce, op. cit., Calton Younger, op. cit., and J.M.
Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State 1921-23 
(Alabama, 1980).
5 The main Irish official records of the Treaty negotia­
tions are contained in the DE 2/304; 1 to 8, DE 2/302 
and DEI/3 files. Some other documents are summarized 
in A Draft History of Negotiations for the Treaty,
56295 (SPO). Erskine Childers', 'Treaty Papers', are 
currently being catalogued by Trinity College, Dublin, 
who have received a collection of his personal papers.
Most of the British papers are in the CAB 23 series.
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1
arrested were "in communication with high Irish officials".
He was referring to the discovery of an extensive arms pro-
2
curement network m  South Wales and the subsequent arrest
3
of ten people , all of whom were members of the Irish Self
4
Determination League. The South Wales organizer of the
League, J.P. Connolly, was found to have twenty seven wea-
5pons hidden m  his lodgings, and more arms and explosives
were discovered in the possession of Gilbert Barrington and
6Richard Purcell the two League organizers on the Tynesids 
Art O'Brien, who had been appointed to one of the negotia-
7
tion's sub committees, was considerably embarrassed by the 
arrest of men known to have close connections with him,part­
icularly as only a few weeks previously he had approached
Lloyd George's secretary to have Sean McGrath and C.B. Dutton
8released from their internment camps. The Home Secretary, 
rather strangely refused to make an official statement on
9
the 'Irish Self Determination League conspiracy in Britain'. 
An even more flagrant breach of the Truce was to follow the
1 Longford, op. cit., 138; Calton Younger, op. cit., 176;
T.Jones, op.cit., 145.
2 ROR 128, 20 October 1921, CP 3436, CAB 24/129; ROR 127,
14 October 1921, CP 3408, CAB 24/129.
3 Times, 15, 27 and 29 October, 1921.
4 ROR 129, 27 October, 1921, CP 3451, CAB 24/129.
5 Catholic Herald, 22 October, 1921.
6 ROR 129, ibid..
7 MacArdle, op cit., 493.
8 T. Jones, op. cit., 117.
9 147 HC Debs. 5, Col. 1062.
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next month, when raids on Windsor and Chelsea Army Barracks
on successive nights yielded six machine guns and fourteen 
1
rifles for the IRA. Once again, the British Cabinet were 
informed that, with the exception of the decorated and woun­
ded veteran Sergeant Roche, all involved were members of
the Irish Self Determination League and were mostly London
2
branch officers. These incidents undoubtedly had an effect 
on the negotiations and rather interestingly it was at app­
roximately these periods that IRA units in Ireland were 
mobilized and informed that the Truce was about to break 
down.^
Scotland Yard in an earlier public statement had referred 
to a definite link between the leaders of the Irish Self
4
Determination League and IRA activities in Britain. Now 
following the arrests in South Wales a Catholic Herald edi­
torial called on the League to organizationally dissociate
5
itself from such activites and this demand was publicly
6supported by some individual League members. The Catholic 
Herald was not at this point of time prepared openly to cri­
ticize the IRA, who had not publicly accepted responsibility 
for these incidents, but its editor, Charles Diamond, saw 
an opportunity of using these episodes to attack the League's 
leadership. He had, in the past, often attacked the various
1 Times, 23 and 24 November, 1921.
2 ROR 132, CP 5090, CAB 24/131.
3 Comerford, op. cit., 857.
4 Times, 18 June, 1921.
5 Catholic Herald 5, 19 November, 1921.
6 Ibid., 12 November, 1921.
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Irish organisations in Britain by implying that they were 
permeated by agents provocateurs" who would be responsible 
for leading many members into prison. Diamond implied that 
the League members who had been arrested had been betrayed 
by wspies" within the leadership but while not supporting 
their actions he was prepared for the sake of their depend­
ents to make a donation of fifty pounds to a "properly con­
trolled fund", a not very subtle reference to his previous 
allegations that the League leaders were misusing organi­
zational funds.^
One event on the security scene that did meet with the app­
roval of most of the League membership was the sudden dis­
missal of Sir Basil Thomson who,as the Assistant Scotland 
Yard Commissioner in charge of the Home Office Intelligence 
Department, had proved to be a most efficient foe of the 
Irish Separatist Movement in Britain. Thomson was ostens­
ibly dismissed for his handling of an Irish inspired breech
2of security at Lloyd George's Chequers residence but the
real reason was that his knowledge of the Prime Minister's
3business liaisons had become politically embarrassing. 
Despite Art O'Brien's membership of the Irish negotiating
1 Catholic Herald, 3 December, 1921.
2 Sir Basil Thomson had decided that four Irish young men 
had painted 'Up Sinn Fein' on a wall as a '‘laugh" with­
out any political motivation and so he let them go - 
Basil Thomson The Scene Changes, op. cit..153.
3 Thomson had discovered that the arms dealer Sir Basil
Zaharoff was, with the knowledge of Lloyd George, end­
eavouring to divert munitions intended for the White 
Russians to Greece for the purpose of attacking Turkey 
- MacCormick, op. cit., 208-9.
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team, the membership of the League were given little factual 
information as to the progress of the conference though from 
the November issue of the Irish Exile a special 'Irish 
Bulletin1 section to counteract the British Press was inc­
luded. Over ten thousand people packed the Albert Hall for
a reception organized by the ISDL for the Dail Eireann 
1
delegates. Art O'Brien,who introduced the delegates to 
the huge audience stressed that, it was a "social not a pol­
itical occasion" and that none of the delegates could make
2any comment on the progress of the conference. The pre­
vious Sunday well over twenty thousand people had crowded 
into Trafalgar Square to attend the League's Terence 
MacSwiney Commemoration, an audience so large that three
3
separate platforms of speakers were necessary. Five hund­
red members of the Preston Branch marched to a MacSwiney
4Commemoration Mass, while at Wigan Father Madden referred
5to "honouring these heroes, Catholic and Irish" at a High
Mass for MacSwiney and Kevin Barry - executed for an armed
attack which resulted in the death of a British soldier.
The Parish Priest however refused the Chorley Branch's re-
6quest for a similar mass . Fr. 0'Shaughnessey chaired.
7
a large public League meeting at Cudworth, forty new
1 Times, 27 Oct., 1921; Catholic Herald, 29 Oct., 1921.
 ^ Irish Exile, November 1921.
3 Catholic Herald, 24 Oct., 1921; Irish Exile, November, 
1921.
4 Catholic Herald, 5 Nov., 1921.
*
5 Ibid., 12 Nov., 1921.
6 Ibid., 29 Oct., 1921.
7 Ibid., 3 Dec., 1921.
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members joined the Stepney Branch after a meeting addressed
1
by Jack Jones MP / while the Oldham No. 7 Branch gained forty
2
recruits after a whist drive. Swansea reported that its
3
"branch register now holds seven hundred names", though 
there is some doubt whether all of these were actually paid 
up members. Elsewhere in Wales the Cardiff No. 7 Branch 
recorded an increase of seventy eight members in under two
4
months. The newly formed Hunslet Branch in Yorkshire rep-
5
orted a membership of one hundred and seventy eight.
Rochdale now had over three hundred and fifty members and 
Halifax nearly five hundred and fifty.^
The other Irish organizations also reported very satisfac­
tory progress during the month of November 1921. The Roger 
Casement Sinn Fein Club (London) referred to a "rapidly inc­
reasing membership which proves the genuine awakeness of
7
national consciousness" and the Gaelic League in London
reported that: "enthusiasm for the learning of Irish is
8extraordinarily keen this year41 . Some of the congregation 
at a Clerkenwell church were no doubt bemused when the res­
ponses at evening devotions were led in Irish by children
1 Catholic ?Herald, 19 Nov., 1921.
2 Ibid., 12 Nov., 1921; Irish Exile, November 1921.
3 Ibid., November 1921.
4 Ibid..
5 Catholic Herald, 12 Nov., 1921.
6 Irish Exile, December 1921.
7 Irish Exile, NOv. 1921.
8 Ibid..
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from a Gaelic League class.'*'
To a certain extent there was a sense of unreality surroun­
ding this expansion of Irish activity in Britain^for few 
in the Irish Self Determination League knew just how far 
the real political negotiations had diverged from the type 
of settlement propounded in the columns of the Irish Exile.
At Lloyd George's bidding the plenipotentiaries effectively 
excluded Art O'Brien from their counsel during the last 
critical weeks of the negotiations. Lloyd George had by 
now developed an almost pathological aversion to Art O'Brien,
"that swine, a little man neglected. Nothing is so piti-
2able as a small man trying to handle big things", but his
secretary's rather more considerate view was that "O'Brien
is more diplomatic as an Ambassador should be and it is less
3
easy to read his mind". Lloyd George's opinion of O'Brien, 
no doubt, stemmed from his inability to cajole and bully 
him in a manner similar to his treatment towards Griffith.
The failure of the plenipotentiaries to consult O'Brien on 
the crucial evening of the fifth of December 1921, when 
faced with Lloyd George's ultimatum for an immediate deci­
sion on the draft proposals, was the subject of a critical
speech in the Dail during the subsequent debate on the 
4
Treaty. The Scottish Communist MP, William Gallacher,
1 Catholic Herald, 5 Nov., 1921.
2 T. Jones, op. cit., 196.
3 Ibid., 91.
4 Dail Eireann Proceedings: Debate on the Treaty between 
Great Britain and Ireland, 21 December, 1921, 123-4.
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crossed over to Dublin to warn Rory O ’Connor (the OC IRA 
Britain) that a 'Treaty' was about to be signed,^ but it 
is not clear whether he was acting on the instructions of 
Art O'Brien or Erskine Childers, the Secretary of the 
Delegation.
At ten minutes past two o'clock on the morning of December 
the sixth 1921, the long drawn out negotiations were con­
cluded when the plenipotentiaries, in contravention of the 
requirement to obtain the Dail Cabinet approval before sign­
ing any document, signed the Articles of Agreement - hence-
2
forth known as the Treaty. Two signed reluctantly, Robert 
Barton subsequently repudiated his signature, in response
3
to Lloyd George's threat of "War within three days", the
"stigma from which the Dominion settlement of 1921 never 
4
escaped". The Treaty provided for the creation of the 
Irish Free State as a Dominion within the British Empire , 
with its final boundary in relation to Northern Ireland to 
be determined by a Boundary Commission. It was a compromise 
between members of the Conservative Party who sought to 
ensure that Northern Ireland would not be coerced into a 
Southern Irish State, Liberals who were no longer prepared
1 Irish Democrat, Sept. 1965.
2 T. Ryle Dwyer has contributed some valuable new insights 
into the proceedings of the last part of the negotiations ; 
see the Sunday Press, 6 Dec., 1981.
3 Longford, op. cit., 239.
4 Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs , Oxford University Press, (1958)153 The 'ultim­
atum' was almost certainly a bluff.
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to risk the disapproval of world opinion by coercing an
unwilling Southern Ireland into the old United Kingdom
framework of relationships;'and the representatives of the
Irish Republic who reluctantly accepted that in the face
of British intransigence the Republic could no longer be
maintained. It was a Treaty that in one form or another
effectively ended the political career of many and even in
some cases, the lives, of those who signed it. For Lloyd
George it was his "greatest achievement, but it was also
the greatest single cause of his overthrow".'*' The Morning
Post denounced it as "an abandonment and betrayal of British
2powers and British Friends m  Ireland". The Diehards in 
the Conservative Party, who had made Ireland the central 
plank in their attack on the Coalition Government, played 
a major role in the Carlton Club meeting (19th. October,
1922) that formally ended the Coalition and drove Lloyd 
George out of Government,never to hold office again. Collins 
died in a Republican ambush, Childers before a Free State 
firing squad, Griffiths of a cerebral haemorrhage/probably 
occasioned when he learnt of C o l l i n s ’ involvement in the 
killing of Field Marshal Wilson.
The political groupings that negotiated the Treaty were soon 
rent asunder. In Britain the alliance between Conservatives 
and Liberals came to an end. Sinn Fein in Ireland was split 
in two and the Irish Republican Army and the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood divided on the Treaty. The Irish Self
1 Michael Kinnear, The Fall of Lloyd George - The Political 
Crisis of 1922 (1973), 15.
2 Morning P o s t , 8 Dec., 1921.
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Determination League had organizationally demonstrated its 
compatibility with the socio-political environment of the 
Irish community in Britain prior to the Treaty but^ it did 
not necessarily follow that it would organizationally remain 
compatible with the post Treaty environment. The League 
had expanded rapidly on the deliberately ambiguous platform 
of Self Determination for Ireland, it had absorbed many 
diverse political elements from long time 'Home Rulers' of 
the United Irish League /to hard line Irish Republican 
Brotherhood members and in between a great mass of people 
swept into the organization on the.high tide of national 
sentiment. The League's organization and membership commit­
ment resembled a series of concentric circles o f •increasing
1
radius as one moved away from the centre. The Treaty was 
bitterly to divide the inner circles, the 'Politicos' in 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Fein, their active 
'Supportersand so with the centre crumbling, what gravi­
tational force was there to hold the outer circles of 'Inno­
cents' together? If the 'Politicos' and 'Supporters' soberly 
decided that acceptance of the Treaty, no matter how reluc­
tantly, was the only realistic choice, would those 'Inno­
cents' who had been mobilized by the passionate oratory of 
Archbishop Mannix decide otherwise? With 'Self Determina­
tion' secured; at least in the minds of many of the Irish 
in Britain, was there any need for the continued existence 
of the Irish Self Determination League 'and if the League 
leadership decided to campaign against the Treaty could they
1 I am employing here a modified version of a structure 
suggested in Allan Potter's Organized Groups in British 
National Politics (1961), 128.
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realistically hope to hold together this diverse coalition 
of political interests in. a new campaign that flouted the 
wishes of the majority of the Irish and British people?.
The League's success to date had been aided by the de facto 
surrender of the United Irish League in the contest for the 
political leadership of the Irish in Britain but there were 
leaders of that organization who now believed that the 
changed post Treaty environment would present them with new 
opportunities to rebuild their former influence.
The Irish Self Determination League leadership in refusing 
a leading position, on his own terms, to Charles Diamond 
had made a very formidable enemy, one who had some forty 
years experience of political infighting. The preference 
shown by some League branches for the Catholic Herald ins­
tead of the Irish Exile and their support for his call for 
close links with the Labour Party had demonstrated that 
Diamond was not without influence among the rank and file 
membership of the League. Diamond, while the struggle in 
Ireland was at its peak, had, by his own standards, been 
remarkably restrained in his attacks on the League leader­
ship. The post Treaty period was to see a very different 
attitude on the part of the Catholic Herald. The leadership 
of the Irish Self Determination League had only succeeded 
in imposing their own political strategy, tactics and views 
on the membership when they were either in accordance with 
the latter's wishes or regarded as being unimportant to them. 
The League leadership had repeatedly shown itself unwilling 
or unable to discipline branches and members who opposed 
their policies/ as in the case of Father O'Mea'ra who had
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publicly urged the Irish in Southwark to support the Labour
Party candidate in a Parliamentary by-election.^ But no
disciplinary action was taken against him despite the rule
that League members were not permitted to become involved
in Parliamentary politics. Father O'Meara was a Labour
Alderman on Southwark Council and had chaired a Trades
Council meeting to protest against the expulsion of the
2
Belfast Shipyard workers , while in his capacity as the 
Administrator of Southwark Cathedral he had convened the 
men of the parish to issue a protest to Lloyd George on his 
Irish policy.
The leadership of the League could not afford to alienate 
such an influential leader of the local Irish community and 
if that required a flexible collective blindness to such 
a flagrant breech of the League's constitution then that 
was considered a necessary evil. The history of the League 
to date however indicated that a crumbling centre could 
hardly be expected to hold a disintegrating periphery 
together.
1 Catholic Herald, 10 Dec., 1921.
2 Ibid., 19 Nov., 3 Dec., 1921.
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Part III The Cosmosociology of the ISDL
THe ISDL reached its peak with the Anglo-Irish Treaty. To 
many members the organization had apparently attained its 
goal and so they simply dropped out. Membership steadily 
declined, until the tensions generated by the Treaty erup­
ted, six months later, into full scale civil war in Ireland. 
This new conflict in Ireland irrevocably split the remain­
ing ISDL membership. And so as the Post-Treaty ISDL was 
a very different organization than the Pre-Treaty League 
it is appropriate that at this point we should depart from 
our narrative account of the ISDL to examine in some detail 
its membership during its peak period. In Chapters 10 and 
11 I shall analyze the Ecology and Socio-economic composi­
tion of the league membership. I. concluded Chapter 6 by 
observing that the role played by Sinn Fein and the Gaelic 
organizations in the formation of the ISDL and its subseq­
uent development, would be investigated in Part III and 
this aspect is dealt with in Chapter 12. I also observed 
that the isolationist/exclusivist orientation of the ISDL 
largely stemmed from dissatisfaction with the attitude of 
the British Labour Movement to Ireland and so Chapters 13 
and 14 explore their role during the Irish conflict. Finally 
as much of the preceding chapters utilize information from 
the Irish Exile it is necessary in Chapter 15 to investi­
gate the role played by the organizational publication of 
the ISDL.
310
CHAPTER 10
The Ecology^ of the ISDL
We shall now consider the geographical distribution of the 
ISDL membership and then attempt to evaluate the extent 
to which the second and third generation Irish born in ' 
England and Wales participated in the League's activities.
We shall then conclude this section by considering the 
participation, or more accurately the nonrpartidipafion 
of newly arrived emigrants.
The Geographical Distribution of the ISDL Membership
Table 1 shows that over 70% of. the ISDL membership, at its 
peak period, lived in Northern England (Lancashire, 
Yorkshire, and the North East regions). And looking at 
Table 3 we can see that almost a third of the membership 
lived in only three urban areas, Manchester, Liverpool and 
Wigan, in the Lancashire region, even though these three 
towns only contained just over a twelfth of the Irish born 
population in England and Wales. The most cursory glance 
at the percentage ratio of ISDL membership to the Irish born 
population of Wigan, Table 3, indicates that many ISDL mem­
bers in<'.thishtown were not Irish born and we shall sub­
sequently consider the participation of the non—Irish born
1 As used by Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays
in the Sociology of Politics, (Connecticut, 1974), 114.
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in more detail in the next section.
Table 1. The Geographical Distribution of the ISDL Member­
ship in 1921^
Area No. of ISDL As percentage 
members of total
Lancashire
Manchester 
Liverpool 
Wigan 
N.W. Lancs
7,465
3,349
1,582
1,372
13,768
19.3
8.6
4.1
3.5
35.5
North East
Teeside 
Tyneside 
Mid Durham
3,965
2,440
1,736
8,141
10.2
6.3
4.5
21.0
London and 
South East 6,481 16.7
Yorkshire
Bradford
Leeds
Sheffield
2,447
1,768
1,515
5,730
6.3
4.7
3.9
14.9
Wales
Swansea
Cardiff
Pontypridd
1,151
1,053
962
3,166
3.0
2.7
2.5
8.2
Midlands
Birmingham 
N. Stafford 
Notts 
Leicester
670
415
294
61
1,440
1.7 
1.1 
0. 8 
0 .1.
3.7
Engand and 
Wales 38,726
1 Compiled from membership lists in O'Brien Ms 8433.
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Table 2. ISDL Branch Membership^
Branch Number
Halifax -543
Fulham 400-
Poplar 400
Rochdale No 22 353
Southwark 340
Forrest Gate 334
Swansea 303
Burnley 300
Chorley 290
Central London 255
Bolton 251
Bermondsey 250
Stepney 249
Balham 205
Walworth 190
Pontypridd No 4 180
Altrincham 180
Ashtown in MakerfieId 144•
Haslington No 4 143
Mid Durham No 3 131
Battersea 120
Southampton 120
Swansea No 8 109
Shepherds Bush 80
Cardiff No 7 78
Oswaldcastle 64
Mid Durham No 20 48
Pontypridd No 2 40
Total 6100
Average Branch Size 218
Date attained2 
Dec. 1921 
Aug. 1921 
Mar. 1921 
Dec. 1921 
Mar. 1921 
Ibid.
Oct. 1921 
Sept. 1921 
Ibid.
May 1921 
Dec. 1921 
Aug. 1921 
May 1921 
Mar. 1921 
Aug. 1921 
Jan. 1922 
Dec. 1921 
Jan. 1922 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Mar. 1921 
Sept. 1921 
Jan. 1922 
Aug. 1921 
Nov. 1921 
Dec. 1921 
. Ibi'd.
Ibid.
1 Complied from Irish Exile branch reports
2 As given in Irish Exile of that date.
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1 2Hausknecht and Greer both, revealed a positive correlation 
between the degree of urban concentration and lower rates 
of political participation in their American studies and 
the particular case of Wigan would seem to substantiate 
their findings. It is also'noticeable, from observing 
Table 2, that outside the London and Manchester conurbations 
the larger ISDL branches tended to be found in the smaller 
towns, particularly those in the coal mining areas. It is 
not surprising that Lancashire, the traditional Irish poli­
tical stronghold in England, the parliamentary and local 
government base of the United Irish League, and the main
3
circulation area of the Catholic Herald, was also an ISDL 
stronghold. But the very disproportionate size of the ISDL 
in the region's two largest conurbations , Manchester and 
Liverpool does perhaps require some further explanation.
With 3,349 members the ISDL could hardly be described as 
a weak force in Liverpool, even if its 'Primary Density' - 
ratio of membership to its Irish born population - was 
considerably less than in London and far smaller than in 
Manchester. If the ISDL was proportionately weaker in 
Liverpool than in many of the larger towns; this was not so 
much an indication of lack of Liverpudlian interest in 
Irish affairs, as evidence of competing Irish interests.
1 Murray Hausknecht, The Joiners, (New York, 1962) , 18.
2 Scott Greer, 'Individual Participation in Mass Society', 
in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of 
Politics, (1959).
3 See HO 45. 11009/20126.
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Liverpool Republicans claimed with considerable justi­
fication that their city was the stronghold of the Irish 
Republican Movement in England and Wales. The city's
1
Sinn Fein cumanns, which raised £12,000 in 1919 alone, m
made Liverpool the foremost centre of Sinn Fein in England
and Wales. Liverpool was the centre of IRA activity, both
logistical and offensive, in Britain. Liverpool's IRA
volunteers organized a large scale seizure and burning of
2the 1921 Census forms in the city's Irish areas. These 
same areas witnessed many streets decorated in the Republican
3
colours t b  celebrate the Truce. Much of this activity, in 
particular the November 1920 large scale dockside arson, 
reinforced traditional sectarian hostility which erupted 
into serious street clashes between Protestants and 
Catholics on several occasions during'the Anglo-Irish War 
of Independence.^ And Art O'Brien's poor personal rela­
tions with Liverpool Sinn Fein undoubtedly hindered the 
growth of the ISDL in that city.
Liverpool had an Irish Nationalist MP and a strong Nation­
alist presence in its local government but the ISDL was
1 ROR 35, 23 Dec., 1919. , CP 343. CAB 24/95.
2 Times 22 June, 1921, this destruction of census forms 
was the result of a decree issued by the Dail Home 
Affairs Minister prohibiting the holding of the British 
Census in Ireland, see Dail Eireann Decrees.
3 ROR 115. 21 July, 1921. CP 3154. CAB 24/125.
4 ROR 84, 9 Nov., 1920. Special Emergency Report.
CAB 24/116, and also the Times, 4 Dec., 1920.
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relatively strong in the other UIL strongholds in 
Yorkshire and the North East regions. And here the ISDL 
also faced competition from entrenched local Irish Labour
1
Parties which refused to affiliate to the new organization.
Seamas O ’Kelly complained that the Cardiff ISDL had a
membership of "only 1200 although there were 30,000 people
2of Irish origin in Cardiff" and though this represented 
a membership/target recruitment group ratio that many a 
political organizer would have been very happy to achieve, 
a Special Branch officer also commented that "considering 
the strength of the Irish element in South Wales the ISDL
3
is not making the headway that might be expected". And 
here again the ISDL faced competition from sizeable rem­
nants of the UIL, particularly in the more isolated mining
4
villages, and its ally the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
who had relatively large membership rolls in places like 
Maestaeg (300) and Newport (280).^
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that the smallest regional ISDL 
membership was in the Midlands but the UIL was also much 
weaker here both in absolute and proportional terms. The 
ISDL was also much stronger than the UIL in the London
1 See ROR 47. 25 Mar., 1920. CP 960. CAB 24/101.
ROR 48. 30 Mar., 1920. CP 1009. CAB 24/103 and
ROR 51. 22 April, 1920. CP 1129. CAB 24/104.
2 See ROR 94. 24 Feb., 1921. CP 2631. CAB 24/120.
3 ROR 43. 26 Feb., 1920. CP 748. CAB 24/99.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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area. By 1919 the UIL had been reduced in London to only ' 
a. token -presence and in .1923 it was declared "prac­
tically d e f u n c t b y  the Special Branch who confidently and
accurately predicted that its new replacement, the Irish
2Democratic League would attract "very little interest" from 
the metropolis’ Irish population. The UIL's predecessor 
the Irish National League had initially been relatively 
well represented in London. From lists of branches re­
presented at the 1887 and 1896 Conventions, as compiled by
3
Wollaston, it is possible to build up a composite picture 
of the geographical distribution of the Irish Nationalist 
presence in Great Britain. Of the 161 branches represented 
at the 1887 Convention, 116 were located in England and 
Wales and 38 in Scotland (the location of another 7 branches 
could not be adequately identified). 38 of these English
and Welsh branches were located in the London area but at 
the 189 6 Convention, when the branch representation was 
reduced to 123, only 10 of the 95 English and Welsh, 
branches were from London. By comparison, Liverpool had 
lost only ..2 ■ branches (from 11 to 9) and Bradford (from 
4 to 7) r Manchester (from 2 to 6), Leeds (from 1 to 6) had 
all shown considerable increases despite an overall decline 
in the number of branches between the 1887 and 1896 Conven­
tions. Thompson verifies fny interpretation that the Irish 
Nationalist Movement in Britain declined at a much faster
1 ROR 192. 6 Feb . , 1923. CP 91(23). CAB 24/158.
2 ROR 208. 31 May, 1923. CP 256(23). CAB 24/160 and
ROR 228. 25 Oct., 1923. CP 430(23). CAB 24/162.
3 Wollaston, op. cit . f 241-2.
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rate in the London area than elsewhere, by observing that 
the London Irish, in the early 20th century exhibited "little 
general interest in Irish issues".^ One reason for this 
was of course the declining proportion of the Irish born 
population in England and Wales who were residents of 
the capital. In 1841, 28% of the Irish born population in 
England and Wales lived in London but 20 years later,when 
the total Irish born population had more than doubled,the
proportion living in London had declined to 18% and in the
2period 1901-21 only 14% resided in the capital. With 
almost 17% of its membership living in the London area the 
ISDL had managed to achieve a presence in depth that the 
post 1900 UIL had so evidently failed to do so.
According to Fitzpatrick,Sinn Fe'iri/hada considerably smaller 
mass organizational membership than the UIL in Ireland. He 
calculates that whereas the UIL had in 1914 enrolled 31 
people in every thousand of the Irish population, Sinn
3
Fein by comparison in 1919 only enrolled 27 per thousand.
The UIL achieved its peak membership figure of 46,000 in
4
1914. If we allow for the UIL's Scottish membership, it
1 Paul Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The 
Struggle for London 1885-1914, (1967), 27.
2 J .A. Jackson, The Irish I n  London, (Unpublished MSc 
Thesis, London (T958) , Table XIX.
3 D. Fitzpatrick, op. cit., 159.
4 Wollaston, op. cit., 77.
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is almost certain that the ISDL with its known 38,726 
members in 1921 in England and Wales was a larger organ­
ization in these two countries than the UIL at its peak. 
It was certainly a much more widely geographically distri 
buted organization.
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The Generational Composition of the ISDL Membership
Table 3 indicates that in some areas, notably Wigan, there 
was a strong non-Irish born element in the ISDL, as in 
Merthyr Vale where the local branch reported that the "Irish 
adult population of this town is about 2,000, the majority
I
of whom are children of the Irish exiles". Yet this branch
2had. a membership of 180 and a good record of activism.
Two of its members, Mr. and Mrs. Evans (hardly the most 
Irish of names), even received prison sentences for their 
political activities. The ISDL founders had deliberately 
framed their Constitution in such a way as to encourage 
those of Irish descent to join the League. Art O'Brien
3
was himself born in England and John Scurr in Australia,
to cite only two of the ISDL non-Irish born leadership.
The two men who shot Field Marshal Wilson were London born
and Harry O'Brien relates how a large number of the London
born children of Irish parents at his school were caned
for refusing to salute the Union Jack on Empire Day (some
4even spat at it) in 1917.
It could be argued that these incidents were all committed 
as a result of parental influence for Dawson and Prewitt
1 Irish Exile, Feb. 1922.
2 Ibid., Jan. 1922.
3 John Scurr's wife Julia, also a councillor, was London
born.
4 Harry O'Brien Memoir , 5.6.
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argue strongly that "the family generally stands out as
the most important agency determining the extent and direc-
1
tion of political learning". Yet while parents may play
2an important role m  the political socialization of their
offspring it is by no means unknown for radical divergence
to occur between the generations. Taylor claims that the
Londoners who killed Wilson had certainly not been reared
3on Irish nationalism. We have already observed the pre­
sence of a Mrs. Despard on ISDL platforms; her brother,
Lord French, was the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the 
object of unsuccessful IRA assassination attempts. The 
Earl of Middleton was the leader of the Southern Irish 
Unionists, his son fought in the British Army against the 
Republicans who numbered in the ranks of Cumann narn'Ban, 
one Gobnait Ni Bhruadair (Albina Broderick), the Earl's 
daughter. She was subsequently wounded fighting against 
the Free State Army in the Civil War. Brendan Bracken the
Conservative Information Minister tried to hxde his Irish
. . 4origins, perhaps because his father was an IRB member.
Maurice Foley, the son of the Labour Minister responsible 
for overseeing the Secret Intelligence Service in 1968, 
joined the Republican Movement in the early 1970s and somehow
1 R.E. Dawson and K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 
(Boston, 1969), 107.
2 Also see H. Hymans, Political Socialization (New York, 
1959) and D.J. Denver and J.M. Bochel 'The Political 
Socialization of Activists in the British Communist 
Party', British Journal of Political Science 3 (1973), 
53-72.
3 Taylor, Asssassination, op. cit., 167.
4 See Charles Lysaght Brendan Bracken (1979) and Andrew 
Boyle Poor Dear Brendan (1974).
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managed to acquire a pronounced Kerry accent before finding 
it advisable to leave his country of birth and settle in 
Ireland.
1
The transmission of ethnic identity to the offspring of 
immigrants has long preoccupied many American sociologists 
seeking to create a theoretical framework of analysis to
interpret the 'melting pot society' or as Novak phrases
2 3 4it the ivunmeltable ethnics" . ParretL and Wolfinger have
analysed the persistence of ethnic generational voting pat-
5
terns while Fitzpatrick, Kasard and Janowitz have focussed 
their research on the community as the primary source of
the persistence of ethnic solidarity. Molon, Paton and
6 7Lambert have elaborated Barth's conceptualization of
8ethnic boundaries while Sharot has updated Herberg's pio­
neer work on the. 'triple melting pot' hypothesis. Herberg 
concentrating on the generational transmission of religious 
values argued that while the second generation often renoun­
ced their immigrant parent's religious values, as part of
1 See Andrew Greeley and William McCreedy, 'The Transmission 
of Cultural Heritages' in Tomatsu Shibutani (ed.) Ethnic . 
Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York, 1965).
2 Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New 
York, 1972).
3 M. Parreti, op. cit.
4 R.E. Wolfinger, op. cit.
5 Op. cit.
6 Op. cit.
7 Op. cit.
8 Stephen Sharot 'The Three Generation Thesis and the 
American Jews', British Journal of Sociology 24 (1973)
151-
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their 1 Americanization1 process, the securely Americanized
third generation often return to their grand parents1 reli-
1 2  3 gious values. Novak and Greeley have during the last
decade focussed research attention on a 'new ethnicity1, 
extending far beyond immigrant religious values and con­
stituting a new third and even fourth generation ethnic 
political consciousness.
However, much of this theoretical framework appears to be
specific to the American case. Of more particular relevance
.to the position of the post Irish first generation in
4Britain are Meinecke's concept of the 'Kulturnation1 and 
the idea of 'Patria' or allegiance to the country of non- 
residence. Thus Art O'Brien, born in England, spoke of 
British-Repubican negotiations in terms of talks between 
"Your Government and Mine". In a similar turn of phrase 
the largely non-Irish born membership of Merthyr Vale ISDL 
spoke of a "sense of duty to our oppressed fatherland that 
inspires us with that determination which enables us to
5
overcome all obstacles however mighty". Situational eth­
nicity manifestations can play an important role in per­
petuating ethnic identity beyond the first generation. We 
have already noticed the important role played by the Gaelic
1 Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew (New York, 1955).
2 M. Novak, op. cit.
3 Andrew Greeley, Ethnicity in the United States (New York,
1974 ) .
4 Meinecke, op. cit.
5 Irish Exile, Dec. 1921.
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League in maintaining ethnic identity among the non-Irish 
born offspring of immigrants and even as a channel of rec­
ruitment into the IRA; a situation which has continued
1 2 until the present day with Sean MacStiofain and Fr. Fell
3
following the path trodden by John 'Blimey1 O'Connor a 
generation ago.
Sean McGrath complained that although "the Irish population ‘
of Great Britain is about 1,500,000 the total membership
4of the League is at present only 2 6,000". McGrath how­
ever gave no indication as to how he had arrived at this 
ISDL target recruitment group figure. O'Day however esti­
mates the first and second generation Irish community in
Britain at between one and a quarter and one and a half
5
million in 1881 when the census recorded 781,119 Irish 
born people living in Britain. So McGrath's estimate cer­
tainly extended to the 3rd.generation.
Art O'Brien was by no means the only prominent Irish lea­
der to come from the second generation Irish community in 
Britain. James Connolly, Jim Larkin, Liam Mellowes and 
Erskine Childers all came from this section and many other 
unknown individuals not born in Ireland itself were active
1 See Sean MacStiofain Memoirs of a Revolutionary (1975)34. 
The son of an Irish mother and an English father who dis­
approved of his subsequent Irish political involvement, 
Sean MacStiofain became the IRA Chief of Staff in 1969.
2 The English born Fr. Fell was imprisoned between 1974-82
for .IRA activity in Britain.
3 A London born IRA volunteer 1916-23.
4 Quoted in D.G. Boyce, op. cit., 86.
5 Alan O'Day, op. cit., 108.
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in the ISDL.
Recent Emigrants and the ISDL
Smith's claim that "emigrants do not generally make good 
nationalists"^ while in general far too sweeping a state­
ment does however hold good for one particular group of 
emigrants. The ISDL was unlikely to attract " new adher­
ents from those who emigrated from Ireland during the 1920- 
21 period. British control in Ireland had historically 
been greatly facilitated by the continual haemorrhage of 
emigration, particularly of young people - the group most 
likely to pose a threat to the colonial power. Successive 
administrations encouraged emigration, some discreetly, 
others like Lord Salisbury less so, as when he declared 
during his 1886 Premiership,
"He would rather employ British wealth in aiding 
the emigration of a million Irishmen than in 
buying out landlords^
Over thirty years later Lord French claimed in an inter­
view that
"the principal cause of the trouble is that for five 
years emigration has practically stopped. In this 
country there are from 100,000 to 200,000 young men 
from 18 to 25 years of age who in normal times would 
have emigrated
With Lord French attributing the increase in IRB and IRA
4membership to non-emigration the Dail Defence Minister
declared that emigration was "nothing less than base des-
5ertion m  the face of the enemy" and the Home Affairs
1 A. Smith, Theories, op. cit., 109.
2 Annual Register (1886), 181-2.
3 Le Journal, 23 Jan., 1920.
4 GT 8227. CAB 24/89.
5 Geroid O'Sul"1 mn Ms 8415 (NLI)
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Minister subsequently issued a series of decrees forbidding
emigration without IRA issued permits and the sale of tra-
1
vel tickets without such authorization. When the British 
ordered Irish shipping agents to sell travel tickets to 
America via Liverpool; that city's IRA units raided the 
lodgings of emigrants en route to America and confiscated 
their tickets. This incident is discussed more fully in 
the section on IRA activity in Britain 1916-1921. So with 
most of the 1920-21 emigrants to Britain leaving Ireland, 
without the necessary IRA authorization they, were unlikely 
to join the ISDL, an organization supporting the IRA.
1 DE 2/37 and DE 2/8.
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Chapter 11
The Socio-Economic Composition of the ISDL Membership
Poulantzas has defined social class as a, "concept which
indicates the effects of a totality of structures, the
expression of a mode of production or a social formation
in the actions of those who are their carriers. It is a
concept which designates the effects of the total structure
1in the realm of social relationships'1. Giddens employs
2the term "class structuration" to convey the multi- 
elemental process that is class determination involving an 
'objective' evaluation of empirical data and a 'subjective1 
interpretation of less tangible evidence, a process which
3
Ossowski terms the 'simple' and 'synthetic' modes of 
analysis. The sociological analysis of class today basi­
cally centres around the axis of the Marxian class posi­
tion in the ownership of the means of production and the
4Weberian concept of status. Poulantzas, Gramsci and
5
Luka.cs have amplified the 'historicity' of Marxist. thought
6 7while Ossowski, Runciman and Marshall have all signifi- .. 
cantly extended the Weberian conept of status. Each school
1 Nicos Poulantzas , Political Power and Social Classes,
(1973) , 169.
2 Anthony Giddens, The Class Struggle of the Advanced
.Societies. (1977). 20.
5 Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in •the Social :.
Consciousness, (1963)
4 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings
(1957)
5 G.S. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), 1-26.
contd.
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of thought^ has, to varying degrees recognized the impor­
tance of some elements of the others’ work, in particular 
the concept of class consciousness whether defined as the 
historically derived perception of class identity or the 
recognition of differing status group interests. Class 
consciousness is essentially a subjective phenomena, eva­
luated by the analysis and interpretation of a very wide 
range of largely subjective evidence.
The sociologist investigating a historical movement usually 
does not have such evidential material available for res­
earch. purposes so that a retrospective evaluation of the 
social class composition of an historical movement his often 
not possible. A careful search, however, of membership 
lists and a close reading of organizational publications 
will often provide deta,ils relating to the occupations 
and income levels' of the membership. Such empirical data 
is too limited in scope, too lacking in the all important 
element of ’self and others perception’ of status position
contd.
6 w.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 
(1966), and'Class, Status and Power, in J.A. Jackson, 
(edt.), Social Stratification, (1969)
7 T.H. Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroads, (1963), 181- 
207.
1 The Weberian approach is exemplified by T.A. Parsons,
’Equality and Inequality in Modern Society’, Sot;jologica 1 
Inquiry, 40(1970). The Marxist school of thought on the 
issue of class is discussed in J.A..Banks, Marxist 
Sociology in Action, (1970), and John Rex, Key Problems 
in Sociological Theory, (1970).
For the attempted integration of aspects from both 
schools of thought see, ‘ Ralf ' Dahrendorf, Class and 
Class Conflict in Industrial Society , ('Stanford, 1959), 
and T.B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, (1965) .
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to justify the term class analysis. The more objectively 
empirical orientated terminology of 'socio-economic 
composition1 is therefore employed in this section!,
. ... We can employ a mosaic of fragmentary evidential 
facts"*" and little bits of information to construct an 
outline illustration of the occupational composition of 
the ISDL membership.
Several items in the Irish Exile indicate that there were
some relatively ’well-to-do' members in the ISDL such as
the organization held a St Patricks Day Dinner in the
2Cecil Hotel,London,with ticket . prices at £1, which in 
terms of average wages was more than the equivalent of £20 
today. At the wedding of one member, other members gave 
presents which included a "magnificent cut glass silver 
salad bowl" and a "solid oak and bevelled drawing room
3
mirror". Yet one could also select contrary evidence from 
the Irish Exile to show that there were few rich people 
within the ISDL. For example the report of the Pontypridd 
no 4 Branch which "decided for the time being to canvass 
the 'better off class' outside our organization for the
4
Irish National Aid Fund" due to the high unemployment level 
among its membership. This same exercise can be undertaken 
by the selective use of Intelligence reports, the blunt
1 See E.J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures, (Chicago, 
1965).
2 Irish Exile, Mar., 1921.
3 Ibid., June, 1921.
3 Ibid., April, 1921.
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observation that the Sinn Fein/ysDL movement in Birmingham 
is confined to the working class: ’‘the more prosperous 
Irish people in Birmingham care little for Sinn Fein"'*' is 
at least partly contradicted by the more thoughful evalu­
ation that;
"Recent arrests are causing the more responsible 
Irish people to hold aloof from the ISDL although 
they continue to contribute to its: funds".2
Hence one . should always be careful of attaching undue
importance to any single piece of evidence of this type
4
and of comparing like with like. Bessel and Jamin have
5
criticized fellow Nazi Movement researchers for using 
'heterogenous data’. They argue that statistical analysis 
requires the use of purely 'homogenenous. data’ of a suffi-
g
ciently large and random sample size. While agreeing 
with much of their argument I still believe that heter­
ogenous data can be very usefully employed,while exercising 
of course due care, in place of non-available homogenous 
data. And I certainly would not go as far as Rogowsk who 
claiming that there is insufficient records for a socio­
economic study of the Nazi Party rank and file has opted
1 ROR 45 . CP 840. CAB 24/100. 10 Mar., 1920.
2 ROR 92. CP 2574. CAB 24/119. 10 Feb., 1921.
4 R. Bessel and M. Jamin, 'Problems of Research, Nazis,
Workers and the Uses of Quantative Evidence’, Social 
History, 4(1979), 111-16.
5 Notably COnrad Fischer, 'Statistics and the Historian: 
the Occupational Profile of the SA of the NSDAP’, ibid. ,
5(1980), 131-8.
’6 R. Bessel and M. Jamin, TStatistics and the Plistorian: ,
A Rejoinder’, ibid. , 4 (1979)', 139-40.
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merely to analyze the much, better documented Gauleiter 
cadre.^
The material employed to analyze the socio-economic compo­
sition of the ISDL does not fufil Bessel and Jamin ’ s cri­
teria for ’homogeneous data1. The ISDL ’Occupational 
Census' - a phenomenon probably unique in the history of 
Irish, exile organizations, certainly in Britain, is not I 
frankly admit a randomly selected sample and as it covers 
only about percent of the total membership it cannot 
be assumed to be totally representative of the organization. 
But the much smaller number of deportees whose occupations 
were given as part of their applications for compensation 
.constitute what we can reasonably regard as the leadership 
cadre of the ISDL.
The ’ISDL Occupational. Census’ wasf
"compiled with a view to giving Irish, exiles 
a chance to go back to their own country and 
work at their own trades and give of their 
Motherland their best".
Branch secretaries were instructed to record members age,
sex, occupation and whether they had ”any Special training
or experience in Engineering, Chemical works, Glass and
Pottery manufacture, Textiles, Shipbuilding also in Banking,
Shipping and Insurance, Patent agent office and fluency in
1 Ronald Rogowsk,lThe Gauleiter and the Social Origins- 
of Facism', Comparative Studies in Society and History,
19 (1977) , 399-43.
2 Irish Exile, April, 1922.
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any of the following languages:, Irish., French, German,
Italian, Spanish, Russian and Norwegian".  ^Unfortunately,
for our purpose, the ISDL Executive did not undertake this
2'Occupational Census' until January 1922, when following 
the Treaty serious tensions were emerging within the organi­
zation and some branches were no longer obeying instructions 
from head office. Even when a Branch Occupational Census 
was undertaken, many Secretaries did not follow their 
instructions to the letter. Some only included those with 
special skills, an extreme case being the North Staffs No 1 
Branch which, listed the occupation of only one member, a 
Head teacher. Others only listed the skilled workers.
Many ignored the unemployed and most did not include non­
working women in their list of members. It has not been 
possible to ascertain to what extent the total membership 
of the ISDL was occupationally classified i'n this manner, 
for all that remains of this census is a number of forms,
I discovered scattered among the contents of a steel box
3
in the Art O'Brien collection. These contain the returns
4
of some 28 branches listing the occupations of 561 members. 
The census returns of these branches geographically, distri­
buted from London to Yorkshire, Ashton in Makerf i& Id’to
1 O ’Brien Ms 9432.
2 Irish EXiie, Jan., 1922.
3 Classified as Ms 8432.
4 These branch census forms were not in a suitable condi­
tion to permit photo copying and so I have reproduced 
them in typescript as Appendix One.
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Swansea, undoubtedly constitutes the best available source 
of information on the occupational pattern of the Irish 
born population in England and Wales in 1922, as the 1921 
Census unfortunately does not provide any data on this 
issue. The- Irish in Scotland were however occupationally 
classified in that country's separate 1921 Census report 
and Table 4 gives some of their main occupations.
Table 4. Some Occupations, of the Irish. Born in Scotland,
1921 1
Male 0 c cup atIon s
Metal Workers
Transport and 
Communications
Construction
Miners
General Labourers 
Teachers
As % of Irish working Males 
24.0
10.6
10.4
10.1
5.4
0.24
Female Occupations
Clerks (non-public 
sector)
Charwoman
Laundry
Shop asst.
Textile workers
Professional
Teachers
As % of Irish working Females
3.7
5.8
2.8
5.6
20.6
9.4
3.8
1 Based on Table 8, 1921 Census of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 
1924).
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The ISDL Occupational Census
The average age of the ISDL branch, members in this census 
was 31.7 (551 individuals) but women members with an average 
age of 29.6 years (166 individuals), tended to be somewhat 
younger than the men who had an average age of 32.5 years 
(385 individuals). The nature of the ISDL Occupational 
Census material does not facilitate a detailed industrial 
occupational classification, so we shall simply analyze it 
in terms of (a) employed and non employed, (b) manual 
and non-manual workers, and (c) further divide manual 
workers into skilled/supervisory and unskilled workers in 
the case of male workers, and for women further distinguish 
factory workers and servants from other manual occupations.
9 6% of ISDL male members were employed at the time of this 
census but only 67% of the women. A few schoolboys are 
included in the non-employed male category but the female 
non-employed was very considerably boosted by housewives, 
as under 10% of married women were in employment at the 
time.'*'
Table 5.) ISDL Membership by Sex and Occupation C%)
Males Females
Manual Occupation 92 69
Non-manual Occupation 8 31
Professional workers as %
of non-manual 20 40
N (377) (113)
1 N. Branson, op. cit., 212.
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Table 5 shows that the ISDL membership was predominantly
concentrated in manual occupations and most were unskilled
workers. For only 24% of the male manual workers were
skilled or supervisory workers. The type of industrial
employment varied considerably according to the region's
industrial structure. In Lancashire many of the members,
both men and women were employed in the textile industry.
In Yorkshire and South Wales the branches had a strong
miners contingent. No fewer than 24 of the 31 manual
workers in the Pontypridd No 2 Branch were miners. The
Earlstown No 1 Branch reported the death of one of its
members^ in a colliery accident while the Tonypandy No 5
Branch, claimed that, "signs^ are not wanting that this
branch will soon regain its activity, lost through the 
2
coal strike". The Victoria Garsfield Durham Miners Lodge
indignantly rejected an invitation to be present when
Lloyd George opened a home for retired minersj they informed
their Prime Minister, "We have not forgotten the deaths of
3Lord Mayors, MacCurtain and MacSwiney of Cork". And in
Lancashire the police discovered that Irish miners had in
1914 followed the example of their American counterparts
4 5and formed a Molly Maguire lodge. Kornhauser suggests 
that homogeneous work groups, particularly when they form
1 Irish Exile, Mar., 1921.
2 Irish, Exile, Nov., 1921,
3 C at holie Herald, 8 Oct,, 1921,
4 See H. Fiftch, op. cit., 205.
5 VI. Kornhauser, politics of Mass Society, (1960)
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isolated residential coinmuniti.es, have a propensity towards 
political radicalism. This might explain the definite 
radicalism of ISDL miners though Newton rejects a similar 
explanation in his study of the British Communist Party . ^
/
Dockers were well represented in the ISDL's East London
and Liverpool branches, Many of the mid-18th century
2Irish immigrants in London had become dockers and thoj's: 
was a strong Irish presence in the late 19th. century doc-
3
kers’ Labour Protection League. A similar situation occurred 
in Liverpool where we have already observed Irish dockers 
struck in sympathy with hunger striking Irish political 
prisoners in Britain. Irish, dockers in Liverpool played 
a very important role in the IRA's logistical network, a 
participation testified to by Special Branch officers who 
complained that trade union officials frequently used 
their position to ’place' IRA members as dockers and 
sailors.^ '
The 4 % of ISDL male members listed as unemployed is un­
doubtedly an underestimate for it is certain that many 
branch secretaries, did not list the unemployed in their
1 K. Newton, op. cit., 47.
2 John Lovell, 'The Irish and the London Dockers.' r 
Society for the Study of Labour History" Bulletin,
35 (1977) , 16-18.
3 See Paul Thompson, op. cit., 270.
4 ROR 34. 18 Dec., 1919. CP 319. CAB 24/95 and Special, 
undated, ROR. CAB 24/122.
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occupational census. In 1921 Britain was in the grip of
the post war recession. With; over: two million unemployed
by the end of that year, exports in 1921 were under 50%
of the 1914 level and so the export orientated industries
were particularly badly affected. 25% of all engineering
workers, 34% of shipbuilding and 38% of steel workers:
were unemployed.^ The miners living in largely self-
contained small ‘communities were, when short time working
is considered, probably the worst affected industrial group
in Britain in 1921 and branch reports in the Irish Exile
refer to this. Maestag No 1 Branch, reported that:
"In common with many other branches in this 
area, work on behalf of the cause has been 
greatly handicapped owing to the disturbed 
state of industry",
while the Darwen No 25 Branch was even more explicit:
"present abnormal conditions of industry are- 
having a very adverse effect on the branch".**
These reports would appear to substantiate Felling's^
hypothesis that unemployment tends to produce a, withdrawal
from political activity and a growing<jsense of political
5alienation, yet Hall has claimed that unemployment can 
generate increased growth in some political organizations. 
Some branch reports in the Irish Exile tend to support Hall’s
1 Branson, op. cit., 69-70.
2 i-Itish Exile, Nov. 1921.
 ^ Irish Exile, Mar., 1922.
4 H. Pel ling, The British Communist Party, (1958).
5 Tom Hall, 'Attitudes and Unemployment', Archives of 
Psychology, 25, No. 165, (1934), 1-65.
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hypothesis, Hid Durham No 3 Branch, reported that, "in 
spite of the great 'unemployment in this district, the 
branch is increasing its membership weekly'.'^ Other branches 
also appeared to be overcoming the effects of high unemploy­
ment in their areas. Thus East Ham reported "a very cre­
dible balance sheet was submitted in spite of the hardship
2caused by much unemployment among the members", while 
Swansea No 4 'Branch admitted to a "high' level of unemploy-
3
ment but good work being done". Newton in his study of
4the Communist Party in Britain shows a correlation between 
high levels of unemployment and the rapid growth of the 
party. But it would appear that overall there is no simple 
causal relationship between unemployment and the size of
5
a political organization. Efsenberg has illustrated the 
non-static nature of the unemployment process by formu­
lating seven stages in the psychological response to un­
employment - the earlier stages are conducive to political 
involvement while the latter tend to be alienatiyev
Most women members of the ISDL who were manual workers 
were employed in factories; 60% of the female manual ISDL 
workers were so employed. But domestic servants accounted 
for the next largest category of female manual workers
1 Irish Exile, Jan.,- 1922.
2 Ibid., Aug., 1921.
3 Ibid., Mar., 1922.
4 Newton, op. cit.
5 Eisenberg,and p. Larzfield, 'The Psychological Effects of 
Unemployment1, Psychological Bulletin (1938) 358-90.
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with 16.7%. '"This was however proportionately considerable 
less than the ratio for the total female working population 
as the million plus servants constituted by far the largest 
single category of female employment in 1921.^
Only 8% of males in the ISDL census were in non-manual 
occupations but almost one third of the female manuals were 
in this category. With the exception of such oddities as 
the Private and Trade Status Enquiry Agent in the Hulme 
Branch, most of these non-manual workers were engaged in 
the more customary white collar occupations. Female Pro­
fessionals proportionately outnumbered males by two to one 
in this category. There were several members of the legal 
profession in the ISDL, notably the barrister Martin* 
O'Connor who advocated that the Irish should "be prepared 
to fight on for another 25 years rather than accept any 
humiliating measure from the British Government", and 
James MacDonnell who spent much of his time—to the detri­
ment of his legal practice - on defending Irish political 
prisoners. But the majority of these ISDL professionals 
were teachers who accounted for all the male and all but 
two of the female professional workers listed in this cen-* 
sus. The ISDL occupational census unfortunately did not 
distinguish between the different categories of membership 
that is, between office holders and rank and file members. 
One might formulate the hypothesis that a middle class
1 Branson, op. cit., 212.
2 Irish Exile, Aug., 1921,
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white collar worker or teacher wa,s wore likely to become
a branch officer than an unskilled labourer. Brady a
clerk with a middle class background states that, "a
Secretaryship was thrust upon me within five minutes of
becoming a member".^ We have observed that the majority
of the ISDL membership were manual unskilled workers but
that does not necessarily imply that its leadership, both
at national and local level, was drawn from this category.
A party with a high, proportion of working class members
and primarily working class orientation will., still tend to
have a middle class leadership at all levels of organi-
2 3
zational hierarchy. Berry and Hindess show that this is 
true for the British. Labour Party, while Barms4 has demon­
strated a similar relationship within the Italian Socialist 
Party. .
We can attempt to illustrate such, a pattern in the ISDL 
if we turn to another source of information. In 1923 
110 persons active in the Irish movement in Britain were 
deported to Ireland. Most of the deportees were members 
of the ISDL and most held some position at either branch, 
district or national level. We can, I think, reasonably •
1 E. Brady, op. cit., 55.
2 David Berry, The Sociology of Grass Root's Politics, 
(1970), 116.
3 B. Hindess, 'Local Electors and the Labour Vote in
Liverpool1, Sociology, 1(1967), 187-195.
4 S.H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian
Socialist Federation, (Yale, 1967).
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classify this group as the *I$DI< leadership1 ; following 
a High Court ruling that their deportation had been ille­
gal the Government was forced to establish the Irish 
Deportees Compensation Claims Tribunal. This Tribunal 
awarded compensation basically on the grounds of income 
lost, and even loss of job, during the period of internment 
in Ireland. Thus it was in the applicants' interest to 
give a full description of their employment and account of 
their income to the Tribunal. Despite a detailed search 
in the Public Records office the files of the separate 
Scottish Tribunal were not discovered. While such infor­
mation would have been useful in a general sense its ab­
sence does not affect our attempted assessment of the 
socio-economic composition of the ISDL leadership for 
that organization did not function in Scotland. I have 
however been able to examine the files of 73 claimants in 
England,'*' - 57 men and 16 women, and it is from these
that the tables below have been constructed. In all res-
2pects, save for the non-recording of many ages, they
afford a more detailed analysis than'the previous Table 5
and figures obtained from the Occupational Census .
Table 6. Occupational Classification of Deportfees.
Males Females
Manual Worker 29 (50.9%) 5 (31.25%)
Non Manual Worker 28 (49.1%) 10 (.62.5%)
Unemployed/Housewife 1 ( 6.25%)
Total 57 16
1 TS 27/182. Reproduced in typescript as Appendix Two
2 Only the ages of nine claimants are given which; is not 
sufficient for tabulation purposes.
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We immediately observe when we compare Tables 5 and 6 that 
the respective classifications of occupations are very 
dissimilar. In particular there are significant differ­
ences in the ratios of manual/non-manual workers. This 
differential distribution is, if anything, more discernible 
in the different ratios between skilled and unskilled u 
manual workers.
Table 7. Skilled and Unskilled Male Manual Workers
Skilled/Supervisory 17 (58.6%)
Unskilled 12 (41.4%)
Total 29
Whereas the manual workers in the ISDL 'Occupational Census'
were largely unskilled, the Deportees were mainly skilled 
or in supervisory grades.
Table 8 further breaks down the Non Manual category of 
the Deportees into three sub-groups - White Collar, 
Professional and Business/Commerce.
Table 8. Classification of Non-Manual Deportees 
Category Males Females
White Collar 11 (39.3%) 1 (10%)
Professional 8 (28.6%) 8 (80%)
Business/Commerce 9 (32.1%) 1 (10%)
Total 28 10
Of the above male white collar workers, six of them can 
be classified as routine clerical workers/civil servants
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but another two had a primary supervisory role: John King
was an Insurance Officer Manager while Patrick O'Hart with 
a salary of £615 as the Private Secretary to the
Managing Director of one of the largest companies in 
Britain can hardly be classified as a clerk. The category 
of Business /Commerce encompasses a wide range of entre­
preneurial activity: a Liverpool newsagent, a Manchester
1
dealer with a profit of £6 a week, two publicans, one 
a woman. Three were also however more substantial business­
men. Martin Maloney a member of the ISDL Executive and 
of the Roger Casement Sinn Rein Club was a London Silk 
Trader who stated that in 1920, which was a below-average
obusiness year, his income (.profit), was £1800. He claimed 
£1,820 for loss of profits and damages and was awarded 
£1,500. It must be remembered in considering these awards 
that the Tribunal was under substantial Government pressure 
to keep them minimal; the Treasury in fact had hoped to
3
settle Maloney’s case for £900.
There were also three Manchester Merchants among the
Deportees. • George Clancy who owned two large provision
shops and a haulage firm claimed £6,110 and was awarded 
4£1,300, while Joseph 0 'Dowd a hardware merchant claimed
1 See TS27/182, claim of James Barrett.
2 See TS27/183, transcript of the 9th day.
3 See letter from Treasury Solicitor to the Tribunal, 
27 Dec., 1923. TS27/179.
@ TS27/182.
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1£1,500 and received an award of £405, William McMahon,
the first Treasurer of the ISDL and a merchant had just
prior to his internment in Ireland been requested by the
Irish Free State Government to establish a large scale
marketing scheme for Irish dairy produce in Britain. He
claimed £5,900 but only received £836 damages probably
because of his known position within the Sinn Fein move- 
2
ment. The largest claim for loss- of profits and damages 
totalling £20,000 was submitted by Sean O'Mahony a manu­
facturers agent but as he was the Republican TD for 
Fermanagh, a member of De Valera's 'Council of State’, 
and had been tried in 1924 on Sedition charges at the Old
3
Bailey he recfeved only £1,000. Art O ’Brien though an 
engineer by profession owned his own publishing business.
We could also perhaps include the six tradesmen who made 
up the self employed manual worker category of the depor­
tees in the Business section. One woman also owned her 
own dressmakers shop.4
Eight men and eight women among the deportees can be classi
fied as professionals. Thomas O'Sullivan the London editor
of the Freeman’s Journal was a member of both, the ISDL
London District Committee and the Roger Casement Sinn Fein
5Club. He claimed £5,760 but was only awarded £905.
1 TS27/182.
2 TS27/182 and TS27/183.
3 TS27/182.
4 See the claim of Eileen Cullanhan,. TS27/182,
5 See Transcript of the Fifth Day TS27/182 and 183.
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Richard Purcell, another journalist ISDL member had 
earlief been jailed for arms smuggling. 6 men and 12 
women of the 600 members in the ISDL occupational census 
were teachers but there were*'7 men and 8~ women teachers among 
the 73 deportees. The importance of teachers, particularly 
female teachers in the ISDL was recognized by an Intelli­
gence evaluator who referred to the fact that many local 
branches were led by "Spitfire women of the school teacher 
type". The Occupational Census listed two female 
teachers in the Stockton ISDL Branch, Battersea had the 
same number, while Ashton in Makefield had three. There 
were no less than four women teachers and one male teacher 
in the London No 4 Branch. The presence of a considerable 
number of teachers in the ISDL, or at least among its sup­
porters is indicated by an appeal in the Irish Exile from
the Dail Eireann Minister of Education for Irish speaking
2teachers to return to Ireland.
Teachers in the 1920's were public service employees at a 
time when many local authorities regarded any participation 
in political activity by their employees very unfavourably, 
never mind membership of an organization aiding Britain’s 
enemies. The Attorney General told the Deportees Compen­
sation Claims Tribunal that Mr Quirke, the Chairman of 
the Management Committee in London which employed John 
Harvey as a teacher, was, "a perfectly loya,l British
1 ROR 205, 10 May, 1923. CP 239(23).. CAB 24/160.
2 Irish Exile, April, 1922.
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subject with no sympathy for traitors, either English
or Irish'1.^ Harvey was dismissed as a result of his depor-
2tation as was Michael Galvin another London teacher.
Mrs Leonard submitted a claim for compensation based on 
her inability, during her internment, to attend an inter­
view for a teaching position in Liverpool but the Tribunal 
was given a Special Branch report of an interview with 
her prospective employer that stated,
"a thoroughly loyal subject of English birth has 
informed me that if the management of the school 
knew of Mrs Leonard's rebel or republican tend­
encies her application would not have been 
considered for a moment".^
Another Liverpool teacher Frank Smyth was dismissed from
his position.^
A few teacher members of the ISDL, particularly those em­
ployed by the Labour controlled boroughs in London, had 
more sympathetic employers. Kathleen Brooks retained her 
teaching position but claimed that her absence from school 
during her internment had adversely affected her promotion 
prospects and sought compensation for this. The Attorney 
General endeavoured to have her claim rejected and suggested 
to the Tribunal that West Ham "is not a Borough in which 
the fact of being an Irish internee would seriously hurt
1 See -the transcript of the Fourth Days Hearing TS27/183.
2 Ibid., of the Seventh Day.
3 Liverpool Special Branch Reports, 3 Jan., 1924. Filed 
in TS24/181.
4 Transcript of the Eight Day Hearing, TS27/183.
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you".'1' Teachers were also prominently involved in the rev­
olutionary movement in Ireland forming 23% of the membership
2
of the First Dail'. In an economically underdeveloped 
Ireland the occupation of teacher was, if the Church is 
excluded, virtually the only avenue open to the children 
of workers and small farmers desiring even limited higher
3
education. The religious beliefs and practices of the 
Irish immigrants in Britain and their descendants necessi­
tated a denominational education system/whi.ch in many areas 
involved the provision of Irish Catholic schools rather 
than just Catholic educational facilities staffed from 
within the Irish community, with the teachers in many cases 
becoming the lay leaders of the local Irish community.
Newton observed that in the British Communist Party tea­
chers had a party membership rate in relation to their 
proportion in the labour force, of almost three times
4
greater than the miners who were the next largest group.
The involvement of teachers in radical political organi-
5
zations, has been attributed by some sociologists, notably
g
by Lenski to status inconsistency. This sociological 
school of thought regards 'status incongruence1, the non 
match of objective factors like income and life-style with
1 Transcript of the First Day Hearing.
2 J.L. McCracken, -Representative Government in Ireland1 
1919-48, (Oxford, 1958), 34.
3 For a detailed account of the position of the teacher 
within Irish society see Patrick Duffy, The Lay Teacher , 
(Dublin, 1968). ~
4 Newton, op. cit., 44.
5 N. Wood, Communism and the British Intellectual , (1954) .
contd.
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the self perceived location of the individual within the 
class structure, as possessing potential radicalizing fea­
tures. Landecker^ suggests a positive correlation between
high status crystalization and class consciousness.
2
Allardt claimed that this situation considerably increased
the propensity towards political radicalism. Associated
with the low status crystalization theory is the concept
3
of 'Marginality'. Newton suggests that both these concepts 
operate most effectively when they are associated with
4
ethnic, rather than class, boundaries. Fuels in a study
a
of Jewish liberalism in America correlated Jewish radi­
calism with specific features of Judaism*, the emphasis 
on learning and social justice within an overall materialist 
orientated religious world perspective. But one could 
argue that these features were the precise elements that 
traditional Irish Catholicism did not emphasise so this 
hypothesis would hardly seem to be relevant in the ca,se of 
the teacher members of the ISDL.
contd.
6 Gehart Lenski, 'Status Crystalization. A Non Vertical
Dimension of Social Status', American Sociological Review, 
19(1954), 405-13.
1 A. Malewski, 'Status Incongruence and its Effects',
Polish Sociological Bulietin, ;(1963) , 9-19, and
I.N. Goffman, 'Status Consistency and Power', American 
Sociological Review,22(1957) , 275-81.
2 Landecker, 'Class Crystalization and Consciousness', ibid., 
(196 3) and also see E r Zimmerman, 'Some Neglected Assump­
tions in Status Inconsistency Theory1, Archives Euro- 
peenes de SocioTogie, 19(1978), 53-73.
3 Quoted in K. Newton, op. cit., 125.
4 Golovensky, 'The Marginal Man Cometh - An Analysis and a 
a Critique', Social Forces32(1952)
5 .L. Fuchs 'Amefican Jews and the Presidential vote'
American Political Science Review, XXXXIX (1955).
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The objective social postion of teachers in Britain in
the early 1920‘s when their wages had drastically failed
to keep up with inflation averaging 23% a year,^ with
professional morale so low that its members actually 
2
decreased would seem to support the 'low crystalized 
status' hypothesis but militancy in the profession did not
3
really materialize until a decade later.
Banks asks why some intellectuals become revolutionaries
and others do not. He concludes that there is no simple
4answer to this very complex problem and the same must 
apply to any attempt to explain the involvement of teachers 
in the ISDL or indeed in the Republican Movement as a 
whole.^
The Church as an ISDL recruitment sphere
A police report in 1917 observed that the Catholic clergy
1 The cost of living index rose 115% between 1911-1919
see R.B. Jones, Economic and Social History of England
1770-1970, (1971), 214.
2 For a detailed article on the position of teachers see
the Manchester Guardian, .21 Feb. , 1922 . Also see
S.J. Curtis, Education in Britain since 1900 , and
Asher Tropp, The School Teachers, (1956).
3 N. Branson and M. Heineman, Britain in the Nineteen 
Thirties, (1973), 27. :
4 J. Banks, op. eft., 47.
5 According to a Free State Minister 20% of the school
teachers in Southern Ireland were opposed to his Govern­
ment in 1922 and favoured a Republican victory in the 
Civil War, Catholic Herald, 6 Jan., 1923.
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in Ireland,
"exercise an immense influence over the youth 
in their parishes and unless some means can be ' 
used to make them abstain from interference 
in politics, I fear that disaffection will be 
dangerously spread".
The clergy were strongly involved in the Irish Nationalist
Movement, Blunt claimed "their parish priest is in 4 cases
2out of 5 President of the local branch." in Ireland and 
0 ‘Day calculates that in 1886 almost half of the Irish 
National League branch meetings in Britain were chaired
3
by priests. The participation of the clergy in consti-
4
tutional and sometimes in insurrectionary movements was 
a well established Irish political tradition. Fitzpatrick 
puts forward the intriguing suggestion that Irish poli­
tical organizations encouraged the participation of priests 
because as celibates they could not create or more
5
accurately procreate a political dynasty.
The non presence of priests in both, the occupational census 
and the deportees list should not be interpreted as indi- 
eating that the ISDL had,unlike the UIL ,failed to attract
1 CO 904/102, (PRO).
2 William Blunt, The Land War in Ireland, (1912), 44.
3 A. O'Day, op. cit., 123.
4 See Richard Hayes, 'Priests in the Independence Move­
ment of 1798', Irish Ecceliastical Record, LXVI, (1947 ), 
258-70. ^
5 Fitzpatrick, op. cit., 88.
6 Wollaston, op. cit., 128-9.
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the support of the clergy. Fori priests played anIimpor­
tant role in the ISDL from the formation of the ISDL in 
London when Fr Campbell of Forrest Gate formally proposed 
the establishment of the first branch in the metropolis,  ^
to the immediate post-deportation period when the Cabinet
was informed "a few militant priests have stepped into the
2breach left by the deported in London”. Irish Exile branch 
reports reveal that at least six had priests as their 
Presidents: Fr Grogan (Bradford No 5), Fr McEnery
(Bradford No 14), Fr Farrell (Hackney), Fr McCormack 
(Hanley No 2) , Fr Lawton (Lewisham) and as only a small 
proportion of ISDL branches were ever featured in the 
Irish Exile it is a reasonable presumption that this is 
not an exhaustive list of priests who were ISDL branch 
Presidents.
The participation of the clergy within the J.SDL no doubt 
facilitated the recruitment of the 'innocents' for it 
conferred a degree of respectability upon the organization. 
The Cabinet were particularly annoyed that the Bishop of
Middlesborough. sent a letter to an ISDL branch, supporting
3 4its objectives. The publication in the Irish Exile, of
an interview with Archbishop Mannix of Australia in which
1 O'Brien Ms 8435.
2 ROR 203. 25 April, 1923. CP 219(23). CAB 24/160.
3 ROR 66. 5 Aug., 1920. CP 1743. CAB 24/110.
4 Irish Exile, April 1921.
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he expressed his support for the aims of the ISDL and 
his subsequent meeting with the Southwark ISDL Branch 
Committee^ was also no doubt of considerable publicity 
value to the ISDL. Clerical participation within the 
ISDL was generally confined to branch level activity, 
though Fr McNiff was a member of the Sheffield District 
Committee, Priests were especially involved in the organi­
zation of the educational aspect of the branches acti­
vities. The promotion of the Irish language w^s a theme 
continuously stressed by many of the ISDL's clerical mem­
bers. When Fr O'Connor of Poplar joined his local branch
he stated that he would "like to hear everyone in that room
2conversing in the Irish language". While at Hanwell,
where a Fr Walsh ran a Gaelic class for his ISDL branch,
3Fr McCormac "stressed the need to speak Irish".
Clerical support in some parishes enabled the ISDL, often 
banned from using public facilities, to use church pre­
mises for meetings, as in the case of the Poplar ISDL 
Branch which met in the local Catholic Institute;, and 
for the holding of socia,ls for fund raising purposes.
Bolton ISDL publicly thanked Fr Farley for permitting local 
schools to be used for whist drives.^ Many ISDL branches
 ^ Irish Exile, June, 1921.
2 Ibid., Sept., 1921.
3 Ibid., Dec., 1921.
4 Ibid., Mar., 1922.
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specifically invited the lochl clergy as .''guests of honour’ 
to their socials. At one typical event, an East Ham 
concert, the audience included FrsClay, Grey, Brady and 
McMahon of the local parishes while Fr Glaghan sent a don­
ation with his apology for absence.^ Priests, as members 
of the lower middle class, were often a relatively impor­
tant source of local branch revenue. When Fr O ’Connor 
joined the Poplar ISDL Branch he paid a subscription of 
one pound instead of the customary two shillings. Cleri­
cal permission to sell the Irish Exile outside churches 
considerably aided the circulation of that publication, 
while in Liverpool the clergy were thanked for facilitating 
church door collections which raised a considerable pro­
portion of that city’s contribution of £10,000 to the
2
’Irish Railwaymen’s Fund’.
The presence of priests within the membership of the ISDL 
branches afforded considerable administration help but more 
importantly it reduced the level of political tension 
particularly when a priest took the chair at .meetings.
' Traditional Irish ’respect for the cloth.’ and the generally 
non-partisan political attitude of the ISDL clerical 
members combined to play an important role in the main­
tenance of a relatively high level of internal branch
1 Irish Exile, Nov., 1921.
2 Patrick Cusack Papers, Ms 10,972, (NLI) - The fund was 
to aid Irish Railway workers suspended from work for 
their refusal to transport British military supplies.
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consensus at least until the Treaty was signed. After 
this, however, inherent political tensions could no 
longer be contained. The ISDL was not the only Irish 
organization of a Republican character in Britain that 
obtained clerical support. The Home Office Intelligence 
Department reported that in Scotland the "Priests are 
taking a prominent part in Sinn Rein deliberations",’*' 
particularly so in Glasgow where the local clergy organi­
zed a fair to raise funds for the Irish Prisoners 
Defendants Fund with. 35,000 people paying £1,000 in ad­
mission charges alone.^
I have already observed that while the presence in, and 
support for, Irish Republican organizations in Britain 
by some members of the clergy may have been functional, 
in that it counteracted the hostility of some members of 
the Irish community towards Church, leaders: of the Cardinal 
Bourne school of thought, it was dysfunctional with, res­
pect to the overall relationship between the Catholic 
Church and British society. The participation of some 
priests in Irish military activities in Britain would, if 
it had been known then, have caused considerable turmoil 
in the already troubled relations between Irish and British 
Catholics and the wider society. Ned Kerr wrote to Michael
1 ROR 65, 29 July, 1920. CP 1706. CAB 24/110.
2 ROR 110, 6 June, 1921. CP 3055. CAB 24/125.
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Collins that he had been offered "some good gear" by a
1
Fr McCormick of Sheffield, while another Collin1s agent
convalesced from a bullet wound, in a St Helens hospital 
2
run by nuns. I have mentioned that the Occupational 
Census and Deportation List contained no references to 
any clerical participation . In the case of the Deportees 
list. ,this omission was simply the result of British 
Government policy. The names of those selected in 1923 for 
deportation appears to have been compiled substantially 
from information supplied by the Free State Army Intelli^- 
gence Department, one of whose reports on the supply of 
munitions from Liverpool to the Republicans in Ireland
3
named five local priests as being prominently involved. 
After the conclusion of the Civil War the IRA was reorgani­
zed and a detailed list of sympathisers in Britain (con­
taining the names of seventeen priests) who were prepared 
to act as couriers, and furnish safe houses and arms 
dumps was compiled by its Headquarters.^
As in the section on the Catholic Church in Britain, no
1 Letter from Ned Kerr to Michael Collins, 4 April. 1920.
P7/A/2, Mulcahy.
2 Letter from P. Daly to Michael Collins, P7/A/5, ibid.
3 Dept, of Intelligence Reports - Intelligence in Britain,
'List of Irregulars in Liverpool1, P17a/182 and P17a/130,
0 'Malley.
4 O'Malley P17a/130.
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attempt will be made here to argue that this clerical
participation in both the military and political movements
was anything other than the involvement of a minority.
Nevertheless it was on a scale sufficiently large as not
to be so easily dismissed and of a nature serious enough
to have further endangered the Church-State relationship
in Britain in the 1919-23 period. T.P. O'Connor arguing
that the Irish in Britain needed a strong organization
claimed they "had made less advance than the Irish in any 
1
other country". Our available evidence strongly indicates 
that the vast majority of. ISDL members were unskilled man­
ual workers. It is interesting that not a single ISDL 
member was listed, or at least identified as such, in the
1921 Catholics Who's Who which contained the biographies
' 2of 5,000, mainly British resident Catholics. And only 
four individuals were identified as UIL members. We 
have already considered in some detail the issue of struc­
tural assimilation or perhaps more accurately non structural 
assimilation. It would seem from our admittedly limited 
evidence that large sections of the Irish Catholic community 
in England and Wales during the first quarter of the 20th 
century were not structurally assimilated and did con-
3
stitute an 'ethni-class'.
1 Glasgow Herald, 21 Nov., 1921.
2 A small number lived outside Britain.
3 See P. Gallo, op. cit., 22.
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According to Newton, the,
"lower socio-economic status of the uskilled 
working class typically produces a combination 
of alienation and political apathy and fatalism, 
the high socio-economic status of thecmiddle 
class tends to produce a combination of non­
alienation and political activity".1
While Berry bluntly states,"it is beyond dispute that the
. . . 2level of working class participation is very low".
Both Newton and Berry were,reaffirming the findings of 
earlier classical research on the correlation of low
3
socio-economic status and low political participation rates.
It is of course possible that the recruitment patterns of
ethnic movements differ significantly from non-ethnic
4 5organizations,though Pinard and Orum's study of the black 
Civil Rights activists in the United States reveals they 
too were essentially middle class based.
Lack of sufficient evidence prevents us from doing no more 
than noting that the ISDL sncceded in mobilizing a large 
section of the population who according to most sociologists
1 Newton, op. cit., 122.
2 D. Berry, op. cit., 116.
3 See S.M. Lipset, Political Man, (New York, 1960).
David Glass (ed.), Social Mobility in Britain, (1954), 
Frank Bealey, Constituency Politics, (1965) and 
Guiseppe Di Palma, Apathy and Participation: Mass
Politics in Western Societies, (New York, 1970).
4 Maurice Pinard, 'Processes of Recruitment . in the Sit In 
Movement1, Public Opinion Quarterly, 33(1969), 355-69.
5 A. Orum, 'The Class and Status Basis of Negro Student 
Protest', Social Science Quarterly, 41(1968), 521-33.
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are extremely difficult to mobilize and they did this at 
a time when their country of residence was effectively 
engaged in a war with their country of birth or patria.
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£HAPTER 12
The Interorganizational Field of the ISDL
In previous chapters we have investigated the emergence of 
the Irish Self Determination League and its growth up to 
its first conference. We have observed the extent to which 
the ISDL successfully 'mobilized' recruits by channelling 
the new upsurge in national sentiment,among many of the 
Irish in England and Wales,into a political organizational 
format. Mobilization is a multi-causal, interactional pro­
cess, involving personal ideological receptiveness, and 
interpersonal contacts. It is usually facilitated by the 
prior existence of organizations riot unsympathetic to 
the objectives of the new political organization. These 
organizations constitute what Said and Ash call the "broader 
social movement environment"^ forming a potential reservoir 
of recruits. Few organizations operate in an isolated man­
ner without linkages to others and so most organizations
operate in what Warren calls the "Interorganizational 
2
Field" or Curtis and Zurcher's the "Multi-Organizational
3
Field" whereby the activities of one organization usually 
exercise an effect on others. The Irish Nationalist/Repub­
lican milieu in Britain during the 1916-22 period is best
1* Zald and Ash, op. cit.
2 See, Roland Warren 'The Interorganizational Field as a 
Focus for Investigation', Administrative Science Quarterly, 
12 (1967) , 396-419.
3 See, Russell Curtis and Louis Zurcher, 'Stable Resources 
of Protest Movements': The Multi-Organizational Field',
Social Forces 52(1973/74), 53-61. The authors however 
are evidently unaware of Warren's work, ibid., as they 
mistakenly claim that no one previously has evaluated 
this topic.
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visualized as consisting of a series of concentric circles 
comprising an 'interorganizational or multi-organizational 
field1. The circle, radii,and circumference/being deter­
mined by the respective degrees of committment required for 
membership in the different organizations. So the inner­
most circle was composed of the IRA and IRB membership and 
the outer circles of the Sinn Fein, ISDL, UIL and Gaelic 
League membership. Babchuck and Booth have empirically
analysed the common pattern of multiple memberships in
1
American voluntary organizations and my research shows 
that it was not uncommon for an IRA member to also be a 
member of the IRB, Sinn Fein, the ISDL and the Gaelic 
League (though UIL members did join tbs ISDL and; Gaelic League; 
they were unlikely to join Sinn Fein and the IRA, unless of 
course they were already IRB members). We will examine the 
IRA and IRB organizations in Britain, in a later chapter, 
and so in this section we shall only observe the inter­
action of the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein on the ISDL's 
inter or multi-organizational field.
The Gaelic League and the ISDL
It has become a maxim of Irish history that the 'Gaelic 
Revival' of the late 19th century was the spearhead 
of the 20th century Irish Revolutionary Movement. To a 
considerable extent it provided the ideological locomotive
1 Babchuck and Booth, 'Voluntary Association" Membership: 
A Longitudinal Analysis', American Sociological Review 
34(1969), 31-45.
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of Republicanism ;though this was contrary to the wishes 
of its early pioneers, notably Douglas Hyde.'*" The irony 
of the Gaelic Revival is that a movement based not merely 
on a-political foundations,but explicitly intended to be 
non political, completely eschewing the politicalffor 
the cultural,and the material, for the spiritual, should have 
played such an important role in Irish political life.
The Gaelic Revival was, at least in the vision of pioneers 
like Hyde, a rejection of the emerging industrial society 
in Southern Ireland, a harkening back to a romanticized 
1Gemeinschaft1 clearly seen in its idealization of the 
Irish peasantry. The Gaelic Revival refutes Shils' con­
ceptualization of ethnicity as a "primordial sentiment",
2declining in intensity with industrialization, though it 
at least partially substantiates Hechter's 'internal col-
3
onialism model1.
The early pioneers of the Gaelic Revival originally envis­
aged a movement emphasizing 'Knlturnation' (psychological
4
nationalism) rather than 'Staatsnation' (political identity)
5 6but in Ireland as in Algeria and Czechoslovakia ,
1 See Michael Lennon, 'Douglas Hyde', The Bell, March
1957, for Hyde's efforts to prevent the Gaelic League
from becoming politicized.
2 E. Shils, op. cit.
3 M. Hechter, op. cit., but also see Sloan's, op. cit.,
observations on the particular position of Ireland.
4 See, Meinecke, op. cit.
5 See, F. Colonna, 'Cultural Resistance and Religious Legi­
timacy in Colonial Algeria1, Economy and Society, 3(1974) 
233-52.
6 Smetana's music like Chopin's was highly nationalistic 
and hence banned during the Nazi occupation.
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the cultural revival became inevitably politicized. The 
growth in the United States of the separatist Black Power 
political movement, which rejected,if not absolutely(repu­
diated the earlier Civil Rights coalition of Blacks and 
White liberals was also preceded by an upsurge of interest 
in Black culture.'*" In Ireland the Gaelic Revival coincided 
with the crippling split in the Irish Nationalist (ie) 
constitutional movement that followed the fall of Parnell. 
The early pioneers of the Gaelic Revival had hoped that 
the ’Fall of Parnell1 marked the end of the Irish pre­
occupation with politics;but instead the discrediting of 
constitutional politics,produced a revival in the fortunes 
of the revolutionaries, notably the IRB which was symbol­
ically illustrated following the death of Parnell; when his
position as the Patron of the Cork Gaelic Athletic Associ-
2
ation passed to James Stephens the founder of the IRB.
From the moment in 1884 when seven men came together in
3
Thurles to form the GAA, the new organization was infil­
trated by the IRB and six years later, it was estimated 
that the IRB controlled well over half of the 800 clubs
1 For the rise of Black Culture/Power in the USA see, 
Carmichael and Hamilton, op. cit. G.L. Watson, op. cit., 
H. Burns, op. cit., and M. Parenti, ’Black Muslims',
op. cit.
2 See C.C. O ’Brien, States of Ireland, (1974), 24.
3 For the formation of the GAA see, Patrick Purcell,
'Seven Men in an Inn - the origins of the GAA', The Bell, 
XII(1946), 217-29 and Marcus de Burca, The History of
the GAA, (Dublin, 1980).
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then in existence.^ The constitution of the GAA ,while prof­
essing the organization's a-political characterfwas extre­
mely amenable to the IRB's ultimate goal of an Independent 
Irish Republic,as it expressly excluded from membership 
those serving in the British Forces, including the Royal 
Irish Constabulary,and prohibited members from playing 
English games like soccer, rugby and cricket. It was thus 
an extremely nationalist organization, refusing to acknow­
ledge the legitimacy of the instruments on which British 
Rule in Ireland ultimately depended upon. Gaelic Football 
and Hurling are very fast field sports played only by fit 
young men, precisely the sort of recruits that most inter­
ested an organization like the IRB, ultimately preparing 
for a military insurrection ;while the caman or hurley 
stick also provided a reasonable substitute for rifle 
drilling.
The Gaelic League, Conradhna Gaedhilge, was founded in 
189 3 to preserve and promote the Irish language, and thus 
had a somewhat wider activist appeal, in terms of age, 
than the GAA. But it undoubtedly played an even more 
important role in the formation of a new nationalist, 
separatist ideology ,by emphasizing the historical,, cultural 
differences between Ireland and England and once again the
1 See W.F. Mandle, 'The IRB and the Beginnings of the GAA', 
Irish Historical Studies, XX(1976/77), 418-38, . •-
who claims that the IRB controlled 497 of the 810 
clubs in 1890.
2 See, Sean Cronin, 'Nation Building and the Irish Lang­
uage Revival Movement', Eire-Ireland, 13(1977), 9-14.
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IRB were extremely active and influential in the new 
organization. Opponents of the Gaelic movement claim that 
reviving the language and culture, and emphasizing the 
differences between Ireland and England, alienated the 
Northern Irish pro-British section and contributed towards 
the Partition of the island*but O'Snodaigh has shown that 
many Protestants, particularly, the clergy were Irish 
language enthusiasts.^ Indeed the very prophetic obser­
vation,
"we have now a literary movement, it is not very 
important, it will be followed by a political move­
ment, that will not be very,important, then must 
come a military movement, that will be important 
indeed".
was made in 1899 by James Standish 0 1Grady, the leading 
Gaelic scholar of the period,and a Protestant and life 
long Unionist.
The influence of the IRB was resented by some of the 
Gaelic League leaders, appalled that in some areas IRB
controlled branches had appointed members as paid organ-
3
zers "who did not even speak Irish", . One influential
4
Gaelic League founder, Eoin MacNeill unconsciously greatly 
aidedj the IRB when he proposed the formation in 1913 of the 
Irish Volunteers to counteract the influence of the Ulster
1 See, Padraigh O'Snodaigh, Hidden Ulster,((Dublin, 1973). 
There is still in Belfast an Orange Order Lodge devoted 
to the study of the Irish language. And also see 
Terence McCaughey, 'The Irish language and the Northern 
Majority', New Ireland, (1965), 24-8.
2 Quoted in W. Thompson, The Imagination of an Insurrection, 
(New York, 1967), 55.
3 See, Leoin O'Broin, op. cit., 165.
4 See, Michael Tierney, Eoin MacNeill: Scholar and Man of
Action, (Dublin, 1981).
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Volunteer Force. While not necessarily supporting the
political objectives of Sinn Fein, Gaelic enthusiasts
welcomed that organization's practical committment to
the language revival by adopting a Gaelic title"*" and using
only the Irish terms, cumann and comhairle for its branches
and committees. According to Eoin Neeson,
"Both organizations (GAA and GL), subsequent to 
1916, were the cohesive element which brought 
together the diffuse interests and activities 
of individuals belonging to other political, cult­
ural and social bodies and helped to fuse and direct 
their energies in a common direction".2
Following the 1916 Rising, a British Intelligence officer
told the Royal Commission inquiring into the events that
the IRB had "obtained practically full control of the
3
Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association" and 
so the Gaelic League was also banned in 1918 when Sinn Fein 
was outlawed.
GAA clubs are known to have existed in Britain since 1890
though hardly any details survive. The Gaelic League was
4established in 1896 in London, largely under the auspices
1 See Sean O'Tuana (edt.), The Gaelic League Idea (Cork, 1972).
2 Eoin Neeson, The Life and Death of Michael Collins,
(Cork, 1968), 15.According to A1 Cohan, The Irish Poli­
tical Elite: Studies in Irish Political Culture, (Dublin,
1972), 60, no fewer than 69% of the TD's in the early 
Dail were members of the Gaelic league.
3 See Minutes of Evidence, op. cit., 58.
4 For an account of the formation of the Gaelic League
in London, see, Art O'Brien, 'Gael Thad Saile: Some
Notes on the History of the Gaelic League in London' ,
Capuchin Annual, (1944),~110-26, hereafter cited as
O'Brien, 'Gaelic League' and Connchadh 0 1Suilleabhain, 
'Connradh na Gaedhilge', An Glor, 2 Feb., 1944. See 
also an unpublished typescript account by Liam O'Rain,
’Twenty Years of the Gaelic League', preserved as Ms 84 36,
(O'Brien).
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of the Irish Amnesty Association, an organization under 
the influence of the IRB. The development of the new 
organization was aided by the existence of the Irish Liter­
ary Society founded in 1882^ which allowed the Gaelic 
League to use its premises. The IRB had also exercised a 
strong influence in the formation of the earlier organi­
zation, as one of its founders the poet W.B. Yeats,was then 
2
an IRB member. In its early years the Gaelic League in 
London,organized in two branches,enjoyed a steady if modest
3
growth. In 1906 Paul Dubois in London enroute to write
a book on Ireland observed the enthusiasm among the London
4Irish for learning the language. The Irish language,even 
before the banning of the Gaelic League in 1918, was consi­
dered to be itself somewhat 'subversive1 and one Claude 
Vasal Chavasse, a Christchurch don, and President of the 
Oxford Gaelic League,was arrested on a visit to Ireland in
5
early 1916, merely for speaking in Irish to a police officer.
A few months later his branch was complaining to the
1 See transcript of (in my possession) Centenary Lecture 
by Dr. John Kelly at the Irish Club, London, 29 Mar. , 
1982.
2 See, C.C. O'Brien, op. cit., 53-4.
3 For the early growth of the Gaelic League in London see, 
correspondence for the 1902-1905 period in the Fionan 
MacColuim Papers, Ms 24,393, (NLI) and for the 1893-1912 
period there are some letters to and from Art O'Brien
in the Eoin MacNeill Papers Ms 10,897 (NLI). Patrick 
Pearse spoke at an early London Gaelic League meeting, 
see report in The Irish Commonwealth, Mar., 1919.
4 Paul Dubois, Contemporary Ireland, (1909), 410.
5 See the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Office ,File 6592 , 
(S.P.O.).
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Government about the conditions of the 1916 Rising prison­
ers. ^  The London Gaelic League Head office was raided imme-
2
diately after the Rising by British soldiers who evidently 
believed that other members had emulated Edward McCarthy's 
progress ,from membership of the Gaelic League,and the same
3
GAA club as Michael Collins yto Sinn Fein and then the IRA.
Fitzpatrick observes that there was a substantial rise in
4
the Gaelic League membership in Clare after the Rising 
and while Cohen cautions that "the jump from cultural 
nationalism to revolutionary participation is very diffi-
5
cult to explain" ,• there can be no doubt that the radical
upsurge in Irish politics in England and Wales in 1919,as
shown by the emergence and growth of the ISDL ;was reflected
in the dramatic growth of the Gaelic League. In 1919 the
West London Gaelic League'reported it had 101 new appli-
£
cants to join its language class and with the other 
branches reporting similar influxes,it was soon found
1 See the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Office File 8081,
(S.P.O.).
2 Ibid., File 25882.
3 See 'Statement by Edward McCarthy concerning His Part 
in the National Movement', Ms 22,246, (NLI).
4 D. Fitzpatrick, op. cit., 155.
5 A. Cohen, op. cit., 50. V.A. Walsh, op. cit., observes
that the Irish immigrants from the Irish speaking Gael-
tacht region showed very little interest in the Fenian
movement in Pittsburgh though this may have been due to 
language problems.
6 Gaelic League Report, 8 Oct., 1919, O'Brien Ms 8435.
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necessary to run language classes in eleven different
centres in London. But even with these new classes, there
were frequent branch reports recordinq the difficulty of
getting offices, teachers and classrooms,to cope with the
new situation whereby the "enthusiasm for the learning of
Irish is extraordinarily keen this year".^ With Art O'Brien,
as the President of the London Gaelic League since 1914 -
2prior to this he had been Vice President for 25 years
and Hugh Lee and Liam McMahon of the ISDL leadership as
3
prominent members of the Manchester Gaelic League, it is 
not surprising that,in its early period of existence,the 
new ISDL jointly advertized its functions and appealed 
for members along with the Gaelic League. The Head office 
premises of the ISDL were subsequently rented from the 
Gaelic League.
In some areas, like Bolton and particularly on the Tyneside,
the Gaelic League was largely the creation of the ISDL,
where a local branch reported that,
"At last, it seems to be realized that through 
its workings in close conjunction with the ISDL, 
it can become not only the most powerful instrument 
for resurrecting the Gaelic League, but also some­
thing which if properly manipulated will build up in 
the land of the Sassanach within his very doors, a 
Gaelic state".^
•*- Irish Exile, Nov. , 1921.
2 O'Brien, Ms 8419.
3 See resolution by the Manchester Coiste Ceantair of the 
Gaelic League placing on record, "the support which the 
ISDL has given it", Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
4 Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
369
This statement and the ISDL's emphasis on fostering the 
Irish language, culture, music and sports,to the extent 
that many branches in their activities reports,referred to 
their purely "Irish/Ireland atmosphere”, is reminiscent of 
the post 1905 Russian Bund's emphasis on fostering Yiddish 
culture. This cultural issue caused deep divisions within 
the Bund, which had originally evolved as an anti-zionist 
Jewish socialist party✓advocating the full integration of 
Jewish workers into the Russian state. Subsequently how­
ever after the 1905 defeat and the ensuing anti-semitic 
pogroms the Bund switched its emphasis away from integra­
tion. ^  The United Irish League never really supported the 
Gaelic Revival movement in Britain, a tactical error later 
acknowledged in 1922 by John Dillon when he suggested to 
T.P. O'Connor that the proposed replacement for the UIL
should "make a bold effort to capture the Gaelic revival 
2
movement". The Catholic Herald committed to the assimil­
ation of the Irish in Britain and resolutely opposed to 
Irish political organizations in Britain, repeatedly condem­
ned the growth of the Gaelic Revival movement in Britain.
Bierstedt has, we have already observed, suggested that
1 See, Charles Woodhouse and Henry Tobias, 'Primordial 
Ties and Political Process in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: 
The Case of the Jewish Bund', Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 8(1965), 331-60.
2 Quoted in F.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon, (1968), 473.
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assimilation is synonymous with acculturation^ and no
1
doubt Charles Diamond recognized in a less theorectical
i
manner, that the promotion of Gaelic culture substantially 
retarded the assimilationist process of the Irish in 
Britain. The existence of Irish societies often served 
as mediating structures between the newly arrived immi­
grants and their new country of residence, and by func­
tioning as a transitional half way house^ultimately faci­
litated integration in to the pluralistic multi ethnic
2'melting pot' society of 19th century America. But, as
we have already observed, Irish emigration to Britain was
running at a very low level in the 1919-21 period and so
this American example is not very relevant to the impact
of the Gaelic Revival movement on a relatively well estab-
ished Irish community in Britain. Art O'Brien suggested
that "in some ways perhaps that sentiment (the language
3revival) was more keen among the exiled Irish", and per­
haps most interestingly of all was the effect of the
4Gaelic Revival on the non Irish born in Britain. Greely
5
and Novak have commented at length, on the emergence of a
1 See R. Bierstedt, op. cit., and also N.R. White, op. cit.
2 See Martin J. Waters, 'Peasants and Emigrants: Consi­
derations of the Gaelic League as a Social Movement', 
in D.J. Casey and N.E. Rhodes, Views of the Irish 
Peasantry, (Connecticut, 1977), 160-77.
3 Said by Art O'Brien at the 19 35 London Gaelic League 
Easter Commemoration, Ms 8417.
4 Andrew Greeley, Ethnicity in the United States: A 
Preliminary Reconnaissance, (New York, 1974).
5 Michael Novak, 'The New Ethnicity', Centre Magazine,
July 1974.
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new ethnic self consciousness among the American born off- 
spring of immigrants,but this has not weakened their fun­
damental Americanism. In Britain however an interest in 
Irish step dancing led London born John 'Blimey' O'Connor 
to joining an Irish language class. He subsequently became 
a fluent speaker,though with a pronounced cobkney accent
and then enlistment in the IRA and ultimately service .in
I
a Republican flying column in the Civil War.
Ireland was of course not the only country where a language
revival was closely associated with a political movement.
In India for example the growth of the Congress Movement
sparked off renewed interest in the Sanskrit language and 
2
literature. During the traumatic post-Treaty period lead­
ing up to the disintegration of the ISDL the Irish Exile 
recounting the achievements of the organization, commented 
that, i
"the League has rescued thousands of our people 
from Anglicization and given them a healthy Irish 
outlook".
and exhorted that the,
"Irish should keep up the Gaelic cultural influences 
developed from the struggle".
There were however those who opposed the 'politicization' 
of the Gaelic Revival. The early Zionist Congresses were 
marked by bitter splits between those advocating a prima­
rily cultural orientation,and the advocates of political
1 See, Harry O'Brien Memoir, 16, and 31-33.
2 See, Bruce T. McCully, English Education and the Origins 
of Indian Nationalism, (New York, 1940), 242-54.
3 Irish Exile, June 1922.
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Zionism.^ Similar disputes arose within the Gaelic organ­
izations in Britain. Some were worried that police and 
even military raids on Gaelic organization premises, and 
the deportation of prominent Gaelic League officials,like
C.B. Dutton^might alienate potential Gaelic enthusiasts
\
who either, like James Standish O'Grady believed in the continued
political union of Britain and Ireland or were simply
frightened of becoming involved in organizations.that so
interested the police. And certainly with all the London
GAA clubs adopting the names of the executed 1916 leaders,
membership of these could be reasonably inferred by the
Special Branch, as indicating sympathy with the ideas of
the executed men. The Gaelic League officer who believed
that "the officers of the Gaelic League should not be
2officers of other organizations" no doubt had Art O ’Brien, 
Liam MacMahon and Hugh Lee particularly in mind.
Other Gaelic League enthusiasts regarded participation in 
the political organizations as diverting resources away 
from the cultural movement. Some of the language purists 
were very sceptical about this upsurge in 1 situational
3
ethnicity1 particularly when it manifested itself more in 
the form of social entertainment, Irish dancing etc. , 
rather than the more intellectual pursuit of language
1 See, Ben-Sasson, op. cit., 899-902.
2 Quoted in the Irish Exile, June 1921.
3 As used by A. Etzioni, ’The Ghetto’, op. cit.
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learninq. One London Gaelic League officer complained that 
"thousands of graceful dancers had been turned out in the 
last twenty five years, but how many speakers of the lang­
uage had been produced?"^ But the language classes cer­
tainly experienced an unrivalled boom during the 1919-21 
period, partly because of the new enthusiasm for all things 
Irish, stemming from the heightened political atmosphere 
and also for more instrumental reasons. Many of the 
leaders of the Irish Republican Movement were,like the
later Israeli leaders, determined to have a new national
2
language to symbolize the break with colonialism . and 
after the signing of the Treaty the Irish Exile claimed 
that,
"As the Irish Government has made Irish compulsory 
for Civil servants, so many firms insist on their 
staff knowing it, within a year or two, commercial 
houses in England will be faced with the necessity 
of dealing with correspondence in Gaelic and they 
will look to Irish exiles with a knowledge of their 
own tongue to carry on business with Irish h o u s e s " . ^
Some were already hoping to benefit from their knowledge
of Irish like the civil servant who wanted to become an
4interpreter during the Anglo-Irish negotiations.
1 Quoted in the Irish Exile, June 1921.
2 De Valera even declared, "it's my opinion that Ireland 
with its language and without its freedom is preferable 
to Ireland with freedom and without its language", Ibid, 
Ironically his subsequent economic policies, which led
to half the children born in the 1940s,emigrating from 
Ireland,and depopulated the Gaeltacht, effectively des­
troyed Irish as a living language.
3 Irish Exile, May 1922.
4 See, Tom Jones, op. cit., 114.
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The dialectical relationship between the Gaelic League 
and the varying fortunes of the Irish political milieu, can 
be seen from the fully paid up membership figures, (appar­
ently many who attended language and dancing classes were 
not actually members) of the London Gaelic League. In 
1919 there were 466 members; by 1920 1,100 but in 19244the 
membership declined to its lowest figure for twenty years.^ 
When the ISDL begun to break up, its Cardiff Branch pro­
posed that ISDL branches should form part of the Gaelic 
2
League" but this does not seem to have happened to any 
significant extent. The Gaelic organizations suffered fur­
ther reverses during the Civil War and its aftermath when 
Pro and Anti-Treaty supporters sought to use them for 
their own purposes. The London GAA clubs were particularly 
badly affected by these divisions and the efforts of 
Republicans to prevent British GAA contingents from parti­
cipating in the 1924 Tailteann Games in Dublinwhich were 
regarded by the Free State Government,as an opportunity of 
demonstrating to the overseas Irishytheir control of the 
country.^
1 Figures for 1919-20 from Irish Exile and for 1924 -
from a Gaelic League Report in O'Brien Ms 84 34.
2 Irish Exile, Mar., 1922.
3 The Tailteann Games, the only real lasting product of
the Paris Congress were to have been held in 1922, but 
had to be postponed due to the Civil War. The Games 
first held in 1924 .were therefore seen as a sign of 
Free State power and hence opposed by Republicans, see 
Irish Times. 22 June, 1924, Catholic Herald, 28 June, 
1924 and S i592. (S.P.O.).
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In many areas of Britain the Gaelic organizations either 
ceased to exist or survived as a mere shadow of their 
former strength. The mass immigration of the Second World 
War and immediate post war periods,did little to revive 
the near dormant Gaelic organizations’!- but with the up­
surge of political interest in the late 1940s and early 
1950s,when the Anti-Partition League seemed to be following 
in the footsteps trodden by the ISDL some thirty years 
earlier the Gaelic organizations in Britain underwent a
considerable revival and new branches appeared in areas
2where the organizations had long been defunct.
Sinn Fein in Britain, 1908-1921.
The Irish Self Determination League effectively owed its 
existence to Sinn Fein which however laid down a number of 
stipulations, regulating the League's relations with other 
organizations and restricting its activities so that it 
would not interfere with the older organization. Many Sinn 
Fein members in England resented the decision to form the 
ISDL and only reluctantly approved its formation,after 
considerable pressure from thoir leadership in Ireland. 
Throughout the League's existence these Sinn Fein members 
continually scrutinized the League's activities to prevent
1 See O'Brien, 'Gaelic League', op. cit., for the fortunes 
of the London Branch during this period.
2 The Irish Democrat, Nov., 1947 referred to a "Great 
revival of the Gaelic Movement in Newcastle with the 
strong possibility of the Gaelic League being once 
more established on Tyneside".
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any violation of its original formation pact with Sinn 
Fein;and eventually after the Civil War,they finally suc- 
eeded in persuading the surviving Sinn Fein leadership in 
Ireland,to revoke their recognition of the ISDL in favour 
of an attempt to revive Sinn Fein in England and Wales.
As Sinn Fein played such as important role in the birth, 
life and death of the ISDL, it is appropriate to examine 
Sinn Fein in somewhat more detail than we have done so far.
We have already observed that the relationship between 
the ISDL and Sinn Fein resembled that of the American 
Clan na Gael and the Friends of Irish Freedom. Both of 
these smaller political organizations sought to create 
a much larger mass organization,utilizing the new national 
consciousnesstin a manner similar to the role of the 
Communist Party of South Africa in the creation of the 
African. National Congress.^" Inevitably tensions arose be­
tween these parent organizations and their offspring. The 
German Workers Party, (the original name for the Nazi 
Party) owed its origins to an initiative by the secret 
Thule Society which wanted to create an anti-communist 
workers organization. Thule Society money ensured that 
this tiny party was not stillborn or doomed like many 
others to a fringe existence. Thule Society members in 
the Police and Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, pro­
tected the fledgling party even when it violated the law.
1 See Allun Brooks, From Class Struggle to National liber­
ation: The Communist Party of South Africa 1940-1950,
unpublished MA Thesis, Sussex University, (1967).
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Yet ultimately the Thule Society was unable to control 
1
its offspring. Sinn Fein, unlike the Thule Society,was 
unable to provide either finance,or legal protection for 
its ISDL offspring.
Moreover Sinn Fein itself was at the time of the birth of
the ISDL an uneasy coalition of differing interests.
2Founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith Sinn Fein originally 
aspired to no more than the creation of an Irish Parliament, 
owing allegiance to the British Monarchy in a manner simi-
3
lar to the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. It was essen­
tially the product of a pragmatic coalition of old Fenians 
who, had, at least temporarily, despaired of sparking off 
a new insurrection, and disenchanted members of the Nation-
4
list Party. During its early existence the principle
1 The Thule Society was a very influential extreme right 
wing organization, masquerading under the guise of a 
patriotic cultural body. It had members occupying high 
positions in the Aristocracy, business, the Civil 
Service, the Armed Forces, and the Police. See Reginald 
H. Phelps, 'Before Hitler Game: The Thule Society and 
German Order', Journal of Modern History, 35(1963),
250. The Nazi swastika and interest in the occult 
were derived from the Thule Society, see, Louis Pauwels 
and Jacques Bergie, The Morninq of the Magicians, (New 
York, 1963), 190-4.
2 For biographical details see, Donagh MacDonagh,
'Arthur Griffith;An Consantoir, 6(1946), 117-24.
Donal McCartney, 'Arthur Griffith', Journal of Contem­
porary History, 8 (1973), 3-19., and James Stephens, 
.Arthur Griffith. Journalist and Statesman, (Dublin,
1922).
3 For the formation and the early years of Sinn Fein see, 
R.M. McEvatt, 'Thomas Martin and the Founding of Sinn 
Fein', Capuchin Annual, 37(1970), 97-113, and Neil 
Sheridan, 'The First Sinn Fein Paper', ibid., 25(1968), 
140-4.
4 See Robert Henry, The Evolution of Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 
1920) and Robert Kee, op. cit., 438-60.
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difference between Sinn Fein and the Nationalist Party 
centred on the former's advocacy that the elected Irish 
representatives should withdraw from Westminister and con­
stitute their own assembly in Dublin.^ If anything the 
Nationalist Party was possibly to the left of Griffith, 
on economic affairs who as an enthusiastic supporter of 
List's economic protectionist policies,bitterly condemned 
the 1913 Dublin lockout workers for destroying the Irish 
capitalism he believed was vital to secure Irish Indepen­
dence.^
But even after Griffith resigned from the IRB, that organi­
zation maintained their interest in Sinn Fein and with 
their aid some 20 branches (cumams) had been established 
in Britain by 1908. The fact that this British offshoot
3
represented almost 20 percent of the total number of cumanns 
indicates the very relative success Sinn Fein had encoun­
tered in Ireland until 1916. Sinn Fein's opposition to 
Irish involvement in the war and the journalist talents of 
Griffith employed in a series of short lived, banned news­
papers , had brought the party much more into the public 
eye than its actual size warranted. So when rebellion
1 See Robert Henry The Evolution of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 
1920)and Robert Kee, op. cit. 438-60.Also see Patrick 
Colum Arthur Griffith (Dublin, 1959).
2 See Rumpf, op. cit., 10-13 and also T.K. Daniel 
'Griffith On his Noble Head: The Determinants of 
Cummann na , Gaedheal Economic Policy 1922-32', Irish 
Economic and Social History, (1976), 55-65.
3 Report by Colonel Chamberlain. Royal Commission Minutes 
op. cit, 44 and also see Edward McCarthy, a London Sinn 
Fein member, Ms. 22,246 (U.C.I).
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broke out in Dublin in 1916, the press, public,and authori­
ties alike, knowing little of the real forces behind the
Rising, promptly dubbed it the 'Sinn Fein Rebellion'  ^ for
2
want of a better name. Arthur Griffith had not known, m
3advance of the plans for the 1916 Rising. He had disagreed
with the IRB1s advocacy of armed insurrection and even
when he found himself the Acting President of the Irish
Republic,was never very happy about defending the actions
4
of the IRA volunteers,nominally under his authority.
Griffith however, fortunately for his later political career, 
found himself and many of his party's members swept up in 
the Post Rising internment wave.
Mr Shortt, the Chief Secretary for Ireland speaking after 
the Rising of the 'take over of Sinn Fein by 'extremists' 
observed "they might as well have taken over any other soci­
ety because Sinn Fein in itself is a harmless literary
1 see the title of a contemporary publication, The Sinn 
Fein Rebellion Handbook, (Dublin, 1916), and Francis 
Jones, The History of the Sinn Fein Movement and the 
Rebellion of 1916,(New York, 1917) .
2 The Home Office Intelligence Department,Reports on 
Revolutionary Organizations, recorded the activities of 
Irish organizations in Britain under the generic title 
of 'Sinn, Fein' even though most of the reports actually 
referred to the ISDL and the IRA.
3 See Sean o ’tuiag 'Arthur Griffith and Sinn Fein', in
F.X. Martin (edt.), 1916, op. cit.
4 For Arthur Griffith's attitudes to violence see, Richard 
Davis, Arthur Griffith and Non Violent Sinn Fein,
(Tralee, 1974) and 'The Advocacy of Passive Resistance 
in Ireland 1916-22', Anglo-Irish Studies, 3 (1977), 
35-55.
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society which if left alone would do no harm to anyone".'*'
But the surviving Republican leaders had no intention of 
leaving Sinn Fein alone. Finding themselves with consi­
derable popular support, particularly for the release of 
the prisoners;but with no political organization of their 
own with experience of fighting elections, they co-opted 
Sinn Fein. In a series of by-elections,four prisoners on 
a 'nominal Sinn Fein' ticket were elected to Westminster
on the highly emotional. "Put him in to get him out" plat-
2 3form. Sinn Fein was totally reorganized in 1917, with the
aid of the IRB who often selected cumain delegates, and elec-
4
tion candidates. The different political views of the old 
Sinn Fein and the new 1916 activists were reconciled, at 
least temporarily, by the adoption of an ambiguously worded
5
Constitution,which was very open to variable interpretation. 
De Valera, symbolizing the new orientation replaced Griffith 
as President of Sinn Fein,but even De Valera realized the 
tactical benefits of hedging on the thorny issue of the
1 107 H.C. Deb. 5. Col 906.
2 Words on an election poster reproduced in Kee, op. cit. ,
625.
3 See Thomas Dillon's unpublished typescript, 'Arthur 
Griffith and the Reorganization of Sinn Fein, 1917', 
Misc. Box IX (T.C.D) and for a particularly detailed 
but erudite account,see Michael Laffan, 'The Unification 
of Sinn Fein in 1917', Irish Historical Studies, 18, 
(1971), 353-79.
4 According to Leoin O'Broin op. cit., 181, the IRB 
appointed Sinn Fein delegates "who didn't know until 
they were told what areas they were representing".
5 See Michael Laffan, ibid., and, 'The Sinn Fein Party,
1916-21', Capuchin Annual, 38(1970), 227-35.
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1 Republic1,declaring that the Sinn Fein electoral victory
in i_ne x918 election*1" was "not for a form of government
as such, because we are not Republican doctrinaires but
« 2
for Irish freedom and Irish independence.
As President of Sinn Fein, De Valera consequently became 
President of the newly declared Irish Republic and the most 
important member of the Dail Cabinet. So Art 0 1Brien,acting 
on instructions from De Valera to form a new mass Irish 
organization in England and Wales,was able to convince 
his reluctant colleagues to agree to the establishment of 
the Irish Self Determination League. However Sinn Fein 
opposition to the new organization was still so strong 
that O'Brien felt obliged even with De Valera's aid to 
'sell' his proposal in terms of the new members it would 
bring into Sinn Fein. "The vast majority of our people 
here are not effective or active supporters of Sinn Fein
..................  Get them through the medium of the Self
Determination League and soon they become Sinn Fein sup-
3
porters". Sinn Fein members determined the choice . 
of the new organization's name and imposed restrictions 
on the type of activities it could engage in. Three of 
the four members of the ISDL's Provisional Executive
1 Sinn Fein with 47 percent of the poll won 73 seats in 
1918. See Joseph Sweeney, 'Why Sinn Fein', Eire-Ireland, 
6(1976), 33-40.
2 Dail Eireann Debates 1919-1921, 9.
3 Letter from O'Brien to J. Faughan, 5 May, 1919.
Ms. 84 35.
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Committee were Sinn Fein members, and in 1921 Sinn Fein 
members still occupied half of the positions on the ex­
panded elected Executive. In London, the proportion of 
Sinn Fein members holding District Committee positions was 
even higher, with three out of the four London delegates 
to the Central Executive Committee being party-.-members ,
Art O'Brien the League’s Vice President, Sean McGrath 
its General Secretary, Michael McGrath the National Organi­
zer, Brian O ’Kennedy the first editor of the Irish Exile, 
Fintan Murphy and Thomas O'Sullivan,both also involved in 
the production of the paper, Elizabeth Eadie, employed as 
a. League clerk, and Martin Moloney, P.D. 0 ‘Hart,and Gaorge 
Mortimer, all belonged to the Roger Casement Cumann of 
London Sinn Fein.^
Yet Art O ’Brien'S predictions that the ISDL would bring
2
members into Sinn Fein were never realized. Most of the 
twenty or so ISDL members deported before the Truce were 
members of Sinn Fein, including Sean and Michael McGrath, 
Thomas Faughanthe League's Treasurer, Brian O'Kennedy 
and C.B. Dutton the London Gaelic League Treasurer. Many 
of the deported members were of course involved in IRA 
activities but many Sinn Fein members were not involved in
1 See 'Extracts from the Minute Book of the Roger Casement 
Club', presented to the Deportees Compensation Tribunal, 
TS 27/179 and'here.-after cited as 'Casement Minutes'.
2 See Report of Ard Chomlairle of Sinn Fein 1919. Barton 
Papers, Ms. 8786, (N.L.I).
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military activities and some pointedly refused to become 
so involved when requested.^ Some potential members were 
probably frightened away from joining Sinn Fein ,as a result 
of these arrests and deportations.But in a September 1921 
Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club discussion on its failure 
to attract many new recruits, Fintan Murphy declared he 
"did not believe that the small membership was as much 
attributable to fear as to the fact of so many of our
A
people being taken up in the ISDL and other branches of 
2
work". Fintan Murphy was a particularly strident critic 
of the ISDL and passed up no opportunity of attacking the 
League, even requesting the return of a letter to Fine 
Geadheal because it had been sent through ISDL channels to 
the Club.^
Some of the most influential members of Sinn Fein,like Sean 
McGrath were also IRB members and as long as the IRB was 
prepared to support the ISDL.the anti-league forces in 
Sinn Fein were contained. The anti-league forces within 
Sinn Fein were strongest in the cumanns outside London.
Of the thirteen delegates present,at the April 1-920 meeting 
of the Ard Comhairl® of Sinn Fein in England, representing
1 See for example, the case of Minnie Kennedy a Roger
Casement member who refused to keep some arms for a
short period in an emergency declaring she "was only 
engaged in propaganda work" - O'Brien Ms. 8427.
2 Casement Minutes. 1 Sept., 1921, but another member
Paddy O'Hart claimed that "in the Sinn Fein Club,
quantity was not so essential as quality", ibid.
2 Ibid.
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eight-cimanrls in Liverpool, Birkenhead, St. Helens and 
London, the seven Liverpool curaaihn representatives were 
most opposed to the ISDL,claiming that its existence impe­
ded the expansion of Sinn Fein and pointed to Scotland 
where in the absence of an ISDL type organization.Sinn 
Fein continued to grow, with forty cumanns. in 1920 and 
sixty-five in 1921.^ One British Intelligence Officer 
reported that in Glasgow "nine out of ten Irishmen appear 
to be Sinn Feiners or supporters in one form or another of
the movement which is the most active of all the revolution- 
2
ary societies". As ’Red Clydeside1 was considered by the 
Government to be potentially, the most revolutionary dan- ;/ 
gerous area in Britain*, the Intelligence agencies were 
particularly concerned by Sinn Fein’s close connections 
with left wingers, notably John Haclean. Art O ’Brien 
himself was also worried by these relations,particularly 
when one Glasgow Sinn Fein cumann actively discouraged 
the participation of middle class individuals. in its 
affairs but he was bluntly told to "mind his own business" 
when he tried to intervene.
1 ROR 141. 2 Feb., 1922. CP 3687. CAB 24/131.
2 ROR 50. 1 April, 1920. CP 1086. CAB 24/101, but
compare this with the claims in the Glasgow Observer,
(A Diamond owned paper), 28 April. 1916 that 9 9 percent 
of Irish and Catholic people in Scotland regard the 
Rising as "needless, foolish, wicked and unjustifiable".
3 ROR 64. 22 July, 1920. CP 1673. CAB 24/109.
4 ROR 120. 25 Aug., 1921. CP 3261. CAB 24/127.
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If Sinn Fein in Scotland, jealously guarded its indepen­
dent position from the organization in England, the situ­
ation there, was little better} for with the Ard C.omhairle ' 
England not meeting between November 1920 and April 1922; 
the English organization became so decentralized, it was 
essentially reduced to little more than a collection of 
autonomous cumanns. At the Ard Comhairle'^ meeting held on 
the orders of the Dublin Sinn Fein Head office to select 
delegates for the Ard Fheis convened to discuss the Treaty*, 
Art O'Brien condemned the representation structure of the 
English Ard Cbmhairle ,which gave Liverpool an inbuilt 
majority,even though the Roger Casement London cumann 
with over two hundred members,was larger than any other 
cumann.'*' In retaliation'*, the Liverpool representatives
used their votes to ensure that no delegates from London
2
were selected to attend the Ard Fheis, a decision sub­
sequently overruled by the Sinn Fein Head office which 
observed; not for the first or last time, "there is a lot 
of bickering going on amongst the Sinn Fein cumainn in
3
England". An earlier circular to all'the E n g l i s h , cumainn 
had further infuriated the Liverpool Sinn Feiners by ob­
serving that,
"if all the Sinn Fein cumainn in England did as 
well as the Roger Casement Club, there would be 
no cause for complaint. Unfortunately the other ^
cumainn have done nothing for the past twelve months".
1 Casement Minutes, 16.
2 Ibid. , 14-15.,
3 Letter from Secretary Sinn Fein Head Office, 13 Feb. , 
1922. O'Brien Ms. 8423.
4 Ibid., 3 May, 1921.
This was a reference to financial contributions sent to 
the Dublin Head Office. The following extracts from the 
1921 Sinn Fein Financial Report‘d clearly indicate the 
important role of the Scottish and English Sinn Fein 
cumainn . in financing Headquarters activities:
Area
Scotland 
England 
Ireland
Ultimately however the pressing financial need to rebuild 
Sinn Fein after the Civil War led to a< (decision by its 
Irish leadership to dissolve the ISDL,in the hope that a 
reorganized Sinn Fein in England could raise the despar- 
etly needed funds. But by this.time Art O ’Brien had 
ceased to be the Dail Eireann Envoy in Britain and even a 
member of Sinn Fein itself. These events will however be 
examined in a later chapter.
No. of cumainn Remittances
1920 1921 1920 1921
40 65 £2,544 3,700
9 9 £1,523 3,740
not given £3,485 266
1 Preserved in O'Brien, Ms. 8431.
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CHAPTER 13
The Irish Self Determination League and the Labour Movement
The 'isolationist/exclusivist' principles on which the
ISDL Constitution was based can be clearly seen in this
statement by the Newcastle on Tyne No. 3 Branch,
"Of course we clearly understand that it is entirely 
out of the question to make any appeal to any English 
body either political or social as it would be unworthy 
of the cause we represent and acceptable least of all 
to the men over whose fate we are all so concerned".^
The 'mien concerned" were the Irish Political Prisoners 
whose release the branch was demanding yet apparently for­
saking non-Irish support. Sinn Fein translates into English as 
'Ourselves alone' and this isolationist philosophy per­
meated the ranks of the ISDL. The League's Constitution, 
on the specific instructions of Sinn Fein,precluded the 
ISDL from any electoral involvement in the British poli­
tical system yet even a cursory reading of the Irish Exile 
reveals the extent to which the membership, and often 
the local officers, were involved in Local Government 
politics. In London alone, Aldermen Mortimer, Scurr and 
Councillors Sexton, Mahoney and Hart, were all Presidents 
of their local League branches. While Councillors Raphail, 
Turner, Adams, McGiff, Alyward, Hubbart, and Purcell were 
all active in their local London branches. And outside 
London, the Irish Exile (which for a period only recorded 
London activities) refers to the involvement of Councillors 
Smith in Hartlepool, Ayles in Bristol, Miller in Chorley,
Irish Exile/ Aug. 1921.
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Butler in Bradford and Ludlow in Oxford.
All of these Councillors were members of the Labour Party. 
The official attitude of the ISDL towards the Labour Party 
was expressed at its Second Annual Conference by the 
League’s President, P. Kelly, himself a Liverpool Nation­
alist Party Councillor,
"Our attitude towards British Labour is the 
same today as when I addressed you at Manchester, 
whilst grateful to British Labour and other English 
organizations for their sympathy, we must still main­
tain our attitude of complete and absolute indepen­
dence of English organizations" .
The presence of Labour Party Councillors in prominent 
local leadership positions in League branches indicated 
that the local branches were determined to interpret in 
a very flexible manner organizational directives parti­
cularly when the participation of local political leaders 
conferred a certain degree of prestige or respectability 
on their activities with all that implied for recruitment. 
Branches also found it ^ .easier to use municipal premises 
for meetings etc., in areas where their membership inclu­
ded local Councillors. Art O ’Brien was himself requested 
by Desmond Fitzgerald the English born Dail Publicity 
Director to organize the leafletting of a Cooperative 
Conference in Preston. Fitzgerald also suggested "employ­
ing such a man as Brian 0 ’Kennedy to speak to specialized
1 I^ish Exile, Aug., 1921.
2 Letter, 10 Sept., 1920. O'Brien Ms. 8427.
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gatherings such as Labour, and Cooperative bodies etc.^
The Leagues’s Head office itself subsequently produced
leaflets calling for "direct action in sympathy with
2
Ireland" by the Labour Movement. Art O'Brien with, his 
business background was personally rather unsympathetic to 
the socio-economic programme of the Labour Party, parti­
cularly the left wing radicals like Jack Jones the
3
Tipperary born MP for Silvertown. In response to a sug­
gestion by Father Campbell that Jack Jones should speak 
at the inaugural meeting of the Forest Gate ISDL Branch
4
O'Brien replied they should have "only our own speakers".
This Sinn Fein (ourselves alone) philosophy was by no means 
unique to the ISDL. This type of attitude towards other 
groups is particularly common in anti colonial wars where
1 Letter, 10 Sept., 1920. O'Brien Ms 8427. Some 
British Cooperatives subsequently protested against the 
destruction of Irish Coops by British Forces. Cf.
Burslem Coop resolutions in FIN 18/1/130 (P.R.O.N.I).
The East Ham ISDL Branch recommended to other branches 
one of their members, "Alderman McGiff of the local 
council, a great asset to the movement, he is especially 
strong on Labour and Co-operative principles", Irish 
Exile, Sept., 1921. McGiff became the Borough Mayor
in 1928. Old Ireland, 13 Nov. 1920, (an Irish Sinn 
Fein paper) reminded its readers that they "must realize 
that there are groups throughout the labour ranks across 
the water which if small at present are genuine and 
ardent workers in the cause of freedom".
2 ROR 92. 10 Feb., 1921. CP 2574. CAB 24/119.
3 See Jack Jones, My Lively Life, (1929), 13. Unfort­
unately this autobiography contains very few revelant 
details on his Irish political involvement.
4 Letter, 27 Nov., 1919. O'Brien Ms. 8427
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the liberation forces are extremely wary of association 
with partners in the Metropolitan country. Thus the 
Algerian FLN refused to permit the Algerian Communist Party 
to affiliate en masse and instead insisted on recruitment 
on an individual basis.^ It is also often present in coun­
tries.where historically oppressed racial or ethnic minor­
ities are struggling to assert their rights as in the 
United States where the more militant wing of the Civil
Rights movement actively discouraged 'white help' after 
2
1966. And in Britain the Campaign Against Racial Discrim­
ination was deeply divided as to whether it should co-
3operate with white left groups.
There were other, more pertinent reasons to account for 
the ISDL's aloofness from the British Labour Party.
Labour's short history on the issue of Ireland's relation­
ship with Britain was not of a type calculated to inspire 
much fraternal feeling on the part of the ISDL. The 
Irish in Britain during the mid-19th century had provided 
the Chartists with some of their most militant and radical
1 The small separate Algerian Communist guerrilla unit
was wiped out by the French Army in circumstances strongly 
suggesting that their location had been 'betrayed' by 
the ALN (military wing of the FLN). Subsequently the 
individual Communist recruits to the ALN tended to be 
selected for 'suicide missions'. See Edward Behr,
The Algerian Problem, (1961) , 232-35.
2 See A. Orum, 'The Class and Status Basis of Negro Student 
Protest', Social Science Quarterly, 41(1968), 521-33.
3 See Heineman op. cit., 20
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support. But the growth of the United Irish League had
absorbed the political interest of many in the subsequent
generations. As Wollaston has shown there can be no
doubt that the existence of the UIL prevented the nascent
Labour political movement from successfully challenging the
Liberals for control of the working class vote for years,
perhaps even for an entire generation.^" Even Michael Davitt,
the former Fenian leader, who in 1890 founded the Irish
Democratic Labour Federation,as the radical wing of the
Irish Nationalist Movement in Britain,and who constantly
2
advocated cooperation between Irish and British workers, 
was only prepared to publicly support Labour candidates
3
when they appeared to have a reasonable chance of winning. 
Davitt however argued for a 'principled' alliance with 
Labour as opposed to the tactical unofficial agreements 
negotiated on a local basis favoured by most UILleaders.
It was not that the Nationalists were opposed as such to 
the socio-economic policies of the Labour candidates. 
According the Stephen Walsh, a Labour MP, "The Irish 
Nationalist Party did more for the workers of Britain than
1 Wollaston, op. cit., 197-214. Paul Thompson, Socialists, 
Liberals and Labour; The Struggle for London 1885-1914, 
(1967), 186, 313. Also illustrates the difficulties 
encountered by the earlier London Labour groupings in 
weaning the Irish from the Liberals.
2 See A.L. Morton and George Tate, The British Labour 
Movement, (1979), 158.
3 Wollaston, op. cit., 200. Davitt edited the publication 
Labour World in the 1890's.
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they did for their own in Ireland'.’^  But simply that the 
primary emphasis of the Nationalists was on securing Home 
Rule and for most of the 19th century this required - with 
brief tactical exceptions when a pro-Tory vote was advocated - 
the mobilization of the Irish vote in Britain in favour 
of the Liberals. Up until 1895 the UIL and its predeces­
sors regarded the nascent Labour political movement as a 
divisive element but following the retirement of Gladstone 
and the subsequent decline of Home Rule sentiment among 
Liberals, the Nationalists were more prepared to favourably 
consider the claims of Labour particularly when it became
apparent that it was a growing political force. Local UIL
I
branches began increasingly to support Labour candidates 
pledged to support Home Rule and in 1905 the UIL leader­
ship formally advocated the Irish should vote for Labour 
Home Rule supporters unless a sitting Home Rule MP was
2involved or if voting Labour would ensure a Tory victory.
By 1907 the Irish Nationalists were claiming that they held
the balance of power in 24 of the 28 Labour Parliamentary
3seats in Britain. But if this was so, the Nationalists 
received very few dividends from their electoral
1 United Ireland, Sept., 1949.
2 F.S.L. Lyons, Dillon, op. cit., 169.
3 Wollaston, op. cit., 197.
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investment in Labour.'*' Harry Twist, the first Labour MP
elected in Wigan, in 1910, (calling his win an 'Irish
Victory1) and who told Redmond "he could count on him as
2
one of his party" , was very much the exception. Leading 
figures in the Labour Movement, like James Sexton,
McCarthy, Curran, J.R. Clynes, John Wheatley may have first 
cut their political teeth in the UIL but most of them sub­
sequently did little to advance the cause of the( movement 
they had once belonged to. And so when the 1914 Home Rule 
Act was finally passed it was largely due to the Nationalist 
pressure on the Liberal Government and not to Labour's 
efforts. The cautious attitude of the Labour MPs towards 
Irish Home Rule was indeed symbolically illustrated after 
the passing of the Act when William Crooks MP requested 
the permission of the Speaker to sing "God Save the King"
3
to celebrate its enactment. Shortly afterwards the Labour 
MPs voted to suspend the implementation of the Home Rule 
Act for the duration of the war.
With the constitutional path blocked, the IRB, who for 
years had stood waiting in the wings while the Parliamentary 
Party occupied the centre of the stage, launched their
1 For a rather different perspective of the Irish influence 
in the Labour Party, see Joseph Banister, Our Judecn - 
Irish Labour Party, (1923). Its title indicates the 
author's politics.
2 United Ireland, Sept, 1949.
3 D. Gwynn, Redmond, op. cit., 383.
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1916 Rising. It was condemned by the Daily Herald,'*'
2denounced by Labour MPs in Parliamentwhile a Labour 
Cabinet Minister, Arthur Henderson was part of the Govern­
ment that sanctioned the executions, including that of 
the badly wounded James Connolly the only Marxist revolu­
tionary of world stature ever to appear in these islands. 
Many of the Irish in Britain never forgot or forgave 
Henderson's participation in that coalition Government.
The Parliamentary Labour Party did oppose the proposal to 
extend conscription to Ireland but more because of the 
number of troops it would have required to enforce rather 
than for any principled reasons. The importance for the 
British war effort of a conciliatory policy towards Ireland 
was clearly very much in the thoughts of one MP who com­
plained to the 1918 Labour Party Conference that the failure 
to implement Home Rule "had meant the loss of many divi-
3
sions in the fight against Germany". This 1918 Labour 
Party Conference "recognized the claim of the people of 
Ireland to Home Rule and to self-determination in all
4
exclusively Irish affairs". A resolution incorporated in 
the Party's 1918 Election Manifesto as "Freedom for Ireland 
and India ......... and the right of self determination
1 For the attitude of the Labour Press to the 1916 Rising 
see P. Beresford Ellis, A History of the Irish Working 
Class, (1972), 232.
2 Less than half of the Parliamentary Labour Party were 
even prepared to support the Nationalist MPs* censure
. motion on martial law.
3 Times, 31 June, 1918.
4 1918 Labour Party Conference Report, 69.
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1
within the British Commonwealth of Free Nations".
Labour was offering the Irish people virtually an unchanged 
1914 Home Rule Act,yet in that 1918 Election the Irish 
electorate swept the Nationalist Party, which had so reluc­
tantly accepted its Partitionist clause,into oblivion.
The Sinn Fein members who replaced the Nationalists refu­
sed to call themselves MPs, preferring instead the Irish 
term TDs, turned their backs on the Westminster Parliament; 
set up their own assembly in Dublin, the Dail, and pro­
claimed an Irish Republic. Yet Labour's offer rigidly 
restricted a future Irish assembly to internal Irish 
affairs and by incorporating Ireland within the British 
Commonwealth, precluded any attempt to democratically 
establish an Irish Republic in accordance with the wishes 
of the electorate. Right from the dramatic entry of Sinn 
Fein in 1918 on to the political stage there was an almost 
total failure by the Labour MPs to understand this new 
Irish political phenomenon or even comprehend the under­
lying reasons behind its electoral triumph. This ignor­
ance partly stemmed from a misunderstanding of what Sinn 
Fein really represented together with a failure to dis­
tinguish between the pre-1917 and 1918 Sinn Fein. Even
Jack Jones told Parliament "I hate Sinn Fein as much as
2any on the Government benches" yet Jones was a frequent
1 See, F.W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 
1918-1966, (1975), 5.
2 114 H.C. Debs 5. Col 1545.
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speaker at London ISDL demonstrations and so his outburst 
should be seen as an attack on the old Sinn Fein's con­
servative policies as represented by Griffith's denunciation 
of the Dublin 1913 workers’ militancy. But prob­
ably the most incomprehensible aspect of Sinn Fein's 
policy to the Labour Party leadership and particularly 
its MPs was the conspicuous absence . from Westminster.
To a party firmly committed to the parliamentary road 
to socialisn^it was inconceivable that such a" 
potentially powerful bloc of 73 MPs - Labour itself had 
only 59 members - could refuse to take its seats and per­
haps aid Labour. Until 1918 the small group of Labour MPs 
were often dependent on the Nationalists to mount any 
type of effective political challenge. Churchill however 
privately welcomed the Sinn Fein boycott of Westminster 
fearing that they, "might align themselves with the Labour 
Party and worst yet convert the United Kingdom into a 
Socialist State".^
Churchill was being decidedly optimistic, or perhaps pes­
simistic is the appropriate word, about the Labour Party's 
determination to create a Socialist State but he was cer­
tainly correct that if Labour did create the envisaged 
Socialist State it would be based on the existing United 
Kingdom. In 1919 James Sexton,the dockers union leader and 
MP,told Parliament that the "Labour Party was very much 
opposed to the separation of Ireland from the United
1 W. Churchill, The World Crisis, op. cit., 297.
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Kingdom".'*' The following year the NUR leader J.H. Thomas
bluntly told the 1920 Labour conference that "the Labour
Movement would not agree to the establishment of an Irish 
2
Republic". Some Labour Party branches did favour the
3
establishment of an Irish Republic and the Independent
Labour Party, affiliated to the Labour Party, but which
unlike the latter had opposed involvement in the First 
4
World War, demanded the "Recognition of the Irish
5
Republic" at its 1920 Conference. But majority British 
Labour Movement policy on Ireland never really envisaged 
an Ireland not part of the British political framework 
and certainly not an independent Republic; the very idea 
of which was bluntly ridiculed by Arthur Henderson as
g
"simply fantastic nonsense".
1 115 H.C. Deb 5!s. Col 1709. For Sexton’s career see 
his autobiography, Sir James Sexton, Agitator, (1936).
2 1920 Labour Party Conference Report, 107. During the 
Irish Civil War Thomas complained "the Irish are rebel­
ling against a Constitution that for the first time gave 
full liberty to the Irish people" and claimed that an 
Irish Republic was "something that no political party in 
this country will concede", quoted in Greaves, Mellowes, 
op. cit., 353.
3 See for example, the request by the Bermondsey and' 
Rotherhithe Trades Council and Labour, that if Mrs Shee.hy 
Skeffington, the Irish widow of the executed 1916 paci­
fist, shared a platform with the Fellowship of Recon­
ciliation, she should insist that "the only condition
of reconciliation is the complete recognition of the 
Irish Republic" - Sheehy Skeffington Papers Ms 22,695 
(III).
4 According to W. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in 
Britain: 1900-1921, (1969) , the Independent Labour Party
claimed a membership of 37,000 in 1920. But R.E. Dowse,
' Left in the Centre (1966) , 70-72 argues these figures 
were very much overexaggerated.
5 Watchword of Labour, 6 June, 1920. The ILP supported an 
Irish . republic even though its very strong pacifist
contd.
398
Given this perspective of the future position of Ireland 
within the United Kingdom, the Labour Party delegates to 
the International Labour and Socialist Conference in 
Berne 1919, saw no incongruity in proclaiming to the 
assembly that "the British Labour Party has always sup­
ported Home Rule for Ireland and is recognized by the 
Irish people as a steady and reliable ally in their agi­
tation for national self-government".^ This statement 
should have been made with the speaker’s tongue in his 
cheek for even before the Conference commenced the British 
Labour Party had tried to prevent their Irish counterparts 
from receiving their credentials as an independent dele­
gation., The very different perspectives of the two dele- 
2
gations can be seen from the Irish Delegates Official 
Report,
HIn the discussion on Territorial Questions, Ireland 
featured prominently. The speaker for Ireland was 
Cathal O'Shannon. He spoke in both Irish and English 
and demanded free and absolute self determination for 
the Irish people and the recognition by the Powers 
and the Peace Conference at Paris of the Republican 
Declaration of Independence at Easter week, confirmed 
by the people at the General Election and stressing 
Ireland's determination to continue at war until her
contd.
section repudiated the means to achieving that Republic.
6 Times, 8 Aug., 1921.
1 Labour reproduced this statement in its Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Present Conditions in 
Ireland, (1920), 12;hereafter cited as Labour: Commis­
sion (1920).
2 One of the principle sources of division at Berne was the 
Congress delegation attitude to the Bolsheviks. The 
Irish supported the pro-Soviet Adler-Longuet resolution 
the British , the anti-Soviet Brantin resolution. See
G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party, (1969), 99- 
100.
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aspirations are fulfilled. His declaration almost 
immediately followed that made on behalf of the 
British delegation by Mr Ramsay MacDonald, and 
thus threw the Irish Labour and National demands 
into sharp contrast with the Home Rule under the  ^
government of England attitude of British Labour".
The Berne Conference however accepted the Irish delegates
position and passed a resolution recognizing,
"the right of the Irish people to political inde­
pendence.....  without any military, political or
economic pressure from outside, or any reservation 
or restriction imposed by any g o v e r n m e n t " .^
Despite this unambiguous call by the Second International,
its .'British affiliate continued to advocate proposals that
fundamentally conflicted with:.the Berne declaration. Early
3
in 1920, five Labour MPs travelled to Ireland on a fact 
finding mission; after observing that "every institution 
of which we as British citizens are so proud, a free press, 
freedom of speech, liberty of the subject, and trial by
4
jury are things of the past in a large part of Ireland". 
Their Report argued that the solution "lies somewhere bet­
ween the extremes of the 'no change policy' of Ulster and
5
the 'clear out' policy of Sinn Fein". Ireland should, 
they argued, be given self-determination but within the
1 Reproduced in Irish Labour and its International 
Relations, (Cork, ND), 41.
2 1920 Labour Party Conference Report, 6.
3 The MPs were, Arthur Henderson, J. Allen Parkinson, 
Walter Smith, William Adamson and J.R. Clynes who 
because of illness did not actually go to Ireland but 
played a major role in drafting their subsequent Report
4 Labour: Commission (1920), op. cit., 3. The MPs also 
observed that "these methods would drive any spirited 
nation into a state of deep seated and dangerous dis­
content" , ibid., 1.
5 Ibid., 10.
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British Empire'*" and moreover recognizing the nature of the
contemporary sentiment in Ireland towards the British
Empire, the Report proposed,
"that the constitution conferring self government 
in Ireland should not be subject to revision by 
the Irish people until after an agreed number of 
years, during which under self goverment they would 
have an opportunity to return to a more normal state 
of mind". ^
3
This recommendation,as the Daily Herald pointed out, con­
flicted with the Berne resolution and made nonsense of 
the concept of self-determination. It certainly did not 
satisfy some of the Irish in Stockport for the following 
month they decided to nominate William O'Brien ,the interned
secretary of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Con- 
4
gress ,in a by-election. Local Irish Labour Parties had, 
we have already observed,existed for some time on the 
Clyde and Tyneside. Mostly created by dissatisfied former 
UIL members, these local Irish Labour Parties had usually 
worked in close association with the British Labour Party 
but some now began to ally themselves with the ISDL and 
Sinn Fein, a process not very effectively discouraged by
1 The Report suggested Dominion Self Government with 
Westminster still responsible for the "Protection of 
Minorities, Foreign Affairs and Defence'1, ibid., 11.
2 Ibid., 10-11.
3 Daily Herald, 26 Feb.,1920.
4 See DE 2/174 for the nomination arrangements. The 
Irish Labour Party and TUC leadership refused however 
officially to support O'Brien’s candidature, see
A. Clarkson, op. cit., 413.
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the Labour Party in Ireland.^ O ’Brien polled a respectable 
2
2,336 votes, sufficient to cause concern even in the
3
ranks of the Parliamentary Party which as a result 
decided to oppose the 1920 Government of Ireland'Bill 
oart it ioning Ireland.
The following month, April 1920, the Independent Labour 
Party, strongly based in the iridustrial centres of Scotland
4
Wales, Yorkshire and Lancashire , where the Irish political 
organizations were very active,openly declared at its 
Annual Conference in favour of an Irish Republic. Inde­
pendent Labour Party delegates then played a key role in 
the June 19 20 Labour Party Conference in mobilizing rank 
and file opposition to the Executive’s attempt to limit
5
Irish self determination to "exclusively Irish affairs".
1 Ibid., 414. Tom Johnson the Irish Labour Party leader 
advised Irish workers in Britain to remain within the 
British Labour Party and campaign for "a more militant 
policy".
2 According to the Times*, 13 April. 1920,analysis of 
the poll, while there was a good deal of cross voting - 
the 45,000 voters cast 89,000 votes - 2,446 electors 
voted for only one candidate, "this number is curiously 
near the number of votes received by the Irish Republican 
candidate".
3 129 HC Debs 5. Col 1328.
4 Kendall, op. cit., 276.
5 1920 Labour Party Conference Report, 161. Until 1918 
there was no organized Labour Party Constituency section 
and so the ILP until 1918 and for several years after­
wards was effectively the Constituenty section of the 
Labour Party.
402
Speaking on behalf of the Executive's resolutions, Sidney
Webb attempted to sway the delegates emotions by asking
if they wanted "Ireland to go spinning along the road
like a motor hog without regard to anyone else on the road" . ^
But after rousing speeches in favour of unconditional . self
determination for Ireland by the veteran dockers union
2leader Ben Tillett and Emanuel Shinwell, then a young 
3
ILP firebrandy< the Conference accepted their proposal by 
1,191,000 to 945,000 votes. This resolution did not how­
ever greatly trouble Richard Dawson,the Unionist Political 
Agent in London,who informed his superiors that the con­
ference did not really reflect Labour Party opinion on 
4Ireland.
Most of the Labour Conference speakers opposing uncondi­
tional self determination were trade union delegates and 
their contributions were a rehearsal for the following 
month's Special TUC 'Irish' Conference. The Miners 
Federation had requested the TUC to convene a Special 
Conference in a bid to link the issue of munitions for
5
Poland with the Irish crisis. In Scotland the regional TUC 
conference had demanded "the withdrawal of the 'Army of
1 1920 Labour Party Conference Report, 161.
2 Ibid., 167.
3 Ibid., 166. For Shinwell's early career see his 
Conflict without Malice, (1955).
4 Dawson, 17 July, 1920. D9895/16/10. (PRONI)
5 Times, 16 June, 1920.
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Occupation1 from Ireland"^ but the Special TUC Conference
in July 1920 while passing a somewhat softer motion on
this issue refused to support the Labour Party Conference
position on unconditional Irish Self Determination.
Instead the TUC advocated a "single Irish parliament with
full dominion powers in all Irish affairs, with adequate
2
protection for minorities". The TUC did appear to recommend 
direct action on Ireland but in such a manner as to. make 
it very unlikely that any effective strike action would 
actually occur for the proposal was to be implemented on . 
an individual union basis after a ballot of their member-
3
ship. The known eagerness of most English workers to
4 '
"strike and loose your pay for the Irish" allowed the 
Cabinet’s Intelligence Advisor to confidently assert that 
the‘"TUC 'direct action' proposal did not represent the
5
general view of individual workers" and Dawson was equally 
certain that "Labour will never resort to direct action for 
the sake of Sinn.Fein and is tired about being worried 
about it".^
1 Irish Labour Party and TUC Report, (Dublin, 1920), 39.
2 Times, 14 July, 1920 and ROR 63, 15 July, 1920.
CP 1634. CAB 24/108.
3 Clarkson, op. cit., 421.
4 Wall slogan in Liverpool dock, quoted in ROR 55.
20 April, 1920. CP 1328. CAB 24/106.
5 ROR 63. 15 July, 1920. CP 1634. CAB 24/108.
6 Dawson, ibid., 17 July, 1920.
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In the 1913 Dublin lock out,- the greatest and most bitter
struggle for unionization ever seen in these islands-, -the
TUC had pledged ’’food for the duration of the strike1 ^
but sent only relatively small shipments and so the strikers
were eventually forced back by hunger to work; if they
could find it and were first prepared to resign from the
Irish Transport and General Workers Union. Railwaymen in
Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham attempted to take
2sympathetic strike action but were opposed by their own 
union leader J.H. Thomas who along with James Sexton of the 
dockers union played a crucial role in preventing unified
3
trade union action in support of the Dubliners. The
lack of British support in this dispute embittered Anglo-
Irish trade union relations and left behind a legacy of
deep suspicion. Relations between the two union movements
did not improve during the ensuing war, especially when
the engineering unions refused to discipline members who
strenuously objected to Irish immigrant workers being given
4relatively well paid jobs in the munition works. The 
miners were however, as usual, the exceptions to British 
trade unionist lack of solidarity with Irish .workers; 
their Federation gave large sums of money to the Dublin
1 See D. Ryan, James Connolly, (1924), 62-8.
2 Ibid., 62.
3 See Morton and Tate, op. cit., 251.
4 See Munitions Ministry File 5-58-320/44
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1913 workers^ and in South Wales there was even some indus-
2
trial action after James Connolly's execution with a
small group of miners even going over to Ireland to help
3
in the Sinn Fein election campaign. Later on, in January 
1921, 400 Scottish miners at the Griffnick colliery struck 
for a day in protest against the "Military Occupation of
4
Ireland" and were subsequently locked out by the owners.
In general however the attitude of the British trade union 
movement towards their Government's policy in Ireland was 
symbolized by Sexton's warning to the Liverpool Irish 
dockers that their strike action,in solidarity with the 
hunger striking Wormwood Scrubs Irish internees,who inclu­
ded prominent trade union leaders like William O'Brien,
did not have "authority from their union and (they) would
5
receive no strike pay". The British unions were not even 
prepared to support the right of their Irish members to 
work without interference from the British Army. Following 
the killing of Irish railwaymen by British troops the 
Irish section of the NUR refused to convey military person­
nel or supplies in a bid to force an enquiry into the
1 According to James O'Connor, History of Ireland, (1925), 
Vol. 2, 192, the Miners Federation voted a £1,000 a 
week for the Dublin lockout fund. The Miners Federation 
President Robert Smillie was. born in Belfast.
2 R. Page Arnot, The Miners, (1953), Vol.' 3, 164-71 claims 
that m  South Wales Connolly's execution had an "appre­
ciable effect" on the coalfields there.
3 Ibid. One of these miners, Arthur Horner a future NUM 
leader actually joined the Irish Citizens Army - Irish 
Democrat, Oct., 1968.
4 ROR 91 3 Feb., 1921. CP 2541. CAB 24/119.
5 Times, 29 April, 1920.
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1
killings and were locked out by the companies. An.Irdsh
1 anti-militarism1 general strike ensued but J.H. Thomas
refused to support his Irish section's strike call decla-
2ring it "meant a declaration of war on the Government".
He subsequently claimed that "not five percent of the men
3
would strike in England on that issue". The Miners 
Federation call for unified strike action in solidarity
4
with the Irish railwaymen was rejected by the TUC.
J.H. Thomas's action was in direct contrast to the NUR's 
instructions to its English members not to load munitions 
on the Jolly George for use by the Poles against the Soviet 
Union and this unfavourable comparison was the subject of 
considerable comment by ISDL members. Quoting one sailor 
as stating "we will ship all that is needed to blow hell
i
out of the lot of them", meaning the Irish, an Intelligence 
Officer assured the Cabinet that a Jolly George situation
5
would not arise over its Irish policy. To prevent British
1 See Charles Townshend, 'The Irish Railway Strike of 
1920: Industrial Action and Civil Resistance in the
Struggle for Independence', Irish Historical Studies,
21 (1977/8), 265-82.
2 Times, 13 July, 1920.
3 Cardiff Western Mail, 18 Jan., 1921.
4 The Locomotive Drivers and Firemen's section did want
to strike in solidarity with their Irish colleagues, 
see DE 2/48, O'Brien Memo, 14 Feb., 1921, and ROR 92,
10 Feb., 1921. CP 2574. CAB 24/119. The Central 
London Branch of the National Union of Clerks also con­
demned Thomas and called for a General Strike against
the Military Occupation of Ireland' - O'Brien ms 8427.
5 ROR 55, 20 April, 1920. CP 1328. CAB 24/106.
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munitions being used against the Soviet Union, the TUC,
and Labour Party leadership called for the establishment
1
of Councils of Action. Some of the 350 local Councils
of Action endeavoured to link the Irish and Russian situ-
2 3ations and in areas like Merthyr Tydfil and Birmingham
local ISDL branches held joint meetings with Labour
parties and trades councils on this issue. Despite an
4
editorial appeal by the Manchester Guardian the National
Council of Action however refused to extend its mandate
to Ireland and strongly urged local Councils to cease 
*5such agitation. Similar local joint ISDL-Trades Council 
meetings were held in protest against the wholesale expul­
sion of Catholic,and a few non-sectarian Protestant,trade 
unionists from Belfast engineering plants. The Amal­
gamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners actually expel­
led the majority of its Belfast membership for refusing to 
strike in sympathy with the expelled workers but the TUC
7
ordered them to be reinstated in the union. The ISDL
1 See C.J. MacFarlane, 'Hands of Russia: British Labour 
and the Russo-Polish War 1920', Past and Present,
No. 38, (1968).
2 Merthyr Tydfil Pioneer, 4 Dec., 1920.
3 Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
(1979), 47-60.
4 22 Sept., 1920.
5 White, op. cit., 69.
6 See reports in O'Brien, Ms 8547.
7 See Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland The Orange State,
(19 76), 33. Val McEntee the Carpenters leader was born 
in Dublin and subsequently became an MP and PaerjSee 
Kendall, op. cit., 347.
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had good relations with the National Building Labourersx 
Union whose General Secretary D. Haggarty was active in 
Irish politic'-, in Britain and local branches provided meet­
ing places for the ISDL. One South London Branch of this 
Union was known as the Shamrock Branch on account of its 
largely Irish membership and their premises were also used 
by the Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club.**" Docker union branch 
premises were also used by the ISDL.
Despite the very ; cautious attitude of the ISDL Executive
2towards involvement with the Labour Party, some branches
maintained very good relations with their local party.
This was particularly noticeable in Poplar where Labour
celebrated its taking control of the Borough,by marching
en masse to the Town Hall,behind an Irish drum and fife 
3band. Most of the Labour Councillors in Poplar were sup­
porters if not actual members of the ISDL and Councillor 
John Scurr the former UIL London dockers leader, who 
became a Daily Herald journalist, was prominent in the 
London District ISDL Committee. Poplar Council due to 
its high poor law relief rates and municipal works scheme 
soon found itself in conflict with the Government especially 
when it refused to pay the Police Rate precept. After a
1 Irish Democrat, June,, 1952.
2 The ISDL May Day demonstration was described as being 
"entirely distinct from any other gathering which may 
be held in Hyde Park on the same day, it will be Irish 
through and through", Irish Exile, April, 1921.
3 Noreen Branson, Poplarism 1919-25 , (1979) , 19.
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celebrated legal case all thirty councillors were jailed 
in September 1921 for six weeks, declaring it would be 
"an honour to be imprisoned in the place where MacSwiney 
had died".^
The blatant defiance of the law by the Poplar Councillors,
and the level of support their actions attracted seriously
2embarrassed the Labour Party leadership. Equally embaras- 
sing was the attitude of the Irish Labour Party; eventually 
in November 1920.the British Labour leadership 'persuaded1 
the Irish Party to accept conditional self determination in 
return for sending a Labour Party Commission of Inquiry to 
Ireland. The Commission was to have sat in the Cork City 
Hall but this was destroyed in a Black and Tan wave of 
arson shortly before and its destruction undoubtedly influ­
enced the Commission's observation that "things are being 
done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink
O
in the nostrils of the whole world". The Commissions
Report denounced,
"the outrages committed in the name of Sinn Fein.
These things have injured and disgraced a cause 
which would if a policy of violence had not been 
started have commanded the sympathy and respect
1 For the Poplar Rates strike and aftermath see Branson, 
op. cit. Charles Key, Red Poplar, (1925), Ministry of 
Health Inquiry, (1922) Guilty and Proud of It, (1922) .
2 See G.V?. Jones, 'Herbert Morrison and Poplarism* Public 
JLajtL, (1973) , 11-31.
3 Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland, (1921), 56.
4 Ibid., 63.
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A special Labour Party Conference was convened at the end 
of December 1920 to discuss the Commission’s Report. Only 
one resolution was put to the 800 delegates, calling for 
an immediate election to elect a constitutional assembly 
to draft "without limitation or fetters, whatever constit­
ution for Ireland, Irish people desire, subject to only 
two conditions, that it affords protection to minorities 
and that the constitution should prevent Ireland.from 
becoming a military or naval menace to Great Britain".^
Two years previously the Irish. Labour Party had written 
"An Open letter to the Workers of Great Britain" comparing
the attitude of British workers to Irish claims, to that
2
of a liberal slaveowner. And now the Commission Report
showed how little change had occured in Labour Party
thinking on Ireland since 1914. Attempts to amend the
Conference resolution and delete the "military or naval
menace" section were brushed aside,as it had been inserted
according to the.Conference chairman "to meet public super-
. 3
stition and prejudice" . This frank admission by the 
Conference chairman effectively exposed the real foundations 
of Labour's advocacy of Irish self government; it was. a
4
serious political disability an unpopular cause".
And when the Anglo-Irish negotiations broke down in July
1 Commission Report, op. cit., 118.
2 Daily Herald, 16 Nov., 1918.
3 Commission Report, op. cit., 118.
4 139 H C Debs 5. Col 2121.
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1921, Ramsay MacDonald expressed his concern that Lloyd 
George would call a General Election which would be dom­
inated "by the passionate prejudices that can be raised 
against an independent Ireland" and feared that Labour 
would lose seats.^ Yet the Labour Lord Mayor of Cardiff,
who publicly welcomed the released . local Irish political 
2
prisoners , defied such prejudices and no doubt the English 
born Councillor Ludlow,the only Labour representative on 
the Oxford City Council,hardly found his membership of
3
the ISDL a decided electoral advantage. In 1921 the 
Labour Party launched a National Campaign for Peace in
4
Ireland; in the first two months of the year they held
5
500 meetings and distributed over seven million leaflets. 
But as Captain Berkely observed, the Labour Party had 
waited until the "Political atmosphere was entirely dif­
ferent" from the 1919-20 period.^ In the 1921 Kircaldy 
by-election • the chief issues were described as "unemployment 
and Ireland'*with the Labour victor describing his win as
7
"a measure of hope to the Irish people".
1 M. Venkataramani, 'Ramsay MacDonald and Britain's
Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations 1919-1931',
Political Studies, 8(1960), 231-40.
2 Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
3 Ibid., Dec., 1921.
4 See The Labour Party and Ireland, (1921).
5 D. Williams, op. cit., 147.
6 D. Boyce, op. cit., 70.
7 Ibid., 30.
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Ramsay MacDonald, during the 1914 Home Rule debate,declared 
Labour would not permit Ulster "to deny the rights of 
Ireland ever to speak and to act or to govern itself as 
an united nationality":^ Between 1914 and 1921 Labour did 
little to prevent the partitioning of1 Ireland. It could 
perhaps be argued that it was powerless and in opposition 
during this period)yet Labour refused to mobilize the 
power of the Labour Movement,by resolutely opposing all 
suggestions of direct action. We shall subsequently 
observe how Labour, when it came to power, in 1924, refused 
to undertake a more equitable rearrangement of the parti­
tion boundaries and how in 1949 it erected a new defence 
line for the partitionists. Clarkson's observation on 
the "unwillingness of British Labour to let itself be
2put to either trouble or expense on behalf of Irish Labour" 
goes a long way to explaining the isolationist/exclusivist 
spirit that permeated the ISDL's Constitution. Walter 
Hampson the Irish socialist journalist and a member of
3
the ILP bitterly reproached Labour for its attitude to
Ireland which he argued was driving Irish people out of
4the Party in Britain. A similar experience drove leading 
Indian nationalists into the arms of the communists in the
1 LIX HC Debs Col 937.
2 Op. cit., 161.
3 For biographical details see J.M. Bellamy and John 
Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol. 6 , (1982), 
131-5.
4 Labour Leader, May, 1921.
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1
1920s and so we shall now consider the relationship between 
the ISDL and the communists or non Labour Party left.
Addendum
Part of this research was originally undertaken on behalf
of the International Tribunal on Britain's Presence in 
2
Ireland and was presented in the format of a paper on the 
'British Labour Party and Ireland 1919-1979' to the Paris 
Hearing of the Tribunal (January 1979). Unfortunately the 
seizure by C13 (Anti Terrorist Squad) officers of much of 
the Tribunal's documentation prevented the planned publica-
3
tion of a volume of evidence.
I only became aware after this chapter was written of two
works dealing with the British Labour Party during this
4period. The first is a thesis by Barry Stubbs and the
*
1 See Partha Gupta, 'British Labour and the Indian Question 
in B.R. Nanda, Socialism In India, (Dehli, 1972), 68- 
121.
2 The Tribunal, based on the format of the earlier 'Russell 
Tribunals' was sponsored by many prominent figures like 
Jean Paul Sartre and Jane Fonda. It held hearings in 
Paris and London during 1979.
3 This planned volume of evidence would have constituted 
probably the most important source of recent northern 
Irish political, social , and economic research data yet 
collected.
4 Barry Stubbs, The Attitude of the British Labour Party 
to the 'Irish Question' 1906-1951. Unpublished London 
School of Economic M. Phil Thesis (1974).
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4
second Geoffrey Bell’s recently published book. Most of 
Stubbs' account for the 1914-23 period uses the sources I 
had already utilized in this chapter but I found his later 
section on the introduction of the 1949 Government of Ireland 
Act very informative. In general Stubbs has made only min­
imal use of the 1919-23 British Government records: an omi­
ssion only partly rectified by Bell's admittedly highly 
committed, polemical account. I have personally found Bell's 
work to be somewhat of a disappointment, owing ot his hap­
hazard and superficial investigation of Cabinet records 
though I acknowledge that Bell has utilised a source - the 
recently catalogued Labour Party Archives - that I did not 
have access to.
Despite these reservations both works are small oases irri­
gating the desert of serious research on the British Labour
Party and Ireland. It seems unbelievable that otherwVise
2 3very competent researchers like Moore, McKibbin and
4
Mackenzie could so totally ignore the attitude of the British 
Labour Movement to Ireland, particularly when so many Irish 
people were actively involved in the evolution of the British 
Labour Party.
1 Geoffrey Bell, Troublesome Business: The Labour Party 
and the Irish Question (1982).
2 Roger Moore, The Emergence of the Labour Party 1830-1924 
(1978).
3 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910- 
1924 (1974). This published version of a D. Phil thesis 
contains only one very brief reference to Ireland.
4 Alan Mackenzie, British Mafoists and the Empire: Anti- 
Imperialist Theory and Practice 1920-1925. Unpublished 
London University Phd thesis (1978).
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CHAPTER 14
The Non-Labour Party Left and Ireland
The Irish struggle for national independence coincided with 
the Russian Revolution and the subsequent struggle for 
survival by the flelgling Soviet Union. The reverberations 
of that titanic clash echoed around the world, generating 
in Britain the impulse to unify the Non-Labour Party left 
wing organizations into a Communist Party at the time the 
Irish Self Determination League was evolving. We have 
already observed that some of the Councils of Action/organ­
ized by the Labour Party and TUC to prevent the export of 
munitions to anti-Soviet forces, attempted to link that 
cause with the Irish struggle. The issue of Ireland and 
Russia often featured at local ISDL public meetings but 
when, at the large November 1919 national ISDL Albert Hall 
meeting, some of the speakers pursued this relationship,
Art O'Brien subsequently complained that the "speeches of 
Lansbury, Williams, Jack Jones and Dr Dunstan were extremely 
disappointing. Instead of keeping to the subject of the 
resolution they wandered off to Russia on every possible 
occasion and waxed a good deal more enthusiastic about 
Russia than they did with regard to Ireland".^ Yet we have 
already observed,that despite O'Brien's personal lack of 
sympathy with British Labour Party's socio-economic poli­
cies, he was instructed by the Dail leadership in Ireland 
to issue propaganda directly orientated towards the Labour
1 O'Brien Ms. 8427.
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Movement. As the Irish Diplomatic Representative in 
London, O'Brien was obliged to implement the policies of 
his Government. And the Irish Government had a very 
definite . policy towards the Soviet Union; for its first 
diplomatic negotiations were conducted with the Soviet 
Union, initially with their representatives in New York 
who in return for an Irish loan handed over the Czar's 
Crown Jewels as surety"*' and then directly in the Soviet
2
Union, by Dr MacCartan the Dail Envoy to the United States.
According to the Draft Treaty negotiated between the
Irish Republic and Russian Socialist Federation Soviet 
3
Republic, the two Governments pledged themselves to 
exert their "influence on all organizations and elements 
which are responsive" to them " in order to prevent the 
transportation of arms, munitions, and military supplies
4
intended for use against" both countries. As Dr MacCartan 
observed, this Draft Treaty had practical implications for 
the Irish Movement in Britain, "they may be able to help 
us in England, the Treaty itself is bound to affect both
1 25,000 dollars were lent to the Soviet representatives
in New York. The Crown Jewels were finally returned 
in 194 9 after featuring in 'Moscow Gold' allegations 
in the 1948 Election; see Michael Mclnerney, Irish 
Times, 14 Dec., 1976.
2 See DE 2/264 and DE 2/119 for the negotiations.
3 The Draft Treaty was due to subsequent events in 
Ireland never formally ratified by the Dail.
4 The Draft Treaty and captured correspondence relating 
to the negotiations was subsequently published as a 
White Paper by the British Government, see Intercourse 
Between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein, Cmd 1326 (1921), 3
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of us in this respect on account of the germ noticeable
in all labour organizations".'*' The Irish Labour Movement
2
enthusiastically welcomed the Russian Revolution and in
a bid to assuage bourgeois Catholic fears the Soviet Union
offered to entrust "to the accredited representative of the
Republic of Ireland in Russia the interests of the Roman
Catholic Church within the territory of the Russian
3
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic".
Lenin had vehemently criticized those, particularly in 
Britain, who had condemned the 1916 Rising arguing that 
"whoever describes this rebellion as a 'Putsch' is either 
the worst kind of reactionary, or so doctrinaire as to
be hopelessly incapable of imagining a social revolution
■4as a living phenomenon." Ireland was referred to, albeit
5
rather briefly, in the anti-colonial section of the 
Manifesto of the Communist International to the Workers 
of the World, issued by the 1919 First World Congress of 
the Third International or Comintern. By the time of the 
Second World Congress, in mid 1920, the fighting in Ireland 
had reached such a level that the country's struggle for
1 Ibid.,4.
2 See Irish Labour and its International Relations, op. cit. 
20 and Arthur Mitchell, 'Ireland and the Soviet Union', 
Capuchin Annual, (1975), 164-8.
3 Irish Times, 14 Dec., 1976.
4 V. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XIII, (Moscow, 1929),
429.
5 See Leon Trotsky, The First Five Years of the Communist 
International, Vol. I (1973), 48-9.
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freedom was getting much more publicity than the previous
year. And this was reflected in the Congress's Manifesto
which contained an explicit rebuke to British Socialists.
Denouncing the Labour Party attitude it condemned "The
British Socialist who fails to support by all possible
means the uprisings in Ireland, Egypt and India  such
a Socialist deserves to be branded with infamy, if not a
bullet". Lenin had always insisted that the "Social-
Democrats of the oppressor nations must demand that the
2oppressed nations should have the right of secession • and 
this requirement was constitutionally embodied in the 
Second Congress Manifesto which required all affiliated 
parties in countries with colonial possessions to render 
"direct assistance to the revolutionary movement in depen-
3
dent or unequal countries". Such parties were instructed 
to adopt "a particularly explicit and clear attitude on
4
this question, not merely words but deeds".
Even without these Comintern stipulations and financial
5
pressures from the Soviet Union , the emerging Communist 
Party of Great Britain and its associated groupings to the 
left of the Labour party could not have been unaffected by
1 Kommunistickeski International Vtovoi Komintern, (Moscow,
1972), 492.
2 V. Lenin, 'The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Rights 
of Nations to Self-Determination' - Collected Works,
XXI, op. cit., 409.
3 Kommunisticheski International Vtovoi Kongress Komintern, 
(Moscow, 1972 edt), 492-3.
4 Ibid.
5 W. Kendall, op. cit., 292-302 argued that the Communist
contd.
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the Irish struggle. Many of the leading British Communists 
had close personal connections with Ireland, W.B. Coates, 
a leading founder member of the Communist Party and 
Secretary of the Hands, off Russia Committee ,was Irish
born,^ Arthur MacManus was the Glaswegian son of an Irish
2 3Fenian, William Gallacher's father was also Irish as
4
was another prominent Communist, J.T. Murphy. Most of 
their Irish connections were not confined to family back­
ground, both Murphy and MacManus had been greatly influ-
5
enced by James Connolly. Murphy went so far as to call 
Connolly "a Communist before there was a Communist Move- 
ment". Connolly had originally undergone his political 
socialization in the Edinburgh branch of the Social 
Democratic Federation - the pioneer of British Marxism - 
where his mentor was the old Fenian John Leslie, the author
contd.
Party of Great Britain was an external creation brought 
about largely through Soviet Union finance.
1 Coates had been a union organizer in Ireland, see James 
Klugman, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
Vol. I (1968), 44. Hobsbawm has said of Klugman's 
official history "unfortunately he is paralysed by the 
impossibility of being a good historian and a loyal 
functionary", quoted in Henry Pelling, The British 
Communist Party , (1975 edt.). Klugman's work contains
virtually nothing of consequence on his party's relation­
ship with the Irish struggle.
2 Kendall, op. cit., 359.
3 See William Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde, (1978),1. 
Gallacher unfortunately does not refer to the Scottish 
Sinn Fein or IRA in his autobiography.
4 See. J.T. Murphy, New Horizons, (1941), 16.
5 Kendall, op. cit., 162.
6 Murphy, ibid., 41.
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of an early Marxist analysis of Ireland^ but who subse-
1 I
I I
quently condemned 1916;although he was originally
responsible for Connolly first going to Ireland as the
2
organizer for the Dublin Socialist Club. The SDF was 
never a revolutionary organization in the Bolshevik 
tradition and as the 20th century progressed its line on 
supporting the Irish Revolutionary Movement steadily 
weakened with its remnants in 1922 calling for support
3
for the Free State forces in the Civil War. Connolly
despairing of the SDF's lack of interest in industrial
agitation was in the forefront of the group of dissidents
who broke away from t he SDF in 1903 to form the Socialist 
4Labour Party. Connolly even after he went to Ireland 
remained in close touch with his SLP comrades. His 
Workers Republic was frequently used as a platform by them
5
and the anti-Hyndman left of the SDF. When the Workers 
Republic was banned by the British, its successors 
including the Irish Worker were printed by the SLP and
g
smuggled into Ireland. The SLP later also printed the
7
Sinn Fein publication Dark Rosaleen.
1 The Irish Question by John Leslie was first published
serially in Justice between 24 March and 5 May 1894 and 
republished as a pamphlet several times.
2 Ibid., (Cork, 1974, edt.), Introductory Note.
3 See SDF resolution in the Manchester Evening News,
24 Aug., 1922.
4 See J.T. Murphy, Preparing For Power, (1934), 87.
5 See Raymond Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism,
(1977), 17-20. This work is essentially an account of 
the SLP.
6 Ibid., 127, 153-4. 7 Ibid., 268.
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The Socialist Labour Party had a pronounced industrial
orientation and viewed electoral participation at any
level of the political system,whether national or local"^
in the same way that Sinn Fein regarded Westminster. To
the SLP, Ireland was the "Achilles heel of British Capita- 
2lism" and it devoted more of its energies to the Irish 
issue than most of the British left groupings. It spons­
ored a series of meetings by Sean McLoughlin of the 
Socialist Party of Ireland and later Secretary of the 
Irish Communist Party. 20,000 people heard McLoughlin
3
speak at nine Yorkshire meetings in mid 1920. Several
SLP members were jailed for advocating that British troops
4 5should refuse to serve in Ireland. John MacLean was
only a member of the SLP for a short period but more
than any other Scottish, English, or Welsh socialist
revolutionary, MacLean personified the Connolly tradition.
Appointed Soviet consul for Scotland .Maclean strongly
believed that a Bolshevik style revolution was possible in
Britain in the near future. Kendall suggests that Maclean's
belief in the possibility of armed revolution, a belief
not shared by the leading English Communists, was largely
g
based on his contact with the IRA in Scotland. In the
1 W. Kendall, op. cit., 71-2.
2 Challinor, ibid., 2661
3 Ibid., 267.
4 See trial reports in The Socialist, 6-, 12 May, 1920 and 
28 July, 1921.
5 See Nan Milton, John Maclean, (1973).
6 Kendall, op. cit., 290.
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post war period, Clydeside became known on account of
1 2its militancy as 'Red Clydeside’ and Kendall and Brown
3
and Wood all argue that the Irish immigrants with their 
tradition of insurrectionism were an important component 
in creating ’Red Clydeside'. We shall subsequently observe 
in our study of the IRA the extent to which John Maclean's 
links with the IRA and Sinn Fein in Scotland so worried 
the government. Maclean's paper the Vanguard constantly 
advocated support for Irish Republicanism: it graphically 
covered the Connaught Rangers Mutiny by a front page cover
4
proclaiming it to be "The Greatest Deed in British History1' . 
His message of total support for Irish Republicanism was 
not without a following for his pamphlet The Irish Tragedy: 
Scotland's Disgrace sold 20,000 copies in a very short 
period.^
Maclean joined the SLP largely, because he disliked the 
intense sectarianism of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain; a sectarianism demonstrated by their call to 
their membership to boycott those of Sean McLoughlin's 
meetings organized by the SLP. Only some 540 of the
1 Kendall, op. cit., 107.
2 Kenneth D. Brown, The English Labour Movement, 1700- 
1951, (Dublin, 1982), 217.
3 Ian Wood, 'Irish Nationalism and Radical Politics in 
Scotland 1880-1906', Scottish Labour History Society 
Journal, 9(1975), 21-38.
4 Vanguard, July, 1920.
5 John Maclean, op. cit., 238.
5 The Socialist , 14 April, 1921. For CPGB/Socialist Labour
contd.
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SLP 1200 members in 1920 had initially joined the new
Communist Party^; and Maclean apparently joined the
Glasgow based SLP with the intention of converting it
into the Scottish Communist Party, the CPGB leadership
2had consistently refused to sanction. Scotland was not the 
only country that the British Communists believed should 
come under the control of the CPGB for their representatives 
on the Comintern Executive initially sought to include
3
their Irish counterparts in a federated CPGB. The 
Irish Communists refused this invitation and, as we shall 
subsequently observe, the relationship between the two
4neighbouring Parties was somewhat less than fraternal.
The West Indian Communist Claude McKay felt so strongly 
that some of his fellow CPGB members had little sympathy 
for the Irish and Indian independence movements;that he 
publicly accused them of favouring a "Socialist British
5
Empire".
contd.
Labour League sectarianism, see the rather partisan 
publication by a member , B. Pearce, Early History of 
of the CPGB, (1966).
1 Kendall, op. cit., 303-5.
2 Ibid., 289-91.
3 Ibid., 232 and also see the memoirs of a Special Branch 
officer, Herbert Fitch, Traitors Within, (1933).
4 The CPGB publication, The Irish Crisis, (1921) officially 
expressed complete support for the Irish cause but the 
reality was rather different.
5 Workers Dreadnought, 31 Jan., 1920.
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At the Communist Unity Convention of January 1921, which 
finally 'fused' most of the left groupings into the CPGB, 
the largest contingent present was from the British 
Socialist Party. This Party had emerged from the main­
stream of the SDF. John, Scurr had served on the Executive
2
of the British Socialist Party but this Party was not 
nearly as active on the Irish issue as the SLP. Some 
ISDL branches and Sinn Fein cumanns maintained a working 
relationship, at the local level, with the Workers
3
Socialist Federation, a group of about 600 members pub-
4lishing the Workers Dreadnought and led by Sylvia Pankhurst. 
Ostensibly its rigid anti-parliamentarism and its refusal 
to affiliate to the Labour Party made this grouping , which 
changed its name to the CP(BSTI),before the CPGB was 
actually formed/rather attractive to those in the ISDL 
who refused to associate with organizations putting up 
candidates for Westminster. However, Maire O'Neill 
(Manning), Sylvia Pankhurst's secretary,had made herself 
very unpopular with the ISDL's leadership, owing to her 
tendency to grossly exaggerate her own earlier part in
5
the Irish Movement. A few ISDL members belonged to the
1 According to Kendall, op. cit., 303-5, the BSP claimed 
to have 10,000 members but this he argues is very much 
an inflated figure.
2 See N. Branson, Poplarism, op. cit., 227.
3 See Kendall, op. cit., 303-5.
4 See E.S. Pankhurst, The Home Front, (1932), and The
Suffragette Movement, (1931).
5 See letter from Markievicz to O'Brien repudiating
0'Neill' s claims to be a Cuman V'lia'mBan officer, 16 May,
1919, Ms 8427.
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small International Communist League but Art O'Brien 
briskly rejected their appeals for financial assistance 
to organize ICL demonstrations on Ireland.^
Writing 35 years later, a Connolly Association member - a
group closely connected with the CPGB7 claimed that
although the CPGB had organized a Hands Off Ireland move- 
2
ment, many of the members in the leadership of the ISDL
distrusted the CPGB front, "the fact that they were men
who had said 'Hands off Russia' led them to hesitate about 
3
them". But while some ISDL leaders like J. McManus,the
Leeds ISDL District President, who made a bitter anti-
4
Soviet speech at his union conference, were fervently anti­
communist, other leaders like John Scurr were radicals. 
Brian O'Kennedy the first editor of the Irish Exile wrote 
an article in which the basic Marxist concepts of alien­
ation and false consciousness were clearly expressed, 
albeit in a non theoretical formulation. Referring to 
"the character of the English worker who still wears the 
shackles of feudalism, but because the little bunch of 
plutocrats and landed proprietors at the top persuade him 
that their freedom is also his, he choruses out stridently
1 O'Brien, 30 Sept., 1920, Ms 8433.
2 Irish Freedom, June, 1942.
3 Irish Democrat, Oct., 1954.
4 McManus was a member of the Post Office Workers Union 
and was trying to prevent the affiliation of the equi­
valent Russian union to the International Postal Union 
Federation, Catholic Herald, 12 May, 1923.
'Britons, never, never shall be slaves'".^ In general,
the most progressive elements in the ISDL were to be found,
not unexpectedly^ in the branches located in the coalfields/
particularly in South Wales. The Pontypridd ISDL Branch's
denounciation that,
"the relief given to the employed and unemployed 
by the Guardians is more of a curse than a blessing 
because they relieve slightly the pangs of hunger.
If these pangs were not relieved then perhaps they 
might make an attempt to cast aside this accursed 
Government of England whose only aim is to enslave 
the world"..2
was no doubt one of the incidents that resulted in the
Cabinet being informed that with regard to the Red
3
International Trade Union sponsored Coalfield Conference 
the "strongest part of the movement here is composed of 
Irish people".^
Several League branches were officially represented at
this Conference much to the chagrin of the League's
leadership who certainly did not share Richard Dawson's,
.their unionist opponent's, enthusiastic belief that "the
appearance of Sinn Fein on the Bolshevist platforms in
5
London is all to the good". Dawson was commissioned by the 
Irish Unionist Alliance to write a book 'exposing' the
1 Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
2 Ibid.
3 R.I.L.U. known as the Profintern was effectively the 
Trade Union equivalent of the Comintern and was strongest 
in Britain in the small mining communities, see J.T.
Murphy, Preparing for Power, (1934) , 203-16.
4 ROR 94. 24 Feb., 1921. CP 2631. CAB 24/120.
5 Dawson, op. cit.
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Sinn Fein-Bolshevik alliance'*' and this 'relationship1
formed a central part of the Unionist propaganda to
2 3British political parties and the general public
4
against Irish independence. This propaganda campaign 
was greatly facilitated by the British Government's pub­
lication of a White paper, Intercourse between Bolshevism
5
and Sinn Fein. But by the time this White Paper appeared
in 1921, it was already considerably out of date as
relations between the Irish and Soviet Governments had
cooled somewhat; notably on the part of the Russians who
were now reluctant to endanger their new Trade Agreement
with the British,by permitting further contacts between
Irish Republicans and Soviet Government officials in
£
their London Trade Delegation. British Intelligence had
1 See Irish Unionist Alliance, London Committee, Minutes,
3 May, 1919. D 989A/1/11 (P.R.O.N.l.) . The book in 
question was Red Terror and Green, (1920).
2 The Southern Irish Loyalists Defence Fund sent a
deputation to meet the Parliamentary National Demo­
cratic Party (27 April, 1920) on this issue; see
D 989 A/9/25 and all the members of the House of Commons 
were presented in May 1921 with the pamphlet, The 
Conspiracy Against the British Empire, Ireland and The 
Revolution, see D 989 C/l/41.
3 W.M. Jellet's pamphlet, Home Rule and After, Ireland and 
the World Wide Conspiracy, was widely distributed by 
the IUA's London Committee.
4 A set of speakers notes was drawn up by the IUA's
London Committee, D 989 C/2/17.
5 Cmd 132 6 ,,
6 See M.V. Glenny, 'The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement,
March 1921', Journal of Contemporary History, 5(1970), 
74-97. “ “
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noted several such contacts in 1920^ but none were 
reported the following year. It is reasonable to assume 
that if such further contacts had been known to have 
occurred in 1921 they would certainly have been reported 
to the Cabinet. For intelligence reports concerning 
Soviet training and financial aid for Indian revolution­
aries produced a Cabinet warning that resulted in the
2
closure of the Indian Military Academy in Tashkent.
It does not of course necessarily follow from this that 
all contact between the Irish Republicans and the.Soviet 
Government had actually ceased for the Comintern effec­
tively controlled by the Russian Party functioned as a 
Soviet surrogate. So that while the Soviet Government 
was establishing formal diplomatic relations with Britain, 
the Comintern was constructing an elaborate underground. 
network using non-Soviet citizens to prevent any embarras­
sment to the Soviet Government if they were arrested.
One such arrested Comintern agent, Erkki Veltheim.a Finn
had been entrusted with establishing an underground mili- 
3tary network. His arrest led to the imprisonment of 
Colonel Malone, the radical MP, believed to be behind an
1 ROR 40. 5 Feb., 1920. CP 579. CAB 24/97., and ROR 53.
6 May, 1920. CP 1239. CAB 24/105.
2 See Zafar Iman, 'Effects of the Russian Revolution on 
India', St Anthony Papers, No. 18, (1966), 74-97.
3 See Times, 3 Nov., 1920 and also see Claude McKay,
A long way From Home, (New York, 1937), 85-6.
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attempt to create a Red Officer Corp5 in Britain.'*' Docu­
ments seized when Veltheim was arrested also indicated
2
that his mission involved contact with the IRA t though
it is not known whether this had in fact occurred before
3
his arrest. Despite the British Cabinet's concern there 
is no substantive evidence that the IRA received arms or 
explosives from any Comintern/CPGB network. It would seem 
that while some mutual exchange of intelligence did occur 
and some Republicans obtained false passporHs through the 
Communist underground, that this very limited aid was 
the sum total of Lenin's demand that the CPGB should aid 
the Irish Republicans with "deeds not words". Detective 
Inspector Herbert Fitch of the Special Branch went so far 
as to give the CPGB a character reference with his obser­
vation that,
1 British Communists, at least those whom I have 
met, look askance at murder and bloodshed as
political tools  it is a great pity that
the foreign brand brings so much opprobrium to 
the home product".4
1 See Herbert T. Finch, Traitors Within: The Adventures
of Detective Inspector Herbert T. Fitch, (1933), 87-9.
H. Pelling, op. cit., 16, intrigingly wrote "it is 
not unreasonable that the Irish strain was a factor
in bringing the Party some of its recruits frommthe 
professional classes such as Colonel Malone". But 
Malone was certainly not Irish born and I have been 
unable to establish any close family tie with Ireland.
2 Kendall, op. cit., 255.
3 ROR 40. 5 Feb., 1920. CP 574. CAB 24/97.
4 Fitch, op. cit., 87. ^
A few incidents concerning the supply of munitions to
the IRA by outsiders are recorded in Home Office files
but significantly none involved members of the CPGB. Most
involved supporters of the Wobblies,“Industrial Workers
of the World"/ or a small independent left wing group work-
2ing in the Woolwich Arsenal. But certainly nothing remotely
approaching the Jeanson ReseaUj(the French organization that
provided arms and safehouses for the Algerian ALN and
3acted as its ’banker’ in France) appeared in Britain to 
aid the Irish cause during the period under discussion.
It cannot be argued that such activities were totally 
beyond the experience of the British left for a British 
network, which included the prominent Irish born Fabian 
S.G. Hobhouse, smuggled at least 6,000 pistols to Russia
4
for use in the 1905 Insurrection. Nor can it be convin­
cingly argued that smuggling arms^even in 1920 was an 
unduly hazardous activity, involving severe penalties, , 
for under the then existing legislation the illegal posses­
sion of arms carried prison sentences measured more in 
terms of months than years.
1 ROR 18. 25 Aug., 1919. GT 8082. CAB 24/87.
2 ROR 187. 4 Jan., 1923. CP4(23). CAB 24/158.
3 The Jeanson Reseau consisted of about 40 French leftists
see Francis Jeanson, Notre Guerre, (Paris, 1960), and
La Revolution Algerienne, Problemes et Perspectives, 
(Paris, 1962).
4 See S.G. Hobson, Pilgrim To The Left, (1938), 125-7, 
and Michael Futrell, Northern Underground, (1963) , for 
a comprehensive account of this episode.
431
The extremely cautious attitude of the CPGB regarding
practical assistance to Irish revolutionaries or even to
stopping British arms shipments to Ireland and dissuading
troops from service in Ireland was,like the subsequent
French Communist vehement attack on the Jeanson Reseau)
largely the result of their fear of being identified as
acting in a treasonable manner. When this very fear was
actually openly expressed by a British delegate to the
Second Congress of the Comintern/ an Irish delegate, who
informed the assembly, that attitude to Ireland was the
"barometer of social revolutionary feeling in Britain"
scathingly remarked, "With regard to the statement that
the British workers will regard as treason to England the
support of the colonial revolutionary struggle against
British Imperialism, the sooner the British workers get
familiar with treason to the bourgeois state the better
2
for the revolutionary movement". The Socialist, the 
organ of the SLP which,as we have already observed, had 
members jailed for anti recruiting,activities succinctly, 
if bluntly, summed up the overall attitude of the British 
Labour movement towards the Irish war, "The old game goes 
merrily on. On the same boat as the resolutions of sympathy 
come 10,000 bombs, made by British Labour and fired by 
British Labour into Irish Towns to kill Irishmen and des-
3
troy Irish homes. Resolutions on paper won’t do".
1 See Irwin Wall, 'The French Communists and the Algerian 
War1, Journal of Contemporary History, 12(1977),521-43.
2 Kommunisticheski International Vtovoi Kongress Komintern
(Moscow, 1972), 145-6.
3 The Socialist, 3 Jan, 1921.
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In 1887, three people were killed and many wounded in 
fierce police and army charges when 80,000 English and 
Irish workers attempted to hold a London protest meeting 
against the arrest of a single Irish MP.^ A generation 
later not only the arrests of thousands/ btit a wholesale 
execution policy failed to evoke a British working class 
reaction on anything even approaching a fraction of this 
scale.
Art O'Brien's antipathy towards left wing organizations, 
even those actively supporting the Irish cause; was streng­
thened by incidents like the already observed habit of 
Maire O'Neill (Sylvia Pankhurst1s secretary) to vastly 
exaggerate her relationship with the Republican Movement. 
Another such individual who incurred O'Brien's hostility 
was the prominent British left wing shop steward William 
Watson of the London Workers Committee. Speaking at a 
public meeting in 1918, Watson claimed that the London
Sinn Feiners could supply him with several hundred men
2
trained to use arms. As the London IRA had not been re­
organized at this time this statement is very unlikely 
to have been true. Moreover Watson's testimony must be 
viewed in the light of his subsequent 1920 admission that 
he had been receiving payments for regular reports to the 
Special Branch. Despite Watson's claims that he had
1 Morton and Tate, op. cit., 175.
2 Dawson, op.‘cit..
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deliberately submitted "nonsensical and misleading reports" 
in an effort to infiltrate the Special Branch,^" most 
British revolutionaries regarded him as an agent pro­
vocateur. The publicity given to his case which included
2the raising of the matter in the House of Commons , .almost 
certainly ensured that Art O'Brien was very familiar with 
this episode,and he probably saw in this incident further 
justification for his aloofness towards the left wing 
in general. The ISDL leadership for personal, political 
and tactical reasons held themselves and their organizations 
aloof from the Communist Party during the period when the 
ISDL was a mass membership organization. Yet we shall 
subsequently observe Art O ’Brien entering into formal nego­
tiations with the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. But by then the Civil War had reduced the 
ISDL1s membership to a mere fraction of its former strength. 
And with the new ISDL Constitution pledging the now small 
number of members to maintain an Irish Republic, dis­
solved by the Anglo-Irish Treatyywhose armed forces were 
facing certain defeat so the earlier isolationist 
strategy was now replaced by a desperate search for allies 
regardless of the ideology they propounded.
1 See W.F. Watson, Watson's Reply: A Complete Answer to 
the Charges of Espionage taevelled Against W.F. Watson 
and an Exposure of the Espionage System ( 19 2 0), 7.
2 See 117 HC Deb. 5,Col. 530.
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The British 'Liberal Conscience1 and Ireland
Despite William McMahon's, the Manchester ISDL leader, claim
1
that he voted Conservative few in the League maintained 
even a token relationships with the party traditionally reg­
arded as the most resolute opponent of Irish independence. 
For the majority of the Conservative Party, any disagree­
ment they had with Lloyd George 1s Coalition's Irish policy
stemmed from a gut feeling that it was not being sufficien-
2
tly tough enough. A few Conservatives did however protest
about the reprisals policy and Oswald Mosley went so far
as to cross the floor of the House of Commons^ after accusing
the Government of "obliterating in Ireland the narrow but
very sacred line that divides justice from indiscriminate 
3
revenge". Mosley subsequently became the Honorary Secret­
ary of the Peace with Ireland Council an organisation that 
very effectively mobilized what was left of the 19th Century 
British 'Liberal Conscience' which' had so dominated the 
country's foreign policy in respect to non British colonial 
issues. In the words of one of its principal founders, the 
historian Arthur Williams, the Peace with Ireland Council 
was "a purely English movement, an English protest against 
the policy of the Government, with members who could not
1 Claim made at the Deportees Compensation Tribunal - TS 
27/183, McMahon was a very successful businessman.
2 See D.G. Boyce 'British Conservative Opinion, the Ulster 
question and the Partition of Ireland, 1912-1921' Irish 
Historical Studies 17 (1970) 89-112.
3 Quoted in Colin Cross The Fascists in Britain (1961) 
14-15.
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1
be accused of working with Sinn Fein" • though precisely this
type of influential movement had earlier been envisaged by 
2
De Valera. Seeking a "Just and lasting settlement between
3
the two countries" by advocating a Truce, Amnesty and neg-
4otiations to give Ireland self-government within the Empire,
the Peace with Ireland Council was formally established in
5October 1920 at a meeting in the House of Commons.
With the Conservative Peer, Lord Cavendish-Bentinck as the. 
Chairman of an organisation that included many Asquithian 
Liberals and Labour figures like Ramsay MacDonald the 
Council was a very influential political coalition. Par­
ticularly, as its membership extended beyond Westminster to 
embrace Anglican bishops, Nonconformist clergy, academics
g
and leading media personnel. The Council held over 200 
7
public meetings / ranging from local protests - some of which
g
were physically attacked by pro-Government supporters - to 
large national meetings in the Albert Hall,attended by 8000
1 D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles (1972) 65.
2 De Valera wrote to Art O'Brien suggesting this type of 
initiative, O'Brien MS 8429.
3 Lt. General Sir Henry Lawson A Report on the Irish 
Situation for the Peace with Irish Council (1920) 8.
4 Ibid and see Peace with Ireland Council Objects (1920).
5 Boyce Englishmen op. cit. 65-6.
6 See membership list in Capt. Berkeley Papers, MS 10,924 
(NLI),Berkeley was a member of the Irish Dominion League 
London Committee.
7 Ibid.
8 Boyce Englishmen op. cit. 70.
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1
people. It also organized a very successful Westminster
2All Party Women’s Meeting and either produced or sponsored
3
the distribution of 30 well circulated pamphlets. By the 
time of the July 1921 Truce the Peace with Ireland Council
4
had established 30 branches and was preparing to lead a
5highly influential fact finding mission to Ireland. During 
its short existence the. Peace with Ireland Council under­
took a very impressive number of activities and as Boyce 
rightly observes its actions compare very favourably to the 
trade unions, which with much greater resources,did far less 
on the Irish issue.^
7
The Pacifist Movement in Britain engaged in some activities
on the Irish issue but to nothing like the extent of its
8intervention in the War or on the Russian issue. The Rev. 
Conrad Noel, the Thaxted Christian Socialist Pacifist Vicar, 
flew the Irish Tricolour from his church steeple in opposi­
tion to Government policy and had it torn down by an irate
1 Boyce, op. cit., 69 ana Berkeley Ms. 10,920.
2 See Edith Stopford Papers, MS 11,426 (NLI) Edith was the 
Council's Secretary and the Times 19 Mar., 1921.
3 Stopford,Ibid.
4 Berkely MS 10,924.
5 Boyce Englishmen op. cit. 70.
6 Ibid, 69.
7 See B.G. Buzan The British Peace Movement from 1919-19 34
Unpublished PhD thesis, LSE (1973) .
8 See David Egan 'Reactions to the Russian Revolution and 
the Anti-War Movement in South Wales' Llafur 1 (1975) 
12-37.
1
mob, largely composed of outsiders. The largest pacifist 
mobilization on the Irish issue was probably the 5000 aud­
ience at a 1921 Women's International League 'Peace with 
2Ireland' Rally. This organization had earlier demanded the
3
release of the Irish political prisoners and a Truce. But
while the Irish Exile gave some publicity to this Women's 
4 .organxzation , it does not appear that many ISDL members 
were involved in its activities. There was virtually no 
organized grouping of women within the ISDL^conscious of 
their own position as women i and a scrutiny of League branch 
reports and the Irish Exile reveals no examples of the exis­
tence of a separate feminist political perspective. In the 
words of Mrs Eadie^a League office clerk, subsequently 
jailed for possession of explosives, "there ’ s plenty of work 
for the women, such as knitting socks for our Irish sol­
diers of the IRA."^
In general the ISDL tended to ignore the activities of the 
Pacifist groups who condemned the IRA as strongly as they 
denounced the British Army. So much so that the quite inf­
luential Fellowship of Reconciliation asked Mrs Sheehy 
Skeffington to use her influence with the ISDL leadership 
to adopt a more favourably, attitude towards their
1 R. Groves Conrad Noel and theThaxted Movement (1967) 262- 
5.
2 ROR 113.7 July, 1921. CP 3115. CAB 24/126.
3 Sheehy Skeffington MS 22,695 (1).
4 Irish Exile July 1923.
5 Ibid, Aug., 1921.
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organization.^ Their attitude towards another grouping in 
Britain, residents from other British colonies, was however 
very different. Art O'Brien warmly welcomed from the plat­
form the presence of Indians and Egyptians in the crowded
Albert Hall audience assembled to greet the Dail Eireann 
2
negotiators. And a representative of the Indian students
studying in London spoke at the ISDL 1921 MayDay Rally in 
3
Hyde Park. Other Indian speakers addressed local ISDL
branches on the parallel between the Indian and Irish strug-
4
gles for national freedom. The ISDL and the Irish move­
ment in Britain generally, benefitted repeatedly from the
activity in Parliament of the Indian Communist MP for
5
Battersea,Saklatvala. On several occasions the Dail Cabi­
net thought it sufficiently important to discuss its rela­
tions with other British colonial groups. This matter,par­
ticularly interested Michael Collins^ and through O'Brien's 
office,he warned the visiting Cypriot Mission, led by its 
Archbishop, to be extremely wary of British promises but 
Collins was very ambiguous on the question of Enossis - 
union with Greece," no doubt seeing a parallel with Northern
1 See letter 23 Nov., 1920. Skeffington MS 22,695(IV).
For other correspondence with the Fellowship for Recon­
ciliation see Skeffington MS 22,695 (II and III). And 
also see report of an Irish Conciliation Group, in London, 
CP 825. CAB 24/100 and a South London Irish Freedom 
Committee, ROR 98, 23 March, 1921. CP 2765. CAB 24/121.
2 Irish Exile Nov. 1921.
3 Ibid. May, 1921.
4 Ibid.
5 Saklatvala addressed the Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club, 
ibid., Nov. 1921.
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Ireland and Partition.'*' Collins was particularly interes­
ted in the Indian issue and instructed that all Dail com­
munications with Indian Nationalists should be conducted
2
through Art O'Brien ; as some of the more progressive Indian
leaders had been deported to Britain. The ISDL's natural
interest in maintaining fraternal contacts with the Indian
nationalists was further encouraged by John Scurr^who served
as the honorary ; Secretary of the Indian Home Rule League:
British Auxilliary and subsequently was a member of the
3
Parliamentary Committee on India. Irish contacts with 
Indian Nationalists was a matter that particularly concerned 
successive British Governments. In the United States, B r i ­
tish diplomats repeatedly filed reports on contacts between
4
Clan na Gael and the Indian Nationalists j and were so con­
cerned about the possibility of Irish American arms ship­
ments to India, they even hired Pinkerton Agency detect­
ives to maintain close surveillance on Irish and Indian 
5
suspects. An Intelligence report concerning Art O'Brien's
negotiations with "Indian and Egyptian extremists" prompted
£
the Home Office to consider his internment. The Govern­
ment had earlier viewed with disfavour the aid given by
1 DE2/510. Letter 28 July, 1919.
2 DE 2/34 4 and DEI/3 memorandum on the Indian Revolution 
Committee. "Useful to keep in touch with them", 27 Apr., 
1921.
3 See Chris Cook (edt) Sources in British Political History 
1900-1951 (1975) Vol. 1. 111-13.
4 Cf. FO 371/563 and 783. British pressure resulted in
the Americans arresting M.N. Roy, the Bengali guerrilla
leader,see B.R. Nanda, op. cit., 30.
5 A. Ward,op. cit., 60.
6 ROR 85. 16 Dec., 1920. CAB 24/117.
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Irish Nationalist MPs to the British Committee of the Indian 
Nationalist C o n g r e s s ^  and the India Office ;which constan­
tly sought to prevent the publication of unsavoury details 
relating to the British Administration in I n d i a „requested
on several occasions the prosecution of Charles Diamond and
2
his Catholic Herald , Scottish and Welsh Nationalists also
participated in ISDL activities, sometimes giving talks on
their own nationalist political objectives to local bran-
3
ches, a policy encouraged by Michael Collins. And a tele­
gram of formal support from the Scottish National Committee
4
was read at the ISDL Albert Hall meeting in February 1920.
1 Margot Duley Morrow The Origins and Early Years of the 
British Committee of the Indian National Congress 1885- 
1907. Unpublished PhD thesis (London, 1977) 160.
2 India Office Memo, 29 June 1921. In HO 45/11009/ 
280126.
3 DE 2/435.
4 Daily Mirror 12 F e b , , 1 9 2 0 .
CHAPTER 15
The Irish Exile: A Case Study of an Organizational Publication
The Irish Exile was part of a long tradition of Irish Rev-
\ 1
olutionary publications some of which/notably those pro-
2
duced by Arthur Griffiths, kept the spark of nationality 
aglow during the periods when the revolutionary political
3
organizations were unable to attract a sizeable following. 
Some of these papers gave birth to organizations, others 
like the Irish Exile were only born after the parent org­
anization had reached maturity.
The mere presence, or conversely absence, of a regular org­
anizational publication can in itself tell us much about 
the organization's state of health. When the Irish Self 
Determination League flourished it gave birth to the Irish 
Exile but when it went into inexorable decline the paper 
disappeared. Organizational publications can tell us much 
about the type of organization, particularly its degree 
of openness. The Connolly Association, who claim with very 
little justification, to have inherited the mantle of the
1 See Virginia E. Glandon, 'The Irish Press and Revolu­
tionary Irish Nationalism', Eire-Ireland 16 (1981) 21- 
33 and Richard Davis, 'The Sinn Fein Press 1914-22', 
ibid., 15 (1980) 60-85.
2 Arthur Griffith produced a number of papers including 
An Faire while in Reading Jail and the Gloucester 
Diamond in the prison of the ■same name. See Arthur 
Griffith Papers, Ms 5942 and 5943 (NLI).
3 See P.S. O'Hegarty, 'The Mosquito Press', The Bell 22 
(1946) 56-65.
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ISDL, have published their own paper for 44 years (Irish 
Democrat/Fre e d o m ). I have never yet read in all these 
issues one direct reference to the actual circulation fig­
ures as opposed to vague references to "sales up twenty 
per cent" etc. The Connolly Association was, and is, clo­
sely linked to the Communist Party of Great Britain. The 
ISDL constitutionally proclaimed its open character and 
so the Irish Exile regularly reported detailed circulation 
figures and recorded in much detail its branch activities. 
From these branch reports alone it is possible to construct 
a composite picture of the League during its heyday. So 
we shall now examine in some detail the functions of the 
Irish Exile as the organ of the ISDL and consider how succ­
essfully it performed these.
1 2
Shepard and Harrison have both amply illustrated the con­
tribution made by organizational publications to the devel­
opment of political movements in Britain. While Buzan has 
delineated the functions of a regular organizational pub­
lication :
(1) "The communication of propaganda to non members" - 
the analysis of this particular function centres on an inves­
tigation of circulation figures and the modes of distribu­
tion .
1 Leslie Shepard, The History of Street Literature; The 
Story of Broadside. Ballads , Chapbooks , Proclamations, 
News Sheets, Election Bills, Tracts, Pamphlets, Cocks, 
Catchpennies and other Ephemera (Newton Abbot, 1971).
2 Stanley Harrison, Poor Men's Guardians: A Record of the 
Struggles for a Democratic Newspaper Press 1763-1973
( 1974 ) .
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1
(2) "Reinforcing internal unity": Wilson particularly
stresses this function which involves the maintenance of
2
comit'tment levels as emphasized by Benewick.
3
(3) "An overlap - as a general educational tool".
These latter two functions will be considered under the 
heading - Content Analysis. We will commence our study 
of the Irish Exile by observing its genesis and then con­
sider its circulation figures, mode of distribution and 
financial position.
Art O'Brien recorded in a memo, dated 27 May 1920, that 
when he heard Republicans in Scotland were planning to launch 
a publication he discussed with Sean Milroy the possibility
4
of starting a similar publication in England. This move 
was backed by Sean McGrath who wrote to Michael Collins 
stating: "I have had in my mind for some time, the p ossibi­
lity of bringing out a weekly publication somewhat on the
5
lines of the newsletter of the 'Friends of Irish Freedom"
(the Republican support organization in America). The idea 
of a publication germinated for a considerable time until 
in March 1921 the London District ISDL Committee launched 
the Irish Exile as a monthly publication costing twopence.
The Irish Exile appeared every month until it ceased
1 John Wilson, op. cit., 321.
2 Robert Benewick, Political . .Violence andP.hblfLc Order 
- A Study of British Fascism (1969).
3 Barry Gordon Buzan, The British Peace Movement from
1919 to 1939 , unpublished PhD Thesis London School
of Economics, (1973 ), 145 .
4 Art O'Brien, Ms 8427.
5 Letter dated 28 June 1920, ibid.
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publication in June. 1922, though for the issue of May 1921 
the title of the Exile appeared in its Irish language tran­
slation as An Deoraide Gadrac. Though the Irish Exile 
appeared initally as a regional (i.e. London area) public­
ation, it was intended from the outset to function as the 
national organ of the ISDL. It was edited by Brian 
O ’Kennedy from the Head Office of the ISDL and in November
1921 the publication became the direct responsibility of
1
the ISDL Central Executive Committee. The paper was inc­
reased in size from sixteen to.twenty-four pages to permit 
a wider national coverage of ISDL branch activities. From 
the issue of November 1921 the Irish Exile carried, until 
March 1922, an eight page section of extracts from the 
Irish Bulletin, a publication produced by the Dail Eireann
Publicity Department and widely quoted in the world and
2
(quality) British press. The price of the Irish Exile 
was increased in November 1921 to threepence when the paper 
was expanded. The issues for the March 1921 - March 1922 
period were printed by the National Labour Press but the 
final three issues were done by Leslie Smith Ltd. and from 
the issue of December 1921 the Irish Exile specifically 
mentioned that the publication only used newsprint manu f a c ­
tured in Ireland.
No information regarding the circulation figures of the
1 The transfer of publication from a regional committee 
to the national leadership was discussed in a memo by 
Brian O'Kennedy (dated 4 April, 1922 ), O ’Brien Ms 8456.
2 See Kathleen McKenna, 'The Irish Bulletin', Capuchin 
Annual, 37 (1970) 503-27.
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Irish Exile for its first six months of publication sur­
vive. The issue of June 1921 informed the readership that
"We are glad to be in a position to state that 'The Exile'
(
is now a sound commercial proposition", but an indication 
of its financial margins of operation is perhaps afforded 
in the appeal to readers in the same issue, that "the cost 
of production would be considerably reduced if our circul­
ation were doubled". The first concrete details of the 
Irish Exile circulation were given in the issue of September 
19 21 when the readers were informed that "after six months 
working the journal had made a profit" and that the circul­
ation was now 12,000 copies per issue. A further indica­
tion however that the profit was still only marginal was 
provided in a statement, in that same issue, that hence­
forth all announcements of coming activities - previously 
inserted free of charge - would now be published as advert­
isements at the rate of two shillings and six pence per 
fifty words or five shillings per column inch, if published 
as display ads. The financial position was next referred 
to in the issue of April 1922 when it was stated that in 
the period between March 1921 and March 1922 the paper had 
made an overall profit of £12 7s. 5d. An internal ISDL 
report, however, revealed that in the six months since the 
Central Executive Committee had assumed responsibility for 
the Exile the paper had lost twenty-three p o u n d s .and that 
the nation wide distribution of their first issue (November 
1921) had resulted in 4,000 unsold copies, a figure which 
declined to 2,000 in December 1921 and was reduced to "very 
few unsold" copies for the January 1922 issue (which con­
tained the terms of the Peace Settlement between Iteland
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and Britain). But the number of unsold copies then rose
to 2,000 for each of the subsequent February and March 1922 
1
issues even though the print order for the March 1922 issue
was only 10,000.This represents an effective circulation
2
of only 8,000 for that month.
It would therefore be reasonable in the light of the infor­
mation discussed to establish a maximum circulation of the 
Irish Exile as the 12,000 copies reported in the issue 
of September 1921 which represents only a sales figure of 
one third of a copy per member or forty sales per ISDL 
branch. Branches were first of all requested to order"suf­
ficient copies of the Exile for their members and also a
3
supply for the general public", an instruction which the
next month was expanded into a positive figure of "at least
4
two copies per affiliated member" . The circulation figures 
show that most branches did not endeavour to implement this 
instruction though there were exceptions,like Tooting which 
held "the record for the number of Irish -Exiles sold each
5
month, some six hundred copies" or "about three copies 
£
per member" . It would be erroneous simply to interpret 
a circulation rate of a third of a copy per member as
1 Irish Exile Management Committee Report, Dated 7 April 
1922, in O'Brien Ms 8456.
2 Letter from Art O'Brien to Brian Kennedy, 4 April, 1922, 
ibid.
3 Irish E x i l e , May 1921.
4 Ibid., June 1921.
5 Ibid., August 1921.
6 Ibid., July 1921.
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indicating a very high percentage of purely nominal member­
ship with little organizational participation other than 
the payment of a subscription. The Walworth Branch had 
one hundred and ninety members with an average branch m e e t ­
ing attendance of over ninety yet it sold only a hundred
1
and eight copies of the Irish Exile per month. The ISDL 
was not the only political organization to fail to sell 
a copy of its publication to each member. Communist p a r ­
ties by comparison to the ISDL exercise a much greater deg­
ree of organizational discipline over their membership but 
in Bologna Province (Italy) in the 1960s the party daily
Unita sold only 15,000 copies though there was a party mem-
2
bership of 126,000 . This represents a sale per member 
ratio of less than one third of that achieved by the ISDL. 
And in 1973 the Secretary of the British Communist Party 
launched a Morning Star circulation drive under the slogan
3
- "Make every member a r e a d e r " . with the implication that 
this had not been the case.
In Ireland in 1916 the Republican paper with the largest 
circulation sold only 4,615 copies while the next largest 
eight political publications all had circulations well under
4
4,000 with most of these selling under 2,000 copies.
1 Ibid., August 1921.
2 Ian Burchall Workers Against the Monolith, 129. Bologna 
is known in Italy as 'Red Bologna'.
3 .Ibid., 216.
4 Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the
Rebellion, op. cit., 118.
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County Clare was the first area in Ireland to be put under 
Martial Law in 1919,a fact which implies a considerable 
degree of Republican support in the area,but Fitzpatrick 
observed that the Republican publications had very low cir­
culation figures in Clare.^ The ISDL's 'Exile^s1 circulation 
in the light of this information is therefore not as sur­
prising as it first appeared to be. Art O'Brien, when the 
issue of an organizational publication was first raised,
stated that it will, "appeal I think mostly to the reading
2
portion of our people", implying that not all members would 
purchase copies. His comments could perhaps be interpreted 
as indicating a high level of illiteracy among the ISDL 
membership, a hypothesis that might be supported by a r e f ­
erence in the 0 1 Donovan Rossa Club's (Tooting) report that 
the "News of the week is read from the Irish papers to the
3
members" . The circulation figures of the Irish Exile and 
in particular the variable branch sales rates do perhaps 
indicate a relatively high degree of decentralization,with 
a reluctance to implement instructions from the National 
Head Office. This hypothesis is supported by evidence of 
branches selling other publications, sometimes to the d e tri­
ment of the Irish E x i l e ,as in the case of the Burnley ISDL 
Branch which sold seventy-two copies of the Irish Exile
4
but ninety-six copies of Eire Oq - a Dublin publication.
1 Fitzpatrick, op. cit., 134.
2 O'Brien Ms 8427.
3 Irish E x i l e , May 1921.
4 Irish Exile, Feb. 1922.
449
The Swansea No. 4 Branch however reported that it was dis-
1
continuing the sale of the Self Determinator (A Liverpool
2
Sinn Fein paper) m  favour of the Irish E x i l e . The sale 
of other political publications undoubtedly reduced the 
potential circulation of the Irish Exile but by how much 
is not clear( for in other branches the ratio of other pu b ­
lications sold in contrast to Irish Exile sales was diff­
erent from that of Burnley. Forrest Gate ISDL sold three 
hundred and sixty copies of the Exile and ninety-four copies
3
of Eire O g .
The bulk of the external sales of the Irish Exile as opposed 
to internal branch sales to the membership were obtained 
by church door selling after Sunday Mass. Branches were 
instructed to sell outside the Churches "in order that those 
of our kith and kin who are not in our ranks may have an
4
opportunity of appreciating the work of the League".
Church door sales were regarded as potentially so valuable
as to alter the printing : schedule of the publication which
was now made "available on the Friday afternoon preceding
the first Sunday of the month. This will give branches
an opportunity of selling each number of the Journal at
5church doors on four successive Sundays". Forrest Gate 
ISDL reported that they sold most of their papers at the
1 Despite an intensive search I have not been able to find
any copies of the Self Determinator but information r e l a ­
ting to its production has been obtained from ROR 98
23 March, 1921, CP 2765. CAB 24/121.
2 Irish E x i l e , FEb. 1922.
3 I b i d ., Aug. 1921.
4 Ibid., June 1921.
5 I b i d . .
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church door'*' but once again there were complaints that some
2branches did not organize such sales. The circulation 
of the Irish Exile was sufficiently large to attract some 
commercial advertizing though it never amounted to more 
than three quarters of a page per issue and usually aver­
aged only half a page. The first issue carried advertise­
ments from an automobile dealer, a sports clothes shop and 
a grocer while subsequent issues contained advertisements
from the Irish National Assurance Company who took a half
3page m  the paper. The Dublin based Exile Employment
Bureau sought architectural draughtsmen and heating 
4engineers.
5
Throughout its sixteen issues existence the Irish Exile 
teetered on the brink of very narrow financial margins but 
most political organizations run their publications at a 
loss relying on donations. The Morning Star and Newsline  ^
even employ a monthly donation deadline to keep their pub­
lications in existence,to generate a dynamic tension among 
the membership.
1 Irish Exile, August, 1921.
2 Ibid., September 1921.
3 Ibid., February 1922.
4 Ibid., January 1922.
5 Jackson erroneously states that the "Irish Exile had 
a short-lived history of less than a year", op. cit.,
124 .
6 Newsline is published by the Workers Revolutionary Party 
(WRP) as a party daily.
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The content of the Irish Exile
A researcher can analyse the content of a publication from 
several different perspectives according to his profes-: 
sional training, academic discipline or even political inc­
lination. One can investigate publication content from
1
the perspective of the journalist who wrote the story,
2
from the socio-linguistic perspective, or from a psycho-
3 4logist's viewpoint as exemplified by Lindsey and White.
Valuable research has also been done by the more politic-
5ally committed investigators like Cohen and Young , Hartman-
6 7and Husband, and the Glasgow University Media Group.
1 Jeremy Tunstall, Journalists at Work (1971) and for a 
more academic treatment of journalists see John Galtung 
and Mari Ruge "Structuring and Selecting News', Journal 
of International Peace Research 1 (1961) 64-69, and Paul 
Rock "News as Eternal Reccurrence", in P. Halmos (Ed.) 
The Sociology of Mass Media Communications (Keele 1969).
2 Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication - A Study 
in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization 
and Legitimization (New York, 1973).
3 See the section on Content Analysis in G. Lindsey Hand 
Book of Social Psychology (Massachusetts, 1968).
4 Amber White, the New Propaganda (1939). An exploration 
of Fascist publications from the perspective of Freudian 
psychology.
5 Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, The Manufacture of News, 
Deviance,Social Problems and the Mass Media.(1973).
6 P. Hartman and C . Husband, Racism and the Mass Media 
(1974).
7 Glasgow University Media Group Bad News (1976) - An 
investigation of Television News Coverage.
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1
There is a large number of general sociolocjic.al studies
of the media and the sociological investigation of content
2
analysis has resulted in useful studies by Gerner and 
Holsti.^
In any primarily politically orientated publication content
4is determined by "Structured ideological biases". The 
Irish Exile was the offical publication of the Irish Self 
Determination League whose object was to promote the Irish 
political cause in Britain. Therefore the Irish Exile fre­
quently carried stories intended to portray the British 
Forces in an unfavourable image. Articles such as "Abuse 
of Women1 (April 1921), "Failure of Terrorism” C(sic 
British) August 1921] appeared regularly. The successful 
communication of propaganda/news is dependent on the "con-
5
sonance and expectations" of its content. Investigators 
in the field of the psychology of perception have shown 
that a newspaper reader classifies and codes information 
according to its content, amount and channel of communica­
tion- a process which Wilkins^ suggests involves a virtually 
instantenous assessment of its reliability or unreliability.
1 For a good selection of readings '.and a useful bibliography 
see Jeremy Tunstall (ed.) Media Sociology (1970).
2 G. Gerner The Analysis of Communication Content (New 
York, 1969).
3 P.R. Holsti Content Analysis for the Social Sciences 
and Humanities (Massachusetts, 1968).
4 As used by Cohen and Young, op. cit., 15.
5 Jeremy Tunstall, Journalists, op. cit., 18.
6 Leslie Wilkins, Social Deviance, Social Policy Action
and Research (1964), 59-65.
453
This assessment, based in part on experience and individual
inclination, of the content and channel communication det-
1
ermines the level of reception. Galtung and Ruge utilize
the radio frequency analogy.of dial tuning to demonstrate
that there is a correlation between the meaningfulness and
relevance of the news content and the channel of communica-
2tion and the level of reception. Berelson and Steiner 
suggest that the concreteness of the content determines 
the level of reception and that ambiguous news is less eff­
ectively absorbed.
The production staff of the Irish Exile were sufficiently 
aware of the importance of source credibility to adopt,as 
a regular practice, the policy of reprinting articles from 
other publications regarded by the Irish Exile readership 
as being reliable channels of news communication..Articles 
particularly relating to British illegal actions in Ireland 
were reprinted* from liberal press organs like the Daily 
News and the Daily Herald. Many of these articles had 
originally been placed in the British press, by the Republ­
icans whose "propaganda was well organized, thoughtfully
3prepared and diligently distributed m  Great Britain".
When the Irish Exile became the official national organ of
1 Op. cit., 65.
2 B. Berelson and G.A. Steiner, Human Behaviour - an 
Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York, 1963), 100- 
112. Also see Leon Festinger, 'The Motivating Effect 
of Cognitive Dissonance', in Gardner Liqdzey (ed.), 
Assessment of Human Motives (New York, 1958), 72.
3 D.G. Boyce, op. cit., 84. Much of the content of this 
work centres around the use of propaganda.
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the ISDL the paper was expanded to include eight pages of
extracts from the Irish Bulletin. The frequency with which
some organs such as the Manchester Guardian and even the
Times used stories based on information from the Irish
Bulletin infuriated the Government and in particular the
military leadership.^ British Intelligence even ettempted
to forge several issues of a spoof Irish Bulletin until
2this tactic was exposed m  Parliament.
Communication researchers have shown that people interpret
3news through certain key words or emotive symbols. White 
suggests that these function as "Gatekeepers" which open 
up the channels of news perception while Wilkins has form­
ulated the conceptual term of a "Bridge" to explain the
process by which the general news is translated into the
4particular and conversely. The Irish Exile, on emotion 
generating issues like prisoners and executions, utilized 
short captions embodying emotive language in articles like 
"The Glory of Martyrdom" (May 1921) and "They died for 
Ireland" (June 1921). In a society whose culture was so 
permeated by religious influences at all levels the employ­
ment of the term Martyr to the executed appeared to confer 
some form of religious sanctification on the struggle they
1 General Macready was the British GOC in Ireland see his
Annals of an Active Life , op. cit., Vol. 2, 494.
2 140 H.C. Debs. 5, col. 2038.
3 D. White, 'The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection
of News' in Dexter and White (eds.), People, Society 
and Mass Communications (Glencoe, 1964).
4 Op. cit., 63.
4 5 5 •'
had died for. The June 1921 issue listed those executed 
to date under the caption of the "Martyrs Crown". Photo­
graphs - "intelligent representations enhancing, locating
1and specifying the ideological theme" of the executed were 
deliberately chosen to emphasize their ordinariness so as 
to promote a degree of reader identification with the exe­
cuted prisoners - the personification of news.
The general standard of reportage in the Irish Exile was 
quite high as the publication had the services of two pro­
fessional journalists, Sean Milroy and J.P. O'Connolly. 
Political education was regarded as an important task of 
the Irish Exile. Factual articles sought to prove Ireland's 
claim to self determination. One article in particular 
used European comparative economic and demographic statis­
tics to repudiate the British claims that Ireland was too
2
small a country to be economically self sufficient. After 
the Dail ratification of the Treaty the pro and anti-Treaty 
ISDL factions were given equal space to discuss their res­
pective viewpoints.
The columns of the Irish Exile were utilized to defend the 
ISDL from the repeated attacks on it by the Catholic Herald 
both general and specific allegations about financial irr­
egularities within the ISDL. To allay the possible fears
1 Stuart Hall, 'The Determination of News Photography', 
Cultural Studies No. 3 (Centre for Cultural Studies 
Brimingham University). Also see R. Barthes, Rhetoric 
of the Image (Working Papers on Cultural Studies No.
1 (ibid.)) as to how photographs are utilized as a prop­
aganda source.
2 Irish Exile, March 1921.
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of that category of potential members we have termed the
'innocents' the Irish Exile Taunchedvpafrticuiarly;strong
attacks on the history of the Catholic Herald and the char-
1
acter of Charles Diamond m  particular, while the attitude 
of the majority of the Catholic Hierarchy in Britain was 
condemned in a series of articles with an increasingly bit­
ter tone culminating in "The Contemptible Clique" in the 
issue of August 1921. Particular editorial stress was laid 
on the economic campaign, initiated in Ireland, to boycott 
British manufactures in favour of Irish goods. The Irish 
Exile declared that it was printed on Irish paper and later
requested readers that "Irish paper should be used for com-
2
munication in this paper", while ISDL branches were encou­
raged to buy goods like cigarettes from Ireland in bulk
3
for sale to the membership. The Exile also carried a ser­
ies of articles on the future of Ireland after independence 
which permitted a wide range of opinions,not necessarily 
reflecting the official viewpoint of the ISDL. These inclu­
ded the radical suggestion of extensive land redistribution 
free legal aid, a populist demand that TDs (Dail MPs) should 
have their salaries deducted for non-attendance and most 
interestingly,in an organization with a very high percent­
age of Catholic members,including a considerable number 
of priests, there was a suggestion that euthenasia should 
be permitted.
1 Irish Exile, March and May, 1922.
2 Ibid., December 1921.
3 Ibid., April 1922.
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The primary function of the Irish Exile was to mobilize
support for the Irish cause in general and the recruit­
ment of members to the ISDL in particular. The first issue, 
in March 1921, listed twelve reasons for joining the ISDL.
"Twelve Reasons Why You Should Join the ISDL
(1) Because you are Irish.
(2) Because you want to know the truth about Ireland 
and the League tells the facts.
(3) Because Ireland needs your help - needs it now.
(4) Because Ireland is calling to her children 
throughout the World and she is calling to 
you.
(5) Because the ISDL helps Ireland in her heroic 
struggle and gives you an opportunity to help.
(6) Because the Irish in Great Britain can help 
Ireland to endure until Victory is won.
(7) Because to stand aside now is treachery to 
Ireland.
(8) Because your apathy is delaying ths international 
recognition of Ireland's just claims.
(9) Because the Irish are the only white race in 
bondage today and Ireland is the only small 
nation in Europe under oppression.
(10) Because the Irish people have settled the 
'Irish Problem' and it is only necessary for 
other nations that enjoy freedom to respect 
hers.
(11) Because the spirit of Ireland's martyred dead, 
the heroism of Ireland's tortured living and 
the hope of Ireland's future calls to you.
(12) Because you are Irish - 'DO YOUR DUTY NOW'."
Once the readers were persuaded that they should play their 
own part in the campaign to aid Ireland they then had to 
be convinced that the ISDL was the appropriate organization 
to channel their support. The Exile's function was to con­
vey an image of a large widely distributed vibrant organi­
zation. It carried out this task by giving considerable 
coverage to reports of individual branch activity; no fewer 
than forty-five branches reported their activies in the 
December 1921 issue alone. Branches frequently reported 
increasing membership and their successful fund raising
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campaigns ,such as Woolwich which reported that its branch
"quota for the Ulster Election Fund - £51 3s Od was raised
within five minutes".^ A very wide range of successful
activities were reported, Halifax claimed
"a continuous stream of new members is ever 
flowing.Irish nationality is certainly aroused 
to a very high pitch in Halifax certainly 
without parallel in the local annals of Irish acti­
vities; all due to the unswerving determina­
tion and continuous perseverance of the local 
members of the ISDL branch"
Richmond ISDL reported an attendance of over two hundred
people on its cruise trip up the River Thames on the "steam-
3er The Royal Thames flying a Republican Flag".
The problems of a hostile public reaction which maiy’bran­
ches faced were not ignored. Ashton in Makerfield r; repor­
ted that "from its inauguration this branch has encountered
4strong opposition from the opponents of the League" . while
the Central London Branch reported "Gratifying progress
in the branch despite the exceptional difficulty of obtain-
5
m g  hall accommodation". Other problems faced by the 
branches concerning the growing economic depression were 
frequently recorded in the Exile♦ For example Erith rep­
orted "This branch after having felt the strain of local 
depression is now showing great improvement"^ and Newton 
Heath stated that they were functioning "successfully
1 Irish Exile, June 1921.
2 Ibid., Feb. 1922.
3 Ibid., September 1921.
4 Ibid., Nov. 1921
5 Ibid., Aug. 1921.
6 Ibid., March 1922.
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1
notwithstanding the unemployment affecting the members".
Not all the branch reports were as favourable as these.
Some criticized their members' laxity. Southampton Branch
for example stated that "it is to be hoped that some of
the members who have of late been exhibiting a deplorable
amount of slackness in the discharge of their branch duties
2will speedily amend their ways". Some branches submitted 
resolutions they themselves had passed for the considera­
tion of other branches, the most interesting resolution 
was probably the one passed by the Terence McSwiney Branch 
to "Pledge ourselves not to use ary intoxicating liquor or 
tobacco until such time as this country withdiaws her Armed
3
Forces from Ireland". There were resolutions criticising 
the ISDL leadership and the ISDL editorial board. The 
Mid-Durham Branch "unanimously resented the (Support the 
Republic Fund) back page advertisement of the March Exile 
as contrary to the official (neutrality on the Treaty) pol­
icy of the ISDL11. ^
The branch reports usually gave the names of their officers 
and often their occupations. Particular coverage was given 
to the formation meetings of new branches. In the December 
1921 issue the inauguration of the Oxford ISDL Branch was 
reported. Its President was a Frederick Ludlow "the only 
Labour representative in the Oxford City Council", its 
Secretary was Mrs Weaver (the wife of a proctor) and its
1 Irish Exile, March 1922.
2 Ibid., Sept., 1921.
3 Ibid., May 1921.
4 Ibid., April 1922.
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membership included the Earl of Longford, the Rev. Cox who 
was the Anglican Vicar of St. Peters and two college stu­
dents. While the Irish Exile was the official publication 
of the ISDL it did not confine itself to merely reporting 
the activities of that organization. The choice of the 
publication's title,* "The Irish Exile - An Organ of Irish 
Movements in and around London" and the post November 1921 
modification to "The Irish Exile - The Offical Organ of 
the ISDL of Great Britain and the Monthly Record of Irish/ 
Ireland Movements" indicated an intention to report the 
activities of all the organizations embracing the concept 
of an Irish/Ireland. So considerable coverage was given 
to the activities of the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Ath­
letic Association.
The publication of a mass political organization of neces­
sity must be orientated towards the lowest common denomi­
nator readership yet/the Irish Exile while devoting the 
majority of its space to branch reports and propagandist 
articles/still managed to print a number of substantial
literary articles. Robert Lynd wrote a very informative
1
survey of Modern Poetry while Liam 0'Rain.contributed a
very erudite philogical series on the ''Scholarship of
European investigators into the origins of the Irish lang- 
2uage1' . The Irish Exile of necessity was often forced to 
argue on a simplistic, emotional, even sensationalistic
1 Irish Exile May 1921, Robert Lynd a member of the Irish 
literary Society was a professional critic and a repor­
ter on the Daily News staff.
2 Ibid., Dec. 1921, Jan. 1922, and Feb. 1922.
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level yet it never degenerated to mere sloganizing. While 
it could be argued that a publication with a somewhat dif­
ferent format might have attracted new readers'; chis might 
well have been at the expense of the existing readership 
and though the content of the Irish Exile when it appeared 
to support IRA activity went far beyond the constitutional 
aims of the ISDL, I can find no correspondence complaining 
about this breach within the surviving ISDL records. The 
production staff of the Irish Exile faced considerable pro­
blems after the first two issues, the editor Brian O'Kennedy 
and another member Fintan Murphy were deported to Ireland, 
while Sean Milroy operated 'on the run' after his escape 
from Lincoln Prison. A police raid on the editorial office 
resulted in the April 1921issue appearing without any branch 
reports which were seized and subsequent raids resulted 
in the confiscation of copy and the all important circula­
tion records which may account for at least a proportion 
of the unsold copies already noted.
If we reconsider the functions of an organizational publi­
cation as outlined by Buzan: propaganda communication, rein­
forcement of internal unity and serving as a general educa­
tional tool, then we may conclude that the Irish -Exile 
performed these tasks quite successfully considering the 
problems we have mentioned. • The Irish Exile undoubtedly 
mobilized a considerable number of recruits and channelled 
them into the ISDL. The circulation of the Irish Exile 
could have been higher - though relative to the other pub- 
lications we have considered it was not that low. The
1 For example the Red International of Labour Unions (Profin­
tern) which claimed a British affiliation of 300,000 
workers only sold 12,000 copies of its Journal contd...
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paper could certainly have been better distributed and if 
the Head Office had not had so many of its organizers depor­
ted, sales levels in many branches would have probably inc­
reased considerably. It is perhaps an indication of the 
high regard held by the leadership of the Sinn Fein in 
Ireland for the ISDL's Irish Exile that,in the event of 
British activities rendering the publication of the Irish
Exile impossible in Ireland.the ISDL were to assume the
1
responsibility of producing the Bulletin.
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Part IV: The Diaspora Irish and the War of Independence
In Volume One we charted the growth of the ISDL up to the 
Treaty and now in Volume Two we will chart its inexorable 
decline. In Chapter 16 we will explore the initial reac­
tions of the Irish in Britain to the Treaty; but for one 
particular interest group - those imprisoned for military 
activities in this country - the immediate Post-Treaty 
period did not bring freedom and so Pro and Anti-Treaty 
ISDL leaders found common ground in an amnesty campaign.
The Treaty cast its dark shadow far beyond the shores of 
Ireland and Britain, penetrating the furthest corner of the 
far flung Irish Diaspora blighting the Paris World Congress 
of the Irish Race. In Chapter 17 we will observe this abor­
tive attempt to form an umbrella organization linking the 
Irish Diaspora to the Homeland. The Congress delegates 
heatedly debated the vexed question of the relationship 
between Homeland and Exile movement and expressed very div­
erse opinions on the position of the Diaspora Irish - exiles 
or citizens* And so in Chapter 18 we will employ this 
Paris debate as a forum to explore the different forms 
Irish nationalism assumed throughout the Diaspora.
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CHAPTER 16
The Treaty: Jubilation and Misgivings
William Gallacher, (the future Scottish Communist MP) , arr­
ived in Dublin early on the morning of the 6th. December, 
1921, with news that the Treaty had been signed. He urged 
Cathal Brugha, the Minister of Defence, to arrest the Pleni­
potentiaries on their arrival but Brugha refused, stating, 
"Irishmen won't arrest Irishmen", to which Gallacher retor­
ted, "if you don't arrest them it will not be long before
1
they are arresting you". Gallacher then met the members 
of the IRA GHQ staff with whom he had been in contact with ; 
on matters relating to the intelligence and logistical ope­
rations in Britain but Rory O'Connor, the OC of the British 
Command and Liam Mellows, the Director of Purchases, both 
refused to arrest the delegates, while Oscar Traynor, the
OC of the Dublin Brigade prevented some of his junior off-
2
icers from carrying out Gallacher's wishes. De Valera and 
the members of the Cabinet who were not in London, only 
.learned about the Treaty when they read the evening newspapers 
but De Valera refused publicly to repudiate the Treaty until 
the plenipotentiaries returned and a full Cabinet meeting 
had been held with the result that "the Treaty and all the 
propaganda in its favour had had three days start and we
3
never made up the handicap". The supporters of the Treaty
1 Greaves, Mellowes, op. cit., 268. Gallacher's father 
was Irish born.
2 Bower Bell, op. cit., 45.
3 Austin Stack, quoted in Longford, op. cit., 265 .
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had no such reservations about waiting for the Cabinet mee­
ting and subsequent Dail Eireann debate. The principal org­
ans of the media in Ireland without exception welcomed the 
Treaty as did the major commercial concerns. The Irish
Hierarchy who had pressurized the Dail Cabinet to accept
1
the earlier British proposals acclaimed the Treaty as "God's 
2
Gift". For most of the people in Ireland acceptance of the 
Treaty was virtually an automatic process. The alternative 
appeared to be war and the six months of the Truce had been 
a long enough period to defuse any , latent militancy but 
short enough for people to remember the horrors of the war, 
that would recommence if the Treaty was rejected.
The Irish Exile in its December 1921 issue responded to the 
Treaty announcement, and its commitment to the Partition 
of Ireland, with a banner headline "No Man has the right 
to fix the boundary of the march of a Nation" (this modifi­
cation of Parnell's dictum was also employed by*the Times
3m  support of the Treaty) and a front page "Important let­
ter from Art O'Brien the Dail Eireann Representative in 
Great Britain*. Art O'Brien writing in this capacity rather 
than as the Vice President of the Irish Self Determination 
League cautioned the readership of the Irish Exile:
1 In a report to Lloyd George,the Under Secretary at Dublin 
Castle, Alfred Cope, wrote "things are humming, the Bish­
ops are especially busy" and Tom Jones commented that 
Cope, in early November, was intriguing with the Bishops 
and Irish media to get the British terms accepted. T. 
Jones, op. cit., 174-5.
2 Bishop Fogarty's description of the Treaty, quoted in 
the Catholic Herald, 17 Dec., 1921.
3 Parnell had claimed "No man can set a boundary to the 
march of a nation" but the Times (9 Jan., 1922) commented 
"it is nevertheless, reserved to some to influence the 
direction of its progress".
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"Be not misled into rejoicing and thanksgiving with­
out cause or reason.... If under the threat of re­
newed and intensified war and as an alternative to 
seeing their country ravished and laid waste by fire 
and sword and their race exterminated, five Irishmen 
have been compelled to sign their names to a document 
published Yester3ay. This is not an occasion for us 
to rejoice*.
The Irish Exile devoted three pages without comment to the 
full text of the Treaty, for the League leadership had deci­
ded to refrain from any observations on the Treaty until
1it had been discussed m  Dail Eireann. Others however m  
Britain very publicly declared for the Treaty. The Catholic 
Herald which also carried the full text of the Treaty dec­
lared in large print "Irish Peace Attained at Last, Hail 
to the Irish Free State" and in its editorial proclaimed 
that "Pearse, Plunkett, MacDonagh, Connolly, O'Rahilly and
their comperes deserve the tribute of a nation's grateful 
2
regard"; a rather interesting pronouncement considering 
that at the time the Catholic Herald had violently denounced 
the 1916 Rising and urged the British Government to execute 
James Connolly. Perhaps this editorial illustrates the 
Catholic Herald's rather remarkable facility to switch its 
editorial line whenever the opinions of its readership alt­
ered significantly. The British Hierarchy unanimously wel­
comed, or at least implied they did not reject, the ending 
of seven centuries of British rule in Southern Ireland.
Bishop Amigo praised .those who have "won for Ireland a place
3
among the nations of the world as a Free State". Archbishop
1 Catholic Herald, 24 Dec. , 1921.
2 Catholic Herald, 10 Dec. , 1921; Irish Exile, December,
1921.
3 Catholic Herald, 17 Dec., 1921.
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Mos tyn of Menevia (Wales) indicated his support for the
Treaty but then banned League branches from using Catholic
halls in his area. Bishop Cowgill of Leeds was "sure that
the bulk of the twenty or thirty thousand Irish people in
Leeds will join with me in the earnest hope that nothing will
now arise to interfere with the due ratification of the
Treaty".'*' The Irish Nationalist Party Councillors in
Liverpool attended a Treaty Thanksgiving Mass in the Pro —
2Cathedral while the old Irish Parliamentary leadership and
the United Irish League in London persuaded Cardinal Bourne
3to say a special Mass m  honour of the Treaty. The 
Salesian- Fathers gave the boys at their Farnborough School 
an extra week's Christmas holiday to celebrate "the Irish
4
Settlement" but some Catholic priests and teachers commen­
ted soberly on one particular implication of the Treaty for 
the future of Catholic interests in Britain.
A new Education Bill which threatened to significantly cur­
tail State expenditure on denominational schools had been 
introduced in Parliament. Previous Bills had been defeated 
largely through the effort of the Catholic Nationalist mem­
bers from the Southern Irish constituencies but as a priest
now observed "we have only got a handful of Catholic mem-
5bers to fight our cause" for the Treaty brought to an end
1 Catholic Herald, 17 Dec., 1921.
2 Ibid
3 Roberts,op.cit., 89. Archbishop Keating also ordered 
the 'Exposition of the Sacrament* in every church in 
Liverpool Archdiocese in "thanksgiving" for the Treaty, 
Catholic Herald, 2lJan.,1922.
4 Times/ 9 Dec., 1921.
5 Catholic Herald, 17 Dec., 1921.
the large Catholic Southern Irish bloc vote in Parliament.
Some Irish Self Determination League branches ignored Art
O'Brien's request to refrain from celebrations. Cardiff
1Branch planned a banquet when the Treaty was ratified,
Brother Thomas of St. Bede's Monastery, urged the Halifax
Branch to support the Treaty and Leicester also voted to 
2
accept it. A very influential statement was issued by
Thomas Faughan, a member of the Standing Committee of the
League^who on his release from Internment called on "the
Irishmen and women of England and Wales who have stood
faithful to the Republican cause to endorse.the great Treaty 
3of freedom", a speech which the other members of the Stan­
ding Committee were unable to comment on until the Dail 
debate was concluded. The toast of the "Irish Free State" 
proposed by General Gough, who in 1914 had refused to move
his Cavalry Brigade from Curragh into Ulster to prevent the
4Unionists from resisting the introduction of Home Rule, 
at a National Liberal Club Society of St. Patrick dinner, 
at which Michael Collins' sister was the guest of honour
1 Catholic Herald, 17 Dec., 1921.
2 Ibid
3 Ibid..
4 For this incident in which a large number of the British
Officer Corps bluntly refused to obey the orders of the
Government and which has become known as the Curragh 
Mutiny see James Ferguson, The Curragh Incident (1964),
A. P.. Ryan Mutiny at Curragh ( 1956 ). As well as refusing 
to implement Government policy, senior Army officers 
bluntly warned the Cabinet that in the event of Civil 
War breaking out,in Northern Ireland, the entire British
Expeditionary Force and troops from Egypt and India would
be required. See CAB 37/120 (81). Gough subsequently
refused a Unionist nomination to stand for Parliament 
and changing his opinions on Irish Home Rule became an 
Asquithian Liberal MP in 1921. Ref. Kinnear, op. cit., 
53.
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was somewhat premature,for the Irish Free State had legally 
not yet come into existence.
The gestation period for the birth of the Irish Free State 
was a considerably complicated matter. The Treaty had to 
be ratified by the Parliament of Southern Ireland which was 
elected in May 1921 but which had only the four Trinity
College members at its first and only session to date. All 
the other members elected had taken their seats in Dail 
Eireann. So as a first step Dail Eireann had to vote the 
Republic, proclaimed by it in 1919, out of existence and 
then, minus its one member who represented a Northern Ireland 
constituency, meet as the Parliament of Southern Ireland 
together with the four Unionists. Dail Eireann commenced 
discussing the Treaty on the 14th. December, 1921 and con­
cluded the debate on the 7th. January, 1922 after a ten day 
adjournment for Christmas. The ten days of the Treaty Deb­
ate required almost three hundred, double columned,pages 
in the Official Report. ^  Fie.ld Marshal Smuts when he had
recommended Lloyd George to negotiate with Sinn Fein had
2
stated "let them talk themselves to death" and it appeared 
at times during the Treaty debate that Sinn Fein was doing 
precisely that in a very complex and convoluted series of 
discussions,(There was even a dispute between the Treaty 
signatories, Collins and Griffith, as to whether the Treaty 
i^n fact required ratification at all). Old animosities,
1 Debate on the Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland,
(Dublin , N . D .)
2 T. Jones, op. cit., 85.
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; 1
particularly between Brugha and Collins, Griffith and 
2
Childers, flared up during the often heated, heavily emo­
tional, discussion in what was aptly termed “Ireland's Days 
of Anguish" ( Catholic Herald, 24th. December, 1921).
The cfebate ssldom' Jeft ..;the metaphysical :plane to 
descend to the practical realities ; of the state
of Ireland in 1921. Most of the T D 1 s contributions took 
the form of public soul searching on the issue as to whether 
the Oath to the Republic was binding for all time. The 
issue of oaths dominated the proceedings, the existing 
Oath to the Republic or the proposed new Oath of loyalty 
to the British Monarchy. The discussions were primarily 
of an abstract nature, the much more tangible issue of the 
North of Ireland and Partition only occupied some nine pages 
in the Official Report: two thirds of that were the contrib­
utions of three members whose constituencies were on the 
new border. It is quite possible that had the vote for the 
ratification of the Treaty been taken before the Christmas
3
recess, the Treaty might have been rejected ; but the holi­
day afforded many TDs the opportunity of discovering that 
most of their constituents were not concerned about abstract 
principles of freedom or moralistic soul searching on the 
durability of oaths but simply, if in many cases with
1 Cathal Brugha, the Minister of Defence, stated that 
Michael Collins was very much his subordinate but that 
the Press for some reason had decided to publicize his 
activities more than any other officers. See Debate on 
the Treaty, 326-8.
2 Erskine Childers, the former Clerk to the House of 
Commons, was interrupted in the course of a speech on 
Parliamentary procedure by Griffith who declared he would 
not listen to a "damned Englishman", ibid., 416.
3 Calton Younger, op. cit., 223.
reluctance supported the Treaty as the only realistic alt­
ernative to a renewed war. Deputies,uncertain as to whether 
their primary obligation was to their own conscience, or 
their constituents ,were harangued by the , commercial inter­
ests that their failure to ratify the Treaty would lead to 
economic suicide and were subject to intense pressure from 
the Hierarchy.'*' The pressure on the TDs to ratify the 
Treaty was almost overwhelming as virtually * all the varied 
groups and organizations ,that functioned in early 20th. 
century Irish society,met especially to discuss the Treaty 
and almost invariably supported it. Under the banner head­
line, "Voice of the Country. The Demand for Acceptance of 
Anglo-Irish Treaty", the Catholic Herald (7th. January,
1922) listed the score cards: out of one hundred and twenty 
major local government bodies only four opposed the Treaty. 
All the commercial organizations and Farmers Associations 
that discussed the Treaty favoured it, but only six trade 
union branches (less than one per cent of all the branches
in Southern Ireland) came out publicly in favour of the 
2Treaty. It is perhaps an indication of how far the revol­
utionary elite can in the course of a struggle distance 
themselves from the masses, from whom they claim their
1 Bishop Browne (Cloyne) stated the "Dail must ratify the 
Treaty" and Bishop Fogarty (Kilhaloe) declared its fail­
ure to do so would be an "Act of national madness"
Catholic Herald, 31 Dec., 1921, while Bishop MacRory, 
whose Down and Connor Diocese was now politically cut 
off from the South of Ireland,argued that the alternative 
to the Treaty was "a swelling tide of emigration of young 
men all over the country", Times, 28 Dec., 1921.
2 Mitchell, op. cit., 146, and see William O'Brien, 'The 
Irish Free State. (The) Secret History of its Founda­
tion' Ms 4210 (NLI).
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mandate of action, that after-the TDs1 holiday in their con­
stituencies, the debate should still have continued for ano­
ther five days.* and that right up to the last day of the dis­
cussion some contemporary political observers believed that
1the Treaty would be rejected. The Treaty was ratified by 
a sixty four to fifty seven vote but an indication of how 
reluctantly some of the Pro-Treaty TDs had voted came when 
the proposal to re-elect De Valera as President of the Irish 
Republic was narrowly defeated by sixty to fifty eight.
There were now three Governments functioning in Ireland, 
the Northern Government, the Dail Government and the Provi­
sional Government of the Irish Free State. Sinn Fein was 
divided into two opposing factions. The Irish Republican 
Brotherhood which rather ironically had remained in exist­
ence after the formation of Dail Eireann in 1919 "to prevent
2the politicians from surrendering the Republic", debated 
the Treaty before the Dail's sessions. Their Supreme Coun-
3
cil voted eleven to four m  favour of the Treaty but mem­
bers who were Dail TDs were given a free choice as to their 
vote on the ratification and the IRB organization as such
was to remain neutral on the issue until the new Free State
4Constitution was drafted. It was the dominating presence
1 A political correspondent even believed that it was only 
Cathal Brugha's attack on Michael Collins that swung 
several uncommitted TDs to vote for the Treaty, see 
Manchester Guardian, 9 Jan,. 1922.
2 Collins to Dan Breen quoted in Calton Younger, op. cit., 
216.
3 O'Broin, op. cit., 196.
4 The Irish Republican Brotherhood and the...Treaty ' ; A 
Statement (NLI) and also see J. O ’Beirne Raneleagh,op. 
cit. .
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of Michael Collins as Chairman of the Supreme Council that 
secured the Treaty's acceptance but Collins still owed his 
membership of the Council to the fact that he had origin­
ally been elected to represent Southern England and there 
were unsuccessful moves by the London IRB to have Sam 
Maguire substituted for Collins as their representative."
The IRB controlled the IRA GHQ Staff and so the IRA Head­
quarters supported the Treaty on a nine to four basis but 
many of the senior field officers opposed the Treaty: eight
of the fourteen Divisions and three of the five Independent 
2Brigades , incorporating a very large majority of volunteers,
declared.against the Treaty. During the Dail debate Seamus
Robinson, a former Glasgow IRA volunteer, and now a senior
field commander speaking on behalf of these units, ominously
referred to "certain terrible action that will be necessary
3if the Treaty is forced on us". Robinson argued against 
those IRA leaders who claimed they could not continue the 
war against England and suggested that they could bring the 
war into England: "one thousand effective shots and one
4
thousand effective fires in Britain would ruin England", 
he claimed. The Sinn Fein factions might engage in theo­
logical disputes over which of the two 'Governments' had 
the right to use specific titles and the tricolour flag but 
it was the majority of the IRA's request for an Army Con­
vention to repudiate all allegiance to political
1 See report of Sean- McGrath, O'Brien MS 84 27.
2 D.R. O'Connor Lysaght,The Republic of Ireland, (Cork 
1970), 67.
3 Dail Debates, op. cit., 290.
4 Ibid., 290-1.
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institutions that showed where the real power in Ireland 
lay and the likely course of future developments,irrespec­
tive of how the electorate voted on the Treaty issue.
1The Scottish Sinn Fein Executive voted against the Treaty
even before the Dail debate was concluded. (At the other
end of the political spectrum the Glasgow Orange Order deci-
ded.to break its historical link with the Conservative Party
2
in protest against the creation of the Irish Free State) ,
The Sinn Fein organization in England did not formally dis- 
3
cussthe Treaty until February but the Special Branch expec-
4ted that.most of the members would oppose the Treaty while 
estimating that eighty five per cent of the Irish in
5
Scotland would however support the Treaty . It did not, at 
this point of time, indicate the degree of support for the 
Treaty in the Irish community in England and Wales. The 
individual branches of the Irish Self Determination League 
who decided on the Treaty, before the Central Executive 
Council had discussed the Dail decision, tended to favour 
the Treaty, but with different degrees of enthusiasm.
6Gosforth "hailed with joy the ratification of the Treaty" 
but to Wallasey the•Treaty was "only a temporary agreement,
7
to be developed and expanded". Newport arranged a
1 ROR 136, 22 Dec., 1921. CP 3659. CAB 24/131.
2 Times, 12 Jan,. 1922.
3 Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
4 ROR 139, 19 Jan,. 1922. CP 3639. CAB 24/132.
5 ROR 138, 12 Jan,. 1922. CP 3609. CAB 24/132.
6 Catholic Herald, 14 Jan., 1922.
7 Ibid..
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1
"celebration luncheon1 . Neath had ''Masses offered in 
2
thanksgiving® but Tonypandy believed that the Treaty was
only the "foundation stone of Ireland's ultimate independ-
1.3ence" .
The January 1922 issue of the Irish Exile though it cont­
ained the details of the Dail vote on the Treaty, went to 
press before the leadership of the League could discuss the 
matter, so it was not until the February issue that the mem­
bership learned officially of the Central Executive Commi­
ttee's response to the Treaty. Their statement was cautious 
in content and ambiguous in tone, declaring that the Central 
Executive Council: "while regretting that Dail Eireann has 
felt itself compelled to agree to a settlement which is less 
that the complete claim of Ireland to absolute independence, 
pledges support to the Government of the Irish Free State 
if and when established". It subsequently emerged that this 
resolution was a compromise drawn up to satisfy Art O'Brien 
who had proposed that the League should openly repudiate
the Treaty and P.J. Kelly, the President, who had sought
4a favourable recognition of the Treaty's merits. However 
the extent to which the Central Executive Council divided 
on the issue is impossible to ascertain owing to the lack
1 Catholic Herald, 28 Jan., 1922.
2 Ibid., 7 Jan., 1922.
3 Ibid., 14 Jan., 1922.
4 See letter from P.J. Kelly to the Catholic Herald, 18 
March, 1922.
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1
of detailed voting records and the volatility of some mem-
2bers who changed their opinions later on. The Catholic 
Herald .which believed the Treaty had produced a new situa­
tion whereby there was no further need for Irish political
3organizations m  Britain, violently denounced the "Junta
of Irresponsibles" and their
"insolent dictation and impertinent criticism on a 
matter of which Jhe Irish people and Dail Eireann are 
the sole judge".
The Catholic Herald was rather premature in its implied
criticism that the League leadership was trying to dictate
to the Irish people how they should vote in the forthcoming
elections, for the anti-Treatyites were confident that given
a sufficient period of delay the Irish people after the
evacuation of British troops would repudiate the Treaty in
the forthcoming elections. The Irish Exile stated that "it
would be invidious for this League to tell the Irish
5
people how they should vote" but argued that the League
1 Gaughan, Stack, op. cit., 186, claims that the Central 
Executive Council was practically unanimous for accept­
ance of the Treaty but my impression of the attendance 
at the meeting, as reported in the Irish Exile (Feb.
1922) was that on the basis of their record to date and 
afterwards that the voting was much closer than Gaughan 
suggests.
2 For example * - Sean McGrath as a member of the IRB and 
a close personal friend of Collins originally supported 
the Treaty, see ROR 138, 12 Jan . 1922, CP 3609. CAB 
24/132 but later changed his view on this issue ; source 
- personal interview with his widow.
3 "Irish political organizations outside Ireland have had 
their roots and justification in Ireland's political ens­
lavement, that is over" Catholic Herald,. 24 Dec., 1921.
4 Catholic Herald, 28 Jan., 1922.
5 Irish Exile, Feb., 1922.
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could play a constructive role in the reconstruction of the 
shattered Irish economic fabric in many areas and for this 
purpose the branches were recommended to undertake an 'occu­
pational census' of their membership to establish the extent
of the skilled labour pool the League could offer to the
1
new Irish Government. The Central Executive Council called 
for an intensive recruitment policy by the branches. New 
branches were established in Northfleet, Whitwick and per­
haps the most interesting branch of all, Oxford, whose div­
erse membership included the only Labour Party Councillor 
in that city, the Earl of Longford and the Rev. Cox, an
2Anglican vicar who was described as an ardent Sinn Feiner. 
The Halifax Branch with over five hundred members recorded
3
that "a continuous stream of new members is ever flowing"
and the Ashtown in . Maker.sf ield, Erdington, Haslingden, Mid- 
4 5Durham, and Stepney Branches all reported substantial inc­
reases in their membership.
One of the main reasons why the anti and pro-Treatyites in 
the leadership of the Irish Self Determination League were 
still able to maintain such a relatively good working rela­
tionship was the British Government's policy on the release 
of prisoners. All those people, including the League mem­
bers who had been interned in Ireland were released
1 Irish Exile, Jan., 1922.
2 Ibid., Dec. 1921.
3 Ibid., Feb. 1922.
4 Ibid., Jan. 1922.
5 Ibid., Dec. 1921.
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immediately the Treaty was signed but problems arose over 
the release of the Irish political prisoners in Britain. 
There were several categories of Irish prisoners in Britain, 
the first and largest consisted of those who had been arres­
ted in Ireland and transferrred to prisons in Britain to
1
serve their sentences and these were released soon after
the Dail ratified the Treaty. The League made a grant of
five hundred pounds available from its central funds to aid
local branches in arranging receptions for these men upon
2their release and large crowds greeted them. Problems, 
however, arose over the Irish people arrested and convicted 
for offenses committed in Britain itself and following the 
release of the prisoners tranferred from Ireland the Irish 
Office firmly declared "the exclusion of Irishmen convicted
3
and sentenced m  England is final and definite". The 
British Government were resolutely determined that there 
should be no Amnesty for those who had waged war within 
Britain itself. Leaders of the League, like Thomas Faughan 
who had supported the Treaty,now declared that they would 
reverse their opinions and recommended the Dail and Pro­
visional Governments to cease all work on implementing the 
provisions of the Treaty until there was a full Amnesty
1 "There were about four hundred male prisoners in Local 
Prisons and three hundred in Convict Prisons who had been 
transferred from Ireland" - Commissioners of Prisons 
Report, 1921, Cmd. 1761 (1922), 4.
2 Catholic Herald, 21 January, 1922, Irish Exile, February 
1922 .
3 Catholic Herald, 21 Jan. 1922.
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i
for all the Irish, political, prisoners in Britain.
2Branches organized local meetings on the issue and held 
a large meeting in Trafalgar Square. The Catholic Herald , 
which since the Treaty had ceased its previous policy of 
confining its criticism of the Irish Self Determination 
League to a few specific leaders,in favour of an all out 
virulent offensive against the League itself, stridently 
declared that in all its forty years experience of Irish 
organizations in Britain "none of them has ever been under 
such unsound, unhealthy auspices and so corruptly and scand­
alously mishandled as the Irish Self Determination League...
3it has done little good and a lot of harm". The Catholic
Herald ridiculed the League's statement that the prisoners
4
were "part and parcel of the Irish Army operating hers", 
tartly replying that if that was so they would have been 
shot for treason. However, the Catholic Herald, recognizing 
the degree of support among the Irish community for the 
release of these prisoners declared that it supported the
5
demand purely on humanitarian grounds. It firmly believed 
that the matter should be left to the Provisional Government 
to negotiate and when the prisoners were released carried
the headline: "Negotiations Succeed, Provisional Govern-
6 7ment's Triumph". The Prisoners' release was only achieved
1 See the correspondence between League leaders, branches 
and the Irish Government in DE 2/339, S1795, S659, and 
S1878.
2 Irish Exile, Feb. 1922.
3 Catholic Herald, 11 February, 1922.
4 Ibid., 21 Jan.,, 1922 .
5 Ibid., 4 Feb., 1922.
6 Ibid., 18 Feb., 1922.
7 Times, 13 Feb., 1922.
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after the Provisional Government threatened to withdraw 
their General Amnesty for all illegal actions committed by
i
the British forces m  Ireland during the recent conflict.
It is an indication of how reluctantly the British Cabinet 
released these prisoners that it required almost two weeks 
of discussions by the Ministers before a compromise was for­
mulated: those convicted of actions before the Truce (i.e. 
July 11th., 1921) were to be amnestied and the Home Office
was to review, individually, the cases of those convicted
2
of actions after the Truce. Feelings in the Cabinet ran 
so high on the issue of IRA activity in Britain that Mini­
sters were evidently prepared to incur the hostility of the 
Provisional Government, whose Minister for Agriculture 
(Patrick Hogan) had a brother still in prison. Another 
three men were sentenced for Post—Truce arms purchases dur­
ing February and the League continued to campaign for a 
total amnesty irrespective of conviction dates.
1 Calton Younger, op. cit., 218.
2 See Cabinet 6 ( 22 ), 30 Jan., 1922 , CAB 23/29 and Cabinet 
12 (22), 21 Feb., 1922, CAB 23/29.
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Chapter 17
The Paris Congress of the World Conference of the Irish 
Race
During the Prisoners controversy the Irish Self Determina­
tion League was left virtually leaderless at both nat­
ional and regional level when twenty four officers went to 
Paris for a week to represent England and Wales at the Irish 
Race Congress which the League had played a prominent part 
in organizing. In February 1921 the Irish Republican Asso­
ciation of South Africa passed a resolution calling for the 
convening of a World Conference of the Irish Race for the 
purpose of "stopping British excesses in Ireland, to secure 
the International Recognition of the Irish Republic, to aid 
the development of the Irish export trade and establish a 
Permanent Secretariat in Geneva or the H a g u e " S o u t h  
Africa, being somewhat geographically isolated, the Associ­
ation requested the Irish Self Determination League in gene­
ral and Art O'Brien' in particular to organize the proposed 
2
congress. Art O'Brien informed De Valera who had earlier 
(February 1920) received a proposal from the Australian Self 
Determination for Ireland League that Self Determination 
Leagues should be organized with a central Secretariat in 
London. De Valera now saw the opportunity of creating a
centrally controlled World Self Determination for Ireland
3 'League as a federal structure with national League
1 The Proceedings of the Irish Race Congress - Fine Ghaedeal 
( Dublin 1922) and hereafter cited as Congress Proceedings .
2 Irish Exile, July, 1921.
3 Art O'Brien Report on World Congress to Dr. MacCartan 
(O'Brien Ms 8456) hereafter cited as MacCartan.
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membership. He requested Catherine Hughes (who had earlier 
helped to organize the Irish communities in Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia and Newfoundland) to undertake the pre­
liminary organization of the proposed Congress'*' but after­
wards the Dail Department of Foreign Affairs took respons­
ibility for the organization and so their London represent­
ative, Art O'Brien, was deeply involved in the organization 
of the Congress.
The Irish Race Congress opened in Paris on the 21st. January 
1922: the third anniversary of the first session of Dail 
Eireann and of the Declaration of Irish Independence. As 
the political situation in Ireland had changed substantially 
since the Congress was first proposed an effort was made 
to give it a cultural rather than a political image, with 
exhibitions of Irish art, musical recitals organised that 
week in Paris by the leading Irish artists. In keeping 
with the cultural image, the organizers suggested that the 
Congress was a modern revival of the ancient Hill of Tara 
Assemblies (held one thousand years previously) and in acc­
ordance with this historical image and in deference to the 
contributions made to European countries by the earlier gen­
erations of Irish exiles the Congress was officially opened 
by its Honorary President, The O'Donnell, Duke of Tetuan
1 Catherine Hughes, Report of World Conference (O'Brien 
Ms 8456) and also see DE 1/3 for relevant correspon­
dence .
2 Times, 24th., 26th., January, 1922; Catholic Herald, 
28th. January, 1922.
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(a descendant of the Wild Geese)'*' who spoke in French. Dail
2Eireann was represented by a 'non-political' delegation 
of ten (five pro and five anti-Treatyites) but as it was amly 
two weeks since that crucial vote on the Treaty, the cate­
gory of non-political could not have been expected to be 
water tight. De Valera reluctant to recognize the new Pro­
visional Government by applying for a passport obtained one
through the devious channels of a Republican network in
3
London,aided by communist sympathizers.
The Treaty cast a long dark shadow over the Paris Congress: 
the original intention to select delegates on a basis prop­
ortional to the Irish population in their countries was
4
frustrated when only a minority of United States delegates 
arrived. The Friends of Ireland and the American Association 
for the Recognition of the Irish Republic were deeply divi­
ded on the Treaty issue, and none of the Canadian , Self
1 The 'Wild Geese' were Irishmen who having been defeated 
in the wars with England, during the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries, left Ireland to enlist in the armies
of France and Spain to fight against the English in the 
continental wars.
2 The new Provisional Government requested De Valera to 
join the Irish Delegation on a "non-party political 
basis", see DE 1/4.
3 Greaves, op. cit., 288.
4 There were conflicting reports concerning the actual 
attendance from the United States. The official records 
show that six out of the sixty invited actually attended, 
see Congress Proceedings (O'Brien Ms 8456); Hughes 
claimed that fifty four American delegates were invited 
but only five attended, see Hughes (O'Brien Ms 8456) 
while An Poblacht 28 February, 1922, stated that twenty 
one members of the American Association for the Recogn­
ition of the Irish Republic attended in a semi-official 
capacity.
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Determination League members attended believing that the 
Congress would be so preoccupied and split on the Treaty 
issue that no useful business could be transacted.^ The 
twenty four Irish Self Determination League delegatesf rep­
resenting England and Wales, together with the six Sinn Fein 
members representing Scotland,constituted the largest group­
ing though they were by no means united on policy issues 
The Scottish delegates fought with the League members over 
representation and one of the most bitter disputes of the 
Congress was the interminable series of arguments between 
Art O'Brien and P.J. Kelly. After the ten delegates repres­
enting Dail Eireann, the Australians had the next largest 
delegation and probably the next most prestigious as their 
seven man delegation was led by P.J. Dillion,the official
Queensland Government Representative in London;and Rev. Dr.
2O'Reilly, the President of Sydney University College. The
remaining delegates of the eighty odd attendance came mos-
3 4 5tly from South America, Europe, South Africa, New
1 See Art'O'Brien, Report on Paris Congress and Fine Ghaed- 
heal to the:Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club, 17 July, 1922 
(O'Brien, Ms 8456) hereafter cited as O'Brien 17 July# 
1922 . It is however qui*te possible that the Canadians 
were annoyed that Dail Eireann had prevented the holding 
of a proposed 'Montreal World Convention', see DE 1/3.
2 For the Australian participation in the Paris Congress 
see Richard Davis 'The Self Determination for Irelandt 
Leagues and the Irish Race Convention in Paris 1921-22 , 
Tasmanian Historical Research Association Papers and Pro­
ceedings , 24, 88, 97 (Sept. 1977).
3 There were seven from Argentina, three from Brazil and 
one each from Mexico and Chile.
4 Three each from Spain and Italy and two from France.
5 Brian Farrington of the South African Irish Republican 
Association.
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1 2 Zealand and Newfoundland. The Congress was nowhere near
as representative as originally envisaged and some of those 
attending did not represent any sizeable Irish communities. 
This was particularly the case with the French, Spanish, 
and Italian delegations.,who were either Dail Eireann Envoys 
or Consuls to these countries, token representatives of the 
Wild Geese to illustrate the old historical exile connec­
tion, or the Rectors of the Irish Colleges (Seminaries estab­
lished during the prohibition of the Catholic Church in 
Ireland during the Penal Laws period) of Salamanca, Rome 
and Paris. No one was ever quite sure how a representative
of the Irish community in Java, consisting of only seven
3people, had been invited.
The Congress commenced its discussion sessions-by passing
a resolution condemning "the vindictiveness of the British
Government in refusing an Amnesty" to the Irish prisoners
4convicted m  Britain. It was probably the only unanimous 
resolution of the whole proceedings! After lengthy and 
sometimes heated discussion the Congress decided to set up a 
world wide Fine Ghaedeal (literally 'Family of Ireland1) 
to unite the Irish organizations throughout the world in 
a common umbrella organization. It was envisaged by the 
congress that Fine Ghaedeal would aid the Irish exile comm­
unities by establishing Chairs of Irish Studies in the
1 Three delegates.
2 One delegate representing the Self Determination League 
in that state. ■
3 Congress Proceedings, 175.
4 Catholic Herald, 28 Jan., 1922.
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universities of countries with major Irish communities and 
provide bursaries for the children of exiles to study in 
Ireland. It was also proposed to compile a world wide Who's 
Who of Irish exiles and financially aid the reconstruction 
of the Irish economy directly by donations and indirectly 
through the promotion of Irish exports. Last but not least 
was the proposal that Fine Ghaedheal would actively foster 
a 'back to Ireland' movement, comparable to the 'Aliyiah' 
or 'Return to Palestine' of the Zionists. Although the pro­
ceedings report does not contain any direct references to 
the Zionist Congress there was no doubt an unspoken objec­
tive of organizing the Irish abroad in a manner similar to 
the Jewish Diaspora. Indeed the Irish/Zionist comparison
is very apt for had not Lloyd George referred to the "Irish
1
as the Jews of the World" and the factional disputes of
the Paris Congress were reminiscent of the abortive attempt,
also in Paris, to form a world wide Jewish organization in 
2
1894 , while the unrepresentative character of some of the
Irish delegates echoed the composition of many of the Jewish
3delegations at the early Zionist Congresses.
The Congress decided that Fine Gheadheal should be a
1 T. Jones, op. cit., 145.
2 An attempt to establish a world wide Zionist Unified
organization failed in 1894. See H.H. Ben-Sasson"(ed)
A History of the Jewish People (1976), 898.
3 At the First and Second Zionist Congresses in 1897 and
1898, participation was restricted to organizations with 
a membership of at least a hundred so some of the smaller 
French Jewish organizations 'represented' groups in 
Poland that they had never met! See Nelly Wilson Bernard 
Lazare:‘Anti-Semitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity
in Late 19th. Century France (Cambridge, 1978), 239-41.
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federally structured organization with a Central Council
of seven members and a representative from each national
section. De Valera and Eoin MacNeill, the Provisional
Government Minister for Education, were elected President
1
andVice President respectively and all the others were elec­
ted without a contest except Art O'Brien, who had to defeat 
P.J. Kelly for the last seat on the Council. Fine Gheadeal 
never achieved any of its lofty objectives. The organiza­
tion was quickly repudiated by a number of the delegates
2
who believed it had a definite anti-Treaty orientation.
A Dail Eireann inquiry was subsequently established to rev-
3
lew the proceedings, and only a few Council meetings were 
4held in Dublin, while the proposed Tailteann Games (Olympics
of the Irish exiles to be held in Dublin) were cancelled
because of the Civil War which prevented Council members from 
5
meeting . And so the organization faded into history, but
1 One of these was H. Hutchinson the Scottish Sinn Fein
leader.
2 See letter from the Australian, Argentinian, New Zealand
and South African delegates to De Valera (30 Jan., 1922)
informing him that they were boycotting Fine Gheadheal 
until the organization replaced Robert Brennan, a lead­
ing anti-Treatyite, as its paid secretary. (O'Brien Ms 
8456) and also see ROR 142, 9 Feb., 1922. CP 3725, CAB 
24/133.
3 See Eoin MacNeill Report on the World Conference to Dail
Eireann, 3 Feb., 1922 (O'Brien Ms 8456) and DE 2/206, 
2/437, 2/439 for revelant correspondence. Also see 
MacCartan, op. cit..
4 See for example a report of a meeting in An Poblacht,
22 March, 1922.
5 Art O'Brien was arrested in Dublin when he crossed over
to attend a Council meeting. See the Times, 6 July,
1922 .
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1 "not into the history books; for the first and last attempt 
to organize the Irish communities scattered throughout the 
world ended in failure, with nothing substantial left to ind­
icate it had ever occurred.
The Irish Self Determination League, which had spent consi­
derable time and effort in organizing the Congress that had
2
turned into such a "hot bed of intrigue" gained little from 
its participation in Paris. P. McManus an Executive Council 
member resigned from the League in protest against the exp­
enditure on expenses in Paris, of over two hundred and fifty 
pounds by the Standing Committee delegates: an episode glee­
fully recorded by the Catholic Herald which determined!^ ; 
catalogued all the 'wrong doings' of the League and though 
it gave considerable space to the coverage of the Paris Con­
gress it did not think much for the concept of Fine Ghead- 
3
heal at all. The deep rooted nature of the personal anta­
gonism between the President, P.J. Kelly, and the Vice 
President, Art O'Brien, of the League, had been very pub­
licly exposed and Art O'Brien was singled out by some dele­
gates as the person who had effectively 'wrecked' the Cong­
ress by insisting on introducing the issue of the Treaty
1 With the exception of Robert Brennan's (a participant) 
brief details), op. cit., 335, and R. Davis Tasmanian, 
op. cit., who mostly concentrates on the Australian as­
pect, I believe that my article on the Paris Congress
- in the Irish Post,13 Feb,1982 is the only detailed account 
of the proceedings, other than contemporary newspapers, 
ever published.
2 Robert Brennan, ibid..
3 .Catholic Herald,. 11 March,.' 1922.
1into the discussions. The Provisional Government Ministers 
who were present in Paris noted that while De Valera had 
generally conducted himself in a statemanslike"non—party 
political" manner, Art O'Brien had effectively spearheaded 
the attack on the Treaty and as the Provisional Government 
(under another hat) were now also the Dail Eireann Govern­
ment, O'Brien's days as the Dail Eireann Envoy in London
2
were clearly numbered.
1 See letter from Brian Farrington (South Africa) to De 
Valera (31 January, 1922 ), O'Brien Ms 8456.
2 MacNeill wrote from Paris, 3 February, 1922, to his 
Government colleagues recommending that Sean T. O'Kelly 
(the Irish Representative in Paris) and Art O'Brien "be 
replaced as Irish Representatives as they were doing 
everything in their power to work against the Government" 
DE 1/4.
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Chapter 18
The Diaspora Irish;Citizens or Exiles?
The Paris Congress provides a very valuable focal point to 
observe the position of the Irish in Britain vis a vis that 
of the Irish Diaspora in general and also to consider the 
potentially troublesome issue of the nature of the relation­
ship between exile and homeland political movements: who 
controls who?.
Art O'Brien's attempts to circumvent the veto of the offi­
cial 'non party1 Dail delegation, on any discussion of the
Treaty at Paris,by seeking to confine the proposed debate
1
to the overseas delegates was opposed not only by the Pro — 
Treaty overseas delegates but significantly by the Lord 
Mayor of Cork who though he was personally strongly opposed 
to the Treaty, roundly condemned this attempted exile inter­
vention into Irish domestic politics. "The people in . 
Ireland", he said, "may decide to accept a Free State, they
may not. Whether they do or not is the concern of the peo-
2
pie of Ireland ". Redmond twenty-one years previously had
foreseen this problem ?bf exile intervention when he bluntly
warned the New York Irish that *.
"when Ireland is united she is entitled to decide for 
herself what is best in her interests. No Irishman in 
America living 3000 miles away from the homelandrought 
to think he has a right to dictate to Ireland."
1 Congress Proceedings, op. cit. 81.
2 Ibid 102.
3 New York Times 5 Dec., 1901.
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This problem of external intervention also plagued the world
Zionist movement when following the emergence of a strong
Jewish presence in Palestine, the Yishuv (Jewish leadership
in Palestine) firmly resisted external Zionist attempts to
control their colony. Jabotinsky as a result of this dis-
1
pute formed a rival Federation of Revised Zionists.
In both cases the internal leadership's desire to weaken 
the influence of the external groups was considerably imp­
eded by their dependence on external financing. For much 
of its existence the Irish Parliamentary Party was largely 
dependent on American funds until 1914 when Redmond's sup­
port for the British war effort so alienated his tradi­
tional backers that money had to be sent from Ireland to
2maintain the UIL offices in the United States. Irish 
Republicanism was even more dependent on American funds and 
though Clan na Gael was technically subordinate to the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, in practice the American offspring
3
often effectively controlled its Irish parent. De Valera 
soon found on his visit to the United States that even 
though the elected Dail had declared an Irish Republic,with 
himself as its President many leading Irish-Americans w a n ­
ted to maintain their old dominance and so severe problems
1 See Michael Cohen op. cit. 125-6 and Ben-Sasson, op. cit 
1005-9.
2 A. Ward, Ireland op. cit. 13-15.
3 See William D'Arcy the Fenian Movement in the United 
States (Washington,1947) and Henri Le Caron Twenty-five 
Years in the Secret Service (1892), Caron was a British 
agent working in the Clan na Gael leadership.
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resulted.^ De Valera had travelled to the United States
to raise funds for the Republican loan there in the same
2way as Art O'Brien was fund raising in Britain. But the 
Friends of Irish Freedom, the Clan na Gael sponsored org­
anization, argued that collecting for a Republican loan vio­
lated American law and so De Valera was forced to establish 
the American Commission on Irish Independence which issued
certificates, exchangeable for bonds only after the Irish
3
Republic had won international recognition. Five and a 
half million dollars were raised in this manner but the epi­
sode had been a powerful reminder to De Valera that the 
Irish Americans were despite their title Americans first 
and Irish second.
Some of the old guard of the Irish Republican movement in 
the United States deeply resented De Valera's declared in­
tention not to play second fiddle to them but their opposi­
tion to his policies was much more deeply rooted than in 
a mere personality clash. Judge Cohalan, the Clan na Gael 
and Friends of Irish Freedom leader, sharply rebuked De
1 For De Valera's long stay American visit see, Patrick 
McCartan With De Valera in America (1932), Katherine 
O'Doherty Assignment America (New York, 1957 ), James 
Walsh ‘ De Valera in the United States 1919'1 American 
Catholic History Society Records .33 ( 1962) 92-107, Donal 
McCartney 1De Valera's Mission to the United States' in 
Art Cosgrove and D. McCartney (edt.) Studies in Irish 
History (1979). Sean Nunan MS 22,548 (NLI) and 'President 
Eamon De Valera's Mission to the United States' Capuchin 
Annual 37 (1970) 236-49.
2 See O'Brien MS 8427, for his fund raising efforts.
3 Desmond Ryan The Phoenix Flame (1937) 310-15.
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Valera for his policy of trying to mobilize Irish Americans
to pressurize their country's leaders to recognize the Irish
Republic. "Do you really think for a moment that American
public opinion will permit any citizen of another country
1
to interfere as you suggest, in American affairs?" he asked 
De Valera. Cohalan's question aptly illustrates the part­
icularistic nature of Irish nationalism in the United 
States, a nationalism that was largely the product of the 
American experience. Brown argues that Irish nationalism 
in American was an 'internalised' product stemming from 
their initially low socio-economic position in a society 
dominated by the 'Wasps'; identified by Irish immigrants
as synonomous with the English landlord oppressor they had
1
knownm Ireland. Foner also argues from this 'internalised'
perspective, though he identifies the radicalizing experi­
ence of the emigrant,in a harsh laisse faire industrial soc­
iety's the most important component in the emergence of
3Irish nationalism in America. Hechter's 'internal colon­
ialism’ model could also be applied in a modified manner 
to analyze the relationship between the Irish Catholic emi­
grant and Wasp 19th century America.
Between 1845 and 1891 over three million Irish emigrants 
entered the United States, many of them blaming British 
colonial rule in Ireland for their enforced emigration.
They came to a United States where there was still a strong
1 Dennis Gywnn De Valera (1933) 96.
2 T. Brown op. cit.
3 Eric Foner op. cit.
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popular anti-British sentiment stemming from the indepen­
dence and 1812 Wars. In the United States many Irish 
Americans believed that the political, economic and social 
power of the Wasp establishment could not be conquered until 
British rule in Ireland had been defeated. So many Irish 
Americans endeavoured, whenever possible, to develop and 
deepen the underlying political and economic conflicts bet­
ween the United States and Britain. Largely through their 
efforts three of the four Anglo-American Arbitration Treaties
negotiated between 1897 and 1911 failed to pass through the
1
Congress or the Senate. In the American 'Melting Pot1
the Irish became a powerful interest group particularly inf-
2
luential m  local government. Many an aspiring candidate
for office found it necessary to support the anti-British
position pursued by Irish American organisations. But the
political power of the Irish Americans was dependent on
their fundamental loyalty to the United States, as expressed
in its most basic form by taking out citizenship. Even
Thomas Clarke the IRB leader found it necessary to take out
his American citizenship papers though he never intended
3
to stay there permanently.
Irish nationalism in the United States pursued a strategy 
of linking the Irish struggle for freedom with the growth
1 A. Ward Ireland op. cit. 257.
2 See Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan Beyond the Melting 
Pot op. cit.
3 See Louis Le Roux Tom Clarke and the Irish Freedom 
Movement (Dublin, 1936) 55.
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of American political and economic power that seeemed almost
inevitably to, sooner or later^bring the United States into
conflict with Britain. This strategy was fiercely opposed
by the powerful Anglophile lobby and the bitterly anti-
1
Catholic fundamentalist Protestants. The determination
of the Irish nationalists in America to do nothing that might
be interpreted by their opponents as indicating a primary
allegiance to another country led to the use of the term
%
Irish Race Conference, with its ethnic rather than politi­
cal connotations, to describe their periodical national 
2assemblies. The opposing tidal currents of pro and anti" 
British sentiment ebbed and flowed through American hist­
ory but did not seriously threaten the potentially diffi­
cult position of Irish nationalists in the 20th century 
until the First World War. Their reaction to this event 
clearly illustrates the particularistic nature of Irish 
American nationalism and their constant dilemma that aiding 
Ireland might in certain circumstances be interpreted as 
an unAmerican activity.
Realising that there was no hope of the United States ent­
ering the War on the German side and understanding only too 
well the power of the Anglophile lobby that sought to align 
America militarily with Britain the Irish American nationa­
lists were determined that the United States should remain 
neutral in the conflict that was ravaging Europe. The Irish
1 See Ray Billlngton the Protestant Crusade (New York, 
1938).
2 C.C. O'Brien op. cit. 48-9.
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1American campaign to keep the United States neutral was 
not without powerful allies, notably in the German commu­
nity. The 11 million German/Austrian born population was 
by far the largest single ethnic bloc in the United States 
and with 3 million of them organized - with the active
2
encouragement of the German dominated brewing industry- 
into the German-American National Alliance, they constitu­
ted one of the most potent political interest groups in the 
country. The earlier noted German-Irish hostility that 
stemmed from the disproportionate Irish influence in the 
Catholic Hierarchy had substantially diminished by 1914.
A new relationship had emerged during the Boer War based on 
a common hostility towards the British and admiration for
3
the Boers. In 1907 the Ancient Order of Hibernians, one 
of the most influential of the Irish American organizations, 
signed a formal pact with the German-American National
4
Alliance to oppose British influence in the United States.
At the local level Irish and German organizations jointly
celebrated their National Days; St. Patrick's Day and
Bismarck's birthday and German-Irish leagugs emerged in 
5many areas.
1 See K.R. Maxwell 'Irish-American Propagandists and 
American Neutrality' Mid-America 49 (1967) 252-75.
2 The Alliance was regarded as a powerful anti-prohibition 
lobby by the brewers, see L.J. Rippley The German-Ameri- 
cans (Boston, 1976) 181.
3 A. Ward, Ireland op. cit. 83.
4 See John 0' Dea. The History of the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians Vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1923) 1387-8.
5 Rippley op. cit. 183.
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1
The strength of the Irish-German Neutrality lobby backed
2
by anti-Czarist Jews was too strong to be ignored and so 
President Wilson launched an onslaught against 'hyphenism1. 
Wilson thundered "Some Americans need hyphens in their names 
because only part of them has come over, but when the whole 
man has come over, heart and thought and all, the hyphen
3
drops of its own weight out of his name". Until the War 
many had regarded hyphenism as a bridge between the Old 
World and the New, a means of softening the trauma of emi­
gration but now Wilson sought to link hyphenism with unAmer- 
icanism. A wave of patriotic fervour swept the country in 
the wake of Wilson's speech. Americanization was encoura-
4
ged with Loyalty Days and "I am an American Days". The 
British Ambassador noted with approval the growth of anti"
5
Irish feeling in the United States but it was the Germans, 
previously regarded as one of the most popular ethnic groups 
in the United States^ who bore the full brunt of public 
hostility following the entry of America into the War.
Many German Americans had in the first year of the war put 
their money where their sympathies lay and bought 10 million
1 See Dean Esslinger 'American-German and Irish Attitudes 
Toward Neutrality 1914-19171 Catholic Historical Review 
53 (1967) 194-216.
2 See Louis Gerson The Hyphenate in Recent American Poli­
tics and Diplomacy (Lawrence, 1964 ) 83.
3 Gerson op. cit. 19.
4 Ibid. 112.
5 See CAB 37/148/15
6 A. Ward Ireland op. cit. 100.
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dollars worth of German war bonds.  ^ Now many hastened to
2buy Liberty Bonds m  response to a masterly psychological 
warfare poster campaign, "Are you 100% American? Prove it!
3
Buy US Government Bonds" . Many German-Americans Alliance 
branches,dissolved themselves, some even transformed them-
4
selves into American Citizenship Associations- an 'Ameri­
canization1 process no doubt hastened by the emergence of 
a semi offical American Protective League whose 200,000
members investigated the loyalities of thousands of German
5
and Irish Americans. In what Higham describes as "the
6most pervasive nativism that America has ever known", no
aspect of German American life was left untouched. Schools
dropped the German language from their curriculum in 14 
7
states, libraries removed German books from their shelves
o
and orchestras ceased to play Bach and Beethoven. With 
town names like Berlin Iowa becoming Lincoln, many followed 
the example of the English Monarchy and anglicized their
1 See Frederick Luebke Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans 
and World War I (Illinois, 1974) 94.
2 Rippley op. cit. 187.
3 Words on poster, reproduced in George Theofiles American
Posters of World War I (New York, 1975) 115.
4 Rippley op. cit. 190.
5 Ibid, 185.
6 John Higham Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American 
Nativism (fiew Jersey, 1955) 195.
7 Ibid, 203-208.
8 See Robert Billigmer Americans from Germany (Belmont, 
California, 1974) 144-5.
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German family n a m e s .^ Even American culinary did not esc­
ape the tidal wave of German- phobia; that most archetypi­
cal of American dishes, the hamburger, now appeared on menus
2 3
as Salisbury steak and sauerkraut became liberty cabbage.
According to Billigmer, German-America lost much of its
dynamism and was never the same after the. tidal wave of
4
German-phobia had swept over it.
With their German allies besieged on all sides most Irish 
Americans lost no time in proclaiming their support for the 
American war effort. Judge Cohalan.the leader of the 
Friends of Irish Freedom who had spearheaded the Neutrality 
campaign, now declared that he believed "there would not 
be in any quarter of the country a single man of Irish blood
5
who would not think of America first". The Irish Fellow­
ship Club, Chicago's largest Irish organization,condemned 
anything that might weaken the Allied cause as being anti- 
American.^ The Ancient Order of Hibernians, denouncing opp-
7
osition to the War as "treason", postponed their Convention
8
and suspended the publication of their paper, the Hibernia
1 Billigmer, op. cit., 145.
2 Rippley op. cit. 186
3 Billigmer op. cit. 144.
4 Ibid. 148.
5 D. Greaves Mellowes op. cit. 125.
6 Times 20 Dec., 1917.
7 A. Ward Ireland op. cit. 141.
8 F.M. Carroll American Opinion and the Irish Question 
(1978) 106.
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while the Gaelic American which opposed the War lost much of
1
its circulation. The new anti-war left wing orientated 
Irish Progressive League,that emerged in a bid to fill the 
vacuum left by the departure from the active scene of the 
established Irish organizations,encountered much opposition 
from both the Irish community and state forces."
The planned 1917 Irish Race Convention never took place but
having established their support for the American war effort
the Friends of Irish Freedom now began to link Irish indep-
3
endence with American war aims ; though the opposition to 
conscription in Ireland generated considerable anti-Catholic
4
hostility. With the ending of the War the Irish American 
nationalists sought, along with many other ethnic groupings, 
to persuade Wilson to raise their national claims at the 
Versailles Conference and when Wilson proved reluctant to 
press for such a fundamental alteration of the European geo­
political system, he incurred the enmity of dissatisfied 
Irish, German, Polish, Italian and Jewish interests in the 
United States. These ethnic groups aligned themselves with 
Republican isolationists, traditional Anglophobes and diss^- 
ident Democrats to oppose the ratification of the "Covenant 
of the League of Nations, drawn up as part of the Versailles
5
Settlement. The Friends of Irish Freedom denounced the
1 Ward, od. cit., 141.
2 See the Golden Papers, Msl7668 (N'LI) .
3 Ward, op. cit., 141-3.
4 Carroll, op. cit., 117.
5 For a conscise but very informative account of the o p p ­
osition to the League see Gerson, op. cit., 100-8.
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League as "Britain's League" claiming it not only effect­
ively legitimized British rule in Ireland for ever but by 
ignoring the issue of "freedom of the seas" and the Monroe 
Doctrine it opposed fundamental American interests. In 
their fight against the League Treaty'*' the FOIF spent , in­
side the United States, much of the million dollars it had
2
raised in 1919 as its Irish Victory Fund.
Not only did the Dail leadership object to such a huge e x p ­
enditure, at a time when the Irish Republic badly needed 
the money, but the very purpose of the expenditure was co n ­
trary to Dail wishes. For Dail Eireann was not opposed 
in principle to the concept of the League of Nations and 
indeed actually welcomed the idea that the League would
impose a moral dimension on the world political system in
3
which might would not be right. De Valera sought to pers­
uade Irish Americans not to oppose the League as such but 
instead to seek modifications which would aid the Irish 
cause. He was however bluntly told by one leader that the 
F O I F 1s task was "to save America from England and all those
4
whom she could influence". Dail Envoy McCartan remarked
5
of this type of attitude, "God save Ireland from her friends" 
Relations between De Valera and the FOIF leadership continued
1 See K.R. Maxwell 'Irish Americans and the Fight for 
Treaty Ratification', Public Opinion Quarterly 31(1967/8) 
620-41, and John B. Duff, 'The Versailles Treaty and
the Irish Americans', The Journal of American History 
L V (1968) 598-612.
2 Tansill, op. cit., 340-8.
3 See Dail Eireann Debates (1919) 72-76.
4 William Fitzgerald, The Voice of Ireland (1924) 238.
5 A. Ward, Ireland, op. cit., 215.
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to deteriorate, coming to a head when the Irish President
suggested to a reporter that Ireland, to assuage British
fears, would be prepared to accept a British version of
the Monroe Doctrine and enter into a mutual defence arrange- 
1
ment. To Cohalan this was more than just unacceptable and 
he vividly pointed to its implication that if an indepen­
dent Ireland should become, "an ally in what I regard as 
the inevitable struggle for the freedom of the seas that 
must shortly come between America and England every loyal
American will without hesitation, take a position unreser-
2
vedly upon the side of America". Cohalan was reiterating
the view of a Fenian leader, expressed almost 60 years pre- 
3
viously but it was a view shared by many others and not
just confined to Irish Americans, for Marxists also shared
this perspective of an inevitable conflict between the two
4
leading Capitalist powers. Both the British and American
5
defence planners had prepared detailed contingency plans 
for such an eventuality and this threat played an important 
part in the British determination to maintain their posses­
sion of the Irish parts as part of the Anglo-Irish Treaty
1 Westminster- Gazette 6 Feb., 1920.
2 Ward, op. cit., 219 and also see' Daniel Cohalan The 
Freedom of the Seas (New York, 1919).
3 See J.L. Kiernan Ireland and America versus England 
(Detroit, 1864 ) .
4 See John MacLean The Coming War with America (Glasgow 
1919). Trotsky predicted an Anglo American War by 1924, 
see J.T. Murphy, New Horiz o n s , op. cit., 173.
5 See Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, 
WO 106/4 0 and for the American plans, Sunday T i m e s , 3 0 ‘ 
Nov., 1975.
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1
settlement.
De Valera eventually responded to the FOIF's hostility by 
forming an American Association for the Recognition of the 
Irish Republic but the spectre of a possible Anglo Irish 
versus the JJnited States conflict and its implications for 
Irish Americans could not be so easily exorcised. The dia­
lectical relationship between exile and homeland political 
movements of necessity also impinges on the position of 
the exile political movement in its country of residence.
The Polish World Exile Organization, Polonia, recognizing 
the potential conflict of interest, declared in its Consti­
tution "that work for the Polish Nation cannot in any way 
cause the Poles living in foreign countries to have diffic­
ulties in regard to their surroundings and the States in
2
which they are living." This issue of citizenship emerged 
at the Paris Congress, Rev. O'Reilly (Australia) opening 
the debate, observed, "I take it we must frankly and unequi­
vocally accept the nationality of the country we are living 
3
in". He was supported by Brian Farrington (South Africa)
who argued that the Irish in South Africa "owed individual
4political allegiance to the South African nation". But
Art O'Brien put a very different view point:
"those delegates who happen to have the misfortune 
to reside in the same country as I reside in, will 
not take the same view with regard to the question
1 See F.M. Hawkings, 'Defence and the Role of Erskine
Childers in the Treaty Negotiations', Irish Historical
Studies 22 (1981) 251.
2 J. Zubricki, Adjustment of Polish Immigrants in Great 
Brit a i n . London University MSc Thesis (1953).
3 Congress Proceedings, op. cit., 37.
4 Congress Proceedings, op. cit., 40.
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of citizenship as Dr. O'Reilly or Mr Farrington.
If I were in their place I think I would p r o b ­
ably agree t h o r o u g h l y ^
Sean Sheehan (Scotland) declared "We Irish in Scotland do 
not accept the nationality of the country in which we re s ­
ide" but he too conceded "It is a perfectly fair and logi-
2
cal thing for the Irish m  America to do that".
Immigrants can adopt three basic types of attitudes towards 
the political system of their new country of residence.
They can give full hearted allegiance, expressed in the 
form of taking out citizenship and actively working within 
that political system for the good of their new country. 
Alternatively they can adopt a grudging, almost coerced, 
negative attitude towards their new state or even refuse 
to become its citizens, preferring to retain the citizenship 
of their country of origin. Such courses of action can 
endanger the position of the immigrant by generating demands 
to restrict their rights or even calls for their exclusion. 
The English Catholic publication the Tablet called for the 
disenfranchisement of the Irish in Britain, even though 
they were by birth British citizen/subjects, "surely • 
Englishmen have a right to exclude from a decision upon 
English matters, the multitudes of Irishmen, who, though 
they live on English soil, belong to neither English party,
3
who remain Irishmen though resident in England." Irish 
Americans interested in Irish freedom always maintained 
that this cause was in the interests of the United States
1 Congress Proceedings , .
2 Ibid., 52.
3 Tablet 23 July, 1892.
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whose citizenship they enthusiastically accepted. Yet as 
we have seen the Irish Americans incurred considerable p u b ­
lic odium in their bid to keep their country out of the 
war. While the traumatic experience of the German Americans 
after the entry of the United States into the war graphic­
ally reveals how a war between the country of residence 
and the country of origin or 'Patria' can drastically change 
the position of the immigrant community.
Herzl's advocacy of a 'Jewish Nationality1, that precluded
full assimilation, aroused much opposition from the rel i ­
gious and lay leaders of European Jewry who realised the 
implications of the Zionist doctrine for the position of 
Jews in their countries of residence. A concern still ' 
very apparent 60 years later in a Jewish Fellowship leaf­
let that observed,
"In many countries where the Jews are regarded as 
followers of a religion,- the creation of a 'Jewish 
S t a t e 1 with its implications of a 'Jewish Nation­
ality' might seriously prejudice the good rela­
tions which at present exist between Jews and
their fellow citizens."2
The Board of Deputies of British Jews was fervently anti- 
Zionist until the Balfour Declaration when it cautiously 
began to reorientate its policy towards Zionism. Even 
though the British Government had appeared in the Balfour 
Declaration to approve of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine 
the Board's reaction produced a breakway League of the 
British Jews, formed to.uphold the "status of British s u b ­
jects professing the Jewish Religion" and to vigorously
1 See Ben-Sasson, op. cit., 899.
2 Bound in Volume, WP 15422 (British Library).
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contest the "allegation that the Jews constitute a sepa-
1
rate nationality". The establishment of a large Jewish 
immigrant colony and their subsequent demand for a Jewish 
State, not just a Homeland, was to cause the British Jews 
considerable problems as Palestine was a British Mandate 
and one they were very reluctant to surrender.
The supreme test of the degree of political assimilation 
and allegiance to the receiving country or the country of 
birth, in the case of the non first generation, is their 
response to a conflict situation between the country of 
birth and the country of residence or 'Patria1. Many of 
the Irish in Britain, as we have observed, voluntarily e n ­
listed in the British Forces during the war; a much smaller 
number followed the example set in Ireland and refused to 
be conscripted. A group travelled over to Ireland to fight 
against the British Army in the 1916 Rising and subsequently 
a number of the Irish in Britain actively engaged in mil i ­
tary operations in Britain itself during the War of Indep­
endence. A conflict supported by- the Irish Self Determin­
ation League which recruited over 38,000 members.
Irish Americans never took up arms against their government 
nor were they ever asked to support such activity. Some 
Irish nationalist miners in Australia fought the forces 
of the British State at Eureka Stockade but this was e s s e n ­
tially an economic protest and its political orientation 
was primarily Australian rather than Irish nationalist.
S. Cohen, op. cit.
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Irish nationalists living in South Africa fought alongside 
the Boers but their primary motivation was the maintenance 
of Boer Independence rather than Irish freedom. Irish 
people in Britain on the other hand witnessed Fenian bomb­
ings in 1867, Clan na Gael bombings between 1883-86, an 
IRA campaign in Britain between 1920-21 and subsequently 
again in 1939-40 and from 1972 onwards. All of these acti­
vities inevitably generated considerable anti-Irish feeling 
in Britain. Only one other group in the Irish Diaspora 
ever went through a similar experience to the Irish in 
Britain - the Irish in Canada.
The American Civil War gave military experience to many 
Irish Americans and the Fenians recruited an Irish Army 
in the United States. Unable to transport their army to 
Ireland and reluctant to see it disintegrate through inac­
tivity, the Fenians decided to strike a blow for Irish 
freedom and against Britain by liberating Canada. For sev­
eral years in the 1860s the Canadian border was menaced 
by Fenian military units who on several occasions mounted 
sizeable incursions.^ Stacey suggests that most Canadian 
Fenians were opposed to their American counterparts'
1 There is a sizeable body of literature on the Fenian 
invasions of Canada, for a representative selection 
see, Brian Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo American Rela­
tions During Reconstruction (Ithaca, 1969), Francis 
Campbell, TheFenian Invasion of Canada (Montreal,.
1909), George Welch, 'The Fenian Foray into Canada',
An' Cosantoir 18 (1958) 268-301, Frank Jones, 'The 
Fenian Raid on Canada 1886', Irish Sword 3 (1957) 47- 
9, Gerald Noonan, 'General John O'Neill and the Canadian 
Invasion', Cloghar Record 6 (1967), 277-319.
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1
invasion plans but following a successful series of border 
skirmishes, some of the Canadian Fenians began to openly
2
carry arms and to forcibly prevent Protestant celebrations. 
With the threat of a Fenian invasion ever in mind the 
Canadian authorities were initially reluctant to take strong 
measures against Canadian Fenians for fear of retaliatory 
raids and so the Irish nationalists became a potent poli­
tical force in Canada. But following the rout of a Fenian 
raid at Eccles Hill in 1870 the authorities took much tou-
3
gher action. A wave of anti-Irish persecution then ensued,
even Irish troops who had refused to join the Fenians did
not escape the tidal wave of anti-Irish feeling that swept 
4
Canada. The Fenian movement in Canada never recovered
from the debacle and most of its supporters turned away
from Irish issues in favour of local politics of purely
5
Canadian concern. Ironically Canada benefitted from the
Fenian raids for the threat of external military interven­
tion played a major role in bringing the Provinces into
£
a Confederation. Fifty years after Eccles Hill, Ottawa
1 See C.P. Stacey, "A Fenian Interlude: The Story of Michael 
M u r p h y 1 The Canadian Historical Review 15 (1934) 14 0-51.
2 See P.M. Toner 'The Green Ghost: Canada's Fenians and 
the Raids' Eire-Ireland 16 (1981) 27-47.
3 See Toner op. cit. and William Baker 'Squelching the 
Disloyal Fenian Sympathizing Brood' Canadian Historical 
Review 141-58.
4 See C.P. Stacey 'Garrison at Fort Wellington, A Mil i ­
tary Dispute During the Fenian Troubles", Ibid., 14 
(1933), 161-76.
5 See Toner op. cit. and D.C. Lyne and P.M. Toner 'Fenian- 
ism in Canada 1874-1884' Studies Hibernian 12(1972) 27- 
76.
6 See, C.P. Stacey 'Fenianism and the Rise of National 
Feeling in Canada at the Time of the Confederation' 
Canadian Historical Review 12 (1931) 238-61.
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police had to repeatedly baton charge union jack waving
crowds as they tried to storm the hall where the Foundation
Conference of the Self Determination for Ireland League
of Canada and New Foundland was taking place. The League
which claimed 20,000 members allied itself with the French
2
language rights movement.
Unfortunately because of organizational problems no Canadian
delegates were present for the important Paris debate on
the issue of exile citizenship. With the exception of the
Irish in Britain none of the other groups in the Irish
Diaspora had faced the same degree of hostility as the
Irish in Canada. Not that they could not tell of their
own experience of persecution by the State as a result of
their activities on behalf of Irish freedom. In Australia
Prime Minister Hughes had tried to have Archbishop Mannix
3
removed from Australia by pressuring the Vatican and two
Republican emissaries,F r . O'Flannagan and Mr. O'Kelly,were 
4
deported. Across the Tasman Sea Bishop Liston of Auckland 
found himself on a "seditious utterance charge" as a res-
5
ult of his comments regarding the Black and Tans: while 
the activity of the Irish support groups in these countries 
found little favour with their governments they did manage 
to win considerable support from non-Irish gpoups with'their 
argument that Irish independence would lead to a further
1 Times 18 Oct., 1920.
2 See John Boyle, op. cit.
3 See Report on Mission to the Holy See, FO 371/12014.
4 Catholic H e r a l d , 8 May, 1923.
5 T i m e s , 8 April, 1922.
weakening of British control that would benefit the coun­
tries concerned. In Britain this claim was only acceptable 
to the tiny group of Marxists who believed that the defeat 
of British imperialism was a prerequisite for revolution.
At Paris the American, Australian and South African d e l e ­
gates argued "it is not as exiles that the Irish abroad 
can best serve the Motherland but as subjects of their v a r ­
ious governments".^ Bromley has formulated a- hierarchical
taxonomy whereby one can talk of a Don Cossack who is a
2Ukranian , who is a Russian ,who is a Slav. But one could 
suggest that the potential for conflict is hot the same 
between the self identifications of. Russian and Slav as 
between Ukranian and Russian,for there has been a history 
of bitter conflict between these two rival nationalisms; 
similar to the historical tension between the Irish and 
British. And just as many Ukrainians opposed Ukranian n a ­
tionalism so many of the Irish in Britain favoured the 
interests of their country of birth of Patria. When the 
English born Art O'Brien, the Envoy of Dail Eireann spoke
of police action jeopardizing "negotiations between your
3
government and mine" the Catholic Herald thundered "no 
one can at one and the same time be a citizen of the Irish 
Republic and also a citizen of Great Britain". But in 
its appeal that "the Irish in Great Britain will only 
be able to exercise their full influence in British soc i ­
ety. .. when they enter fully into the life and citizenship
4
of the land in which they live" the Catholic Herald was
1 O'Brien Ms 8456.
2 Yu. Bromley, op. cit.
3 Catholic Herald 3 D e c ., 1921.
4 Ibid.
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surely recognizing that many of the Irish in Britain had 
not been fully integrated into British society even if they 
did not share the perspective of Art O'Brien.
Art O'Brien at Paris adopted the classic pose of the 'Uit- 
l a n d e r ' or outsider. Afrikaners deeply resented British 
immigrants for their Uitlander stance believing that the 
British were actively threatening their culture by giving 
allegiance to an external power.^ The Irish Republican 
Association of South Africa did not assume a Uitlander pe r ­
spective, neither did the Irish support organizations in 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States.
Wilson fought a campaign against Hyphenation, but Hyphena­
tion in the case at least of the Irish Diaspora in South 
Africa, United States, Canada and Australia implied a funda­
mental or primary loyalty' to those countries. Hyphenism 
is the converse of Uitlanderism. It would be false to 
claim that all ISDL members in England and Wales or Sinn 
Fein members in Scotland fully shared the Uitlander per s ­
pective of Art O'Brien and Sean Sheehan but it is interes­
ting that whereas the Irish living in the United States 
termed themselves Irish Americans, the Irish living in 
Britain did not use a hyphenated title but merely referred 
to themselves as the Irish in Britain. In all my research 
of the Irish in Britain I have never come across a hyphena­
ted title like Irish-British or Irish-Britons. The term 
Anglo-Irish referred to the dominant elite, usually Protes­
tant, who comprised the leadership of the British
1 See John Stone Colonist or Uitlander; A Study of the 
British Immigrant in South Africa (Oxford, 1973).
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establishment in Ireland itself and hence had little appli­
cability in Britain.
The debate on exile or citizen ended on an inconclusive 
note at Paris but it was clear that most of the delegates 
rejected Art O'Brien's perspective. In attempting to raise, 
against the wishes of the Dail delegates, the issue of the 
Treaty, O'Brien had departed from the established position 
whereby the English support organization did not seek to 
impose its wishes on the Homeland movement. Paris revealed 
O'Brien as occupying a minority position with respect to 
the Irish Diaspora and he was soon to find himself in a 
minority position with the Irish in Britain as well.
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Part V The Civil War and the Irish In Britain
Many of the 'innocents' - who constituted the bulk of the 
ISDL's membership - simply dropped out following the Treaty. 
Leaving the relatively small group of 'supporters' and 
'politicos', now irreconcilably divided by the Treaty, to 
battle for control of the organizational shell. Chapter 
19 reveals how the future of the ISDL was so inextricably 
linked to the onrush of events in Ireland, with successive, 
but unworkable compromises unable to block the inexorable 
road to hostilities. In Chapter 20 we will observe the 
inability of the Pro-Treaty ISDL members to overcome the 
Civil War induced apathy, dissilusionment and disenchant­
ment of the Irish in Britain and the consequent failure to 
build a new Irish Government support organization. The 
much reduced Anti-Treaty ISDL members did however, despite 
many difficulties, manage to keep the nucleus of their or g ­
anization together until the Free State Government p e r s u a ­
ded the British to deport many of them. Chapter 21 relates 
the aftermath of these deportations, the ensuing p a r l iamen­
tary opposition, and finally the Court rulings that compelled 
the British Government to request the return of the depor­
tees, some of whom were then put on trial. A trial which 
was to finally destroy the ISDL.
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' CHAPTER 19
To the Civil War, the Rift Deepens
The Paris Congress had exposed the deep divisions within 
the Irish Self Determination League’s leadership on the Treaty 
which had opened a yawning chasm, apparently unbridgeable.
The deep fissures first revealed in Paris were further enl­
arged by the production in London of the anti—Treaty Irish 
Bulletin distributed from the office of the Dail EifeanfTenvoy 
in London. The Catholic Herald implied that Irish Self
Determination League funds were being used to finance this 
. 1
publication and Michael Collins complained that "Art O'Brien
is using all our machinery as a Propaganda Department 
2
against us" while the Home Office was concerned that the
3
Bulletin's contents might be reprinted m  the British Press 
(an indirect compliment to O'Brien's long established links 
with correspondents). The editor of the Irish Exile was 
warned by Sean Milroy TD, the former League organizer who 
was now an official in the Provisional Government, that if 
the paper attacked his Government, steps would be taken to
4
create a Provisional Government Support League in Britain.
The Irish Self. Determination League wracked with internal 
arguments, however remained on the surface a united organi­
zation. Sinn Fein in Ireland might be divided into factions
5
and the Irish Republican Brotherhood split asunder, but
1...Catholic H e r a l d ,.. 25 Feb., 1922 . ,
2 Ibid.
3 ROR 145, 2 March, 1922. CP 3796. CAB 24/133.
4 Standing Committee Report, 11 Feb., 1922, O'Brien Ms 8435.
5 By February 1922 the Irish Republican Brotherhood was 
irrevocably split on the Treaty issue see O'Muirthile 
Memoir P7/52 (UCD), 177.
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ostensibly the League remained relatively untarnished by
the Treaty issue with most of its leadership apparently in
favour of it. Ironically the unceasing attacks on the
League by the Catholic Herald were undoubtedly a factor in
preserving the unity of the leadership for the Catholic
H e r a l d 's indiscriminate allegations that "thousands of
pounds of Irish Self Determination League money has been
1
squandered and even worse" was as much an implied challenge
to the Pro as to the Anti—Treatyites among the leadership
and the closing of organizational ranks against the common
2
enemy necessitates mutual restraint. The continued impri­
sonment of several League organiz.ers was also a contribu­
ting factor in keeping the organization together.
A decision by the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis not to take a vote 
on the Treaty but to postpone the planned election for a 
new Dail for a three month period to enable the formulation 
of a suitable compromise was welcomed by the Irish E x i l e , 
which carried the report on the front page of its March 
1922 issue. But its front page appeal for unity was some­
what counteracted by a full back page advertisement for the 
"Uphold the Republic Fund" and an article, on another page, 
which described the Treaty as "a two o'clock in the morning 
compromise by tired and irritated men, who had come to the
1 Catholic H e r a l d , 4 Feb., 1922.
2 See F.G. Bailey: Strategems and S p o i l s , A Social 
Anthropology of Politics (1969), 129 for a fascinating 
account of organizational rank closing tactics.
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end of their tether and wanted to sign something and be done
with it".'*' This same issue of the Irish Exile carried an
appeal by the Foleshill Branch for recruits which claimed
tiiat, "there can be no danger personally, now to be a mem-
2ber of the Irish Self Determination League". It was not
the only branch that was literally begging for new members.
British Intelligence reported that, "The Irish residents
of Great Britain are not showing the same keen interest in
political matters as heretofore, possibly a reaction after
3
the extreme tensions of the past two years" but the St. 
Patrick Day celebrations which were arranged by the politi­
cal organizations were well attended. In Birmingham the 
local Irish Self Determination League branch joined with 
the Irish National Forresters to hold a rally in the Town 
Hall at which Archbishop McIntyre (the new Birmingham
4
Bishop) spoke in favour of the Treaty. The Keighley League
Branch and the remnants of the United Irish League in the
5area organized a joint concert, but in Halifax the League 
broke its practice of co-operation with other Irish organi­
zations and held its own celebrations.^
The Catholic Herald which had, in the immediate post—Treaty 
signing period, claimed there was no longer any need for
1 Irish Exile, March 1922.
2 Ibid..
3 ROR 142, 9 Feb., 1922. CP 3725. CAB 24/133.
4 Catholic Herald, 25 March, 1922.
5 Ibid..
6 Irish Exile, March 1922.
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Irish political organizations in Britain, now suggested that
if the membership of the Irish Self Determination League were
not prepared to ensure that the League unequivocally backed
the Provisional Government a new Pro-Treaty organization
1
should be created. This organization did not materialize
but the presence of Sean Milroy as the guest of honour at
the Union of Four Provinces St. Patrick's Day banquet, att-
2ended by six hundred people, indicated that the nucleus 
of such an organization did exist in London.
The March, 1922, Executive Council meeting of the Irish Self 
Determination League considered a report that showed an 
overall fifty per cent decrease in the paid up membership
3
of the League.
1921 1922 PERCENTAGE
AREA MEMBERSHIP MEMBERSHIP DECREASE( 1921-22)
MANCHESTER 7,465 4,942 33.8
LONDON 6,481 3,699 ■ 42.9
TYNESIDE 3,965 878 77.9
LIVERPOOL 3,349 825 75.4
BRADFORD 2,447 1,032 57.8
TEESIDE 2,440 673 72 .4
LEEDS 1,768 1, 188 32.8
MID DURHAM 1,736 909 47.6
WIGAN 1,582 539 66.0
contd...
1 Catholic Herald, 4 March, 1922 .
2 Ibid., 25 March, 1922.
3 Figures compiled from lists in O'Brien, Ms 84 32.
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1921 1922 PERCENTAGE
AREA MEMBERSHIP MEMBERSHIP DECREASE(1921-22)
SHEFFIELD 1,515 615 59.4
N W.LANCASHIRE 1,372 891 35.1
SWANSEA 1, 151 824 28.4
CARDIFF 1,053 642 39.9
PONTYPRIDD 962 602 37.4
BIRMINGHAM 670 516 23.0
N.STAFFS 415 105 74 .7
NOTTS & DERBY 294 205 30.0
LEICESTER 61 20 67.2
TOTAL 38,726 19,104 50.9
A Branch in Bradford had an almost ninety per cent decrease 
in membership down from five hundred and twenty one mem­
bers to fifty eight. These membership figures must however 
be interpreted cautiously;for at the December 1921 Central 
Executive Council meeting the acting General Secretary, Sean
Harvey;reported that there had been a steady increase in
1membership during the August to November period. The Irish
Exile in January 1922 reported increases in the membership
2of three branches and in February, Halifax claimed that
3
"a continuous stream of new members is ever flowing". 
Leicester reported that a proposal to disband had been def­
eated by sixty four votes to two yet in that same month, 
of March 1922, we have observed that Leicester was recorded
1 Irish Exile, Jan. 1922.
2 Haslingden recorded an increase of fourteen members. 
Sperrymoor reported "increasing membership". Erdington 
reported thirty seven new members.
3 Irish Exile, Feb. 1922.
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as having only a membership figure of twenty. The reason 
for this discrepancy and the explanation for the very size­
able but variable reductions reported by other branches 
can be partly attributed to the fact that these figures only 
covered those members who had paid their two shillings sub­
scription for 1922.
Unemployment had reached serious levels at the end of 1921 
with the onset of the post—War depression. Exports fell 
to under fifty per cent of their 1914 level and unemployment 
reached the two million level at the end of 1921. The 
almost inevitable post—War decline in economic activity was 
deepened by direct Government action through the implemen­
tation of the Geddes Report which drastically slashed pub­
lic spending right across the board. The swiftness of the 
economic decline is illustrated in the Trade Union member­
ship figures for 1920 and 1921 which reveal a decrease from
I
8.3 million to 6.6 million members in one year. The 
Cabinet responded to the recession by establishing an emer­
gency committee to maintain law and order in the event of 
expected serious disturbances. The impact of the recession 
was revealed in the increasingly frequent Irish Self Deter­
mination League branches1 references to the problem of unem­
ployment in their reports for the Irish Exile. Steel, ship­
building and engineering workers, with unemployment rates
2of 38%, 34% and 25%, respectively were the worst affected 
in this recession and the League membership figures for 1922
1. Branson, op. cit., 69-71.
2 Ibid., 69.
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do indicate a certain relationship between the areas with 
the highest unemployment and the largest decline in member­
ship. The North East of England with its shipbuilding and 
steel industries suffered the greatest drop in League mem­
bership but even in London <with a much lower loss of member­
ship/the branches of Greenwich, Charlton and Blackheath 
areas held a joint meeting to consider what action they 
could take to help the unemployed Irish residents of these 
districts.^- It is very probable that many League members 
could not afford to pay their annual subscriptions and hence 
did not appear on the Head Office membership register but 
often remained on the individual branch strength. Some 
branches undoubtedly withheld all or part of their subscrip­
tions believing that they would be used by the Head Office 
to finance anti-Treaty propaganda. Others refrained from 
submitting their subscriptions until the League's future 
existence was clarified at the April Annual Conference.
When all these allowances have been made, it is still evi­
dent that thelrish Self Determination League had lost a very 
considerable number of its members but that the decline was 
less than the fifty per cent that the paid up membership 
figures suggest.
The American Association for the Recognition of the Irish-
2
Republic suffered a much greater membership decline than
the League with areas like Pittsburg losing over ninety
3eight per cent of its members and even in the epicentre of
1 Catholic Herald, 5 November, 1921.
2 Tansill, op. cit., 436.
3 Catholic Herald', 3 June, 1922.
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Irish Americanism, Boston, the membership declined from one
1
hundred and twenty five thousand to nine thousand. The
Irish Self Determination League operating in the.much less
favourable British environment, thus survived the immediate
post—Treaty dissension period to a much greater extent than
its American counterpart. Differences of opinion on the
merits of the Treaty held by the leadership of the League
never really developed into arguments relating to the merits
2
of the League's continued existence. In America, however,
Edward Doheny, the Association's President, argued that the
organization "is no longer needed because the reasons for
3
its formation no longer exist".
Organizational membership decline, especially over a short 
period of time, does tend to develop a cumulative momentum 
of its own which by its very size adversely affects the 
morale of the remaining members and may generate further 
membership loss. The declining membership figures were the 
subject of considerable discussion - often heated - at the 
Executive Council meetings. P.J. Kelly argued that as they 
showed the majority of the Irish Self Determination League 
branches and membership were now located in Lancashire and 
Yorkshire the April Annual Conference should be switched from
London, where the decline in membership had, actually, been
1 Ibid. , 1 April, , 19.22 .
2 J. McManus, a former member of the League's Executive Coun­
cil,did suggest that the League having achieved its purp­
ose should be disbanded, see Catholic Herald, 4 Mar.,1922 
but this was after his resignation from the organization in 
protest against the Paris Congress expenses and he was not 
supported by any of the pro~Treaty League leaders.
3 Catholic Herald, 18 Feb., 1922.
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below average, to a venue in this region.^ This proposal 
was defeated on the grounds that any further interference 
with the Conference arrangements would alienate many members 
but Art O'Brien's next manouevre revealed that he did not 
appreciate the motivations that had driven many members out 
of the League after the signing of the Treaty, believing 
that its objective had been attained.
O'Brien proposed that the Executive Council should req­
uest the Conference to reaffirm the objectives and Constit­
ution of the League as formulated by the First Annual Con­
ference "to secure the application of the principle of Self 
Determination for Ireland and the Recognition of the Irish 
Republic proclaimed in Dublin in Easter 1916". As such it 
was a relatively non-controversial motion but O'Brien argued 
that this was not an abstract commitment and claimed that 
the Rules of the organization pledged the membership to work 
actively for the maintenance of the Irish Republic. There 
was a heated discussion at this meeting when some Executive 
Council members demanded to know how O'Brien was able to 
interpret the Rules in a manner that firmly committed the 
League to oppose the Treaty and hence work against the majo­
rity wish of the Dail Eireann T D s b u t  in the vote that was 
eventually taken O'Brien's proposal was carried by a major­
ity of six (fourteen for, eight against). The defeated 
minority were however determined to investigate the manner 
in which Art O'Brien had interpreted the Rules. To their 
fury they discovered that the issue was not one of
1 Ibid., 18 March, 1922.
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'interpretation' but rather the existence of a Rule they 
had never known about. The controversy over the 'omission' 
of the rule pledging "our members to work for the Recogni­
tion of the Irish Republic and meanwhile to support by every 
means in their power, the cause of an independent Irish 
Republic" from the League's Rule Book, issued to all memb­
ers was to the detriment of the organization, very publicly
1
conducted m  the columns of the Catholic Herald. Many
organizations restrict certain types of information to spec-
2ified sections or people but 'omission1 of information is 
much more easily achieved in formal rather than informal 
organizations.
In March 1922 the Irish Self Determination League was an 
organization which in the period of a few months had lost 
a very considerable proportion of its membership’ an organ­
ization that contained many members who openly doubted the 
necessity of its continued existence) an organization whose 
membership was deeply divided on the Treaty issue', an organ­
ization which contained a very large number of 'Innocents', 
members with no previous experience of intra-organizational 
conflict and intrigue. It was hardly conducive to the 
future well being of the League that many members now learned 
that they had joined an organization whose full objectives 
had been deliberately concealed from them. The 'concealment' 
policy had extended to the highest levels. All the Catholic
1 Catholic Herald, 11th,. 18th, March, 1922.
2 As used by Harold Guetzkow, 'Communications in Organiz­
ations' in James March ed., Handbook of Organizations' 
(Chicago, 1965), 551.
Herald allegations about sinister influences controlling
the League in a manner unknown to the membership, appeared
to acquire a new substantive character when the President
of the Irish Self Determination League, P.J. Kelly, publicly
1
stated that he had not known about the missing Rule. Art
O'Brien's belated explanation that this Rule had been om:it-
ted from the printed Rule Book, distributed to all members,
on the advice of legal experts who had claimed that its
publication would have given the Authorities grounds to sup-
2
press the League was just too disingenuous for many members 
who had learned of O'Brien's manouevres at the Paris Congress. 
Legal opinion could proclaim that an organization with a 
Republican objective was technically violating British Laws 
but that did not necessarily mean that the British Govern­
ment would rigidly enforce a rather ambiguous law and supp­
ress the Irish Self Determination League if it adopted a 
clearly Republican stance. The Sinn Fein organization in 
Britain was openly Republican but the Authorities did not 
ban it. The position of a Dail Eireann Envoy in London 
clearly flouted British Law but on at least one occasion 
the police provided a bodyguard for Art O'Brien. The Autho­
rities might possibly, though it is unlikely, have attemp­
ted to suppress a Republican League in its early stages of 
development when it still had only a small membership. It 
is, however, very unlikely, considering the divided opinion 
in Britain on the Irish issue, that they would have acted
1 Catholic Herald, 18 March, 1922.
2 Ibid., 1 April, 1922.
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once the organization had grown to over twenty thousand 
members and after the Truce (July 1921) it would have been 
almost impossible to have taken such legal action. Members 
of the League were therefore doubly annoyed, for having been 
misled in the first instance when they were recruited and 
for the deception having continued long after it could ever 
have been justified on a legal basis. The February, 1922 
issue of the Irish Exile carried a detailed statement of 
the League's objectives, without any mention of omitted 
Rules and many members were undoubtedly antagonized about 
this omitted Rule through reading the Catholic Herald.
Deception is often a common practice in many organizations 
and may even be tacitly accepted by the membership if they 
believe the policy is not contrary to their interests. Thus 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews passed into the con­
trol of the extreme Zionist element in 1944 largely as a 
result of a wholesale policy of deception. The majority 
of representatives on the Board of Deputies were nominated 
by Synagogues. The normal avenue to nomination in the case 
of non-practising Jews was confined to a few long establ­
ished social and cultural organizations. Fervent Zionists , 
however, discovered the existence of a number of tiny, alm­
ost defunct Synagogues, and all that these non-practising 
Jews had to do was to pay the synagogues' annual subscrip­
tion, which enabled them to convene meetings of the 'congr- 
gations' for the purpose of nominating representatives to 
the Board of Deputies. The means by which the Zionists
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'took over1 the Board of Deputies was an open secret in the
Jewish community but as many people sympathised with the
aims of the Zionists, a collective blind eye was turned to 
1
the episode. The Irish Republican Brotherhood's history 
reveals its organizational mastery of 'the art of deception'/ 
controlling Sinn Fein Ard Fheises by the arbitrary appoint­
ment of delegates,regardless of area of residence, and ensur­
ing the appointment of members,who often "couldn't speak
2Irish", to paid positions within the Gaelic League. The 
Irish Self Determination League was operating in a rather 
different environment. A definite commitment to working 
for the Republic was contrary to the wishes of the majority 
of the membership who resented that having been deceived 
initially, the object of the deception ploy was to secure 
the adoption of a policy they opposed. Art O'Brien came 
out of the 'missing Rule' affair very badly. A detailed 
search of his papers and the surviving League records rev­
eals no sign of the League leadership prior to March 1922 
ever having discussed this particular 'Rule' and it would 
not be unreasonable in the circumstances to doubt the act­
ual existence of this 'Rule' and regard it as having been 
tactically created sometime during early 1922 rather than 
having been 'resurrected'. The agenda for the Third Annual 
Conference of the Irish Self Determination League showed 
clear signs of division within the League. At previous con­
ferences officers had been elected virtually unanimously 
but at the April 1922 Conference there was a contest for
1 See Chaim Bermant, Troubled Eden, an Anatomy of British 
Jewry (1969), 102-3.
2 See O'Broin, op. cit., 181.
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the Presidency between P.J. Kelly, nominated by the Liverpool 
District Committee and fifteen other branches, and Art 
O'Brien, nominated by the London District Committee and only 
three other branches. Nine nominations were received for 
the post of Vice President and three for Treasurer. Thir­
teen major policy motions were submitted, three London Bran­
ches called on the League to oppose the Treaty but another 
London Branch sought. a declaration of support for the Pro­
visional government of the Irish Free State and a Cardiff 
Branch openly supported the Treaty but with the reservation 
that complete independence should be the ultimate objective. 
The continued existence of the League, at least in its pre­
sent form, was the subject of several motions. Liverpool 
District Committee proposed that the League be dissolved 
and a new organization with a lesser political orientation
should be formed for the purpose of "the moral and material
1
uplifting of the Irish residents in Great Britain". The
proposal that such an organization should seek "no political
representation on municipal or national legislative assem-
2blies in England" may have been inspired by the Nationalist 
Party members of the League who did not want to create any 
threat to their Party's control of council wards in areas 
of Liverpool with a large Irish electorate. Swansea No.
2 Branch advocated that League branches should be trans­
formed into Gaelic League branches but its neighbour, Swansea 
No. 4 suggested an explicitly political change of name to 
the Irish Republican Recognition League. The least
1 Catholic Herald, 1 April, 1922.
2 Ibid..
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controversial motion was from Derby and Notts No. 3 Branch
which requested Conference to ensure that "children of Irish
parents in Britain be taught a thorough knowledge of Irish
1
history, literature, sports and customs".
The immediate pre*-Conf erence period further revealed the 
deep divisions that had emerged within the League as bran­
ches discussed the agenda and mandated their delegates on 
which way they were to vote. The Levershulme Branch never
sent a delegate; it split on the agenda and dissolved 
2 *itself. Eskwinning passed a vote of confidence in Michael
3
Collins and the Provisional Government and the Mid—Durham
District Committee instructed their delegates to make a
strong protest over the publication of a full page "Uphold
4the Republic Fund Appeal® in the Irish Exile as being con-
5
trary to official policy. The Central London and Finsbury
6Branches supported O'Brien's motion while the Walthamstow
delegates were mandated to vote for any resolution that
7
opposed the Treaty. The Aberavon Branch wrote a letter 
requesting that the Conference and delegates "must not act 
the coward; we must not shirk our responsibilitiesty placing 
the whole of the responsibility on the people at home,
1 Catholic Herald, 1 April, 1922.
2 Ibid..
3 Irish Exile , April, 1922.
4 Ibid., March, 1922.
5 Ibid., April, 1922.
6 Ibid., April 1922
7 Ibid., March 1922.
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because they may vote in favour of the Treaty; rather we 
should consolidate the position until the people at home 
have a chance of regaining courage and confidence to renew 
the fight for the complete victory".^ This branch accom­
panied its clear cut advocacy of a substantial modification 
of the League's relationship with the Homeland Movement with 
a strong warning that the League should not moderate its 
stance to attract new recruits) "these people are no good 
to us and they are no good to Ireland. We carried on in 
the dark days without them, we can carry on now without 
them".2
In Ireland the political situation had deteriorated consid­
erably. The Provisional Government of the Irish Free State 
was still co-functioning, in an often confused manner as 
the Cabinet of Dail Eireann but the Dail TDs who had opposed 
the Treaty formed Cumann na Poblachta (League of the Repub­
lic) and the next day their leader, De Valera, warned that
achieving freedom, might entail "a march over the dead
3
bodies of their own brothers". The Provisional Government 
performed feats of verbal acrobatics in an endeavour to per­
suade the volunteer IRA that they would remain the Army of 
the Republic, which they were in the process of disestabli­
shing, while simultaneously forming a new professional 
National Army. By mid-February 1922, individual IRA units 
had not only repudiated the Treaty but were raiding RIC
1 Irish Exile, April 1922.
2 Ibid..
3 Irish Times, 16 March, 1922.
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barracks for arms. Faced with this challenge to its autho­
rity, the Provisional Government withdrew its permission 
for the IRA to hold an Army Convention and threatened that 
any officer who attended would be dismissed. The proscribed 
Army Convention took place (26th. March, 1922) in secret.
The Freemans Journal contravened a request not to publi­
cize the proceedings and the IRA reacted by literally taking 
their premises apart.  ^ The two hundred and twenty three 
Convention delegates,representing one hundred and twelve 
thousand volunteers, repudiated the Treaty, the leadership
of Dail Eireann and placed the control of the IRA under a 
2
new Executive. De Valera ominously spoke of "rights which
a minority may justly uphold even by arms, against a majo- 
3
rity". The confrontations that occurred between National 
Army and Executive Forces in Limerick, Athlorie Boyle and 
a score of other places,as the rival armies sought control 
of barracks evacuated by the British Army and Police ,mostly 
ended without blood being shed in any quantity;after token 
exchanges of gunfire, but such a situation could not con­
tinue indefinitely and the Catholic Herald demanded that
the Provisional Government follow Smuts' actions and put
4down the rebels. The Irish Times gloomily warned "we are
5
within .msasurable distance of an outbreak of Civil War"
Irish Times, 31 March, 1922.
2 Bower Bell, op. cit., 47.
3 Calton Younger, op. cit., 251.
4 Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922. Smuts had been forced 
to put down a rebellion by his former comrades in South 
Africa.
5 Irish Times, 29 March, 1922.
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but General Macready , the British GOC in Ireland, reported 
that Civil War was unlikely simply because the Executive 
Forces were so much stronger than the National Army.'*' Ind­
eed, for a period during March there was a distinct possib­
ility that the Free State might find itself involved in a 
new military conflict with the British Armyjas the situa­
tion in the North of Ireland went from bad to worse, when
almost four hundred people, mostly Catholics, were killed
2in the Belfast area between July 1921 and March 1922.
Collins reacted in a typical manner; arms given by the 
British Government to equip the new National Army were exch­
anged for Executive Forces' arms and sent across the border, 
with Free State officers,to defend Catholic areas against 
the onslaught of the British equipped and paid Special
3
Constabulary. It was in this politically highly unstable 
period, fraught with the possibility of armed conflict bet­
ween the two armies in Southern Ireland and the potential 
threat of a clash between British forces and IRA units sup­
porting the Provisional Government north of the Border, that 
the Irish Self Determination League held its Annual Confer­
ence in the first week of April 1922 in London.
The Special Branch predicted that the Conference "would be
4a lively one" and it certainly was. But it would have been 
even more so if the Government had not preempted much of the
1 See GOG- Weekly Report On Ireland, 1 April, 1922.
2 See Reports in DE 2/347 and 2/348.
3 Calton Younger, op. cit., 259-61.
4 ROR 149, 31 March, 1922. CP 3917. CAB 24/136.
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thunder of the anti -Treatyites by releasing all the Irish
1
political prisoners convicted in the post--Truce period with
2the exception of the Connaught Rangers. The appearance 
of the released Irish Self Determination League organizers 
in the company of two Ministers of the Provisional Govern­
ment, Duggan and 0 1Higgins, was interpreted by some deleg­
ates hitherto unsure about the Treaty, as a visible manifes­
tation of the negotiating strength of the new Government 
and a reassurance to their fears that under the Treaty the 
Irish Free State Government would be a mere cipher, rubber 
stamping British directives. There were approximately one
1 A Cabinet meeting had decided as a matter of policy to 
consider each prisoner's case individually rather than 
have a general amnesty, 30 Jan., 1922. See Cabinet 6
(22), CAB 24/29 .
2 The Connaught Rangers were a Regiment in the British Army 
stationed in India. They mutinied in June 1920, after 
hearing reports of British atrocities in Ireland ,,One 
soldier was executed and many others sentenced to long 
terms of imprisonment in Britain* see T. P. Kilfeather,
The Connaught Rangers (Tralee, 1969), Sam Pollock, Mutiny 
for the Cause (1969) and R.A. Hinchy, 'The Connaught 
Rangers Mutiny', An Cosantoir XVIII (1958), 439-44.
Cabinet 6 (22) ibid.. There was strong opposition from 
some Ministers to the release of the Connaught Rangers and 
as a compromise it was decided that the Secretary for War 
should examine the case "with a view if possible to their 
liberation in connection with the impending disbandment
of the Regiment". The Secretary for War, Sir Worthington 
Evans, subsequently recommended that there should be no 
amnesty for Mutiny but that the longer sentences could 
be reduced to seven years if there was no publicity given 
to the proposed reductions. See War Office Memo, CP 3690 
CAB 24/132. The Cabinet in the interests of maintaining 
military discipline accepted this recommendation; see 
Cabinet 12 (22), 21 February, 1922. CAB 23/29. The 
Military still consider the case of the Connaught Rangers 
to be such a sensitive issue that its records and rep­
orts on the Mutiny - WO 32/4235 and WO 32/4236 are still 
not open for inspection at the Public Records Office.
And the emotions that the 'Mutiny' can still evoke were 
seen when Trident Television publicly condemned a play 
on the subject they had originally sponsored, see Irish 
Press, 12 November, 1979.
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hundred and seventy delegates present‘d at this, the most cru­
cial conference of the League since its formation.
The Conference proceedings opened with an acrimonious argu­
ment over the financial position of the League, whose income
2for 1920-21 was £20,399, with most of the discussion cen-
3
tred on the provision for Salaries (£3,900) and the organi­
zers' expenses (£491). A minority of delegates wished to 
have the individual salaries of the organizers made public 
but this motion was defeated. Dissension over the financial 
position of organizations is often the first visible sign 
of severe internal conflict and is effectively a form of 
surrogate warfare by proxy. The debate on the League's 
funds which at one point looked like lasting for the entire
day was only ended by Sean Harvey's challenge "to go through
4
the Petty Cash Book" item by item.
The resolutions submitted by Art O'Brien and P.J. Kelly were 
not put to the Conference, indicating that there had been
1 The exact figures are imprecise because different totals
are given in the various reports of the Conference. The
Irish Exile, April 1922, in the course of its four page 
Conference report, refers to an attendance of 169 but
in another reference claims that there were 181 delegates 
present. The Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922, claims that 
there were 170 delegates and the Special Branch report 
mentions the figure of 169, see ROR 150, 6 April, 1922,
CP 3934 . CAB 24/136 .
2 See O'Brien, Ms 8432.
3 The provision for Salaries was considerably inflated by
the practice of paying two thirds of deported official's
salaries to their families. See Cabinet Minutes of 27 
April, 1921. DE 1/3.
4 Irish Exile, April 1922.
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a degree of pre-Conference manoeuvring to establish a common 
position that would enable the League to continue in exist­
ence. Hugh Lee simply proposed on behalf of the pro-Treaty- 
ites that, pending the General Election in Ireland, it would 
be 'impolitic to make any vital alteration in the League"^ 
and this resolution was seconded by Alderman Scurr, hitherto 
identified with the anti-Treatyites. The section of the 
League membership who opposed theTreaty were themselves split 
into factions. One led by Art O'Brien wished to postpone 
the decisive vote until after the Irish elections. The 
other wished to force the issue and have the Conference com­
mit the organization to a definite anti-Treaty stance.
Brian Hannigan, on behalf of this faction proposed an amend­
ment to Lee's resolution that
"though recognizing the lawful authority of the new 
State, Conference hereby pledges itself to support 
those of our people in Ireland who will undertake to 
work for the re-establishment of an Irish Republican 
State".
The discussion that followed became so heated that at one ■
point the Chairman described the proceedings as resembling
3
a "bear garden" but amid all the confused rhetoric two 
main strands of argument can be unravelled. The first was 
that the pro-Treaty section accepted the Treaty in a very 
pragmatic manner. In the words of a Mr. Coffey the Treaty 
permitted the Irish Free State to create an "army of seven­
teen thousand and they would be in a position to start figh-
4
ting again in five years time". The second argument
1 Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922.
2 Irish Exile, April 1922.
3 Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922.
4 Irish Exile, April 1922.
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involved a reiteration of the Paris Congress decision that
they "must support whatever the majority of the Irish people
w a n t " T h e  votes were taken in an atmosphere of much
2
"cheering and hissing", the amendment being defeated by
ninety votes to fifty eight and the resolution accepted on
3a one hundred and three to forty eight basis. The timely
appearance of some of the released prisoners on the platform
contributed somewhat to a reduction of the tensions. Art
O'Brien made a speech intended as a strong appeal for the
continued unity of the organization while simultaneously
striving to regain the leadership of the anti-Treatyites.
"He believed that many delegates had voted for the res­
olution in order to keep the organization together and 
he hoped that when the time for decision camg they
would be on the side of the Irish Republic."
The Conference after further argument agreed to adjourn 
until after the Irish elections and for the existing offi­
cers to retain their positions.
The Catholic Herald headlined its report of the Conference: 
"Anti-Treaty Motion Beaten: Irish in Britain Refuse to Dic-
5
tate to People at Home". A Special Branch officer repor­
ted that "Art O'Brien was very crestfallen after the Confer-
6ence refused to take a clear decision", but this assessment
1 Irish Exile, April 1922.
2 Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922.
3 Irish Exile, April 1922.
4 Ibid..
5 Catholic Herald, 8 April, 1922.
6 ROR 150, 6 April, 1922. CP 3934. CAB 24/136.
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was an oversimplification of a complex set of issues. Art 
O'Brien in fact recognized that in the context of the accep­
ted resolution the anti-Treatyites had suffered a major 
defeat, moreover a defeat which he had endeavoured to avoid. 
The defeat had occurred because a faction of the: anti-Treaty- 
ites had repudiated O'Brien's compromise and sought the con­
frontation which he wished to forestall. Some members of 
this faction by walking out of the hall after the resolution 
was passed had publicly demonstrated that they no longer 
wanted a large scale organization, if that entailed a dil­
ution of their position. Even more ominous was the shouted
threat by a member of the Standing Committee that "the London
1
IRA will deal with these people" to delegates speaking in 
favour of the Treaty. This intervention alienated a not 
insubstantial minority of delegates,as yet undecided on the 
Treaty issue.for an analysis of the voting indicates that 
at least nineteen delegates abstained on both votes and ano­
ther ten changed their pro-amendment votes to pro-resolution 
votes. Art O'Brien in an effort not to be outflanked on 
the Treaty issue was forced to weaken his unity plea by a 
public declaration against the Treaty which he made in order 
to regain the leadership of the anti-Treatyites. O'Brien's 
ambivalent policy however cost him support on both sides.
The Conference's decision to commit the Irish Self Determi­
nation League to a policy of relative inaction was hardly 
in accordance with Weber's definition of an organization
1 Catholic Herald, 29 April, 1922.
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as: "a system of continuous purposive activity of a speci­
fied kind" ^  for its post-=€onference activity was to be dir­
ected towards merely assuring its continued existence as 
an organization. Yet Galbraith strongly asserts that the
dominant interest of most organizations is not the achieve-
2ment of specified goals but its very survival. Organiza­
tional goals are not impersonal rational constructs but
"abstractions distilled from the desires of members and
3
pressures from the environment and internal system" inex­
tricably intertwined with the continued existence and very
4
survival of the organization. The reluctance of the majo­
rity of the Irish Self Determination League leadership to 
take the steps which would have decisively ended the exist­
ence of the League, as it had evolved over two years, was 
paralleled by the adjournment of the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 
in Ireland to preserve unity. Organizations tend to deve­
lop an internal dynamic or momentum of their own, their mem­
bers tend to recall past fraternal relationships when dis­
putes arise and hesitate to initiate decisive confrontations. 
Between January and mid-April 1922 the IRA and the National 
Army confronted each other on numerous occasions but though 
guns were often pointed, they were rarely fired and when
1 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations 
(New York, 1947), 145-146.
2 John Kennedy Galbraith, 'The United States Economy is
Not a Free Economy1, Forbes, 15 May, 1974, 99.
3 Hall, op. cit., 10.
4 See Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern
Societies (New York, 1960), 18-20.
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discharged aimed to frighten not to kill, such was the rel­
uctance of former comrades in arms to fight each other.
Art O'Brien at an Irish Exile editorial meeting a few days
after the Conference issued instructions for the publication
to mostly use "non-political material, language, sport and 
1
music etc" but it was impossible merely issuing instruc­
tions or passing conference resolutions to suspend the on­
going political discussion on the Treaty in many branches. 
The Central London Branch, whose members included Art 
O'Brien, passed a very pro-Republican motion and that very
atypical League branch, Oxford, continued its eccentric path
2by changing its name to the Irish Republican League. One
London Branch, Silvertown, decided to "forthwith cease its
existence" but expressed its willingness to co-operate with
some future Irish organization if the members supported its 
3objectives and the Special Branch reported that the 
Liverpool branches of the League had been very inactive
4
since the Conference. Some branches closed down after the 
members had either decided the League had no future objec­
tives that could reasonably be attained or because the mem­
bership were too divided politically to continue functioning 
as a working branch but the case of Lewisham was rather 
different. A leading member of the Lewisham Branch,-William 
Robinson,who had been imprisoned for his IRA activities,
1 Letter to Brian Kennedy, 4 April, 1922, O'Brien Ms 8456.
2 Irish Exile, April 1922.
3 Catholic Herald, 13 April, 1922.
4 -ROR 153, 27 April, 1922, CP 3952. CAB 24/136.
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publicly declared in favour of the Treaty to the annoyance 
of his comrades in the local IRA unit and they tried to kid­
nap him at a branch meeting. Shots were fired in this inci­
dent with the result that the membership voted at their next
1
meeting to suspend all branch activity. Guns were also 
produced during a heated discussion at the Peckham Branch 
meeting.^
The Catholic Herald in its report of these incidents remin­
ded its readers that a member of the Irish Self Determination
League Standing Committee had threatened such occurrences
3
if the motion on the Treaty was passed and many members 
of London branches no doubt.either resigned in protest aga­
inst such intimidation or,decided it was safer not to att­
end branch meetings and so the erosion of the League in 
London quickened. It is extremely improbable, despite the 
speculation of the Catholic Herald, that Art O'Brien or even 
any of the anti-Treatyite leadership of the League, inclu­
ding the officer who had made the threat, encouraged such 
intimidatory action. They were powerless in the face of 
militant action by armed persons reluctant to accept any 
political authority. One armed group of London IRA members, 
who claimed they deserved some financial recompense, even 
forcibly entered the League's Head Office and threatened
4
"to blow the place up".
1 See ROR 20,April 1922, CP 3945, CAB 24/136; ROR 153, 27 
April 1922, CP 3952, CAB 24/136; Catholic Herald, 22 
April, 1922 .
2 Ibid., 29 April, 1922.
3 Ibid..
4 ROR 153, 27 April, 1922, CP 3952, CAB 24/136.
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A similar though much more serious situation had developed
in Ireland where since early April gunfire had become a
nightly sound in Dublin, with bank and Post Office raids
a daily occurrence (not always undertaken by the Executive
forces). A Free State General was killed in Athlone and
an assassination attempt was made on Michael Collins and
two other senior officers. At the end of April Civil War
appeared to have commenced with sporadic skirmishes giving
way to pitched battles between National and Executive troops
in Kilkenny and Annacarty but after some fifty casualties
1
had been suffered a Truce was negotiated. This was at
least partly influenced by a very successful Anti-Militarism
2Strike organized by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.
The seizure of the Four Courts in Dublin and the resultant 
paralysis of the legal system by the Executive Forces was 
the source of much concern to the British Cabinet. Minis­
ters believed that the Free State was not prepared decis­
ively to confront the Republicans and in evidence pointed 
to the almost ritual character of the recent fighting in 
which,'despite the expenditure of much ammunition and the 
employment of Armoured Cars (supplied by the British Govern-
3
ment) there were only a few fatalities. The British
1 See Calton Younger, op. cit., 270-311; Bower Bell, op. 
cit., 47-48; Kee, op. cit., 133; Catholic Herald, 29 
April and 6 May, 1922.
2 Mitchell, op. cit., 156.
3 Cabinet 27 (22), 16 May, 1922. CAB 23/29. The capture
of Kilkenny by the Free State forces which took three 
days of fighting, involved several hundred troops but
despite prolonged and heavy gunfire, there were no
deaths, many on both sides deliberately fired high of 
the target. See Calton Younger, op. cit., 285-86.
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Cabinet, fearing a Republican coup d ' etat that the Free State 
forces would not resist, had already drawn up contingency 
plans for the reconquest of Ireland and the prevention of 
the "serious outrages [that] might take place in this 
country"
The Provisional Government might have been forced to tole­
rate the presence of a Republican HQ across the river from 
their offices but they were determined no longer to counten­
ance a London Dail Envoy who was so openly anti-Treaty.
Art O'Brien publicly protested against the exclusion 'of the 
Connaught Rangers from the Amnesty and following what he 
considered to be unfavourable comments about him made by 
the Minister of Home Affairs (Duggan) in a newspaper article
he publicly condemned the Provisional Government's unwill-
3ingness to press the cases of the remaining prisoners.
The Provisional Government, which since the Paris Congress 
had been seeking an opportunity to dismiss O'Brien, seized 
its chance, dismissing him the day his letter was published. 
A brusque exchange of letters between the Minister for 
External Affairs, Gavan Duffy, and O'Brien ensued with 
O'Brien claiming that as he had been appointed by the Dail 
he could only be dismissed by that body. C.B. Dutton was
4
offered O'Brien's former position but declined to accept.
1 Cabinet 23(22), 5 April, 1922 and Cabinet 24 (22), 10 
April, CAB 23/29.
2 Irish Independent, 7 April, 1922.
3 Ibid., 17 April, 1922.
4 For the dismissal of O'Brien see the case file - P7/B/
27 9 (Mulcahy Papers) and the Correspondence in DE 2/410, 
DE 1/4 and S1605.
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Art O'Brien now, perhaps realizing that with the loss of 
his position he had also lost much of his former influence 
in the Irish Self Determination League, appeared to repudi­
ate the Conference decision to adjourn. Bleakly surveying 
the diminished fortunes of the League since the Treaty was 
signed, he wrote:
"signs of apathy and indifference have been very appar­
ent in the Irish Self Determination League. Many bran­
ches have ceased to function, membership had markedly 
dropped and the financial revenue has decreased very 
considerably. This slow disruption could have been 
stopped, if only the recent Conference of branches had 
adopted a definite and clear line of policy, the effect 
of the delaying motion carried at the Conference was 
to leave the.organization in a state of suspense for 
several months. Instead of steadying the process of 
disintegration the results of the Conference has given 
it impetus"
Elsewhere in this May issue of the Irish Exile the readers
were informed that
"as a consequence of the delaying motion at the Con­
ference the Executive has been obliged to dispense with 
the services of all organizers"
and could themselves observe the straightened financial pos­
ition of the League by the reduction of the Irish Exile from
2twenty four pages to sixteen pages.
Art O'Brien once again returned to his Paris Congress argu­
ment that the Irish in Britain, because of their particular 
circumstances,should adopt a different position on the 
Treaty than the people in Ireland. He maintained that the 
Irish Self Determination League had not attained its objec­
tives and hence should remain in existence. Hugh Lee put
1 Irish Exile, May 1922.
2 The price was correspondingly reduced to two pence.
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the case for the pro-Treatyites. His claim that the Treaty 
conferred economic freedom to the extent that the Irish Free 
State, by fixing a low rate of taxation, "could entice 
English capital"^ to develop the Irish economy’reveals just 
how little even intelligent leaders like Lee understood the 
implications of the Treaty and in particular Article 5.
This provided for an Irish liability for an unspecified pro­
portion of the United Kingdom Public Debt and as a later
Cabinet record shows was intended precisely to prevent the
2type of economic boom Lee envisaged. Lee, like O'Brien, 
however, believed that the Irish Self Determination League 
should continue to exist for "it is not that we Treatyites 
differ from Republicans as to our ultimate objective, namely 
complete independence, our difference is as regards methods'1. 
He brushed aside the bitter controversy within the League 
over the Treaty in a plea for unity stressing that it is 
"only natural that members of the Irish Self Determination 
League should be sharply divided on the Treaty issue, as 
members of the organization are generally young and enthus­
iastic " . ^
1 Irish Exile, May 1922.
2 In 1925 the Free State Government protested that its eco­
nomy, ruined by the Civil War, could not meets its fin­
ancial liability to Britain. In the discussion that 
followed this plea the British Cabinet "were reminded
by one of the signatories of the Irish Treaty that one 
of the principal reasons for the insertion of Article 
5 had been that if the Irish Free State had been relieved 
of all debt, its financial and fiscal situation would
be so favourable as compared with that of Great Britain
as to attract capital and industry from this country in 
order to escape taxation. Owing to the Civil. War and 
other causes, however, this anticipation had not been 
realized" - Cabinet 56 (25), 2 Dec., 1925. CAB 23/51.
3 Irish Exile, May 1922.
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The pro-Treaty section of the League's leadership wished 
to maintain the unity of the organization but there were 
definite limits on how far they were prepared to compromise. 
They were not willing to tolerate any public declaration 
by other League leaders on the Treaty if such statements 
could be inferred to represent the policy of the League.
At its mid-May meeting the Standing Committee of the League 
passed a resolution that it believed there was "a strong 
well organized and determined proportion of the Irish people 
who are bitterly opposed to the acceptance of the T r e a t y ^  
This resolution as such did not directly attack the Treaty 
but P.J. Kelly and Hugh Lee publicly disassociated them­
selves from it claiming that the Standing Committee "does
not represent the views of the majority of the members of
2the Irish Self Determination League". This very public 
dispute among the League leadership occurred just before 
a meeting was organized in London to establish a new openly 
pro-Free State organization. The meeting was sponsored by 
the Union of Four Provinces Club, not hitherto noted as an 
institution in the forefront of the Irish Separatist strug­
gle. A London Committee to raise funds for the Free State 
candidates in the coming election was duly established but 
though a message of support was received from Dr. Mark Ryan, 
the veteran Fenian leader, no known members of the League's
London branches could be identified from the attendance 
3
list. A similar committee in Scotland was somewhat more
1 Freeman's Journal, 15 May, 1922.
2 Ibid., 18 May, 1922. <
3 ROR 157, 25 May, 1922, CP 3996. CAB 24/136 and Catholic 
Herald, 2 0 May, 1922.
successful and its offshoot in the North-East of England 
secured the services of J. Connolly, the President of the 
Tyneside District Committee, much to the annoyance of 
O'Brien^ who did however appreciate that Connolly, just out 
of prison, was in need of the money that this full-time 
organizer's post provided him. The particular case of 
Connolly excepted, none of the pro-Treaty League leaders 
were prepared to join a new organization believing that the 
adjourned Conference would firmly commit the League to supp 
orting the Free State. The heat generated within the lead­
ership over the Standing Committee resolution was consider 
ably dissipated by a startling political development in 
Ireland a few days later.
Events in Ireland once again fostered the fervent illusion
that conflict could be avoided and the unity of opposites
maintained. The open combat of early May had been ended
by a Truce following the signing of an 'Army Document' by
leading National Army, Executive and Neutral IRA officers
which called for "an agreed election with a view to forming
a Government which will have the confidence of the whole 
2country." Pressure was exerted by these officers on their 
respective political leaders and the resulting agreement 
was termed, after its principals, the 'Collins-De Valera 
Pact'. This Pact provided for a National Coalition Panel 
of candidates to contest the June election for the Third 
Dail (Parliament of the Irish Free State) under the banner
1 O'Brien, Ms 8435.
2 Calton Younger, op. cit., 276-7.
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of Sinn Fein,which called a special Ard Fheis to ratify the 
agreement. Candidates were to be chosen proportionally to 
the pro and anti-^Treaty strength in the Dail, though all 
other parties and interests could contest the election, and
a Coalition Government was to be formed by this panel.^
• • 2The British Government were horrified by the Pact.
3
Churchill angrily denounced the agreement in Parliament 
and the British Cabinet considered the Pact violated the 
Treaty in spirit and openly mocked Article Seven.which requi­
red all Ministers of the Provisional Government, unequivo-
4
cally,to signify their acceptance of the Treaty. We have 
already observed that Collins had authorized extensive cov­
ert Free State military aid for the beleagured Catholics 
in Belfast and there had been considerable conflict on the 
border between the Northern police forces and National Army, 
Executive and Neutral IRA troops, who were practically figh­
ting as a unified force. An incident now occurred which 
brought British Army troops into open conflict with the Free 
State forces. British Army troops moved into the disputed 
territory of the Belleek-Pettigo triangle and shelled Free 
State positions. The conflict lasted several days during 
which Churchill's bellicose attitude nearly endangered the 
entire Treaty until Lloyd George negotiated a face-saving
1 See ibid. and Longford and O'Neill, op. cit., 88-9.
2 For a detailed account of theBritish Government's posi­
tion see Thomas Towey, 'The Reaction of the British Gov­
ernment to the 1922 Collins-De Valera Pact', Irish Histo­
rical Studies 22 (1980), 65-76.
3 154 HC Debs, Cols, 2125-82.
4 See Cabinet 27 (22), 16 May, 1922 and Cabinet 30 (22),
30 May, 1922. CAB 23/29.
547
ceasef ire.
The British Government might rail against the 'Pact1 but
to the leadership of the Irish Self Determination League
desperate to preserve organizational unity it was greeted
like mana from heaven. To the Standing Committee of the
League representing "opposing views in reference to the 
2
Treaty", the 'Pact* was viewed as embodying the promise of
the "hope of a dramatic reunion of our people on a national 
3basis". The Standing Committee issued a statement (prin­
ted in the June issue of the Irish Exile) claiming that:
"the disintegration of the Irish Self Determination 
League at the present moment would be a national cal­
amity, built up as a result of infinite labour and self 
sacrifice on the part of its members. The organization 
has become the greatest Irish political factor this 
country has ever known. In the course of three years 
over forty thousand pounds has been collected for patr­
iotic purposes. The League has rescued thousands of 
our people from Anglicization and given them a healthy 
Irish outlook - an outlook which had been almost lost 
during the forty years of political struggle and asso­
ciation with English Parties who used the Irish popul­
ation in this country for their own purposes.... The 
standard of national pride, dignity and self respect 
has been raised through the teaching of the League 
which has lent willing assistance to every Irish/
Ireland organization in this country. This is work 
of the greatest permanent value"
1 See Calton Younger, op. cit., 307-10; War Office Memo on 
Belleek-Pettigo Incident, CP 4017, CAB 24/137 and for the 
Irish Military reports - S1235.
2 Jones, op. cit., 212, depicts a vivid impression of Chur­
chill awaiting the latest dispatch from Belleek as if it 
was a telegram from the Gallipoli beach head and refers to 
Churchill as being obsessed with "winning the battle of 
Belleek11. For Churchill's own account of this skirmish see 
Churchill,The Aftermath, op. cit., 336-7.
3 Irish Exile, June 1922.
4 Ibid..
5 Ibid., June 1922.
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1
This statement signed by all the League's national officers 
provides several interesting insights as to how organiza­
tional goals evolve and change.
In the first part of this statement the reference to funds
raised indicates an organizational perspective of evaluating
2
the 'effectiveness' of the League in quantitative terms even
though the original specific objectives had not been attai-
3
ned. Freeman and Hannan have demonstrated that as most 
organizations never achieve their stated goals, they evalu­
ate their effectiveness in quantitative terms which may 
have little in common with the original goal. Members were 
in fact requested to continue their support for the League 
not because the original objective or goal of Self Determ­
ination had not been realized, for that ambiguous goal was 
not shared by those who believed that the Treaty had given 
Ireland the right of Self Determination, but in terms of the 
League's overall contribution to the maintenance of an iden­
tifiable Irish community in England and Wales. In effect 
because the original goal was either unattainable given
existing resources or had become a source of division, the
4
organizational goals had been modified or 'displaced', 
though this had never been formally ratified by a Conference.
1 P.J. Kelly (President), A. O'Brien (Vice President).
H. Lee, W. McMahon, and M. Maloney (Joint Treasurers),
S. McGrath (General Secretary).
2 As used by James Price, op. cit..
3 John Freeman and Michael Hannan, op. cit..
4 See W. Keith Warner and Eugene Havens, 'Goal Displace­
ment and the Intangibility of Organizational Goals ' , 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 12 (1968), 539-55.
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The formation objectives, the Constitution, of the Irish 
Self Determination League remained unchanged as the 'Offi­
cial' goals but the League had now adopted a much broader,
i
generalized,, less political, 'Operative goal'* to maintain 
the national identity of the Irish in England and Wales, 
a function originally implied in the League's objectives 
but now the’means to an end' had become ends in themselves.
The formulation of this new operative goal was the only way
to maintain organizational unity but the impact of this
statement from the leadership was weakened by the publica-
2tion, m  the same issue of the Irish Exile of a violently 
anti-Treaty article by P.D. O'Hart, a leading London Sinn 
Fein member, in which he brusquely ridiculed Hugh Lee's 
article in the previous issue. Once again the impetus tow­
ards uniting the respective factions was impeded by a small 
coterie unprepared to make any compromises. Nevertheless, 
there were several issues on which both the pro- and anti- 
Treatyites and the neutrals within the League could campaign 
in a united manner. The position of Catholics in Belfast had 
become critical,* the clergy in that city estimated that 
almost four hundred Catholics had been killed in under two 
years (July 1920 - May 1922) and another thirty died in the
3
first week of June. Nine thousand Catholic workers were
1 See Charles Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex 
Organizations', American Sociological Review, 26, 1961, 
855 and Edward Gross, op. cit..
2 Irish Exile, June 1922.
3 Catholic Herald, 18 February and 27 May, 1922.
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expelled from the shipyards and mills, and .four hundred were
1
made homeless in the month of April alone. Thousands fled
across the border, many others went to Britain, principally to
London, Liverpool and Glasgow where over three hundred were
2
accommodated m  one church hall. The welfare of these ref­
ugees was totally the responsibility of local Irish commun­
ities. The British Government's inaction on this issue can be 
contrasted ‘ with their treatment of two other Irish groups 
who came to Britain. The Government established the RIC 
Resettlement Branch of the Irish Office to aid RIC. personnel
who had left Ireland and this body liaised with other offi- 
3cial and unofficial bodies.such as the Westminster Cathedral
4based Catholic Women's League ,to find employment and accom­
modation for these men. The Government under Parliamentary 
5pressure was forced to establish a Relief Committee for 
Southern Irish Loyalists who did not wish to remain in 
Ireland. Ten thousand pounds^ was budgeted for the relief
1 Catholic Herald, 13 May 1922.
2 Ibid., 17 June, 1922.
3 See Mepol 2/1814, a request to local London police sta­
tions to investigate the financial standing of businesses
in which ex-RIC men wished to invest their gratuities.
4 Catholic Herald, 17 June, 1922.
5 151HCDeb$ Col. 1302. In 1929 a backbench Tory rebellion 
won further payments for the Irish Loyalists; see Catholic 
Herald 2 March, 1929.
6 Cabinet 26 (22), 10 May, 1922, CAB 23/29. This was sub­
sequently increased to £25,000, see CP 208 (23) 25 April,
1923. CAB 24/160. See also the files of the Irish Dis­
tress Committee (Refugees): Irish Grants Committee. TS 27/179 
and Relief of Refugees from the Irish Free State, HO 45/ 
11992/465017 and correspondence between HM and Free State 
Governments on the Relief of Irish Refugees - Cmd. 1684
( 1922 ) .
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of a group who according to figures given in Parliament
numbered only three hundred^ and were already adequately
cared for by private charitable organizations with consi- 
2
derable funds. The Irish Self Determination League organi­
zed a series of meetings to protest against the plight of 
the Belfast Catholics and demand the release of eleven
League members who had been arrested on arms conspiracy
3
charges during May. The London District Committee reported 
that ,
"May has witnessed a great renewal of the former 
activities of the Irish Self Determination League 
in London. A large number of branch meetings have 
been held and they have in every instance been very 
well attended".
The series of public meetings in London drew audiences which 
"exceeded all expectations and enthusiasm ran very high"^ 
with an attendance of seven thousand at a Trafalgar Square
5
rally. The Bradford No. 5 Branch however reported good 
branch meetings "which are now of a more ’social trend’ 
owing to the decision of the committee not to have political 
discussions until the Irish people decide for themselves".^ 
Other branches also pursued this policy of strict neutrality 
to the point of effectively refraining from all political
1 The Southern Irish Relief Association whose President
was the Duke of Portland and the Marquis of Lithgow
as its chairmen, was only one of a number of such 
organizations. See D. 989 B/l-10 (PRONI).
2 Catholic Herald, 13 May, 1922.
3 ROR 154, 4 May, 1922, CP 3960, CAB 24/136.
4 Irish Exile, June, 192 2.
5 O'Brien, Ms. 84 35.
6 Irish Exile, June, 1922.
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activity. The Lewisham Branch recommenced functioning but 
only as a "social branch until the present central leader­
ship is removed11.^
This new, relative unity of the Irish Self Determination
League was dependent on the success of the Collins-De Valera
Pact and that agreement implicitly rested on the drafting
of a Free State Constitution basically acceptable to the
anti-Treatyites. When the first draft of the new Consti-
2
tution was submitted to the British Cabinet its proposals
horrified Ministers who vehemently protested that they
violated virtually every clause of the Treaty. The proposed
Constitution effectively reduced the status of the Crown's
Representative in Ireland to a Commissioner and the oath
of allegiance - a crucial issue to the anti-Treatyites -
was omitted, while the Irish demanded the, then, unheard
of right, to make their own treaties with foreign powers 
3
and sought the abolition of the appeal to the Privy Council. 
British Ministers exerted very strong pressures on the Irish
1 Catholic Herald, 27 May, 1922.
2 For the intra-governmental negotiations between the rati­
fication of the Treaty and the-submission of the new 
Constitution, see the minutes and reports of the British 
Cabinet's Provisional Government of Ireland Committee - 
CAB 27/154, CAB 43/3, and 43/7 and for a concise account 
of the day-to-day problems that arose see Thomas Towey, 
'The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Irish Elections 
of 1922', Eire-Ireland, 15(1980), 18-29.
3 Joseph M. Curran, 'The Issue of External Relations in the 
Anglo-Irish Negotiations of May-June 1922 ', Eire-Ireland, 
13(1977), 15-25, argues1 that the Irish conceded far too 
much on the issue of external relations as South Africa 
and Canada v/ould have supported their position.
4 Cabinet 31(22), 1 June, 1922, CAB 23/30.
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1 2 to substantially redraft the Constitution. The new draft
met with the approval of the British Government, though
3
its a-religious character annoyed some English Catholics, 
and in doing so effectively destroyed the base of the Pact 
for the anti-Treatyites totally rejected the new Constitution.
Compromise now at last proved impossible and Michael Collins 
effectively ended the Pact with an eve of election speech
4
repudiating its 'panel vote provision*. The Irish Self 
Determination Leagues protest that polling day (16th June, 
1922) was overshadowed by the British threat of renewed war­
fare was justified for Churchill, himself, told the Cabinet 
"the more the fear of renewed warfare is present in the 
minds of the electors the more likely are they to get to
1 See Cabinet 33(22), 2 June, 1922. CAB 23/30 and Leo 
Kohn, The Constitution of the Irish Free State, (1932), 
74-79.
2 For the drafting of the Irish Constitution, see Hugh 
Kennedy, 'Character and Sources of the Constitution of 
of the Irish Free State', American Bar Association 
Journal, 14(1928), 442, and Brian Farrell, The Drafting 
of the Irish Free State Constitution, Irish Jurist, V, 
(L970 ) , 115-40. For the legal issues involved and for 
the political issues see John McColgan, 'Implementing 
the 1921 Treaty ; Lionel Curtis and Constitutional Proc­
edure' , Irish Historical Studies, 20(1976/77), 312-33, 
and D.K. Akenson and J.F. Fallin, 'The Irish Civil War 
and the Drafting of the Free State Constitution1, Eire- 
Ireland, 5(1970), 10-26,28-93.
3 The Month August 1922 complained of a "serious omission" 
in the Irish Free State Constitution, as there was no 
reference to the "Authority of God as the source of
all lawful power" and demanded an amendment to include 
this.
4 See Michael Gallagher, 'The Pact General Election of 
1922', Irish Historical Studies, 21(1978/9), 265-82
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the polls and support the Treaty".'*' The combined effects
of these conditions and the outdated electoral register
2
which effectively disfranchised many led the Irish Labour
Party leader Johnson, himself a supporter of the Treaty, to
declare the 'elections "were a farce and utterly useless as
3
any test upon these questions" (the degree of whole hearted 
support for the Treaty).
Only twenty one percent voted for the anti-Treaty Sinn Fein 
candi ateslthe pro-Treaty Sinn Fein canditates only polled 
thirty eight percent of the votes cast/for almost forty 
percent of the electorate rejected both factions of Sinn 
Fein and voted for a wide range of Independents, Farmers
4
and Labour Party candidates. To many voters the need to 
maintain a Sinn Fein party in existence was no longer 
obvious and a large section of the old Irish Parliamentary 
Party vote, who had never really accepted the Sinn Fein 
policy, supported the Labour Party in a protest vote against
5
both factions of Sinn Fein. Before the results were dec­
lared on the 24th June, Field Marshal Wilson was shot dead 
in London on the 22nd and a wave of arrests hit the Irish
1 Cabinet 32(22), 2 June, 1922, CAB 23/30.
2 In particular women under thirty were excluded .
Griffiths argued that the delay in compiling a new
register would "torpedo the Treaty"/ see Catholic Herald, 
11 March, 1922.
3 McCracken, op. cit., 75.
4 Kee, op. cit., 738, and Calton Younger, op. cit., 313-14.
5 Mitchell, op. cit., 162.
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Self Determination League of which his killers had been 
members. The League suffered considerable embarrassment 
from this episode which set in train the escalation of 
events, culminating in the Provisional Government assault 
on the Four Courts. The shells that hit the Four Courts 
at 4.29 am on the morning of the 28th June 1922 heralded 
the Civil War which destroyed the Irish Self Determination 
League as a mass organization of the Irish in Britain.
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CHAPTER 20
Civil War in Ireland: the Irish Self Determination League 
Divides
The assassination of Field Marshal Wilson by two rank and 
file members of the Irish Self Determination League^- on 
12 June 1922 was a very serious embarrassment to an organi­
zation already considerably weakened by internal conflict;,.
A Cabinet meeting hastily convened on the afternoon of 
Field Marshal Wilson's death was informed that the police 
had been keeping close surveilance on thirty ISDL members
in London for some time and the necessary instructions
2
were given to raid their homes. About eighteen members 
of the League were subsequently detained for questioning
3
in the aftermath of this incident but only two members 
were eventually charged with offences related to the 
possession of explosives and rifles. However as one of 
these individuals , / Mrs Elizabeth ^Eadie , was a senior 
administrative official at the League's London Head Office, 
considerable adverse publicity inevitably followed as a 
a result of her conviction for the possession of incendiaries. 
Art O'Brien was himself several years later accused of 
a direct involvement in the assassination by Elizabeth
1 Catholic Herald, 19 August 1922 gave brief details
of Dunne and O'Sullivan's membership in the London ISDL.
2 Conference of Ministers held at 5 pm. (22/6/1922) - 
Cabinet 36(22) Appendix III (CAB 23/29).
3 Times, 24 June 1922 and 27 June 1922.
4 Ibid, 30 June 1922 and O'Brien Ms 8427.
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Lazenby; her evidence, - if it can be called that, is
somewhat tenuous'1' but the promptness of his action in
securing legal services for Dunne and O'Sullivan does
2
raise certain questions never adequately answered.
Whatever the precise involvement of ISDL leaders in the 
assassination, the incident certainly weakened the level 
of support for Irish organizations- in Britain for the
3
community was swept by a tidal wave of anti-Irish feeling. 
Sectarian passions rose to a new peak in Liverpool and 
Glasgow^; there were reports of Irish people being sacked
5
on the spot but the impact of this rise in anti-Irish 
hostility was somewhat muted by the outbreak of Civil War 
several days later. This relative lessening of anti-Irish 
hostility - which still remained a strong force in many 
areas where the Irish were most visible - was ironically 
the result of a fundamental misinterpretation of the causes 
that led to the Civil War. To most British people the 
attack on the Four Courts Garrison by the newly elected 
Irish Government was practical evidence of the determin­
ation of their former opponents to suitably punish those 
who had issued the order to assassinate the Field Marshal. 
In fact,as we relate in more detail elsewhere, the actual
1 Lazenby, op. cit., 135.
2 Taylor, Assassination, op. cit., 85.
3 Freeman's Journal, 28 June 1922.
4 ROR 161 29 June 1922, CP 4075. CAB 24/137.
5 Irish Independent, 28 June,-1922; Catholic Herald, 8
July 1922.
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impulse~and in effect it was little more than a spur of 
the moment decision,— behind the Four Courts attack 
owed very little if at all to any desire to placate the 
British Government. ,The Iri^h Government ignored peremp­
tory demands by the British in the wake of Wilson's 
assassination to take immediate action against the Four
Courts^to the point where the British Cabinet ordered their
2
G.O.C. in Ireland to launch his own military assault.
General Macready , however,found sufficient excuses to
refrain from such action until the General Staff were able
to persuade the Cabinet that the British forces lacked
sufficient resources in Ireland for such an attack;which
could well have produced a new realignment of the contending
3
Free State, and various Republican military groupings.
4It was the kidnapping of General O'Connell , the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the new Irish Government's Armyt by the
Republican forces in the Four Courts that was the decisive
factor in the long complex chain of events that culminated
5m  the Civil War. It is very doubtful if many National 
Army personnel would have been so motivated by the death 
of their old opponent Wilson and even after the kidnapping 
of a very popular officer, a mutiny delayed the actual
1 Cabinet 36(22).CAB 23/30.
2 Decision taken on 23 June 1922. CAB 21/255 and also 
Macready op. cit., 652-54.
3 British attack order rescinded on 25 June 1922. CAB 
21/255.
4 O'Malley, op. cit., 88-90.
5 For a detailed chronology see Outbreak of Events 
Preceding the Civil War. S 1322.
5 5;9;
assault on the Four Courts1? The attack commenced shortly.
before dawn on the 28th June,1922 but initially was carried
out with such little enthusiasm;that the British Cabinet
seriously considered the possibility of actively employing
2their forces to bolster up the National Army. For their
part the Four Courts garrison ,reluctant to appear unduly
aggressive had refused to take the necessary precautions
of fortifying nearby buildings to serve as their perimeter 
3outposts. Their Republican compatriots elsewhere m  
Dublin, still annoyed by the Four Courts garrison's split 
with the mainstream Executive forces at the Army Convention
4
held the previous week, were likewise reluctant to engage 
the National Army units beseiging the building. And when 
they did intervene, it was on the other side of the River 
Liffey after instructing the Four Courts garrison to 
surrender.^
The nature of the fighting, the seizure of buildings -
prestigious but geographically isolated from each other -
only to surrender them a few days later, the paucity of 
6casualties especially compared to those sustained in
1 Provisional Government Minutes, 27 June 1922, P7/B/6/2
2 Conference 133, 28 June 1922. CAB 23/29.
3 Joseph Curran, op. cit., 230.
4 See Sean McBride, Report of Convention of 18 June 1922, 
P7/B/58/18/3.
5 O'Malley, op. cit., 91-97.
6 Total casualities were reported in the Freemans Journal 
10 July 1922 as being 64 dead and 280 wounded. The
National Army claimed to have had 19 soldiers killed and
112 wounded ;see Freeman's Journal 11 July 1922. The 
Republicans never officially listed their casualities but 
as they were fighting from within the protective walls
of strong buildings which they usually surrendered before
contd...
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the 1916 Easter Rising week indicated;despite the heavy 
use of artillery and the massive amount of ammunition 
expended by both sides, a definite determination to make 
a lot of noise without inflicting serious casualities on 
opponents. The fighting in Dublin during the end of June 
and the beginning of July was more of a gesture than any­
thing else. Certainly the Catholic Herald, a publication 
which we have repeatedly observed had few sympathies with 
Republicanism, reported the conflict in much detail under 
the banner headline "each activated by the highest of 
patriotic motives".1 Its editorial clearly implied that 
the fighting so far had been a gesture and suggested that 
without any imputation of cowardice and lack of patriotic
adherence to the Republican opinions they profess, 1
2 3
the Irregulars may now "laudably lay down their arms" .
contd...
any final hand-to-hand assault it would be reasonable, 
applying standard military accounting methods to infer 
that they suffered even fewer casualities than their 
opponents. So the majority of the casualities, . 
as is inevitably the pattern in urban fighting,
were non-combatants.
1 Catholic Herald, 8 July, 1922.
2 'Irregular* was the term popularly applied by the press
to describe those waging war against the new Irish Govern­
ment. Its derogatory implications led to threats by the 
anti-Government forces against publications employing it. 
Terminology is definitely a problem in discussing the 
forces participating in the Civil War. The Government's 
Army used its old title - Olglaigh na h Eireann - the 
name by which the IRA was and still is known in its Irish 
title, but used the term National Army as the English 
version of its name. Its opponents often referred to 
them as 'Free Staters' or just 'Staters', their own title 
originally in the English version - Executive forces of 
the Irish Republican Army was quickly abbreviated to IRA 
as the Civil War progressed.
3 Catholic Herald, 8 July 1922.
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This conciliatory tone was even more strikingly struck 
in the initial attitude of the ISDL Anti-Treatyite leader­
ship towards the outbreak of the Civil War. There seems 
to have been a general desire by both the pro and anti—  
Treaty supporters in Britain to downplay the significance 
of the Dublin fighting, to regard it as a more serious and 
certainly more prolonged outbreak than had previously 
occurred but one that would still probably end like its 
predecessors in another truce. Few signs of hostility 
towards the new Irish Government and its Army were publicly 
displayed on the part of the ISDL Anti-Treatyite leadership.
On the contrary when Sean McGrath’s wife died at the end 
of July, prominent representatives from both factions 
attended the funeral service in London1 and even more
strikingly a National Army contingent fired volleys of
2shots over her coffin at the burial in Ireland. Art
O'Brien also displayed a very concilatory attitude to
3
his arrest in Dublin by National Army troops; he was,
he subsequently wrote in an indignant refutal of press
comments, "treated very courteously" during the few days
4
he was detained.
It was of course a time of great confusion; people were 
often unsure as to which side, they supported;some who
1 Freeman's Journal, 1 August 1922.
2 Freemans Journal, 2 August 19 22.
3 Times, 6 July 1922.
4 Freemans Journal, 11 July 1922. Also see Art O'Brien
File, S 1605.
565
joined the National Army later defected to the IRAi It
took some time before people realized that this indeed
was the ultimate conflict and that a point had now been
reached where emotionally fired personal loyalties and
allegiances had to be weighed against practical choices.
In Britain the process was further complicated by the
issue of Dunne and O'Sullivan waiting in Wandsworth Prison
for their execution. Collins went to extraordinary lengths
to free the two condemned men. When the military efforts
came to naught he persuaded his Ministers - some of whom
undoubtedly began to wonder why he was making such
strenuous attempts to save men whom the British Government
were determined to execute - to secretly ask the British
Cabinet to reprieve Dunne and O'Sullivan.1 Pro and Anti —
Treaty ISDL supporters joined in a common effort to gain
a reprieve, several petitions were circulated, one organi-
2
zed by George Bernard Shaw and another circulated through
3
the Irish community attracted 45,000 signatures. The
4demand for a reprieve was supported by the Daily Herald 
and several MPs including James Sexton, who had opposed 
the political objective of the 1920 Liverpool Dock Strike 
when Irish workers struck in an attempt to have prisoners
5
in Wormwood Scrubs released. Several hundred people sang
1 See the file on the Death of Sir Henry Wilson and the 
subsequent execution of Reginald Dunne and Joseph 
O'Sullivan, S 1570 (State Paper Office)i
2 Taylor, Assassination, op. cit., 188.
3 Freemans Journal, 9, 10, August 19 22.
4 Daily Herald, 3 August 1922.
5 Freemans Journal 9 August 1922.
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Irish songs outside Wandsworth Prison on the Sunday before
the executions1 and others gathered to say the rosary
outside the prison gates on the actual morning of the 
2
executions. Some however regarded the actual demand
for a reprieve as in itself as much a subversive action as
the assassination; a writer in the Times warned that
circulating a petition would certainly spark off "anti—
3Irish feeling in England" while the Morning Post complained
of the amount of publicity given to the reprieve campaign
4by some Fleet Street papers.
With the execution of Dunne and O'Sullivan the! pro and anti- 
Treatyites in Britain lost the last remaining issue on 
which they could unite if only temporarily, to campaign 
for the achievement of a common objective. Already there 
were signs that the growing tensions that had widened with 
the onset of the Civil War could no longer be peacefully 
contained even in Britain. While pro and anti-Treatyites 
were joining together in a demonstration outside Wandsworth, 
their Durham counterparts engaged in what was described as 
a ''pitched battle" when Free State supporters in the ISDL 
tried to hold a meeting there. Smoke bombs were thrown,
and the widespread use of "sticks and fists" resulted in
5
the meeting being abandoned. A similar meeting in
1 Freemans Journal, ‘8 Aug., 1922.
2 Ibid, 11 August 1922; Times, 12 August 1922; and Taylor 
ibid, 194.
3 Times, 9 August 1922.
4 Morning Post, 11 August 1922.
5 Freeman's Journal,,-8 August 1922; Times, 8 August 1922.
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Newcastle on the same day also ended in considerable 
1
disorder. An earlier meeting in Falkirk the previous
2month had turned into a large scale "punch up". "The
ISDL is falling to pieces all over the country” reported
3
the Cabinet's Intelligence Adviser while a Member of 
Parliament who inquired about the current strength of the 
organization was informed that its membership, estimated
4
at 18,000 in March 1922 had now "considerably decreased " .
This reduced membership was very substantially further 
decreased after the League formally and irrevocably split 
when the adjourned Conference was reconvened in July.
Art O'Brien, acting under considerable pressure from his 
hard line Republican supporters, persuaded the League's
5Standing Committee to reconvene the adjourned Conference.
His move was firmly opposed by the organization's President, 
P.J. Kelly,who counter attacked with a statement advising 
branches not to attend the proposed conference and 
suggesting instead that he would personally reconvene the
g
adjourned Conference when "peace returns to Ireland."
Kelly's statement was publicly supported by Hugh Lee who 
earlier that month had attacked a strong anti-Free State 
resolution proposed by his own Manchester District Committee,
1 Catholic Herald, 12 August 1922.
2 ROR 164, 20 July 1922, CP 4115. CAB 24/137.
3 ROR 165, July 1922, CP 4132. CAB 24/137
4 156 H.C. Debs., 5. Cols. 359-60.
5 ROR 166, 3 August 1922, CP 4144. CAB 24/137; Freemans
Journal, 29 July 1922.
6 Catholic Herald, 29 July 1922.
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condemning Michael Collins for shelling the Four Courts
1
at the "bidding of the English" as being “contrary to
the League’s policy1' of formal neutrality on the Treaty 
2
issue. In his eve of conference statement Lee now
warned members against attending this "inopportune confer­
ence whose only business appears to be the resurrection
3
of the secret ’Uphold the Republic’ rule” . Lee however 
had seriously miscalculated the purpose of this reconvened 
Conference which had other objectives than merely committing 
the Irish Self Determination League to unequivocal support 
to the Anti~Treatyite cause. For Art O'Brien and his 
supporters were now determined to remove all Treaty 
supporters from their national leadership positions. The 
Conference delegates' elected Art O'Brien as the new President 
of the League, with Mrs Prosser (Barrow-in-Furness) and 
Gilbert Barrington (Newcastle) becoming the new Vice — 
Presidents. Martin Maloney and Sean McGrath retained 
their old offices as Treasurer and General Secretary 
respectively.^
The promotion of Gilbert Barrington in particular, to a 
national League office showed the extent to which the 
organization was now controlled by hard line uncomprom­
ising Republicans. Following his release from prison, in 
April 1922, where he had been serving a sentence for IRA 
activities, Barrington visited his former pupils at a
1 Manchester Guardian, 1 July 1922.
2 Ibid, 3 July,1922.
3 Freeman's Journal, 27 July 1922; Irish Independent, 27
July -1922.
4 See Report of ISDL Conference held on 29 July 1922 O ’Brien 
Ms 8435.
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South Shields school and told them uto fight for Ireland 
against the British Government" when they grew up.1 Art 
O'Brien justified Kelly's dismissal as President of the 
League by implying that his position as the only Standing 
Committee officer who did not hold either a Branch or 
District Committee officership indicated the former
President's lack of popularity among the organization's
2 , ■ 
rank and file. No amount of verbal camouflage could how­
ever conceal the damage that had been self-inflicted on
the League in the process of turning it into a fully
fledged Republican organization. Two hundred and seventeen
branches had sent delegates to the April conference but
only forty-three branches were represented at the July
Conference. London with thirteen branches present led
the way, followed by seven from the Tyneside area, five
from North East Lancashire and three each from Notts f and
Derby, Cardiff and Mid Durham. Two branches each were
represented in Manchester and Sheffield while the Barrow,
Bradford, Preston, Swansea and Wigan areas had been
3
reduced to one branch in each district. Some of these
branches however seem only to have sent delegates to
observe the proceedings and in the following weeks several
1 Catholic Herald, 7 October 1922.
2 Irish Independent, 29 July 1922. The following month
(September) Art O'Brien issued a strong rebuke to 
P.J. Kelly condemning his suggestion that all Irish 
National Aid Fund cheques should be jointly signed by 
Hugh Lee and Art O'Brien to prevent any bias against 
relieving the plight of former prisoners now supporting 
the Treaty ; see Ms 842 7.
3 See O'Brien, Ms 8435.
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split away from the reorganized ISDL. The Mid-Durham 
District Committee advised its affiliated branches to 
sever all relations with the new ISDL Standing Committee1
while the Cardiff District Committee formally dissolved
\
all the League branches in its area. Its last resolution
was a joint vote of condolence to the relatives of
Reginald Dunne, Joe O'Sullivan and Arthur Griffith,the
leader of the Provisional Government who died early in 
2August. Other branches not represented at the Conference
3
speedily announced their dissolution or their decision,
like that of the Newport branch, to continue their existence
4
purely as an Irish social club. Several former League 
branches in the Staffordshire area joined together to 
form the North Staffordshire Irish Reunion Committee under
5
the Presidency of Canon O'Rourke.
Yet with hindsight Art O'Brien and his fellow-minded 
supporters would seem to have had no alternative choice 
but to take the necessary decisive steps that finally split 
the League. Maintaining the League's policy of non inter­
vention in Irish politics was effectively giving the pro — 
Treatyites a bloodless victory while their presence in 
all levels of authority throughout the ISDL organization 
impeded the impact of attempts by the anti-Treatyites to
1 Freeman's Journal, 7 September 1922.
2 Catholic Herald, 19 August 1922.
3 C.f. the Pontypridd branch - ibid, 22 July 1922
4 Ibid, 12 August 1922.
5 Freeman's Journal, 15 August 1922.
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use their leadership positions to commit the League to 
all out opposition to the Treaty. With the onset of the 
Civil War the previous existing status quo position of the 
League become untenable and so the anti—Treatyites had 
really no other option but to mobilise their forces and 
seek a formal organizational goal transformation accompanied 
by the necessary wholesale branch and individual member­
ship expulsions that this process inevitably entailed.
1 2Simmel and Aldrich suggested that organizations facing 
situations of intense intra-organizational conflict have 
three basic choices. They can simply ignore the divisive 
issue, but this tactic was clearly a non-starter for the 
ISDL given the very strong views on both sides with regards 
to the Treaty issue. Or they can try to dilute the level 
of intra-organizational tension by recruiting new members 
who are not committed to any of the competing viewpoints. 
Again this was clearly impossible at a time when the Treaty 
had so obviously divided the Irish community. The final 
choice involves the expulsion of one section by constricting 
the organizational boundaries and strengthening membership 
requirements by either enacting new rules like Art O'Brien's 
insistence on enforcing the secret 'Uphold the Republic' 
rule or by generally raising the level of ideological
1 Georg Simmel, Conflict, (New York, 1959 52 .
2 Howard Aldrich, 'Organizational Boundaries and Inter- 
Organizational Conflict', Human Relations, 24 (1971), 
279-293.
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conformation. Zald and Ash1 argue that in certain circum­
stances the expulsion of dissidents does not weaken the 
organization but rather instead confers the valuable 
benefits of heightened internal consistency and consensus, 
thereby greatly facilitating the process of goal trans­
formation. Their argument is only however really applic­
able in the case of organizations expelling a minority 
deviant tendency whereas the minority anti-Treatyites in 
the ISDL had effectively expelled their opponents who 
undoubtedly constituted the majority of the League's 
membership.
By expelling the bulk of the League's membership the anti- 
Treatyites certainly ensured their future organizational 
existence, albeit in a much weaker form than before.
Their pro-Treaty opponents however made little use of the 
new situation and failed to effectively reorganize the 
League as a support organization for the Provisional Govern­
ment. P.J. Kelly's intentions to await the ’’return of 
peace to Ireland” before reconvening the adjourned 
Conference effectively committed the pro—Treaty section 
of the League to enforced inactivity as long as the Civil 
War lasted. Its duration turned out to be much longer than 
most had anticipated for contrary to the expectations on 
both sides,hostilities did not cease when the IRA withdrew 
from Dublin. The IRA, for a variety of often conflicting
1 Mayer N. Said and Roberta Ash, 'Social Movement 
Organizations. Growth, Delcay and Change'. Social 
Forces, XLIV (1966) , 327-41.
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reasons, had effectively decided not to fight a major 
battle in Dublin. It mobilized less troops in the Capital 
than the National Army, which realizing the significance 
of maintaining its hold on Dublin had committed about a 
quarter of its eleven thousand personnel to the attack on 
the Four Courts. The IRA had considerably less arms than 
the National Army but appreciably more troops1 who could , 
and often did,obtain arms by attacking the small isolated 
garrisons the National Army was obliged to distribute piece­
meal across the rest of the country. Instead of moving 
troops into Dublin when the fighting started, the IRA moved 
its men in the surrounding counties further south to con­
solidate the so-called 'Republic of Munster1 . However by 
surrendering Dublin so easily the IRA ensured that it 
lost the war; for giving up the principal communication 
centre from which roads and railways radiate throughout 
Ireland,enab]ed the National Army to speedily dispatch 
the fast moving columns that rapidly retook the IRA. occu­
pied towns in the North, East and West of the country and 
sliced through the Midlands,cutting the Republican control­
led rural areas into a series of disconnected localities. 
While the IRA moved its troops up from the deep South to 
defend an impossibly long 'Limerick-Waterford Line1, troops 
using shipping,seized in Dublin Harbour, sailed around their 
defence positions to land on the relatively undefended 
shores of Kerry and Cork. Nowhere, except around the
1 For the respective balance of force see 'Commander in 
Chief's Report1 P7/B /7/2/24 , . and 'Report of the
Executive (IRA) Subcommittee' P7/B/58/19/1.
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Limerick area did the IRA make any serious attempt to 
defend the towns it held; its leaders seemed to have an* 
instinctive prejudice against fighting from fixed positions, 
preferring the fluidity of guerilla warfare. They uncon­
vincingly argued that any sustained effort to hold a major 
town,particularly the capital city, would inevitably bring 
the British forces - still garrisoned in strength inside 
the Dublin area - into action alongside the National Army.1 
But ''bringing the British back into the War1 was certainly 
a Republican objective immddiately before the start of the 
Civil War and definitely the motivation behind the abortive 
campaign in Britain itself the next year.
The Republican leadership, though in reality the IRA was 
never really coordinated at anything above, and often a
2good deal below, Division level throughout the Civil War 
were confident when they evacuated their last urban strong­
hold in mid-August that they could through widespread 
guerilla warfare effectively prevent the new Free State 
from functioning. They believed that the new Government 
would be unable to provide sufficient troops to quell the 
IRA's numerous small guerilla units . But possession of 
Dublin - the financial centre of Ireland - and the other 
urban areas afforded the Free State the revenue with which 
to raise the necessary troops. Over 130,000 unemployed,^
1 See General Macready's Situation Report of 1 July, 1922 
CAB 24/137.
2 See O'Donnoghue op. cit., 260-72.
3 See Military Appreciation 12 Aug., 1922,..CP 4165. CAB 24/138
4 Mitchell, op. cit., 150.
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many of them embittered veterans of the British Army,
offered the rapidly expanding National Army a fertile
recruiting ground.1 At the beginning of July the National
Army was authorized to expand its establishment over three- 
2
fold. With over two thousand would-be recruits in one
3
day in Dublin alone, the National Army was to further
\
double its size by the end of the Civil War when it had
literally snuffed out guerilla warfare by a saturation
strategy. Big business enterprises offered to make up the
difference in salaries for their employees temporarily
4enlisted for the duration of the War, while the Bank of 
Ireland gave six months paid leave to all its young male
5
staff who it actively encouraged to join the National Army. 
Big business concerns - and many smaller enterprises as 
well - had enthusiastically welcomed the Truce and the 
ensuing Treaty. Their antipathy towards Republicans was 
further increased when the IRA levied a 'war tax' during 
its brief occupation of Cork and Limerick. The IRA's 
guerrilla campaign, which by the winter of 1922, essentially 
consisted of wrecking the communications system and in 
particular conducting a virtual 'scorched earth* offensive 
against the vital railway network, considerably dislocated 
an already ravaged economy and produced substantial further
1 'Expansion of the National A r m y S  1302.
2 See Report by Major Whittaker (British Army Intelligence
Officer), 19 Sept., 1922, CAB 24/139.
3 Freeman's Journal, 15 July, 1922.
4 Ibid, 25 Jan., 1923.
5 Ibid, 15 July, 192 2.
unemployment.
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Of the IRA leadership, only Liam Mellowes advocated linking
specifically radical economic policies to their war aims,
but he was in prison and a voice literally crying in the
wilderness.1 Military tactics alone dominated the IRA's
strategy, arid these often actively operated against the
poor, the small farmers and the workers whom the IRA
leaders regarded as their natural allies but offered them
few material prospects in return for their support. Buildings
in Cork intended to house slum clearance families were
burnt by the IRA to deny their possible use to the National 
2
Army. The same practice was followed in the case of the
3
Cleeves Creamery where the workers had formed a 'Soviet'
4
and opposed all outside interference. The "Workers 
Republic , printed in London by the Communist Party on
5
behalf of its tiny Irish counterpart, who were fighting with
g
the Citizens Army alongside the IRA warned i
"if the Republicans reduce the struggle against the 
Free State to a merely military struggle, then the
1 See D.R. O'Connor Lysaght, The Republic of Ireland,
(Cork, 1970), 69-70. Greaves, Mellowes , op. cit.,
180.
2 Catholic Herald, 19 Aug., 1922.
3 For the formation of Soviets in Ireland see D.R. O'Connor
Lysaght, 'The Month of Soviets' , Red Mole, 24 Jan., 1972 
and Gerard Burns, 'When Ireland Flew the Red Flag11,
Irish Press, 16 Oct., 19 79.
4 Calton Younger, op. cit., 397.
5 ROR 167, 27 July, 1922. CP 4132. CAB 24/138.
ROR 167, 10 Aug., 1922. CP 4156. CAB 24/138.
6 Mitchell, op. cit., 164.
ROR 171, 7 Sept., 1922. CP 4138. CAB 24/138.
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centralized power of the Capitalist State will crush 
them in a few months?1
The author of this article was right but it took consider­
ably longer than he envisaged. On the 21st August the 
Freeman's Journal in bold headlines proclaimed: "National 
Army - Supreme from Donegal to Cork." But on the following 
day Michael Collins/Commander in Chief of the National 
Army, was killed in his own rural Cork homeland. His death - 
because of its particular circumstances, shot at long 
range in a hastily organized ambush - has become Ireland's 
equivalent of the '• Kennedy assassination conspiracy1'- with
various authors suggesting that he was alternatively killed
2
by his own guards or by a British agent. Whatever the 
precise manner of his death the actual incident had a 
considerable impact on the Irish community in Britain,part­
icularly in London where he had spent the formative years 
of his revolutionary period, - he was still at the time of 
his death the Southern English representative on the Supreme 
Council of the IRB. A striking photograph shows an Irish 
girl kneeling in a London street, rosary beads in her hand, 
as she prayed in front of a newspaper seller's placard
announcing "Collins Dead" - oblivious of the puzzled crowd
3
surrounding her. The Catholic Herald devoted a full page
4
to his death and masses were said in many Catholic churches.
1 Workers Republic, 1 July, 1922.
2 John M. Feehan, The Shooting of Michael Collins:
Murder or Accident , (Cork, 1981).
3 Freeman's Journal, 24 Aug., 1922.
4 For details of the many masses see Catholic Herald,
9 Sept., 1922; Catholic Times, 2 and 16 Sept., 1922.
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Over 3,000 people attended a requiem for Collins and
Griffiths in St George’s Cathedral, Southwark,1 and
St Mary's Cathedral, Newcastle, was packed by a capacity
congregation for a High Mass celebrated in front of a
2
tricolour draped catafalque.. Tributes to the deaddlrish 
leader came from all sides of the now very divided Irish 
political movement in Britain, from branches of the virtually
3
defunct United Irish League and both Pro-Treaty and Anti-
4Treaty ISDL branches. Sean McGrath spoke of the “loss 
of a great Irish leader" - of a comrade who had become an
5
opponent. A large number of Irish people living in London
6crossed over to Dublin for the funeral where they joined 
Art 0 1Brien:following his release from Portlaoise Prison 
where he had spent most of August after his second arrest
7
by the National Army.
But even as they stood around the graveside in Glasnevin,
o
the rifle fire of a nearby IRA ambush was a vivid reminder 
of the impossibility of recreating, on a permanent basis, 
the old spirit of unity that had brought them temporarily 
together again. The death, the previous month, of 
Sean O ’Daire had the same traumatic effect on the Irish
1 Manchester Evening News, 11 Sept., 1922.
2 Freeman's Journal, 1 Sept., 1922.
3 Freeman's Journal, 25 Aug., 1922.
4 Ibid, 26 Aug., 1922.
5 Ibid, 24 Aug., 1922.
6 Ibid, 28 Aug., 19 22.
7 Ibid, 24 Aug., 1922.
8 Catholic Herald, 2 Sept., 1922.
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Movement in Glasgow as Collin's death had in London. 
O'Daire's death was particularly ironic for he was killed 
in ambush by an IRA unit led by Frank Carty - the man he 
had freed from a Glasgow prison van, a year and a very 
different war, ago.*
The Newcastle ISDL branch reconsitituted itself as the
2Michael Collins Branch of the Irish Free State League 
an organization which however appears to have been confined 
to that city. The Eskwinning branch decided to pursue an
3
independent course of action in favour of the Free State, 
while the Colne branch decided to become a purely social
4
club. This disintegration and fragmentation of the pro- 
Free State ISDL branches was considerably hastened by the 
uncertain and contradictory policies of the pro-Treaty ISDL 
national officers. At the end of September, Hugh Lee and 
P.J. Kelly informed ISDL branches that they intended to
5
reconvene the adjourned Conference (April) in November.
But no such conference appears to have been held in 1922, 
and in December Hugh Lee told a newspaper reporter that he 
now believed the "League had accomplished its purpose1 f  
a sentiment most definitely shared by the Catholic Herald 
which strongly argued that the Free State did not require
1 Freeman's Journal, 28 July, 1922; Times, 29 July, 1922.
2 Catholic Herald, 30 Sept., 1922.
3 Ibid, 9 Sept., 1922.
4 Ibid
5 Catholic Herald, 30 Sept., 1922.
6 Manchester Evening News, 13 Dec., 1922.
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the support of any Irish organization in Britain.1
Lee's change of heart was probably influenced to a consider­
able extent by the apparent failure of the Pro-Treaty ISDL 
members to make much headway in his own town, Manchester. 
Here as in most of the other Irish communities there were 
two ISDLs,existing side by side in an atmosphere of mutual 
recrimination. After the July Conference the Anti-Treaty 
supporters held new elections for branch and district 
Committee Officerships but the existing Pro-Treaty Officers
refused to recognize the legality of these. Both factions
2
claimed to be the legimitate ISDL but the local paper
3
which investigated this "truly Hibernian situation” con­
cluded that the Anti-Treaty ISDL with five branches and 
about three hundred* land fifty members was the strongest
4
m  terms of active membership. The existence of two com­
peting organizations,with the same name was hardly conducive 
to attracting new members, uncertain as to which of. the 
factions was right and this unfortunate situation led the 
Standing Committee of the Anti-Treaty ISDL to discuss the 
’'advisability of changing the name of the organization" 
to avoid any further confusion. Lee's views as to the 
desirability of winding up the League were no doubt also 
considerably influenced by a very unpleasant event that had
1 Catholic Herald, 7 Oct., 1922.
2 Manchester Evening News, 19 and 26 Aug., 1922.
3 Ibid, 19 Aug., 1922.
4 Ibid, 13 Dec., 1922.
5 Minutes, 13 Nov., 1922, Ms 8427.
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occurred the weekend before he gave the newspaper inter­
view. The Annual Manchester Martyrs’ Commemoration atten­
ded by several thousand people in remembrance of the three 
Feniaus,hanged there in 1867, broke up in "wild disorder” 1 
when Republican and Free State supporters violently clashed. 
Manchester was not the only place to witness scenes of 
violent conflict between rival Irish exile factions that
day. A particularly nasty confrontation also occurred on
2
the other side of the Atlantic, in New York . In both 
places the cause of the disturbances was the same, under­
lying simmering tensions brought to the boil by a traumatic 
development in the Irish Civil War; the introduction of 
special Military Court Martials empowered to inflict the 
death penalty for a wide range of offences without any
3
•possibility of appeal. The first executions took place in 
4mid November but it was the execution of Erskine Childers, 
5
a week later, that sparked off the confrontation in 
Manchester. Childers had been responsible for transporting 
100 rifles bought in 1914, with money raised by an Irish 
committee in London, to Ireland. Afterwards this former 
Clerk to the House of Commons had joineld the Royal Navy 
but subsequently became the leading Sinn Fein propagandist 
and a determined foe of the Treaty. His execution, for the 
possession of a pistol given to him by Michael Collins, 
brought home to the Irish in Britain and elsewhere the
1 Manchester Evening News, 27 November, 1922.
2 Manchester Guardian, 27 November, 1922.
3 Dail Eirann Debates, 28 September, 1922, Col. 931.
4 Freeman's Journal, 18 November, 1922.
5 Ibid, 25 November, 1922.
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ruthless determination of the Provisional Government to 
crush the militant opponents of the Treaty.
From the manner in which the pro-Free State Government 
press editorially ignored the executions it is apparent 
that they were greatly troubled by them, including even their 
staunch supporters who had previously advocated a tougher 
line. The IRA responded to this new tactic by shooting 
dead a prominent Government TD - General Sean Hales whose 
brother was a leading IRA commander.1 As a reprisal the
2Government executed the four senior IRA prisoners it held.
Even the stringent military censorship imposed on the press
in Ireland could not contain the flood of protest from
public bodies against what . Tom Johnson, the leader of
the Official Opposition in the Dail denounced as ‘'Murder,
3an illegal act of vengeance". The earlier executions
carried out after a summary court martial did at least 
have some semblance of legality as the law authorizing 
them had been enacted by the Dail. Executing without trial 
four men arrested months before at the fall of the Four 
Courts was as the Government freely admitted no more than
4
an "official reprisal"' . As such this action was not one 
that found favour among many in the Irish community in 
Britain. The very timing of the executions on the feast 
day of the Immaculate Conception alienated many Catholics.
1 Curran, op. cit., 265.
2 Curran, op. cit., 265.
3 Freeman’s Journal, 9 December, 1922.
4 Ibid.
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Two of the men executed had close connections with the
Irish National Movement in Britain; Liam Mellowes had
been born in England and as Director of Purchases, during
the War of Independence, remained in very close contact with
the various organizations supplying munitions, while Rory
O'Connor had been the OC Britain during the IRA's phase of
offensive activity there. It was not an auspicious start
for the Free State which had officially come into existence^
two days earlier,when the King had signed the requisite
proclamation1 following the passing of the Irish Free
State Constitutions Act*opposed only by the two Communist
2
MP s in the House of Commons, Newbolld and Saklatvala.
The revulsion felt against the executions at least partly 
explains the almost total failure of the new Free State 
Government to organize an effective, or indeed any real 
support movement among the Irish in Britain. Towards the 
close of 1922 the Pro-Treaty Sinn Fein Clubs in Scotland 
formed themselves into an Irish Exiles League with the
3
intention of organizing throughout Britain. But despite 
having the active goodwill of the Free State Government, 
who offered the services of their Northern Boundary Comm­
ission officials, the new organization never 'really took 
off in Scotland and succeeded only in putting out fa few
4
isolated offshoots in North East England. The majority of
1 Curran, op. cit., 263.
2 Freemans Journal, 28 Nov., 1922.
3 Ibid, 19 Dec., 1922.
4 Ibid, 20 March, 1922. °The newly formed Irish Exiles
League of Great Britain, an anti Republican organization
is not making much headway in spite of its having received 
the benediction of President Cos grave . *; ROR 187/
4 Jan., 1923. CP 4(23). CAB 24/158.
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ISDL branches broke away from the new Anti-Treaty leader­
ship after the July Conference and while some,as we obser­
ved, then immediately dissolved themselves, many still 
remained in existence for some time either as social clubs 
or independent political organizations. In addition to 
the potential manpower resources afforded by the ISDL 
Pro-Treaty membership the Free State could, at least theo- 
ectically, count on the support of the majority of members 
in two other existing organizations.
The Irish National Forresters, the Irish Nationalist Bene­
ficial Society, recorded a membership of over 20,000 in 
1922.1 Its important influence in the umbrella worldwide 
INF movement can be seen from the attendance at the fol-' > 
lowing year's International Congress held in Dublin.
Ill delegates represented branches in Ireland itself, 47
2
delegates came from England and 39 from Scotland. The 
Cabinet's Intelligence Advisor reported the INF membership 
was largely in favour of the Free State and that the members 
were "well represented in Northern English industrial
3
areas". Its membership was indeed largely confined to the 
North with a few branches in the Midlands arid the South 
a geographical distribution corresponding to the earlier 
Irish immigrant settlement patterns and closely paralleling 
the distribution of the United Irish League branches, with 
which it shared a largely common membership. The formation
1 Catholic Herald, 21 April, 1923.
2 Ibid, 11 Aug., 1923.
3 ROR 174* 28 Sept., 1922. CP 4242. CAB 24/139.
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of the Irish Free State forced the INF in England and 
Scotland to acquire a certain degree of autonomy from the 
parent organization in Ireland, to satisfy the requirements 
of the Registrar of Friendly Societies in England and 
in particular Northern Ireland.1 The tensions that stemmed 
from the enforced formation of separate Regional Councils 
for England and Scotland produced a de facto breakaway from 
central authority that ultimately encompassed a large number 
of branches and considerably weakened the overall organ­
izational effectiveness -of the INF. The second organization, 
the Ancient Order of Hibernians ,effectively duplicated 
much of the INF's work but had a much smaller membership. 
According to the Cabinet's Intelligence Advisor,
“the leaders of the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
support the Free State but they have few followers 
among the ordinary London Irishmen*. 2
To a considerable degree the AOH belonged to a different 
era and depended for much of whatever strength it retained 
on the maintenance of a high level of inter-communal 
sectarian tensions in particularistic places like Liverpool 
and Glasgow.
In any case the leaders and members of the INF and AOH 
were not accustomed to acting politically in their own 
right. Rather the membership of both organizations had 
traditionally pursued their political aims through the 
United Irish League. The most that the Free State
1 Catholic Herald, 11 Aug., 1923.
2 ROR 192, 6 Feb., 1923. CP 91(23). CAB 24/158.
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Government could expect of them from an organizational 
point of view were simple resolutions of support'1' and a 
firm resolve on the part of their leaders to deny Anti" 
Treatyites a platform at their, largely, social events.
The key to their effective co-option as a working support
organization in Britain on behalf of the Free State lay in
reactivating the almost defunct central UIL organization
and reviving its moribund local branches. But neither the
signing of the Treaty nor the formation of a Provisional,
and subsequently, a Free State Government evoked any signs
from the UIL leaders of their willingness to effectively
reorganize themselves as a support organization acting on
behalf of the new Irish Free State and its Government.
Developments in the British political sphere did however
force the UIL and in particular its President T.P. O ’Connor,
who by this time in effect functioned as its constitutional,
- but only just -, monarch, to reconsider the organization’s
future in the light of the changed political relationship
between Britain and Ireland. The Lloyd George Coalition
had run into trouble on many fronts both at home and
abroad. The short lived post war boom had now run out
of steam and all the signs clearly pointed to an ever
deepening economic recession but as neither the Conserva-
tive nor Liberal parties had any fundamental economic
differences this was certainly not sufficiently important
to cause the collapse of the Coalition Government though
1 For example the London AOH Convention passed a resolution 
supporting the Free State Government, Freemaris Journal,
29 Jan., 1923.
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it did fuel a series of by election reverses. Lloyd 
George’s Irish policy culminating in the Treaty Settlement 
of December 1921, was undoubtedly the single most influential 
factor in the formation of the anti~Coalition back bench 
Conservative grouping known as the Diehards. Mostly belong­
ing to the old Tory landowner section of the Conservative 
Party these MPs tended to have more personal connections 
with Ireland, either in the form of land holdings or ancestry 
and in some cases birth places,than the majority of their 
party colleagues. They had strong and powerful connections 
in the armed forces, the former Naval Intelligence 
Director , Vice Admiral Sir Reginald Hall,and the former 
CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson were Diehards. Their 
influence was sufficiently powerful to prevent the appoint­
ment of General Bryne - regarded by them as a 'Sinn Fein 
supporter' - as the head of the Home Office's Intelligence 
section in succession to Sir Basil Thomson . whose sacking 
they regarded as a 'blow against Ulster'.1 Fifty eight
Conservative MPs - though not all of these were actual
2
members of the Diehard group - voted against the Irish 
Treaty - and thirty seven openly opposed the Government 
over its response to the House of Commons debate that 
immediately followed the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson -
a man regarded by some Diehards as a future Tory Prime
3 .Minister. But important as they were as a focal point
for the rapidly developing anti-Coalition feeling inside
1 Kinnear, op. cit., 97.
2 Defined as those who actually signed Diehard manifestos.
3 Kinnear, op. cit., 83.
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the mainstream of the Conservative Party,the Diehards 
never looked capable of mobilizing''a'decisive^ Conservative 
Backbench vote against the Coalition.
Unfortunately for Lloyd George, June - the month in which 
Field Marshal Wilson was assassinated - was also the month, 
the great ’Honours Scandal1, slowly ticking away for years 
just below the surface of political life, finally blew up 
in his face. The subsequent and very public disclosures 
that Lloyd George had through the offices of Maundy 
Gregory and others 'sold Honours' to noveau riche business­
men - many of them war profiteers - on a sliding scale, 
starting at £10,000 for an ordinary knighthood and £35,000 
for a baronetcy, lost Lloyd George much of his remaining 
credibility which by this time was, in truth, not very 
much.1 It was in this atmosphere of scarcely concealed 
mistrust on the part of most Conservatives and outright 
hostility from the Diehards:that Lloyd George proceeded 
to finally destroy his administration with an ill thought 
out, badly planned,foreign intervention that, almost brought 
Britain into a new military conflict *,at a time when the 
British population definitely did not want any fresh for­
eign adventures, particularly if they seemed likely to lead 
to war. In Asia Minor Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy had 
already antagonized many Conservative backbenchers who 
favoured the new Turkish state created on the Asian side 
of the Straits by Atta Kemal. In August 1922 the Turkish 
Nationalist Army totally routed the Greeks at Smyrna and
1 Rowland, op. cit., 574-75.
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advanced towards the British positions on the Straits at
Chanak Lloyd George mistakenly tried to use the resultant
'Chanak. crisis' to whip up a 'war fever' in Britain as a
prelude to a sudden General Election.1 But at the dramatic
and historic Carlton Club meeting of the 19th of October
1922, the Conservative back benches finally rebelled
against the leadership of Chamberlain and "startled them- 
2
selves" by decisively rejecting any further participation 
in the Coalition. Lloyd George's Irish policy was probably 
the single most important event that influenced the Carlton
3
Club vote. He immediately resigned and Bonar Law,who 
succeeded Austen Chamberlain as the Conservative leader, 
became the Prime Minister of a Caretaker Government in the 
interim period before the General Election held on the 
15th November,1922.
The forthcoming General Election forced the UIL to under­
take a limited series of activities initially designed to 
mobilize support for their parliamentary candidates. At 
a hastily convened Caxton Hall conference, in London,
T.P. O'Connor launched an appeal to "reconstitute UIL 
branches and hold meetings of Irish electors in all poss-
4
ible constituencies". The attendance at these meetings 
held during the following week showed the extent of the
1 For the 'Chanak Crisis' see A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 
248-50, and Kinnear, op. cit., 114-15.
2 Kinnear, op. cit., 119-24.
3 Ibid, 139.
4 Freeman's Journal, 26 Oct., 1922.
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UIL's decline since its pre-war heyday. Two hundred 
delegates attended the Glasgow convention1 and another 170 
delegates representing 35 branches in Yorkshire, Lancashire 
and Staffordshire - the traditional UIL heartland - met 
at Manchester,to discuss not . just the mobilization of the
. o 2Irish vote in Britain but the future of the League itself. 
They agreed to T.P. O'Connor’s proposal that the. UIL ; 
having outlived its usefulness, should sponsor a conference! 
after the election to discuss the future representation 
of Irish and, significantly, Catholic interests in Britain. 
Their proposed new organization was however received with 
little real enthusiasm and encountered much outright 
hostility. The press was almost universally hostile to the
new initiative with only the Catholic Times giving it a
3very cautious welcome. The Manchester Evening News - 
covering much of the old UIL heartland - believed it would
not attract much support and declared that the UIL had
4
decayed beyond the point of resurrection. The Liverpool 
Daily Post followed the majority Of the press in opposing
5
outright the proposed new organization. The most virulent 
opposition came,not unexpectedly, from the Catholic Herald 
which initially'ridiculted the UIL initiative as
5"Another Corpse Revival - Rip Van Winkle has woken up "
1 Freemans Journal, 2 Nov., 1922.
2 Freeman's Journal, 1 Nov., 1922.
3 Catholic Times, 7 Oct., 1922.
4 Manchester Evening News, 24 Oct., 1922.
5 See Home Office review of press attitudes towards the 
new UIL initiative. ROR 176, 12 Oct., 1922. CP 4282. 
CAB 24/139.
6 Catholic Herald, 14 Oct., 1922.
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but in the following weeks' edition the very idea of an
"Irish National Party" in Great Britain was denounced as
an "anachronism and an absurdity, it should be wiped out".1
The Catholic Herald subsequently suggested that the new
organization was simply a ruse created to pay off the UIL's
2bank overdraft.
But to the Cabinet's Intelligence Advisor, T.P. O'Connor's
proposal "to organize moderate opinion" was a very welcome
development for,
"all through the recent agitation, moderate Irish 
opinion in this country remained voiceless and the 
followers of the old Nationalist Party allowed irres­
ponsible Sinn Feiners and Self Determination Leaguers 
to dominate the situation^ ^
It was a vain hope as the author was obliged to admit in
his subsequent Reports - "T.P. O'Connor's effort appears
4
to be doomed to failure", it is "encountering much leth-
5
argy". The Special Branch was also wrong in their assump­
tions that the new organization planned to link the old 
Nationalist movement in Britain firmly to the new Free 
State Government. The old Home Rule movement in Ireland 
played only a minimal role in the political life of the 
new State. Many of its supporters refused to have anything 
to do with either of the rival Sinn Fein factions with
1 Catholic Herald, 28 Oct., 1922.
2 Ibid, 4 Nov., 1922.
3 ROR 175, 5 Oct., 1922. CP 4264. CAB 24/139.
4 ROR 179, 19 Oct., 1922. CP 4296. CAB 24/139.
5 ROR 178, 26 Oct., 1922. CP 4292. CAB 24/139.
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over a quarter of a million voters casting their ballots 
against them in the June 1922 Election. Many old Home 
Rulers regarded the Treaty as offering little more than 
the 1914 Settlement and in fact quite a number of irrecon­
cilable Nationalists believed that its recognition of 
partition was a considerable step backwards. Only a hand­
ful of old Nationalists became TDs in the new Dail and, 
with only some 3% of TDs in the 1923 Dail having started 
off their political life in the old Parliamentary Party, 
the Nationalists had less than half the representation of 
their former Unionist opponents'*' who joined Cumann -na 
Gheadheal.
The new Irish Government went to considerable lengths to
conciliate the minority Unionist section in Southern
Ireland and in particular appointed a disproportionate
number to the Senate but made little effort to co-opt the
old Home Rulers who eventually founded a new Irish National
2
League in 1926. The UIL in Britain believed that its 
members had been deliberately passed over by the Free 
State when it appointed its representatives in Britain, 
particularly with the nomination of James MacNeill a 
brother of the Minister of Education, a former Indian 
Civil Service employee .as its first High Commissioner in 
London. Under his direction Free State officials in 
Britain maintained a very low profile, doing very little 
to mobilize political opinion within the Irish community
1 McCracken, op. cit., 89.
2 Catholic Herald, 18 Sept., 1926.
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especially on the Northern Ireland issue.1 If the appoint­
ment of .MacNeill was a disappointment to UIL leaders, the 
Free State's acceptance of Tim Healy as the British 
nominee for the new position of Governor General certainly 
infuriated them ;for Healy had been the most virulent of 
Parnell's opponents,inside the Nationalist movement after 
the famous 'split' occasioned by Parnell's relationship
with Kitty O'Shea. He had been expelled from the Irish
2
National League of Great Britain and even among the anti- 
Parnellite forces was regarded as a maverick, "a brilliant 
disaster" who had allowed his own personal prejudices ,arid 
unrelenting hostility to those who opposed him ,to fatally 
dominate his political judgement. His appointment as 
Governor General confirmed the UIL's suspicions of the Free
4
State Government's hostility towards Parnellism and 
virtually assured that the reconstituted UIL would refuse 
to give anything other than lukewarm support to the Dublin 
Government. It certainly ended any hope the Free State 
Government may have entertained of co-opting the proposed 
new organization.
John Dillon7the leader of the old Nationalist movement in 
Ireland,agreed with T.P. O'Connor's plans to reorganize the 
UIL into a new organization whose primary focus would be 
orientated towards the problems faced by the Irish
1 Catholic Herald, 4 Oct., 1924.
2 Lyons Dillon, op. cit., 169.
3 Curran, op. cit., 263.
4 Catholic Herald, 30 Aug., 1924.
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community in Britain rather than towards involvement in 
domestic Irish politics. He argued that the UIL must 
now
"make a bold effort to capture the Gaelic revival 
movement and the social side of Irish life.M^
The Home Office noted at the same time "the Irish in many
areas are tired of national politics" but had "run quite
a number of Irish Catholic candidates in the Borough
elections.1*^
The Nationalists in Britain only fielded two candidates 
in the November 1922 General Election. T.P. O'Connor was 
once again returned unopposed in his Liverpool Scotland 
constituency but in the next door Exchange seat the former 
Belfast MP, and Vice President of the AOH, Joe Devlin 
polled a very respectable 12,614 votes, representing almost
3
4 5% of the voting electorate and demonstrating that,m 
Liverpool at least, its very particularistic form of Irish 
Nationalism was still an important political force.
T.P. O'Connor claimed that Devlin failed to attract as many
4
Liberal votes as in previous elections while Devlin him­
self blamed his defeat on the unprecedented Conservative
5
mobilization of their female supporters and certainly 
the Tories had poured a very large number of canvassers
1 Lyons, Dillon, pp. cit., 473.
2 ROR 179, Nov., 1922. CP 4294. CAB 24/139.
3 F.W.S. Craig, Minor Parties at British Parliamentary
Elections 1885-1974'-, (1975), 47.
4 Manchester Guardian, 21 Nov., 192 2.
5 Catholic Herald, 25 Nov., 1922.
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aided by unprecedented financial resources into the
constituency.1 T.P. O'Connor only endorsed one other
candidate , an independent Liberal in the Camberwell 
2constituency , but he was defeated. The Freemans Journal
advised the Irish in Britain "whenever they see a Diehard
3head let them hit it". But despite Lloyd George's claim 
that opposition to the Irish Treaty was the main motivation 
behind the Carlton House vote ,that had led to the General 
Election,^ Ireland never really surfaced as an election 
issue and even the Conservative Manifesto only contained a 
brief reference to it : while a three hundred strong Northern 
Irish Unionist delegation sent over to 'influence' the 
Conservative election campaign returned home,in disgust, 
having failed to get an invitation to appear even on 
Diehard platforms. Charles Diamond campaigning for Labour 
"on an anti-Socialist" platform lost in Rotherhithe to a 
Conservative,who had produced a leaflet suggesting that
7
Diamond "should go back to Ireland".
The Conservatives gained 345 seats in the new Parliament 
while Labour with 142 seats now became the official
1 P.J. Waller, op. cit., 291.
2 The Star, 13 Nov., 1922; Freeman's Journal, 14 Nov., 1922.
3 Ibid, 24 Oct., 1922.
4 Ibid, 23 Oct., 1922.
5 Kinnear, op. cit., 139.
6 Freeman's Journal, 11 Nov., 1922; Catholic Herald,
18 Nov., 1922.
7 Catholic Herald, 25 Nov., 1922.
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opposition leaving the divided Liberals with 117 seats in
third place.1 Labour appears to have captured the majority
of the Irish vote in Britain,
“not so much for their love of Ldbour; there is a 
lot of feeling that Labour did not very actively 
oppose Lloyd George's Irish policy between 1920-21 
but because of their fear and distrust of what is 
called the 'Ascendency P a r t y '.'2
But the extent to which Labour's past attitudes to Ireland 
alienated Irish voters in Britain was probably considerably 
overestimated; certainly the Special Branch wrongly sug­
gested that Arthur Henderson might lose the East Newcastle 
by election of January 1923 because he
•■is not popular with many of the Irish voters and is 
being reproached with having acquiesced in the 
executions of 1916 when he was in Government^
It was a mistake shared with the Daily News who also
mistakenly claimed that the "Self Determination League and
the Irish Republican Brotherhood are big powers on
4
Tyneside11, but J. Macnamara ,who described himself as 
President of the Irish Labour Party and the Self Deter­
mination League,issued a statement claiming that the
5Irish community there did support Henderson. His victory 
margin of over 4,000 votes was ironically the same as the 
Daily News estimate of the size of the constituency's 
Irish vote.0 An attempt by the Manchester Pro-Treaty ISDL
1 A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 256.
2 ROR 178, 26 Oct., 1922. CP 4292. CAB 24/139.
3 ROR 188, 11 Jan., 1923. CP 15(23). CAB 24/158.
4 Daily News, 10 Jan., 1923.
5 Daily News, 11 Jan, 1923.
6 Ibid, 10 Jan., 1923.
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to mobilize the Irish vote on behalf of candidates sup­
porting the North East Boundary Commission,on which their 
leader R.J. Purcell served ,as the Northern English 
representative1, was publicly opposed by their Anti-Treaty 
counterparts who argued that no organization had the right 
to tell the Irish in Britain as to how they should cast 
their votes.^
The Anti-Treaty ISDL however showed few sigjis themselves 
of being able to mobilize Irish opinion in England and 
Wales in support of its cause. The autumn and winter of 
1922 was a very bleak period for their organization which 
faced not so much outright opposition in the Irish commu­
nity, though this did exist in varying degrees in different 
areas, but the much more debilitating and morale sapping 
mass apathy that permeated the community to such an extent 
that Art O'Brien wrote.
“there is very little enthusiasm for anything here 
at the moment", 3
"our people here are disheartened and suspicious of 
everything and their attitude of mind tends rather 
to be destructive rather than constructive". 4
His condemnation of his members' destructive attitudes
was undoubtedly a reference to the problems faced by his
close comrade Sean McGrath,who was forced to take the
1 Catholic Herald, 11 Nov., 1922.
2 Manchester Evening News, 10 Jan., 1923.
3 Art O'Brien to R. Brennan, 4 Sept., 1922, Ms 8456.
4 O'Brien to Brennan (undated letter but probably 
Autumn 1922), Ms 8456.
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extreme step of submitting his resignation, as General
Secretary of the ISDL, to counteract allegations that he
was not totally committed to the Anti-Treaty Cause.
McGrath's critics inside the League, who seemed mainly to
be those hard line Sinn Fein members,who had opposed the
formation of the ISDL, claimed that by attending Michael
Collins' funeral and byjsanctioning a Free State Army volley
over his wife's grave he had given grave offence to other
members. The Standing Committee managed to persuade
McGrath to withdraw his resignation1 but this episode,
ironically at a time when British Intelligence was report-
2ing McGrath was again involved in arms purchases, was 
a foretaste of the bitter personal attacks on O'Brien and 
McGrath that were ultimately to lead to the final dis­
appearance of the League. It is also interesting to 
consider that McGrath's critics were purely political 
activists, while his military comrades imprisoned in 
Kilmainhan spontaneously knelt and said the rosary for
3
their former leader when they heard of Collins' death.
Art O'Brien, had himself lost some of his authority and
prestige within the League as a result of the enforced
closure of his Republican Government Representative's
4office due to a severe lack of funds. At the same time 
the new Irish Government renewed with vigour the legal
1 See O'Brien Ms 8427.
2 ROR 180, 9 Nov., 1922. CP 4302. CAB 24/140.
3 Barry, op. cit., 183.
4 O'Brien Ms 8459.
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action first started by Michael Collins to regain control
of funds originally entrusted to O'Brien by the First
Dail. This action was part of a concerted drive by the
new Irish Government to deny their opponents access to
funds, particularly in the United States.1 In Art O'Brien's
case this legal action ultimately became another source
of disagreement between himself and De Valera /who initially
instructed O'Brien to defend the action but appears not
to have provided the requisite funds for the very expen-
2
sive legal costs. Art O'Brien's own personal position in 
the Republican hierarchy in the immediate period after 
the fall of the Four ■ Courts is somewhat unclear.
Hutchinson, the Scottish Sinn Fein leader, asked in August 
19 22 for the appointment in his country of a 'liason 
officer' between the Army and Sinn Fein similar to the
3
position held by Art O'Brien in England. O'Brien however 
seems to have held no duly authorized political position 
in the Anti-Treaty forces for the first four months of 
the Civil War. He was not of course the only Republican 
leader to find himself in this uncertain position.
De Valera himself, perhaps shrewdly realizing that there 
was little he could do in the immediate period, refused to 
accept anything but a humble volunteer's rank in the IRA; 
but following Liam Lynch's cavalier rejection of discussion 
on the necessity of establishing the future relationship
1 Times, 23 Aug., 1922 - The Free State Government 
was granted an injunction in New York, freezing 
£510,000 of De Valera's American loan.
2 See Art O'Brien File, 1922-1936, S 1605.
3 S 1859.
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between the IRA and the Anti-Treaty TDs/'1' he then demanded 
that either the IRA recognize the existence of the poli­
tical movement or the TDs would resign. The IRA Executive's
Meeting of the 16/17th October 1922 decided that a new
2civil Republican Government should be formed and the 
following week the available Anti-Treaty Second Dail TDs 
met secretly to elect De Valera as President of the Rep­
ublic and the new Council of State. The IRA Executive 
formally pledged its allegiance to this new 'Government' 
but as it still retained the final right to approve or 
reject peace terms to end the Civil War, the Army in effect
3
remained the supreme authority. Shortly after his election
De Valera reappointed Art O'Brien as the official London
4
Representative of the new Republican Government. This 
action may possibly have been what Gaughan describes as 
the
“establishment of a link between the political wing 
of the Anti-Treaty forces as represented by De Valera, 
Stack and Art O'Brien-.^
As O'Brien certainly had, by his visits to Ireland and his
accompanying spells of imprisonment, ’ maintained his
contact with the Anti-Treaty political leadership in
Ireland.
1 See the captured correspondence between De Valera and 
Lynch which was subsequently published as Correspon­
dence of Mr Eamonn de Valera and Others , (Dublin, 1923).
2 O'Donoghue, op. cit., 270-77.
3 Macardle, op. cit., 807-8, and O'Donoghue, op. cit., 
342-43.
4 S 1605.
5 Gaughan, •Stack', op..cit., 291.
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The restoration of his personal official position, though 
it may have improved O'Brien's morale, did little to 
improve the fast declining fortunes of the ISDL, now but 
a shadow of its former pre-Civil War strength The survi­
ving branch minutes - largely confined to London reports - 
depict an organization rapidly losing members and unable 
to instil any real sense of purpose among its depleted 
ranks. The fact that the November London District Committee 
meeting was "so poorly attended that the bulk of the work 
was deferred to a special meeting"1 indicates that the 
cancer of apathy gnawing its way through the rank 
and file supporters had even penetrated the middle rank 
leadership. Ironically this poorly attended District 
Committee was the first held after the change in represen­
tation which increased the number of branch delegates from 
one to three irrespective of membership size. This incre­
ased representation was probably an attempt to involve a 
greater number of the dwindling membership, in the running 
of the League, and it was also no doubt an effort to camou­
flage the effective loss of almost half the London branches 
in the first four months after the July Conference. In 
a bid to conceal the demise of some of these, no longer 
functioning branchesfO'Brien ordered the amalgamation of
the existing branches on a new area pattern that 'twinned'
2
functioning branches with 'ghost' branches. Such a neat 
paper reorganization could not solve the many problems
1 Circular to delegates, 20 Nov., 1922, Ms 8427.
2 O'Brien to Purdell, 23 Oct., 1922, Ms 8435.
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facing the local branches. Writing from Twickenham
once a flourishing large branch, Joe Fowler,who was fast
emerging as one of the new hard line local Republican
leaders, vividly described the "great struggle to" maintain
our outpost of the faith ...taxing to the utmost one's
enthusiasm and energy, but the maintenance of every
Republican centre is so essential".1 Art O'Brien in,an
otherwise very frank/assessment of the organization's
position tried to suggest in a circular, to all the remain-
ing branches ,that if the League could survive this current
very difficult period then "our now small centres will
form the nucleus of bigger activities to come". But for
the moment, he suggested that Mif we cannot meet in large
halls as formerly, let us meet even in the smallest of
rooms if necessary" before concluding with an exhortation,
common to organizations facing much reduced interest in
their message,
“if the multitudes will no longer come to hear our 
gospels let us preach to the fewV^
O'Brien's reference to the League's inability to hold 
meetings in large halls should not be taken as an indi­
cation of its total failure to attract an audience suffi­
ciently big to fill such halls. About eleven hundred 
people heard Mary MacSwiney vehemently denounce the Free
State Government at the Essex Hall commemoration of her
3
brother's death held under the auspices of the ISDL.
1 Letter 22 Nov., 1922, Ms 8427.
2 Circular, undated but probably September/October 1922,
Ms 8436.
3 Freeman's Journal, 26 Oct., 1922. ROR 179, November 1922. 
CP 4294. CAB 24/139.
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This was however one of the few meetings where the Special
Branch proved unable to influence the hall owner to deny
the League its facilities.1 Special Branch harrassment
of the League even extended to the definitely illegal
practice of stopping the postal delivery of a large number
2of ISDL leaflets sent out to the local branches. In 
Ireland itself, the ever wary eye of the official military 
censor, ensured the ISDL was very rarely mentioned in 
newspapers. This was a considerable setback/for an organ­
ization severely crippled by the inability to resume the 
publication of its own organ and therefore totally depen­
dent on external publicity. The burning of the total
supplies of the Catholic Herald for Southern Ireland, by
3
the IRA during its occupation of Cork, ensured that • 
organ's unceasing hostility to everything connected with 
the Republican cause » which went as far as denouncing 
De Valera as a "hybrid Spaniard of alleged Jewish extrac-
4
tion", and it only mentioned the Anti-Treaty ISDL when­
ever the reference was particularly unfavourable to the
1 Art O'Brien described how the Special Branch success­
fully persuaded Islington Council to reject ISDL hall 
booking applications. See letter 27 Feb., 1923,
Ms 8427.
2 ROR 168, 17 Aug., 1922. CP 4164. CAB 24/138 - it
is apparently contrary to the Post Office regulations 
not to deliver any mail which is definitely not of an 
obscene nature.
3 Catholic Herald, 5 Aug., 1922.
4 Ibid, 23 Sept., 1922) The Catholic Herald was, and as 
the twenties proceeded became even more,noted for its 
virulent anti-semitic tone.
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organization. The various Republican newsheets like 
War News and Poblacht na h Eireann, produced underground 
in Ireland under very difficult circumstances, only 
reached England in very small quantities if at all. The 
Pro-Treaty ISDL also failed to produce their own newspaper, 
but the Free State Government continued to produce an 
edition of the Dail Eireann Bulletin from its London office. 
This however confined itself almost totally to reporting 
events in the North East of Ireland where,as the Catholic 
Herald reminded its readers,the campaign of assassination 
had not abated since the partition of the island but had 
instead reached such a level of ferocity that a new 
section of Belfast’s Catholic Milltown cemetary had been 
totally filled in two years solely by Pogrom victims.1
By means of this Bulletin and through its Northern Bound­
aries Commission the Free State Government attempted, with 
considerable success, to prevent the Anti-Treaty forces in 
Britain from utilizing the plight of the Northern Catholics 
as a means of mobilizing support for their campaign against 
the new Irish Government. It is however almost impossible 
to estimate the potential size of the support within the 
Irish community in Britain for the Anti-Treaty cause in 
Ireland. Kelly in his statement condemning the reconven­
ing of the adjourned ISDL Conference claimed he was con­
vinced that,
"90% of the Irish in Great Britain are in favour of 
giving the Free State party and the Provisional
1 Catholic Herald, 19 Aug.,1922.
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Government every opportunity and support in giving 
effect to their policy'i 1
The British Cabinet were informed,
"more than 90% of the Irish in Great Britain are in 
favour of the Free State and the remaining small 
minority are not among those who count socially, 
politically or in the commercial world'.*^
In an earlier report the Special Branch bluntly, if some­
what unempirically, analyzed the respective socio-economic 
composition of the Pro and Anti-Treaty supporters in terms 
of
‘the more respectable and responsible people supporting 
the Provisional Government, the cranks and roughs the 
Republicans ."3
Yet as my analysis of the social status of the ISDL's
leadership shows, men like Art O'Brien, Martin Maloney and
George Clancy can . hardly be dismissed as "roughs" or
as not "counting in the commercial world." Attempts to
even tentatively locate the socio-economic source of Anti-
Treaty support within the Irish community in Britain are
considerably impeded by the almost total lack of attention
given to this topic in works dealing with the Civil War
in Ireland. Few Irish sociologists would disagree with
McCracken's very generalized observation that,
"the Pro-Treaty Party which stood for peace and ordered 
Government won the support of the conservative, 
propertied class in the country, the large farmers, 
the leaders in industry and commerce and the well 
established professional men. The Anti-Treaty Party 
relied chiefly on the small farmers, shopkeepers and 
sections of the artisan and labourer class'.14
1 Irish Independent, 27 July, 1922.
2 ROR 184, 7 Dec., 1922. CP 4353. CAB 24/140.
3 ROR 162, 6 July, 1922. CP 4090. CAB 24/137.
4 McCracken, op. cit., 113.
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Yet this must remain as only a very generalized obser­
vation for there were too many exceptions cn either side 
for it to be anything else. Rumpf evaluating the role 
of the farmers in the Civil War suggests that in general 
the more prosperous dairy and cereal crop areas where 
the emphasis was on production for a market, especially 
the British export market, favoured the Treaty whereas 
the subsistence farming, regions of the much less fertile 
West were by and large Anti-Treaty.1 Lysaght however 
observes that the IRA, despite its numerical concentration 
in the West,was considerably hindered by its earlier 
campaign against landless labourers occupying large tracts
of under utilized land and that these lumpen proletariat
2
tended to enlist in the paid Free State Army. A British
military observer noted that "unemployment'* seemed to be
a substantially more important motivation than fervour for
3
the Treaty among most recruits to the Free State Army. A
Free State Government Minister claimed that one in five
of the country's school teachers - jobs commonly regarded
as the most secure positions in the Irish labour market -
4
were militant Anti-Treatyites. But at this moment we 
must frankly confess to our inability to do more than give 
a very impressionistic glimpse of the socio-economic compo­
sition of Anti and Pro-Treaty forces. This situation will 
unfortunately remain so until Irish sociologists and
1 Rumpf, op. cit., 6 8.
2 Lysaght, op. cit., 69.
3 Major Whittaker. CAB 24/139.
4 Catholic Herald, 6Jan.,1923.
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historians turn their attention to a wide ranging series 
of local empirical investigations in the style pioneered 
by Fitzpatrick1 whose seminal work unfortunately stops 
before the onset of the Civil War.
The Irish Civil War was above else a conflict motivated 
by different interpretations of the nationalist ideology 
that had fuelled the earlier War of Independence. That is 
not to say it was not a war where economic issues were 
totally absents from the thoughts of the participants ; these 
were indeed present but,though they underlined the conflict, 
their visible influence was muted and seen more as shadows 
illuminated by the fire of war. Smith suggests, after a 
very detailed exploration of the varying types of Nation­
alism, that "it is impossible to tie Nationalism to the
2
aspirations of any social groups in a consistent manner11.
It is an extremely apposite reminder of our present in­
ability to systematically analyze the socio-economic 
composition of the opposing forces in the Irish Civil War 
when father fought son and brother killed brother. One 
example, many others could be cited, shows the problems 
facing sociologists attempting to analyse the conflict.
Eoin McNeill,a Minister in the Free State Government,had
two sons fighting in the war, one in the army loyal to
3
his Government, the other was killed opposing it.
1 David Fitzpatrick, op. cit.
2 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism , (1971), 132.
3 Younger, op. cit., 47^.
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There are no surviving records, indicating the socio­
economic status of the Anti-Treaty ISDL rank and file 
members, similar to the League's pre-Civil War 'Occupational 
Register'. But the overall impression gleaned from the 
surviving,and admittedly,very scanty material pertaining to 
the organization during this period casts serious doubts 
on the accuracy of the Special Branch's blunt dismissal 
of the Anti-Treaty supporters in Britain as "cranks and 
roughs". It would appear that both Kelly and British 
Intelligence seriously overestimated the degree of support 
within the Irish community for the Free State and certainly 
greatly exaggerated the fervour of that support. Certainly 
in Ireland itself, there was, definitely not a nine to one 
majority in favour of the Free State during the Civil War. 
That is not to say,of course,one can interpret the public's 
lukewarm attitude to the Free State Government as support 
for its opponents. Apathy, disillusionment and disenchant­
ment were the dominant attitudes of most people in Southern 
Ireland arid undoubtedly in the Irish community here. The 
lack of real popular support for the Free State Government
was of such an extent it considerably worried both Irish
1 2 Government Ministers and British military observers.
Once again when we try to quantify the degree of active
support for the Free State within the Irish community in
Britain we come up against that old familar problem of
the 'silent majority' . As the Manchester Evening News
1 See for example Dail Eireann Debates, 1 Sept., 1922,
Cols. 959-61 . 2 , Macready's Report, 26 Aug., 1922.
CP 4174. CAB 24/138.
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a paper determinedly behind the Free State, observed,
“the section of Irish people here who are content 
to remain within the British Empire though they may 
be numerous are silent"
Their leader writer then observed that"while Republicans 
may be a tiny minority in Ireland, the Irish Republicans 
in the Manchester district have proved that they are a far 
from insignificant body. The charge may be brought against 
them that they foment disturbances in Ireland while remain­
ing at a safe distance and separated from the scene of 
turmoil by the expanse of the Irish Sea but we must do 
them the justice to say that judging by their record, the 
majority of them if circumstances permitted, would like to 
be in the thick of the struggle themselves" 1
This editorial,in what was probably the English paper with 
the best record of reporting activities inside the Irish 
community, was inspired by a 5,000 plus attendance at an 
Anti-Treaty ISDL meeting held the previous day in 
Manchester. It was certainly the largest manifestation 
of Republican strength seen in Britain since before the 
onset of the Civil War. And it reflected the growing 
confidence felt by many Anti-Treatyites in Britain that 
their cause was no longer quite as hopeless as it has 
appeared six months before. The fall of the Four Courts, 
the surrender of Dublin without an effective fight, the 
evacuation of all Republican controlled towns during the 
summer and early autumn,had induced almost total despon­
dency in the ranks of the Anti-Treaty ISDL. The Free
1 Manchester Evening News, 22 January, 1923.
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State's failure to win the early decisive battle that 
would have brought the war to a speedy conclusion, the 
reversal once again to the guerrilla type warfare that 
characterized the War of Independence,now enabled many 
Anti-Treaty supporters to nurture the growing conviction 
that a protracted conflict would eventually so weaken the 
economic resources of the Free State, it would be forced 
back to the negotiating table. Even the pessimistic Joe 
Fowler observed "there were some slight indications of the 
turn of the tide" and as winter developed the military 
position did actually appear to be now much more favour­
able for the IRA. With its long communications lines, 
broken at many points by demolished bridges, torn up rail­
way tracks and trenched roads, the Free State .Army, now 
increasingly split into the small units necessary to 
garrison towns and villages throughout the country,was 
constantly subject to ambushes and hit and run attacks by 
the more mobile IRA flying columns which were not so 
nearly affected by the adverse weather conditions. In 
early December the IRA captured the important focal point 
of Carrick-on-Suir and for almost a week its advance posed 
a serious threat to Dublin itself.1 These relative military 
successes produced few new recruits for the Anti-Treaty 
ISDL but they did give many members a new hope which was 
reflected in substantially increased organizational activity. 
An increased level of activism that was,paradoxically, to 
spell doom for the ISDL as the response of the authorities 
was to deport en masse the national and local leadership
the following March.
1 Younger, op. cit., 495.
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CHAPTER 21
A Plot Foiled: Deportation and Trial
Towards the end of 1922, the Republican leadership in 
Ireland evidently considered there was still sufficient 
potential popular support for their cause among the Irish 
community in Britain to justify the dispatch of a high 
level propaganda team to work alongside the revived'ISDL 
organisation. Sean 0'Mahony,a member of De Valera’s new 
Council of State,led the team which included a very form­
idable quartet of prominent Republican women, Mary MacSwiney 
TD (the sister of the dead Lord Mayor) the widow of 
Cathal Brugha, Maude Gonne McBride, the widow of a 1916 
executed Idader, and the first woman ever elected to 
Westminster, the Countess Markievicz. With her many conn­
ections in British Labour organizations and the women's 
movement she proved to be a particularly useful and extre­
mely hard working addition to the Republican cause in 
Britain. In the first fortnight of March 1923 alone, she 
spoke at seven meetings in London, four on the Tyneside,
three in Manchester1 as well as speaking at Scottish 
2venues.
The Countess effectively based herself in Britain for
1 O'Brien Ms 8419.
2 Anne Marreco, The Rebel Countess, The Life and Times 
of Constance Markievicz, (1967), 287-90.
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almost a year but most of the team.like the fiery Mary 
MacSwiney who spoke at a “very largely attended meeting" 
commemorating her brother's death, and Mrs. Brugha who
2
however only drew a crowd of about four hundred people
to her 'Anti-Treaty Meeting' two months later, were only
in Britain for a specific series of meetings. Sean
O'Mahony however appears to have been involved in other
non-propaganda activities and was probably using London
as a convenient base for establishing new munitions
purchase networks on the continent. He still found time
to speak at a number of meetings and a police report,
produced at his subsequent trial on a sedition charge
described a Bermondsey meeting where he spoke to
“about six hundred people, all Irish, a large 
number of them being young men and women who 
displayed considerable enthusiasm specially 
at the speaker's remarks against the Free 
State and the British Empire*.1
Significantly this officer considered it important to 
note "there was a complete absence of any priests or 
Catholic officials in the hall". Only a year before such 
a report would undoubtedly have referred to the presence 
of at least half a dozen priests who would probably have 
occupied places of honour bn the platform itself. It
1 Freeman's Journal, 2 6 Oct. , 1922, O 'Brien Ms 8427,
2 ROR 185. 14 Dec., 1922. CP 4365. CAB 24/140.
Catholie HeraTd, 17 Dec., 1922.
3 Police Report of Bermondsey Meeting, 21 Jan., 1923, 
tagged as 'Exhibit 9', O'Brien Ms 8419 .
610
would however be rash to simply interpret the non-presence 
of priests at this particular meeting as conclusive evidence 
that the ISDL had now totally lost its previous clerical 
support,for a number of priests subsequently stepped into 
the gap when the ISDL leadership was deported1 and'indeed 
Free State Army Intelligence officers were annoyed when 
several priests, actively involved in the supply of
2munitions to Ireland were not included among the deportees.
Priests living in the East End of London who opposed the
Treaty,and they were very definitely a minority of the
cler jy who generally did support - 'for various reasons -
the new Irish Government, probably decided that recent
local events necessitated their 'diplomatic1, absence from
local ISDL meetings. The previous Sunday a rather nasty
scuffle involving opposing members of the congregation
occurred when two East Ham priests tried to prevent the
distribution of leaflets advertizing the Bermondsey meet- 
3mg.
These two priests and the section of their congregation who 
militantly assisted them had been infuriated by the content 
of this leaflet denouncing the Irish Catholic Hierarchy.
The Irish bishops in their collective pastoral letter of 
October 10, 1922, strongly denounced the IRA campaign of 
"murder" against the National Army and accused them of 
having "wrecked Ireland from end to end, burning and
1 1 "a few militant priests have stepped into the breach 
left by the deported in London1* - ROR 203, 25 April,
1923, CP 219(23). CAB 24/160.
2 P7/B/84.
3 O'Brien Ms 8427.
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destroying national property of enormous value.'11 They
were certainly right about the huge economic damage the
Civil War was inflicting on an economy,already in deep
trouble and scarcely able to take the Sttess of a new
military budget;so large in comparison to its tax base,
that this was already proportionately greater than the
2
British war time expenditure.
This pastoral letter outraged Republicans both inside and
outside Ireland. It was not so much their reference to
murdering their opponents that antagonized the IRA,even
though this implicitly sanctioned the activities of the
National Army. Such condemnation had been frequently
voiced before, during the War of Independence when the
IRA was fighting the British,and as we have observed had
little effect on the guerrillas determination to continue
fighting. Indeed when Cardinal Logue threatened to
excommunicate every Republican sympathizer in Dundalk,.
after its inhabitants had openly welcomed its seizure by
the IRA, in July 1922, he observed such a dire threat
"would not affect the desperate characters who fear
3neither God nor man".
What really antagonized and even alienated Republicans, 
was not the Bishops’ condemnation of their military tactics, 
such denunciations would have been seen almost as ritual
1 Freeman's Journal, 1 Oct., 1922 .
2 Catholic Herald, 14 Oct., 1922.
3 Glasgow Herald, 31 July, 1922.
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criticism with no real import, but their absolute rejection
of their cause , the ''Republic1 which to many had
assumed a mystical if not sacred character. The Bishops'
blunt claim "A Republic without popular recognition behind
it is a contradiction in terms"1 not only spotlighted the
Republicans dilemma, that they were fighting against the
wish of the majority of the people. It also sought to
remove the legitimacy of their cause and reduce their
military struggle to the level of banditry. The pastoral
letter had little practical effect, IRA members already
facing summary execution for possession of arms were
unlikely to be influenced by episcopal pronouncements,even
accompanied by threats of excommunication. The threat
to "withold the sacraments" in any event turned out to
be a hollow gesture for sufficient priests - despite
2
threats of suspension - supported the Anti-Treaty cause 
to ensure that any Republican denied confession in one 
area, could find a more sympathetic confessor without too 
much trouble.
With so many priests openly defying their bishops, Rome 
was forced to send an envoy, a Mgr. Luzio whose very 
mission was interpreted by the Free State Government, with 
considerable justification, as a propaganda victory for 
the Republicans. Most historians now consider that the 
Catholic Hierarchy made a serious tactical error in
1 Catholic Times, 14 Oct., 1922.
2 Catholie Hera1d, 14 Oct., 1922.
3 Neeson, Civil War, op. cit., 328-30.
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issuing their pastoral letter as it could have little 
practical effect other than as a propaganda boost for 
the Free State Government.1 And as the Republicans took 
over the Government only a decade later ,with memories still 
embittered by the Episcopalian stance, the episode ensu­
red that the Hierarchy exerted considerably less influence 
cn the new Government than on its predecessor. Dan Breen, 
a prominent IRA leader and subsequently a member of 
Fianna Fail; frankly admitted the "Civil War was bad but 
it saved us this much - it saved us from the Government 
of Maynooth".^
The ISDL1s response to the Bishops' pastoral letter was 
not as vehement as their Chicago counterparts who threat­
ened to "found a new American Catholic Church" if Rome
3
did not immediately repudiate the Irish Hierarchy.
Mary MacSwiney publicly renounced her adherence to the
4
Catholic faith at an ISDL meeting, but few members were 
prepared to follow her example and settled instead for 
the widespread, Church door distribution of a leaflet 
proclaiming "Fidei Defensores, Cromwell could not destroy
5
our Faith and neither can the Bishops". This leaflet
1 Curran, op. cit., 255.
2 Younger,483 - Maynooth, the largest seminary in
Ireland, is the traditional meeting place of the
Hierarchy.
3 Statement by the Patrick Pearse Council of the American 
Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, 
Irish Independent, 15 Jan., 1923.
4 Catholic Herald, 21 Oct., 1922.
5 Copy in Art O'Brien Ms 8427.
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echoed the League’s earlier attack on Cardinal Bourne’s 
1921 St. Patrick’s Day Pastoral letter with its defiant 
rejection of the political authority of the Episcopacy 
but this time there was no Archbishop Mannix- to support 
the ISDL and the Irish Catholic congregations in Britain 
were deeply and often violently divided on the issue.
In some places like East Ham members of the congregation 
openly sided with the leaflet distributors against their 
clergy; in others, as in the case of a Glasgow parish 
where the police had to rescue two female Republicans 
from a mob of fifty irate parishioners1, the reception was 
definitely hostile. The issue was of sufficient import­
ance to find its way onto the agenda for the London
2
District Committee’s February meeting.
The Catholic Herald used these occurences and highlighted 
a somewhat obscure incident where the IRA burned a convent 
used to accomodate National Army troops as evidence of the 
ISDL's campaign against Catholicism itself. But though 
the campaign against the- Irish Hierarchy, sometimes liter­
ally fought on the doorstep of British churches, did not 
gain the ISDL many recruits neither does it appear to 
have lost them any sizeable number of members. Certainly 
their opponents failed to mobilize any fervent Catholic 
hostility that did emerge against this ISDL campaign.
A British Intelligence report observing yet another failure
1 ROR 203. 25 April, 1923. CP 219(23). CAB 24/160.
2 Agenda 15 Feb., 1923, O'Brien Ms 8427.
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to organize Pro-Treaty support in London complained there
was still "little sign of a revival of moderates in
London to combat extremists".^ This failure to reorganize
Pro-Treaty support is even more significant than the
similar attempts made earlier, for the Free State was
now definitely winning the Civil War. At the beginning of
February 1923, a senior IRA officer,Tom Barry,informed Liam
Lynch that the Anti-Treaty military forces were facing
2imminent defeat as the balance of forces , with the IRA 
reduced to 8,000 troops and the National Army expanded to
3
over 40,000 soldiers, had now decisively swung against the
Republicans. The number of attacks made on National Army
garrisons clearly indicated the declining military power
of the IRA: there were 98 attacks in November 1922 but
only 63 in January 1923 and in the month of February this
4
level was almost halved. The IRA,at a very high cost in 
lost personnel did launch a new offensive in the last
5 •
week of February but it never regained even the temporary 
initiative it had seemed to hold three months earlier. The 
remorseless toll of the firing squads: the penalty of 
execution was extended in January 1923 to a whole new 
series of offences including even the possession of 
documents , began to sap Republican morale and reports
1 ROR 194, 22 Feb., 1923. CP 123 (23). CAB 24/159.
2 Captured communication reprinted in the Irish Independ 
dent, 9 April, 1923.
3 O'Donnoghue, op. cit., 297.
4 Figures given by President Cosgrave - interview with 
the Dai1y Express, 12 March, 1923.
5 Freemaris Journa 1, 18 Jan., 1923.
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began to appear of whole units surrendering with their 
1arms.
The firing squads were probably the decisive element in
the Free State's military victory, yet executions, like
2the eleven carried out on the 21 January , were a tactic 
unlikely to gain for the new Government anything but the 
most convinced Pro-Treaty support. And the new year saw 
the emergence of measures even more unlikely to win active 
support for the Free State among a disillusioned, apathetic 
Irish community in Britain. Official executions did at 
least have some legal justification, though the new 
practice of suspending sentences as long as there were 
no attacks in a specific area, which in effect made 
prisoners hostages for the behaviour of those still fight-
3
ing , contravened established legal practice. But the
4
growing number of prisoners shot while escaping spot­
lighted an alarming new trend.
As the level of fighting decreased, paradoxically the 
viciousness of the combat intensified, whereas in the 
earlier period hundreds fired at each other without any 
real effect now the bullets increasingly found their
Freeman's Journal, 8 Feb., 1923.
2 Ibid, 22 Jan., 1923.
3 Ibid, 20 Jan., 1923.
4 See for example, the "murder verdict" recorded by a 
Kerry coroner's jury, ibid, 6 April, 1923.
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targets particularly in small scale street ambushes. 
National Army troops responded to devastating IRA land 
mine ambushes in South Kerry - one of their few remaining 
strongholds - by tying prisoners to mines and then deton­
ating them. At first the press simply reported such 
incidents as "prisoners killed removing mines"^ but some 
National Army officers, appalled by the actiorisr.ofsome of 
their troops, soon made the full truth known.
The Catholic Herald which initially dismissed these reports
2
as Republican propaganda was forced to warn only three
weeks later that the Free State was in danger.of loosing
the support of the Irish in Britain as a result of its
3
troops indiscipline. A leaked British liasion officer’s
report on the growing indiscipline among National Army
4
troops infuriated the Free State Government, but confirmed 
many people's suspicions about the conduct of the war.
Civil War by its very nature is usually characterized by 
the high level of personal viciousness , particularly
1 See report of 12 prisoners killed in one such incident 
Freemaris Journa1, 8 March, 1923.
2 Catholic Herald, 6Jan.,1923.
3 Ibid, 27 Jan., 1923.
4 The IRA published, much to the embarrassment of the 
Free State Government, an intercepted British Military 
Intelligence report which claimed National Army troops 
had "murdered" prisoners. The Irish Government angrily 
blamed the British authorities for this 'leak1;
see SI784 (SPO).
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towards prisoners and other non--combatants, exhibited on 
both sides. The indiscipline of the National I.Army 
probably cost the Free State considerable support among 
the Irish in Britain while the corresponding tendency of 
the IRA to increasingly concentrate on 'soft' targets won 
the Anti-Treaty ISDL few new recruits.
Sean McGrath wrote to all branch secretaries suggesting
that a series of public meetings on Free State atrocities
should bring a "large influx’of members",1 but only twelve
2new members joined during February 1923. It is probable 
that if the ISDL had been prepared to relax its hsrrd line 
stance on unequivocal support for the Anti-Treaty cause, 
it might have had more success in attracting those who
3
had been alienated from the Free State by the executions. 
The ISDL was now, however,firmly controlled by hard line 
Anti-Treatyites who insisted that the few new members who 
did join should sign a declaration explicitly recognizing
4
the 'Irish Republic' . It also seems to have been their
intention to have sought a more Republican sounding title
5
for the organization at the next annual conference.
1 Letter dated 31 Jan., 1923 - O'Brien Ms 8427.
2 Report of ISDL Standing Committee held 10 March, 1923, 
O'Brien Ms 8419.
3 See a letter from Sean McGrath to Art O'Brien 21 Feb. , 
1923, in which he says " I don't think Hugh Lee (the 
Manchester Pro-Treaty ISDL leader) will start any 
opposition camp, as a matter of fact, I think Mr. Lee 
has changed considerably since you last saw him".
- O'Brien Ms 8427.
4 O'Brien Ms 8427.
5 Standing Committee Report of 28 Nov., 1922, O'Brien 
Ms 8427.
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The appointment of another senior IRA officer, Anthony 
Mullarkey to replace Gilbert Barrington on the Standing 
Committee when he went to Ireland,* clearly illustrated 
the extent to which the hard line Republicans had taken 
total control of the ISDL. This process had been hastened 
by the enforced resignations of more moderate Anti-Treaty 
leaders, like the Birmingham ISDL leader Harrington, who 
having obtained employment with the Irish National Assur­
ance Company;as a result of their earlier rise to prominence 
within the local Irish communities during the pre-Treaty
period ,were now ordered to sever their connections with
2
the Anti-Treaty ISDL or face dismissal.
Other employers also used economic sanctions against rank
and file ISDL members as in the case of Shelia O'Connell
dismissed from her post as Matron of a Bradford Catholic 
3
orphanage. A report and subsequent correspondence in
the Catholic Herald revealing the increasingly frequent
practice of specifying "English or Scotch desired" in
advertizements placed by Catholic institutions, suggested
4she was unlikely to obtain similar employment. In the 
light of the foregoing discussion,especially the very
1 Standing Committee Minutes 6 Feb., 1923 and 19 Feb.,
1923 O'Brien Ms 8427.
2 ROR 194, 22 Feb., 1923. CP 123(23). CAB 24/159.
and ISDL Standing Committee Report 2 Feb., 1923,
O'Brien Ms 8427.
3 Freeman's Journal, 27 Jan., 1923.
4 Catholic Herald, 24 Feb., 3 March, 1923.
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evident failure of the ISDL to increase its membership
Art O'Brien's confident, but retrospective, assessment
"a considerable improvement had been made and it looked
as if the League might once more be a powerful factor in
the fight for the Republic", should be treated only for
what it was - a post-mortem justification of his desire
to continue the League's existence despite the contrary
wishes of the Republican leadership.1 A more honest, and
certainly more realistic, assessment of the position of
the ISDL in early 1923 was given by Art O'Brien himself
in a contemporary letter when he referred to the position
2of the League as having "now become more stabilized".
That particular term with its connotation of a hospital 
patient's condition is a particularly apt description of 
the ISDL in February 1923. The haemorrhage of members 
which had so sapped the strength of the League since the 
signing of the Treaty and even threatened the very exist­
ence of the organization after the July 1922 Conference 
had now been stemmed. Like most patients who had been 
laid low by a prolonged and extremely debilitating malady, 
the League could never expect to be anything other than 
a shadow of its former self. But its continued survival 
seemed to be no longer in question and there appeared to 
be no reason why the ISDL could not continue almost
1 Letter to Sinn Fein Head Office Dublin, 16 Jan., 1925, 
O'Brien Ms 8431.
2 Letter from Art O'Brien to Gilbert Barrington, 6 Feb., 
1923, O'Brien Ms 8427.
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indefinitely in its post-conference truncated form, 
loosing a branch here, forming a new branch there1, with 
little hope of any real expansion but with reasonable 
confidence that its very reduced, cadre membership was 
sufficiently determined to ensure the continued existence 
of the organization. Though perhaps not necessarily 
under the banner of the Irish Self Determination League 
for the Standing Committee had decided to recommend a
2change of name to the Annual Conference in April 1923 . 
They hoped this name would more firmly identify the organ­
ization’ s support for the Republican cause in a manner 
similar to the League's Scottish counterpart, Cumann 
Poblacht na h'Eireann Albain, formed by a reorganization
3
of Sinn Fein branches there at the end of 1922.
The Conference never took place as in April 1923 most 
of the ISDL's national and local leadership were no 
longer in Britain, having been deported the previous 
month, and confined in various Irish prisons and intern­
ment camps. In the early hours of March 10, 192 3, a 
co-ordinated series of nation-wide arrests resulted in 
the detention of forty people in London , twenty two in 
the Liverpool area, eight in Manchester and two elsewhere 
in England, while another forty were arrested in Scotland,
1 Preston ISDL collapsed at the beginning of February 
1923 but a new branch was formed in Fulham, Ms 84 27.
2 O'Brien Ms 8427.
3 Glasgow Herald, 13 Nov., 9 Dec., 1922.
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mostly in the Glasgow area.1 After being held initially
in local police stations they were taken, some of them
2
chained together in open lorries , to the Liverpool and
Glasgow docks and put aboard the waiting Royal Navy
warships which conveyed them to Dublin where they were
3
interned in various prisons and camps.
Each deportee was given an order signed by the Home 
Secretary stating as a person "suspected of acting, or 
having acted, or being about to act in a manner prejud­
icial to the restoration or maintenance of order in 
Ireland" the Home Secretary had exercised the power 
given to him by Rule 14B of the Restoration of Order 
(Ireland) Act 1920 to "order that you be deported to 
the territory of the Irish Free State, to be interned in 
any place there, at the discretion of the Government of
4
the Irish Free State."
The English courts,however,subsequently ruled that the 
entire deportation proceedings were illegal and corres­
pondence between the Irish and British Governments indi­
cates the British Cabinet must have been aware their
1 Evening Standard, 12 March, 1923. Liverpool Post, 12 
March> 1923. Manchester Evening News, 12 March, 1923. 
And Glasgow Herald, 12 March, 1923.
2 Transcript of Deportees Compensation Tribunal - Treasury 
Solicitors Papers, TS 27/183.
3 Ibid.
4 Ts 27/181
623
proposed intention to deport people resident in Britain 
was indeed highly questionable if not definitely 
illegal. The initiative behind the deportations came 
from National Army Intelligence Officers stationed:;in 
Britain who were alarmed by the extent of the IRA's 
logistical network there. Their reports on Republican 
activity in Britain had revealed a situation sufficiently 
important to warrant a formal request from the Director 
of Intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief requesting him 
to ask the Irish Cabinet to submit proposals to their 
British counterparts concerning the possible internment 
of several hundred people resident in Britain.1
The British Government believed it did not possess the
necessary powers to intern people in Britain and so the
Irish Government suggested the Republicans should instead
2be put on trial for conspiracy in England. The Home 
Office indicated its strong opposition to the prospect 
of such a large number of conspiracy trials in England;
although it suggested such a procedure might be possible
3
in Scotland , a view not held by the Glasgow Prosecutor 
Fiscal, who was concerned that the lack of positive 
evidence available, due to the reluctance of Intelligence 
Officers to reveal their sources, would inevitably
1 Director of-‘Intelligence to Commander in Chief, 14 
December, 1922 - O'Malley Pl7a/182
2 See Correspondence on 'Irregulars in England' - Hugh
Kennedy (Attorney General, Free State) -P4/11/9 (UCD).
3 Home Office Memo, 15 December, 1922 in O'Malley 
P17a/182.
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result in the dismissal of most of the charges.1
A considerable volume of correspondence was exchanged
between the two Governments and their respective intell-
2
igence agencies before a compromise solution, whereby
the British would deport the people wanted by the Irish
Government,who would then intern them in Ireland, was
finally worked out. In the process of these lengthy
negotiations the British Government clearly indicated
its reluctance to arrest the three hundred people
identified as hard line Republicans by National Army 
3
Intelligence and firmly insisted on a substantial 
reduction of about two thirds of this figure.
Despite National Army assurances that all the persons
named on their list were active supporters of the Anti-
Treaty cause, several of those deported had either
4
refused to take sides in the Civil War, or had actually
1 Correspondence included in Director of Intelligence 
Report, 18 June, 1923; ibid.
2 See Correspondence with the Home Office in Mulcahy 
P7/B/84; O'Malley P17/195; Kennedy P4/11/9; Kennedy 
to Irish Free State High Comissioner London, P4/G/16 
(UCD); Papers of Patrick McGilligan - Secretary to 
Irish High Comissioner London - P35 (UCD); and Irish 
Cabinet Minutes in Mulcahy P7/B/245 and P7/B/84.
3 This list included 55 in London, 78 in Liverpool and 
134 in Scotland, see Director of Intelligence Files 
in O'Malley P17a/182.
4 As in the case of Fintan Murray - TS 27/179.
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supported the Free State.1 The 'lengthy and drawn out
nature of the negotiations between the Irish and British
authorities seem to have come to the attention of some
of the ISDL leaders, for as early as November, 1922,
British Intelligence was reporting that Art O'Brien
2feared "large scale deportations" and in February 
1923 suggested he seemed to know about the inter -
3
Government negotiations in some considerable detail.
Art O'Brien had good reason to suppose he had been tar­
geted for deportation; his multiple arrests and detentions 
during his trips to Dublin in the summer of 1922, were 
not unrelated to the interception of a letter from a 
senior IRA officer, requesting O'Brien to supply a list
of likely Free State Intelligence agents recruited from
4
Collin's old London network. British Intelligence were 
certainly aware of efforts by Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath
5
to buy arms, while Irish Intelligence reported that
1 Like Mr McGlynn - Times, 20 April, 1923.
2 ROR 179, November, 1922, CP 4294. CAB 24/139.
3 ROR 194, 22 February, 1923, CP 123 (23). CAB 24/159.
4 "Mick Collins is using some of his former associates
for intelligence work in Dublin. Will you get from
. Art O'Brien a list of the prominent Free Staters or
pals of Mick who are at present out of London and 
also a complete list of Mick's former pals as he 
may be utilizing some of them. This is urgent".
Letter from Earnie O'Malley to Sean T. O'Kelly 
(arrested with O'Brien in Dublin July, 1922) inter­
cepted by National Army and subsequently published 
in Freemaris. Journ'a 1, 27 July, 1922.
5 ROR 170, 31 August, 1922, CP 4173, CAB 24/138.
And ROR 180, 9 November, 1922, CP 4302. CAB 24/140.
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O'Brien had spent at least £8,500 on munitions in
the first two months of 1923 alone.1 It seems that only
days before his arrest, Art O'Brien obtained a passport,
though it is not clear whether this was to be used
simply to avoid his impending arrest or for a trip
abroad on Republican business. He subsequently claimed
he had firm information in advance on the arrests,
2the day before they took place and his own arresting 
officer testified O'Brien told him "I knew about this
3
at 2 p.m. and you will not get as many as you expect".
O'Brien was certainly correct in his assumption that
some of the senior IRA officers in Britain had indeed
escaped the net while on the political side of the Anti-
Treaty movement, the police also failed to arrest most
4of the editorial staff who produced the Eire paper , 
which had been launched in Scotland two months pre-‘
5
viously and had soon become the principal Republican
publication in Ireland as well as Britain. Considerable
efforts were made to track down the wanted persons and
6one was subsequently deported, before the Government 
yielded in the face of strong parliamentary opposition
1 See S1605 (SPO).
2 Transcript, Page 26, TS 27/183.
3 Ibid, 62.
4 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166 (23). CAB 24/159.
5 Launched on January 21st, 1923, see O'Brien Ms 
8427 and 8431.
6 John McCann was deported in early April, see 
Manchester Evening News, 5 April, 1923.
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and decided to call a halt to further deportations.
It is possible that Art O'Brien though knowing in advance
about the deportations decided not to take bvasive
action and instead relied upon his English birth place
to save him from deportation to another country. At
least eight other deportees were born in England,1 and
indeed several of these had "never been in Ireland before."
One had been born in England of English parents while
3
another was born in India.
Despite an earlier parliamentary statement that persons
born in England could be deported to Ireland,under the
relevant provisions of the Restoration of Order In 
4
Ireland Act , people in this category had probably
assumed this situation had changed, once the South of
Ireland was given its own Government with almost full
5
internal legislative powers. And so they and others 
who had either not actively supported the Anti-Treaty 
cause or even had supported the Free State, probably
1 Kathleen Brooks, John McCann, Arthur O'Hara, Charles 
Garrety, James Hickey, Kathleen Barrett, George 
Clancy, Thomas Joyce. It has not been possible 
owing to the non-availability of records to compile 
a similar list for the Scottish deportees.
2 See TS 27/183.
3 Irish Times, 31 March, 1923.
4 138 H.C. Debs. 5, col. 540.
5 Home Secretary Shortt refused to say whether even
those born in Ireland could be deported from Britain
after the new Free State■Constitution had been 
ratified, 157 H.C. Debs. 5, Cols, 659-660.
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felt as traumatically shocked and bewildered by their
unexpected deportation as did the Japanese community
in America, particularly those born in that country,
when they were interned en masse after Pearl Harbcur 1
Certainly this was the side of the deportations issue
that the Parliamentary Opposition initially focussed
2
their attentions on, with MPs like George Lansbury,
3 4 5James Maxton, Jack Jones, and Robert Wilson raising
the issue of specific deportees who had been born in
Britain. But Home Secretary Bridgeman reminded
questioners that being born in Britain did not necessarily
make a person of Irish descent loyal to the country
and pointed out that "both of the men who murdered
Sir Henry Wilson were born in this country."
However it quickly became clear that the Government had 
seriously underestimated the degree of parliamentary
1 For the Internment of the Japanese community in America, 
see:
Harry H.L. Kitano, Japanese Americans: the Evolution 
of a Sub Culture (Englewood Cliffs, 1969).
Roger Daniels, Concentration Camp USA; Japanese 
Americans in World War II (New York, 1972).
Leonard Broom and John I. Kitsuse, The Managed 
Casuality. The Japanese American Family in World War II 
(Berkeley, 1956).
Andrew W. Lind, Hawaiifs Japanese: An Experiment 
in Democracy (New Jersey, 1946).
2 161HCDebs. 5 Col. 1762.
3 Ibid, Col. 1549.
4 Ibid, Col. 1043.
5 Ibid, Col. 2389.
6- Ibid., Cols. 2246-52.
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opposition to the deportations. The initial state­
ment by the Home Secretary on the deportations and the
IRA attacks they had pre-empted1 triggered off such
2
repeated stormy question time sessions that the Govern­
ment was forced, against its wishes, to permit an
3
Adjournment Debate on the topic. It won this by 
sixty votes but the issue was not allowed to rest there. 
The Home Secretary had initially refused to give the 
House any details about communications received from 
the Irish Free State Government concerning the deport- '
4
ations. But in the face of MPs' concern that deportees
5
might be summarily courtmartialled or even "accidentally
6shot" he was forced to promise the House that the
7
Irish Government would not charge them with any offence 
and subsequently admitted he had established a clear 
understanding that the deportees would be returned from 
Ireland whenever the British Government so wished.^
However the British Home Secretary's attempts to reassure 
MPs that the deportees still effectivley remained under 
British jurisdiction while in Ireland deeply antagonized
1 T6i H.C.' Debs. 5, Cols., 1043-48.
2 Ibid, Cols, 1548-1554; Cols. 1762-170.
3 Ibid., Cols. 2218-62.
4 Ibid, Col. 1548
5 Ibid, Col. 2102
6 Ibid, Col 2105.
7 Ibid, Col. 1765
8 Ibid, Cols. 2146-48
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an Irish Government very loath to publicly concede
its subordinate position, particularly in a matter
affecting internal security. President Cosgrave
emphatically refuted the Home Secretary's claim, that
the Irish Free State was not outside the jurisdiction
of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Acts,1 when he
told the Dail the following day;
“The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 
1920 and the Regulations made there under, 
are, so far as the territory of Saorstat 
Eireann is concerned, are spent and of no 
legal force in effect... no one is being ^ 
held here under the authority of that Act'*.
A senior Dublin judge subsequently backed this inter- 
3
pretation. This extremely embarrassing denial of 
British control over the deportees in Ireland was 
swiftly followed by an even more significant bombshell - 
announcement by Cosgrave. The British Government, he 
said, had assured him that all the deportees were
4
Irish citizens; that this was patently not so, provided 
the deportees with an issue they exploited to the max­
imum possible benefit. In a letter to the Home Secretary 
the deportees who had formed a committee to represent 
their interests in Mountjoy argued that the majority of 
them were not in fact Irish citizens. The deportees 
born outside Ireland were obviously entitled to the 
citizenship of the country of their birth while the 
relevant section of the Constitution of the Irish Free
1 161 H.C. Debs. 5, col. 2102.
2 Dail Eireann Debates, 20 March, 1923.
3 Irish Times, 31 March, 1923.
4 Dail Eireann Debates, 20 March, 1923.
631
State clearly restricted citizenship to those actually 
domiciled in its territory. And so the deportees 
argued that as "our domiciles are in England, we are 
by the terms of the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State, which is an Act of the British Parliament, 
debarred from citizenship of the Irish Free State."1
This argument which the British Government never 
effectively tried to refute, presented the Parliamentary 
opposition, particularly the Labour MPs, with an 
opportunity to savage the Government for so contemp­
tuously interfering with the "liberties and rights of
2British citizens". It also afforded a way by which 
the Labour leadership could be seen to respond to the 
strong feelings the deportations had generated within 
local party organizations without appearing to be in 
any way tacitly supporting the Anti-Treatyists. Some 
Labour MPs like the Rev. Dunnico.,the organizer of a 
Defence Fund for the deportees, and Will Thorne who
demanded the party should "hold protest meetings all
3 4over the country" , and Jack Jones did openly support
the political cause expounded by the deportees.
Supporters of the ISDL were also very active at local
government level in raising the deportation issue.
Alderman Scurr, a member of the League, used his
1 Letter , 20 March, 1923 in TS 27/181.
2 .161 HCDebs 5 -, Col. 2218.
3 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166 (23). CAB 24/159.
4 161 H.C. Debs 5 , Col. 1151.
official position as Mayor of Poplar to demand their
immediate release with full compensation. He also put
forward a resolution on this issue, that was accepted
by the Independent Labour Party Conference.1 Another
ISDL Councillor, R.P. Purcell, successfully persuaded
the Woolwich Council to unanimously pass a similar 
2resolution but the Manchester City Council meeting had 
to be adjourned twice when the issue was raised, with
Conservative and Labour members actually engaging in
3 . 4physical confrontations on both occasions.
The deportation issue aroused such strong feelings 
inside the Labour Party, that the leadership eventually 
set up an official Parliamentary Labour Party Enquiry, 
under Arthur Greenwood and J.W. Muir,which visited 
Ireland and met Government and Labour Party leaders 
there. It was not permitted to see the deportees but 
it did meet representatives of the Republican prisoners' 
welfare organization. Their report accepted the deportees 
claim that they were British, not Irish citizens, and 
strongly criticized the British Government for deporting 
people under legislation introduced for promoting order 
in Ireland, a "responsibility", it said, "which no 
longer rests with the British Government, but with the
1 Freemans' Journal, 22 March, 1923; Catholic Herald,
7 April, 1923.
2 Liverpool Post and Mercury-,. 29 March, 1923.
3 Manchester Evening News, 11 April, 1923.
4 Ibid, 18 April, 1923.
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Free State Government". It expressed concern over the 
conditions the deportees were being held in and suggested 
that "unfortunate incidents might occur to the depor­
tees" as the "Free State Government has not yet got 
complete control of all its troops". The Report con­
cluded that the British Government by arresting and 
then deporting "these people is clearly responsible 
for their reasonable comfort and safety during intern­
ment" and suggested the Government had an obligation 
to look after the deportees1 dependents left behind in 
Britain. It recommended the Government should only 
have extradited those who were definitely Irish citizens 
and should instead have charged the British citizens, 
if sufficient evidence was available, otherwise they 
should not have been arrested.1
The Communist Party attacked this recommendation , which
effectively incorporated the Mountjoy Prison Deportees
2
Committee's demand to be tried in Britain , as evidence
of the Labour Party's definite Free State bias in a
"Hands off Ireland" manifesto that declared "Irish
3
Republicans we are at one with you". It instructed all 
its branches to launch a new "Hands Off Ireland" 
movement using the deportations as the launch vehicle.
One of the most interesting changes produced by the
1 Parliamentary Labour Party Report on the Irish 
Deportations, copy in TS 27/181.
2 ROR 200, 5 April, 1923, CP 183 (23). CAB 24/159.
3 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166 (23). CAB 24/159.
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great loss of ISDL members, following the Treaty Split 
was the Anti-Treatyite leadership's new found prag­
matism; implicitly reversing the organization's earlier 
strong isolationist stance in favour of seeking new 
allies to compensate for its membership loss. So at 
the end of 1922, Art O'Brien, who personally had very 
little time for the policies advocated by the Communist 
Party, opened discussions with their leadership1 in a 
bid to utilize more positively their opposition to the 
Treaty. These tentative negotiations were extended into 
a series of larger meetings between Saklatvala and ISDL 
representatives who included a priest , Father McKenna, 
and leaders of the Communist Party of Ireland. The
outcome of this discussion was a series of joint meetings
2
on the Free State's campaign against Republicans.
At the other end of the political spectrum the Catholic
3
Herald initially supported the deportations but the 
following week switched its line to the one officially
4
advocated by the Labour Party; indicating, perhaps, that 
it had detected a ground swell of opinion within the 
Irish community against the deportations. T.P. O'Connor 
initially declared his unwillingness to raise the deport­
ations in Parliament owing to his reluctance to do
1 ROR 186“ 21 Dec. , 1922". CP 4375. CAB 24/140.
2 ROR 193. 15 Feb., 1923. CP 105(23). CAB 24/159.
3 Catholic Herald, 17 March, 1923.
4 Ibid, 24 March, 1923.
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anything that might publicly embarrass the Irish Govern­
ment1 but soon found himself asking parliamentary
questions about some of his constituents who had been 
2deported. The Catholic Church in Britain never officially
commented on the deportations though it was suggested by
3
the press that they had not displeased Cardinal Bourne.
Encouraged by the Parliamentary Labour Party's support 
for their contention they were British citizens, the 
Deportees Committee decided to legally test their depor­
tation and subsequent internment by taking a test case, 
Arthur O'Hara's, to the Irish courts. The judgement that 
the act under which they were deported no longer applied 
to Ireland was a major victory for the deportees,even 
though the judge also ruled their internment once they 
had arrived, no matter voluntarily or not, in Ireland
4
was legal. The British Government tried to stem the 
new parliamentary row that followed this judgement by 
persuading a back bench MP, Sir Kingsley Wood, to intro­
duce a Private Bill amending the Restoration of Order 
in Ireland Act. The Bill provided for a statutory
*
advisory committee to review all the deportations and 
the Home Secretary sought by this tactic not only a means 
by which he could order the release of a number of
1 Freeman's Jourha1, 17 March, 1923.
2 161 H.C. Debs -5 ,Cols . 226-29.
3 Diary Editor, London Evening Standard, 12 March, 1923.
4 Irish Times, 31 March, 1923.
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deportees and thus assuage parliamentary concern:but a 
new piece of legislation "reaffirming the existence of 
the powers under which we acted."1
Very few of the deportees were however prepared to even
formally apply to the Advisory Committee for a review
and their Deportees Committee, denounced the new body as
a "mockery of the principles upon which the English
2
judiciary system is based on". They challenged the
Home Secretary to arraign them on specific charges ,
employing the evidence he claimed had been accumulated
against them. Art O'Brien who had emerged as the
deportees' spokesman was selected by them as a test
case for a Habeas Corpus writ in the London High Court.
His application was rejected by the court which ruled
the writ could not be granted owing to O'Brien being
3
outside the control of the Home Secretary but this was 
really a pyrrhic victory for the British Government as 
the judgement effectively supported, much to the ■ ».
embarrassment of the British authorities, the earlier 
Dublin judicial interpretation of the powers of the Free 
State. So in a new bid to strengthen their legal 
position, the British Government made an Order in Council, 
statutorily including the Irish Free State within the
1 Restoration of Order in Ireland (Amendment Bill) 
Memorandum from Home Secretary, 9 April, 1923, CP 
188 (23). CAB 24/159.
2 Letter to Home Secretary, 20 March, 1923, TS 23/181.
3 Freeman's J o u r n a1, 11 April, 19 23.
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British Isles for the purpose of making internment 
orders. It was a fatal mistake, vehemently denounced 
as adding "a new terror to litigation with Government 
officials if they can make Orders in Council while a 
case is being argued to assist their argument"  ^ by the 
High Court to which O'Brien had taken his Habeas Corpus 
appeal. The judges savaged the Government for intro­
ducing a Restoration of Order in Ireland Act that was 
so essentially based on the wartime Defence of the Realm
Act to the extent of including a large number of regul-
2ations which could not conceivably apply to Ireland.
Lord Justice Scrutton argued that even if these "lazy 
and unintelligent" regulations still had any effect 
in Ireland - and his colleague Justice Bankes claimed 
they did not - only the non-existent Chief Secretary 
for Ireland could order internments. Lord Justice 
Atkin, going even further, bluntly asserted his opinion 
that "the Home Secretary had no more right to delegate 
the choice of place (of internment) to the Irish Free 
State Government than to the first man he met in the 
street".^
1 Lord Justice Scrutton - Times Law Report, 10 May, 
1923.
2 "It is difficult to understand why in 1920 it was 
desirable for the restoration of order in Ireland 
to regulate the cultivation of hops in England 
(Regulation 20) or the capture for food of migrating 
birds or rabbits in England (Regulation 2K) or to 
limit English season tickets (Regulation 7B) >or to 
forbid persons in England to have in their possession 
more silver coinage than they reasonably required 
(Regulation 30E). Why these regulations were ever 
enacted in this lazy and unintelligent way I do not 
understand" - Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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In a last ditch effort the Attorney General, appearing 
on behalf of the Government, sought to avoid the granting 
of O'Brien's Habeas Corpus application by arguing - 
contrary to the Home Secretary's previous assurances 
to Parliament - that his political master no longer 
had any control over the terms of O'Brien's internment.
But he was forcibly reminded by Lord Justice Scrutton 
that the original Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 expressly 
"condemns the sending of inhabitants or residents of 
England as prisoners for criminal matters into Ireland 
with the severest penalties". Granting the Habeas Corpus 
application, to a man who described himself as the 
"representative in London of the Irish Republican 
Government, an undoubtedly illegal body", Lord Justice 
Scrutton said that while "it was quite possible even 
probable that the subject in this case is guilty of high 
treason, he is still entitled only to be deprived of 
his liberty by due process of law."1
The legal ripples generated by the O'Brien case can 
still be seen today in the present Prevention of Terrorism 
Act which provides only for deportation and not for 
internment. This legislation is based on the 1939 
Prevention of Violence Act which specifically rejected 
the possibility of interning IRA suspects during the ' 
1939-40 bombing campaign, after the Lord Privy Seal 
warned the Cabinet that the Home Secretary’s proposal 
l.~ Times' Law Report  ^ 10 May, 1923.
639
could risk a repeat run of the "Art O ’Brien case".'*'
The Art O ’Brien case, though virtually unknown today, 
stands as one of those land mark cases ' in English law 
where the Judiciary asserted the right of the individual 
to be supreme over all other considerations irrespective 
of how much they embarrassed the Government. A Times 
editorial rightly described the case as one "of great 
constitutional importance" in which "the Lord Justices 
were called upon to guard the liberty of His Majesty’s 
subjects against encroachments of the Executive, and 
they certainly succeeded in maintaining the great trad­
ition of the Law of England that they should pay no
regard to any inconvenience which might be caused by
2
their decision". Inconvenience was however a very 
mild term to describe the embarrassment the granting 
of Habeas Corpus to Art O'Brien had caused the Govern­
ment. It had arrested a large number of British citizens 
at the bidding of another government who had no legal 
jurisdiction over them and had then deported them 
under armed guard - an action that enraged a High
Court bench, appalled by the blatant flouting of estab-
3
lished legal convention. In response to persistent
1 Cabinet Minutes, 5 July, 1939. Cabinet 33(39)
Conclusion 10.
2 Times, 10 May, 1923.
3 "He (Art O'Brien) is apparently imprisoned without 
trial for a sentence of Indefinite duration; and
the Home Secretary who ordered his arrest and deport­
ation to Ireland, states to the court by his counsel, 
the Attorney General, that the Home Secretary cannot 
release him. Before the War it is almost impossible 
to conceive that such a state of things could exist 
in England" - Lord Justice Scrutton,' Times, 10 May, 1923.
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Opposition queries, seme of which . were concerned about 
the fate of their deported constituents, the Home 
Secretary had assured MPs he still retained control 
over' the deportees even though they were now interned 
in another country. But this claim had been promptly 
rejected by the President of the Irish Free State, 
the Irish courts and even the British Government's legal 
adviser, the Attorney General in his final defence 
statement to the High Court.
By all standards the British Government had managed to
get itself into a first class monumental legal and
parliamentary row,and this at a time when the Prime
Minister, Bonar Law, was preparing to quit his office,
through ill health,1 with the succession likely to cause
a period of internal strife inside his Party. The
Attorney General in a brief statement to Parliament
informed the members the Government had lodged an
2immediate appeal with the House of Lords, who in com­
pliance with the Government's wish for a speedy verdict 
agreed not only to postpone their traditional Whitsun 
holiday but.to sit earlier and rise later than customary , 
while accepting typescript, rather than the,traditional
3
formally printed record of the earlier High Court case.
1 Bonar Law discovered In early May 1923 he had termi­
nal throat cancer and immediately submitted his res­
ignation. A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit. 264.
2 Times, 10 May, 1923.
3 Ti*nes, 11 May, 1923.
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The appeal to the House of Lords was intended however 
only to provide the Government with a few extra days' 
grace to consider how it should react to the High Court 
Art O'Brien Habeas Corpus Writ. For the. Government had 
already learned even before the High Court case had con­
cluded, that it did not in fact have the legal powers 
to deport O'Brien. This had been established by a 
special Privy Council convened at the request of the 
Attorney General to provide an "Interpretation Order" 
of the present validity of the Restoration In Ireland 
Order Act. After a careful scrutiny the Privy Council 
decided that even if the High Court favourably - which 
was unlikely - interpreted the British Isles as still 
legally encompassing the Irish Free State , the 
omission of two crucial words1 rendered the entire 
relevant section invalid. It also warned the Attorney Gen­
eral that the Government's hasty action in retrospectively 
changing the law after the Irish court ruling was
likely to be interpreted by the High Court as a
2"confession of the weakness" of its case. The Government 
had in fact known for two years that the Restoration 
in Ireland Order Act had been hastily drafted, with the 
result it was open to variable legal interpretation,
3
even when all of Ireland was still under British rule.
1 "regulations there-under" (see below).
2 ' Memoirs of Sir Aimeri'c Fitzroy ( 1925 ) Vol. 2 801.
Sir Almeric was the Secretary to the Privy Council 
and convened the meeting on 29 April, 1923.
3 Home Office memo (June 1921) in Home Office File
414 250/13, placed in TS 27/181.
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The High Court had previously under these circumstances 
ruled in the Government's favour, in the earlier Brady 
test case,1 but a strongly dissenting opinion of Lord 
Justice Scrutton had indicated that should Ireland ever
' s
gain its own political administration, the British
Government's powers to .deport people from Britain to
Ireland , which he^personally believed to be already
2non-existent, would automatically cease.
As expected, the House of Lords quickly concluded it
3
had "no jurisdiction to hear the appeal" and a*hastily
convened Cabinet meeting later that day decided to
ask the Irish Government to return Art O'Brien. It
also set up a working party to discuss new legislation
to provide for internment within Britain itself and to
draft the necessary indemnity bill to prevent the
Government from being sued by the deportees for illegal
4arrest and imprisonment. Telegrams sent the following 
morning to the Irish [Government requested the release 
of Art O'Brien"whose immediate re-arrest (once-'.landed in
1 Memo on Edward Brady :case to Advisory Committee 
TS 2 7/181. Also see Patrick Foy's Habeas Corpus 
Application (March 1920) , TS 85. Times, 28 June, 
1921.
2 Times, 26 June, 1921.
3 Their decision was given orally in a brief state.-; :. 
ment -' Times, 15 May, 1923 and subsequently in a 
much longer written judgement, Times, 10 July,
1923.
4 Cabinet Meeting, 14 May, 1923. CAB 23/45.
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Britain) on criminal charges is under consideration,"1
and later that day the return of all the deportees,
under military escort, was also requested except for
2a dozen people likely to be subsequently charged.
The House of Commons which had loudly cheered the Lords 
3
verdict was informed by the Home Secretary that he 
had requested the return of all the deportees, though
4some of these he said might be re-arrested in Britain. 
Strictly speaking the Scottish deportees did not necess­
arily have to be released as Habeas Corpus did not 
exist under its separate legal system and as their depor­
tation orders had been signed by the Secretary of State 
for Scotland, the Home Secretary was technically 
exceeding the authority of his office. Fortunately for 
the Home Secretary, in view of his earlier statements 
regarding his control over the fate of the deportees, 
the Irish Minister for Home Affairs ,while still main­
taining his Government's claim over the internees, had 
already declared his willingness to send them back to
5
Britain : circumstances had substantially changed during 
their two month long internment, the internal security 
situation had improved remarkably and with the new
1 Home Office telegram to Irish Free State President,
No. 60 of 15 May, 1923, in O'Malley P17a/195.
2 Ibid, telegram No. 61.
3 Times, 15 May, 1923.
4 164 H .C . Deb. Col. 246. .
5 Irish Times, 14 May, 192 3.
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IRA's leaderships1s order to its units to cease all 
offensive action from the beginning of May,1 the Civil 
War was all but over. With its prisons and internment 
camps crammed to overflowing with captured IRA men and 
women, the Irish Government had no objection to releasing 
people, normally resident in Britain, who could now no 
longer do it any harm. For the Irish Government, 
unlike its British counterpart, the deportations and 
the subsequent legal wrangle had in fact provided a 
valuable political bonus in reaffirming their authority 
on domestic matters inside the Irish Free State and 
gave them an opportunity of refuting those critics 
of the Treaty who had argued that by its terms the 
Irish Government had been placed, in all matters, in an 
inferior position under the British Government.
2Art O'Brien was returned to British custody at Hollyhead
and after a physical confrontation with his detective
escort,who refused his demand to travel to London first 
3class, was brought to the High Court in accordance 
with the Habeas Corpus Writ requiring the authorities 
to physically produce him before the Bench. The judges 
ordered his immediate release from custody but his 
period of freedom only lasted the length of the walk 
from the court room to the door. Upon stepping out
1 O'Donoghue, op. cit, 308-10.
2 Freeman's Journa1, 14 May, 1923.
3 TS 27/183.
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into the street he was immediately re-arrested1 =,ahd
taken to Bow St. Court to be charged with ''Seditious
2
Conspiracy" and remanded to Brixton. The remainder
of the deportees were taken under a large military
escort, the following day to Hollyhead and most, after
being interviewed by detectives, were permitted to
travel home to be greeted by crowds of sympathizers in
3
London, Liverpool and Glasgow. Three of the Liverpool
deportees and two from Birmingham were however taken
to their home towns to face ammunition and conspiracy
charges, while Sean McGrath and two others were brought
4to London and charged along with Art O'Brien.
From his Brixton prison cell O'Brien continued to 
create new legal problems for the British Government.
Having secured his release through a 17th century law, 
he now went back another three centuries,through the 
mists of English legal history,to resurrect Richard the 
Second's 'Statute of Praemunire', in a bid both toopunish 
the Home Secretary who had deported him and in pursuit 
of exemplary damages for his illegal arrest. A Conservative 
back bench MP assured the Home Secretary that the Statute 
of Praemunire, whose least penalities would have 
summarily ended his political career and inflicted a
1 Fre ernan' s Journa 1, 17 May , 1923.
2 Times, 17 May, 1923.
3 Ereeman's Journal, 18, 19 May, 192 3?' Times, 17, 18
May, 1923.
4 Times, 19 May, 1923.
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lot more hardship1f was not now considered to be legally
enforceable and the House generally treated the revival
2of such an ancient law' in a rather frivolous manner. This
archaic statute did however, in an oblique manner, achieve
its objective in focussing MPs . and public opinion on the
financial plight of deportees who had lost wages,even
jobs,and suffered considerable hardship, including physical
brutality which the Government tacitly admitted had oocured
3
in Mountjoy Prison. But one of the effects of the Indemn­
ity Bill (that is an act retrospectively making legal the 
Government's previously illegal action) which was shortly 
to be presented before Parliament, was to remove the 
deportees normal right to sue for damages through the 
courts.
In an editorial on the deportations the Times observed,
11 it is hardly necessary to say that no one outside a
small group of fanatics and dreamers can have the smallest
4usympathy with Mr. O'Brien but the Daily News and the 
Westminister Gazette, two papers which could hardly be 
said to harbour sympathies for Irish Republicans, both
1 ..-Art* :OlBrien sought a; ^declaration that the defendant
is disabled from and incapable of holding any office of 
trust or profit within the realm of England, the dominion 
of Wales, or the Town of Berwick upon Tweed or any of 
the Islands, Territories or Dominions thereof belonging.
A declaration that the defendant is liable to incur and 
sustain on Order that he do sustain and suffer the pains, 
penalties and forfeitures limited, ordained and provided 
in and by the Statute of Provision and Praemunire, made 
in the 16th year of King Richard II". He also sought 
\  under Act 31 Charles II "a declaration that the defendant is 
incapable of any pardon from the King, his heirs and 
successors of the daid forfeitures, losses or disablil- 
ities or any of them", see TS 27/181.
2 ' Times, 18 May, 1923.
3 This was acknowledged in a letter, 9 Oct., 1923, from 
the Colonial Office to the Treasury Solicitor rejecting
cont..
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denounced the section of the Indemnity Bill which spec- 
fically prevented the deportees1 recourse to normal legal 
remedies.1 Many, both inside, and outside the House of 
Commons, while recognizing the legal practicalities that 
required the enactment of an Indemnity Bill, were perturbed 
by its denial of financial compensation for those who 
had been illegally arrested and interned in another country/ 
under very trying conditions. So, nine Liberal and two 
Labour MBs presented a number of petitions on behalf of 
their deported constituents "praying" that they be given 
the right to appear before the Bar of the House to put
2their claims for financial compensation before the House. 
This is a rarely employed procedure and the Speaker 
refused them the necessary leave to present their petitions 
in person but it did serve its purpose in focussing MBs 
attention on their case.
With Mr. Bridgeman, the Home Secretary, unable bo appear
before the House until the Indemnity Bill received its
first reading, it fell upon the new Prime Minister, Stanley
Baldwin, a somewhat surprizing choice to succeed Bonar
cont his application to call the Governor of Mountjoy
Prison and other Irish officers as witnesses to refute 
claims of brutality, TS 27/181, and also see the 
British and Irish Government correspondence in S 2151, 
(SPO).
4 Times, 26 May, 192 3.
1 Daily News, 28 May, 1923,' Westminster Gazette, ibid.
2 164 H.C. Dels.5, Cols. 813-21 and letter from Denton 
Hall and Burgin, (the deportees solictors) outlining 
the procedure of presenting petitions in TS27/181.
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Law,1 to move, a,s one. of hJt^ first major tasks as Prime '
Minister the Restoration of Order in Ireland (Indemnity)
Bill. Acknowledging criticisms that the Bill would legally
remove the right of compensation, he conceded the deportees
had a moral right to at least some financial recompense,
2
and promised to examine ways of making this possible. His
observation that as some of the deportees could have
secured their earlier release,by applying to the Advisory
Committee/they therefore could not really expect much
compensation, brought an angry retort from Ramsay
MacDonald, the Labour leader, who hoped "British citizens
and Irishman had not yet reached the state of servility
in which, if unjustly deported they would apply to Advisory
Committees to prove that they ought not to have been 
3
deported” After considerable modification, forced on
4the Government by Parliamentary and public opinion , the
Indemnity Bill - shorn of its original intent .to permit
internment outside periods of formal war - was passed with
5a majority of some ninety votes. Ironically one of the
1 It had been generally assumed that Viscount Curzon 
would succeed Bonar Law as Prime Minister and that 
Stanley Baldwin a somewhat, up to then, undistinguished 
figure was appointed purely at the behest of King 
George V but it now appears that senior Conservatives 
did recommend Baldwin's appointment/ see Robert Blake
The Unknown Prime Minister, (1955) , 518-27.
2 164 H.C. Debs.'5, col. 859.
3 Ibid. Col.943.
4 For the evolution of the Indemnity Bill; see Restoration 
of Order in Ireland Act(Indemnity) 1923 correspondence 
- TS 27/180, TS 27/182, and TS 27/181.
5 164 H.C. Debs. 5s. Cols. 854-971.
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results of the potentially most serious conspiracy against 
the British State, to emerge this century, was the enactment, 
of legislation that gravely impeded Government action 
against similar plots in the future.
The principals in this conspiracy, which had so embarrased 
the Government, did not escape scot free. On the 27 June, 
1923, Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath were arraigned before 
an Old Bailey jury at the start of a trial which more 
than any other event was to effectively lead to the demise 
of the Anti-Treaty Irish Self Determination League. They 
were charged that on
"March 31, 1922, and divers other days, thereafter 
until the date hereof, (they) did contrive and 
intend to disquiet and disturb the peace of our 
Lord the King of England and the peace and good order 
of and within the Free State’in Ireland, and to 
overthrow the Government as by law established in 
the said Free State: and unlawfully and seditiously 
conspire with divers other persons being members 
and officers of a certain combination known as the 
Irish Self Determination League, to maintain and 
assist and incite divers evil dispersed persons 
in the said Free State, known as members of the Irish 
Republican Party in and towards insurrection and 
breaches of the peace and the obstruction arid 
prevention by force and arms of the said Government 
as by law established in the said Free State: and
to incite hatred and ill will between different •:
classes of his Majesty's subjects in England and 
the said Free State against the peace of our Lord 
the King!1
At their earlier committal the Prosecrition had pointed out
that the defendants could have been charged under the 1848
Treason Felony Act which carried a life imprisonment penalty 
or even with High Treason, the charge that brought Roger 
Casement to the Pentonville scaffold> but it had been
1 Times, 28 June, 1923.
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decided in • ‘'these merciful days1 to merely charge them 
with Seditious Conspiracy. Despite its convoluted term­
inology and archaic language, the charge was clearly form­
ulated against Art O ’Brien and Sean McGrath in the context 
of their leadership of the ISDL,whose activities even 
on the purely propaganda and political level, against the 
Irish Free State, were plainly considered to be illegal 
actions in so far as they sought to remove a 11 Government 
by British Law established". Six other men stood in the 
dock with the two ISDL leaders but they were merely supp­
orting characters selected to illustrate various examples 
of the illegal activity the Prosechtion alleged Art O'Brien 
and Sean McGrath were the prime instigators of . Sean 
O'Mahoney, a member of De Valera's Republican Council of 
State,was said by the Prosecution to be the link between 
O'Brien and De Valera. The other five all facing specific 
arms, explosives and ammunition offences as well as the 
conspiracy charge, were said to be members of IRA units 
in different parts of England. Both Anthony MulLarkey, 
the OC Newcastle IRA, and Thomas Flynn his quartermaster
were ISDL members though O'Brien claimed no knowledge
2of Flynn's membership. Denis Fleming,the OC Liverpool 
IRA, and his brother Patrick were members of Sinn Fein while 
Michael Galvin, a captain in the London IRA, appears not 
to have belonged to any political organization.
1 ' Times, 24 May, 1923.
2 See O'Brien's notes on his defence prepared for
his solicitor, Ms 8419.
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In the Prosecution case, led by the Attorney General, they 
were but walk-on characters on a stage dominated by Art 
O'Brien's presence and to a much lesser extent Sean 
McGrath's. The Attorney General in his opening speedh 
argued that
Ujust as De Valera was regarded as the head of the 
conspiracy in Ireland, the defendant Art O'Brien 
was regarded by the Prosecution as the head of the 
whole conspiracy in England!!1
Documents found in his possession, concerning recent IRA 
actions in Ireland, were cited as evidence of O'Brien's 
knowledge of the illegal activities of a movement, he = 
admitted supporting. A notebook containing details of 
various types of explosives and their particular, appli­
cations was produced by the Prosecution who claimed it 
had been .found in Sean McGrath's residence, in a search 
immediately following Sir Henry Wilson's assassination.
A Post Office officer gave evidence of covertly opening 
mail sent to cover addresses, which it was alleged were
used by O'Brien and McGrath to communicate with IRA
2leaders in Ireland. But perhaps the single most damning
piece of evidence,incriminating the Irish Self Determination
League in illegal activities,was a memorandum from the
OC Newcastle IRA to his subordinate officers informing them
of his intention of "holding a Battalion Council on
Saturday 1st, there is a 'District Meeting' of the Irish
Self Determination League on that day so we can carry on
. 3
with the 'EC' as soon as the I9DL finish'-. This
1 Times, 28 June, 1923.
2 Times, 2 July, 1923.
3 Cited as 'Exhibit 29', in O'Brien Ms 8419.
652
memorandum which the Prosecution alleged was written by 
Mullarkey clearly inferred that at least some of those 
attending the IRA officers' meeting would also be present 
at the earlier ISDL regional leaders meeting. Great play 
was made by the Prosecution of Mullarkey1s co-option, 
following a proposal by Art O'Brien , on to the League's 
Standing Committee, to replace Gilbert Barrington,whom 
the Prosecution claimed was,the quartermaster of the Tyne­
side IRA Brigade,until he was forced to flee the country 
after the discovery of an arms dump. Two Free State Army 
officers, a colonel and a captain, provided evidence of 
a substantial arms traffic from Britain to Ireland during 
the Civil War, an activity O'Brien was alleged to have 
financed.
Under cross examination Art O^Brien denieid any involvement 
in arms trafficking or funding IRA activities. He 
claimed that the IRA's actions during the Civil War were 
not designed to overthrow the Free State Government but 
merely undertaken to maintain the Government of the 
Republic. A subtle line of reasoning that did not impress 
Mr. Justice Swift who observed that the Free State Gover­
nment had been established by law: a point recognized by 
O'Brien who also agreed with the judge's view that the 
political and military wings of the Republican movement 
were intermingled. O'Brien however strongly denied he 
had ever advocated the use of force and gave his opinion 
that the Republic "could not be maintained by force of 
arms but only by political means'1.! Sean McGrath in
1 Times, 3 July, 1923.
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his evidence observed the '"Republican forces should have 
surrendered earlier” and stated that while "to a certain 
extent he approved of the fighting against the British 
forces, he disapproved of Irishmen fighting Irishmen'*.* 
Bernard 0 1 Connor, a Barrister and ISDL member, called as a 
defence character witness effectively hammered home the 
last nail in the ISDL's coffin, when he agreed with the 
Judge that the
"Irish Free State was established by English Law 
and that according to that law, the Republican 
movement which endeavoured to overthrow the State 
was guilty of treason or treason felony.
All the defendants except Sean O'Mahoney whom the prosecution
had claimed had been "imported from Ireland to make 
3
speeches" and Patrick Fleming, acquitted at the direction 
of the judge, were found guilty as charged. In his summing 
up the judge described the trial as "a case of very 
great public importance" and observed
“no doubt it came as a shock to the jury to learn 
that in connection with this movement, England had 
been parcelled out into military areas, that dumps 
were formed and that munitions and guns were being 
sent over to IrelandM
and praised the country's intelligence services for uncove- 
4
ring the plot. His sentencing reflected the view that it
1 Times, 4 July, 1923.
2 Times, 4 July, 1923.
3 Ibid, 29 June, 1923.
4 Justice Swift spoke of his "relief that the authorities
in this country were not so blind or stupid as they were
sometimes thought to;>be and that they knew a little more 
of what was going on than those who did these things 
either suspected or imagined. It is well for the 
country that there is an organization - when it is 
suspected that a crime is about to be perpetrated - 
which has the means of watching the suspected persons”.
- Times, 5 July, 1923. This was a reference to the 
Post Office Investigation Branch who had secretly inter­
cepted and copied letters, vital to the Prosecutions 
case.
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was the Irish Self Determination League rather than the 
Irish Republican Army that was really on trial. The 
other four convicted, described by the judge as "boys", 
though they were all in their twenties and thirties, led 
astray by elder men, were each imprisoned for one year 
but O'Brien and McGrath, though convicted on only one 
charge^were given the maximum two years sentence.*
British academics have almost totally ignored the study 
of ''political trials', their implications and their effects, 
but fortunately there is a respectable body of American
2research in this otherwise neglected field. . Both Hakman 
3
and Kircheimer focus their work on the use of legal 
techniques, designed to buttress a particular ideological 
form of social structure against a contending ideological 
threat, opposed to that system. And certainly Justice 
Swift made no pretence of concealing his opinion that the 
very objective of the Irish Self Determination League, 
namely the maintenance of an Irish Republic, no matter 
how peacefully its methods towards attaining this goal, 
would inevitably bring it into conflict with the British 
legal'system. His rigid insistence on strict compliance 
with established legal and courtroom procedures, prevented
1 Times^ 5 July, 1923.
2 Nathan Hakman, 'Political Trials in the Legal Order:
A Political Scientist's Perspective', Journal of Public 
Law, 21 (1972), 73-126.
3 Otto Kircheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal 
Procedure for Political Ends ,(Princeton, 1961), 7.
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the defendants from asserting their political beliefs and
substantially thwarted their counsel's attempts to situate
the trial within the context of a struggle for political
control of the new Irish State in a manner whereby they
could morally if not legally justify their actions. So
the trial never assumed any of the pronounced adversarial
character that Barkan has observed in modern American
political trials,1 let alone turning the courtroom into
a political arena to denounce the established legal system
2as in the 1 Chicago 8 Trial* . Neither did the trial 
generate favourable publicity for the ISDL or help to 
build it up in the manner Lefcourt suggests has occurred 
in the case of some American organizations which have
3
benefitted from anti-trial sentiments. The observation
by the Special Branch "it is regarded as a matter for
congratulation that the newspapers are devoting so little
4space to the case against them" in respect of the conspiracy 
trial, is not strictly correct, for certainly the trial 
was - as is only to be expected in such cases - extensi­
vely reported in the Times and in somewhat less detailo 
in the Glasgow Herald, Manchester Evening News and Liverpool 
Post etc. but certainly their editoral line, congratulating
1 Steven E. Barkan, 'Political Trials and the Pro-se 
Defendant in the Adversary System' , Social Problems, 
24(1976/77), 324-36.
2 Robert J. Antonion, 'The Processual Dimensions of 
Degradation Ceremonies. The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: 
Success or Failure1, British Journal of Sociology,
23(1972), 287-97.
3 Gerald B. Lefcourt, (edt), Law Against The People ,
(New York, 1971).
4 ROR 210, 19 June, 1923. CP 277(23). CAB 24/160.
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the authorities in exposing the conspiracy could hardly
have displeased the Government. Detailed coverage of the
links between the IRA and the ISDL - an organization ruled
to be virtually illegal itself - was very unlikely to
encourage new members to join the League. While no doubt
many of the surviving rank and file ISDL members were
extremely surprized to discover that Art O'Brien had
for four years been in receipt of a salary of £750 a year,
plus a very generous expense allowance in connection with
his post as Republican representative in London.1 The
Catholic Herald made much of this issue and of O'Brien's
rejection of the use of arms to achieve the Republic he
2
was paid to represent.
Dock speeches have sometimes transformed humilating defeats 
into a rousing propaganda victory / that has ensured the 
movement was not forgotten, after the imprisonment or 
execution of the leader. Fidel Castro, a previously 
virtually unknown figure, leapt into national prominence 
with his resounding defence "La historial me absolvera" 
at his trial following the Moncada Barracks debacle. And 
by his eloquent defence of one of the most bungled Irish 
revolts ever staged, Robert Emmet ensured his lasting
4
position in Irish history with a speech still taught
1 Times, 3 July, 1923.
2 Catholic Herald, 14 July, 1923.
3 "History will absolve me" quoted in Marta Rojos
Rodriguez, La Generacion del Centario en el Moncada, 
(Havana, 1964),
4 "When my country takes her place among the nations of 
the earth, then and not till then let my epitaph be 
written", quoted in Frank O'Connor (edt), A Book
~ of Ireland , (1959), 110-11.
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in Irish classrooms, and one so much part of the national 
ethos it is still capable of silencing judges today.1 
Art O'Brien's performance in the dock was not however in 
that tradition. In part this was no doubt due to O'Brien's 
reserved personality and dislike of flamboyant gestures , 
while the ambiguous nature of the conspiracy charge is 
one in which the defendants personal demeanour and perfor­
mance under cross examination often plays a crucial part 
in determining their guilt or innocence. O'Brien also 
seems to have been very conscious of the fact it was the 
ISDL as much as himself that was on trial and aware that 
much of the organization's activities could, by a strict 
interpretation of the law, be considered 'seditious' in 
so far as they were directed towards the replacement of 
the Irish Free State by a Republican Government. But to 
many of the surviving members of the Anti-Treaty ISDL,
Art O'Brien's low key defence seemed to be no more than 
a tactic designed to secure his personal release at the 
expense of the Anti-Treaty cause, whose military tactics 
he disowned in the dock. This impression was strengthened 
by the grounds of O'Brien's and McGrath's appeal to the
I At the 1970 'Arms Trial1 in Dublin: where a number
of former Irish Government ministers, including Charles 
Haughey thex present , T}aoiseach, and IRA leaders were 
charged with^importing arms, an IRA leader John Kelly 
was stopped by the judge when he tried to make a highly 
political defence speech. But when he informed the 
judge that if his interpretation had been applied to 
another trial in that same courtroom three centuries 
before, then the "most famous speech in Irish history" 
could never have been delivered, he was permitted to 
continue his speech. Source - Personal Observation.
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High Court where they argued unsuccessfully that they
should have been tried, separately from the others facing
specific arms and ammunition charges.1 To their former
supporters this seemed to be. a manoeuvre on O'Brien's and
McGrath's part to disassociate themselves from the IRA.
They believed that O'Brien, whom they argued was only
facing a maximum two year sentence, should have turned his
defence speech into a rousing,defiant,reaffirmation of
Republican policy and used the court room stage as a platform
to revitalize the morale of the Anti-Treatyites badly
shaken by the collapse of the Republican military forces.
They compared his position and behaviour very unfavourably
2with the eighty one Republicans executed after the brief­
est of summary court martials and others killed in myster­
ious non-combat circumstances.
O'Brien's imprisonment did not end the controversy over 
his performance in the dock : the argument and counter 
arguments substantially affected proposals by his remaining 
supporters to reorganize the ISDL and he emerged from 
prison a year later to plunge straight into a turbulent 
froth of allegations that effectively ensured the demise 
of the Irish Self Determination League.
1 Times^ 3 July, 1923.
2 There has been considerable controversy over the actual 
number of official executions carried out by the Free 
State Army during the Civil War but this figure of
81 appears to be accurate and was given in the Irish 
Press, 12 July, 1972.
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Part VI The Twilight of Irish Separatism in Britain
Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath had played a major role in the 
formation and growth of the ISDL. But to some of their 
fellow Sinn Fein members they had created a Frankenstein 
and now, with O'Brien and McGrath in prison, their oppon­
ents lost no time in destroying their creation, by 'decen­
tralizing' the ISDL as a first step towards incorporating 
it into Sinn Fein. O'Brien and McGrath had always trium­
phed in their earlier confrontations with Sinn Fein by app­
ealing to De Valera. But now their ace card was trumped 
when De Valera for personal and organizational reasons 
ordered the disbandment of the ISDL. In chapter 23 we will 
investigate the demise of the ISDL, was it an act of organ­
izational homocide instigated by a conspiracy or simply 
euthanasia - the termination of an organization that had 
outlived its usefulness and had no viable future? The ISDL 
was not the only organization in the Irish community affec­
ted by the creation of the Irish Free State and so in Chapter 
22 we will examine the UIL's response to the changed polit­
ical environment.
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Chapter 22
A New Situation Demands New Organizations: The
Reorganization of the ISDL and UIL.
With the deportations the Irish Self Determination League
t
lost virtually all its first and much of its second tier 
leadership along with many of its local cadres. Surviving 
local leaders who had evaded the arrests dragnet, and who 
were still sought for their IRA activities,were far too 
concerned with staying free to get involved in the reorgani­
zation of the League. Effective control of the organization 
passed into the hands of an Emergency Committee which was 
formed by j.Fowler, G. Lowdin, E. Delaney, N. Collins,
E. Merryman and P. McBride‘S. This essentially was the some­
what depleted Standing Committee of the London District 
Committee. Of its membership only J. Fowler could make 
any claim to national prominence within the League and 
even he had only been considered a junior leader. This 
virtual usurpation of the national organization’s leadership 
by local London leaders antagonized branches in other areas 
who were effectively deprived of any influence in the over­
all administration of the League and contributed substan­
tially to the pattern of purely localized' organizational 
activities which hastened the demise of the national organi­
zation. This sense of grievance stemming from exclusion in 
the new decision-making and policy-forming body was parti­
cularly strongly felt in the Tyneside area which had six 
branches still active compared to only four in London.
1 Minutes of Standing Committee, 26 March, 1923, O'Brien 
Ms. 8432.
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The Tyneside branches seem to have been so ignored by 
the new London based leadership to the point where Mrs 
Prosser who though as a Vice President of the League was 
constitutionally one of, if not, the most senior.officer 
left of the original leadership, had not been invited to 
participate in the Emergency Committee and kept so much 
in the dark that she was obliged to write to Fowler in 
an effort to discover if a national organization of the 
ISDL still existed."^*
The new London-based leadership appear to have done very 
little in the way of mobilizing the ISDL in such a manner 
that it might have organizationally benefitted from the 
considerable support the arrests and subsequent depor­
tations had generated on behalf of those interned in 
Ireland. With the exception of Manchester where the/peague
still retained considerable strength and organized a
2
large protest meeting, most of the protest activity 
sparked off by deportations was carried out under the 
auspices of the Irish Prisoners Defence Committee, a broad 
based organization with only tenuous links to the ISDL.
This organization which changed its name to the Irish 
Seditious Conspiracy Trials Committee after the return of
1 See letter , 16 April, 1923, Ms. 8432.
2 Manchester Evening News, 13 March, 1923, and Freeman1s 
Journal, 14 March, 1923.
3 There is very little surviving material on the Irish 
Prisoners Defence Committee which is first mentioned 
in-a note dated 25 March, 1923. O'Brien Ms. 8433.
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the deportees raised at least £820 and possibly much
more^ for their legal expenses in fighting the various
actions that secured their release. It conducted a vigorous
2publicity campaign distributing leaflets and organizing
3
relatively we 11-attended protest meetings.' A typical 
joint protest meeting and fund raising dance held under 
its auspices in a Greenwich Council hall shows the broad 
nature of support the Defence Committee managed to mobilize.
This function was officially supported by the Greenwich,
/
Deptford, Woolwich and Lewisham Labour Parties and the
local Communist Party. While speeches were given by such
diverse figures as Father Lawlton and Saklatvala,the 
4
Communist MP.
The Labour Party officially condemned the deportations but 
no doubt their leader Ramsay MacDonald subsequently regret­
ted making some of his Parliamentary speeches on the issue
c
and writing a rousing denounciation of the arrests when 
he subsequently came under strong and ultimately succes­
sful pressure from his party colleagues to release O ’Brien
1 A Balance Sheet of this organization shows that it 
raised £821 16s 4d but only part of the sheet survives 
and it would appear that additional funds were recorded 
on the missing portion, O'Brien, Ms. 8433.
2 See their leaflfet; preserved as 'item 78' in Miscel­
laneous Leaflets 1919-23', ILB 300 (NLI).
3 ROR 199, 28 March, 1923, CP 177(23), CAB 24/159,
4 See Irish Army Intelligence Report, S 2156.
5 See his article in Socialist Review, April, 1923.
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and McGrath after he took office as the country's first
Labour Prime Minister early in 1924. The Rev. Dunnico, a
Nonconformist Labour MP, organized a petition for their
release which was supported by such prominent Labour leaders
as J.R. Clynes, Philip Snowden and included the Bishops
of Southwark and Portsmouth among its notable signatories.^
campaign was also launched at the London Labour
Party Annual Conference for the reinstatement of Rose 
2Killeen t the Whitechapel teacher deportee, dismissed for
3
her political views by the London County Council, follo­
wing pressure from the Hammersmith Ratepayers Association
who demanded the sacking of "Irish teachers who are openly
, 4
disloyal to this country".
But while the ISDL deportations certainly aroused consider­
able hostility far beyond the Anti-Treaty milieu in Britain,
this opposition particularly among the Labour Parliamentary Party 
was based to a considerable extent on purely tactical con­
siderations and was employed more as a valuable weapon 
against a Government,which had made a series of blunders 
affecting basic citizenship rights,rather than as a display 
of any real sympathy for the Anti-Treaty cause. Inter­
preted at this basic level of analysis the campaign on
1 Catholic Herald, 22 Dec., 1923.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 15 Jan., 1924.
4 Ibid. , 22 Dec. , 1923,.
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behalf of the deportees, or rather more accurately 
against the illegality of their deportation, certainly
never attained the dimensions of the American reaction
1 2 against the Palmer Raids and subsequent deportations;
an episode with striking similarities to the ISDL depor­
tations.
Even the Communist Party, which accused the Labour Party of 
insincerity in its attitude towards the deportations,adop­
ted what,in effect, were double standards in its response 
to the arrests. While all branches were told in the usual 
weekly circular from head office to start a new 'Hands 
off Ireland1 movement and hold meetings on the deportations, 
branch leaders were verbally informed by special messengers 
"that no member must help, or converse in public with any
3
known members of the ISDL". And the year previously, the
1 The Palmer Raids - called after their instigator - 
resulted in the arrests of some 6000 radicals in 
1919/20, some of whom were subsequently deported in 
very dubious legal circumstances; see Patrick Renshaw 
'The IWW And The Red Scare 1917-24', Journal of Contem­
porary History, 3, (1968), 63-72.
2 These arrests and deportations drew widespread criticism 
and even resignation from the Government while a number' 
of prominent business lawyers defended, without fees, 
people subject to deportation orders; see Ann Fagan, 
'Political Deportations', Science and Society, 19,
(1955), 134-66, and 'Political Deportations In the United 
States: A Study In The Enforcement Procedures: 1919-
25', Law Guild Review, Vol. XIX, (1954), 93-128.
3 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166)23), CAB 24/154.
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Communist Party had refused permission to its tiny Irish 
counterpart to collect funds from the Irish in Britain,  ^
though this refusal may.have at least partly been moti­
vated by envy that the Communist Party of Ireland was
in receipt of funds from the Russian Trade Delegation in 
2London , which the British Communist Party no doubt believed
should have been given exclusively to them. Relations
between the two parties became so strained that it was
reported the British Communists had requested the Moscow
based and controlled .Comintern to "liquidate" the Communist
party of Ireland as a preliminary step towards forming a
3
new party under the control of James Larkin, the veteran 
Irish Trade Union leader,who had just been released from 
his long imprisonment in the United States. The British 
Communists seem to have regarded their Irish counterparts 
as having been too tainted with Republicanism as a result 
of their participation in the Civil War which Larkin had 
opposed. But even in the case of Larkin, influential Comm­
unist leaders like J.T. Newbold the MP for Motherwell, 
preferred to keep the Irish as it were at arms length. He 
strongly opposed a suggestion that Larkin should be invited 
to speak on the party’s Scottish platforms during the 
December 1923 General Election on the grounds that they 
should "fight purely on the class issue" but his obser­
vation that "people will just say oh his usual last card,
1 ROR 173, 21 Sept., 1922. CP 4207, CAB 24/139.
2 ROR 206, 17 May, 1923, CAB 24/160.
3 ROR 231, 15 Nov., 1923.
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playing up to the Irish" night perhaps be interpreted, 
with some justification, as a shrewd electoral appreciation 
of the importance of the sectarian factor in Scottish poli­
tics. ^ Despite this evidence of Communist Party caution in 
involving itself in Irish activity, British Intelligence 
appears to have been considerably alarmed by the Communist
participation in the deportees release campaign and warned
2
the Cabinet that John McPeake, whose arrest in Glasgow
and subsequent deportation was the subject of a number
3of Parliamentary questions, had been sent over to Scotland 
to improve relations between Republicans and Communists,^
5
though the basis for this assertion was not at all clear.
Whatever the factual basis of this fear, it certainly could 
not have been inspired by the strength of the Republican 
political movement in Britain whose supporters* morale 
according to Intelligence reports had been badly affected
1 ROR 234, 6 Dec., 1923, CP 476(23), CAB 24/162.
2 John McPeake was the driver of Collins armoured car and
was accused of involvement in Collins death. But Collins* 
nephew General Collins Powell,who talked to the IRA
ambushers, has exonerated McPeake; see Robert T. Reilly,
’The Road to Beal na mBlath’, Eire-Ireland, (1966), 3-9.
3 165 HC Debs Col. 2534. 167 HC Deb 5's, Cols. 23, 205-7,
1254-55.
4 ROR 213, 5 July, 1923, CP 291(23), CAB 24/160.
5 It is more likely that McPeake simply fled to Scotland
with the assistance of the IRA to whom he had sold his
armoured car, because fellow soldiers were openly 
accusing him of involvement in Collins death.
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by the publication of captured letters from Republican
leaders in Ireland to their American allies, ^  revealing
their "vanity, greed and furious personal jealousies .
The amounts of bickering and graft disclosed has dismayed
Irish people in Britain who are sympathetic to the Repu~
2
licans". The ending of the Civil War in May 1923 with the 
total defeat of the Republican forces was undoubtedly a 
major blow to the morale of the remaining ISDL members 
but one might have supposed that the Appeal Court Habeas 
Corpus decision and resultant release of most of the 
deportees would have served as a major confidence boost;
yet there is no trace of any such mood in the surviving
*
Emergency Committee minutes which record few details of 
any activity at all. The Emergency Committee appear to
/
have used the verdict of the Seditious Conspiracy Trial
as a convenient pretext to finally dissolve an organization
it had done little to preserve as a viable, centrally
directed entity. In a circular sent to the remaining
branches this Committee claimed that the Old Bailey trial
had shown that
"no Irish organization here can be constitutional 
if it sides in any way with any party in Ireland 
that is in conflict with His Majesty's Government 
in Ireland".
Recommending the effective dissolution of the ISDL as 
a national organization the Committee observed that lack 
of funds prevented the convening of any conference to
1 Freeman1s Journal, 20 March, 1923.
2 ROR 199 28 March, 1923, CP 177(23), CAB 24/159.
3 Circular dated 21 Aug., 1923, O'Brien Ms. 8432.
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decide the matter but claimed it had earlier sought the
views of all the surviving branches with the result that,,
"out of twenty seven branches that by a wide 
stretch of the imagination might be considered 
alive, sixteen made no reply at all, four replied 
there was no branch remaining, two are still writing 
a reply, three'stated their intention to continue 
as 'Independent Republican Clubs'and two will continue 
as League branches but cannot support a Central office."
Their advice that the ISDL should now undertake a "decen­
tralization" rather than a "termination" process might 
seem at first sight to simply parallel the evolution of 
the 'Committee of 100' which;
"began as a compact, clearly articulated structure 
with identifiable and responsible leadership and 
evolved into an amorphous collection of semi-auto­
nomous units with no authoritative leadership at 
all".1
But in the case of the Committee of 100 the restructuring 
appears to have been undertaken at local level, in practical 
pursuance of an ideological change of perspective, whereas 
there must be a strong suspicion that the decentralization 
proposal in the case of the ISDL was motivated mainly by 
a desire to weaken the bonds binding branches together so 
that they could more easily be absorbed by another organi­
zation, Sinn Fein, when the time and conditions were right. 
Joseph Fowler,who had emerged as the most influential member 
of the Emergency Committee, was a member of Sinn Fein, as 
apparently were some of the other members,and appears to 
have held the view that with the demise of its former mass
1 Frank Myers, 'Civil Disobedience and the British Commi­
ttee of 100: Organizational Change', Political Science
Quarterly, 86, (1971), 92-112.
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support the conditions that,had once necessitated an
ISDL type broad based organization rather than the more
elitist and sectarian Sinn Fein no longer now applied.
When Fowler took effective control of the ISDL, Sinn Fein
was still very inactive in England and was even weaker in
Ireland where only sixty branches survived out its former
strength of 1500.^ By June 1923 when the Republicans began
to reorganize Sinn Fein as their political party to contest
the proposed General Election, its strength had further
2declined to only sixteen properly affiliated cumainn ..
With Sinn Fein reduced to such straits, Fowler could hardly 
have recommended the ISDL should dissolve itself into 
another organization apparently even more debilitated than 
itself. So his proposal that ISDL branches should cons­
titute themselves as 1 Independent Republican Clubs1 was 
a convenient way of creating the necessary half way house 
to accomodate Republican supporters until they could be 
incorporated into a reorganized and revitalized Sinn Fein. 
We have observed that the formation of the ISDL was acti­
vely opposed by some Sinn Fein members and that they sub­
sequently passed up no opportunity to belittle the League 
in their unceasing campaign to regain the whip hand for 
Sinn Fein. In May 1923, the publishers of Eire, the 
Glasgow based Sinn Fein organ, informed London ISDL branches 
that they were no longer prepared to continue publishing
3
advertizements on behalf of the League even though despite
1 Freeman's Journal, 16 Feb., 1923.
2 Sinn Fein, 8 Dec., 1923.
3 O'Brien, Ms. 8431.
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the chaos caused by the deportations they had managed to
push up sales of the paper from an initial order of only
1 2 50 to over 900 copies per issue. Eire, established in
3early 192 3 , became the major Republican organ in Ireland
as well as in Britain and though a major target of the
March arrests was still able to continue publication with
4substantially the same editorial staff despite periodic 
5seizures.
The 900 copies of Eire sold in London might have seemed to 
offer a nucleus of support around which the ISDL could be 
revitalized even though many of these readers were probably 
very reluctant to transform their passive sympathy for the 
Anti-Treaty cause into active membership of an organization 
whose very goals had been declared effectively illegal by 
an English judge. Weiss suggests that when the strength of 
punitive social sanctions outweighs the intensity of belief 
in a cause, particularly if it is a cause that is seemingly 
hopeless, then the individual will not transform passive 
sympathy into active support as expressed in terms of
1 O'Brien, Ms. 8427.
2 ROR 203, 25 April, 1923, CP 219(23), CAB 23/160.
3 O'Brien, Ms. 8431.
4 P.J. Little and George Humphrey, its principal staff
managed to escape arrest, ROR 198, 22 March, 1923,
CP 166(23), CAB 24/159.
5 See Glasgow Herald, 9 May, 1923.
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joining the actual organization.'*' Joe Fowler expressed
this hypothesis rather more bluntly,
"apart from a faithful few, the majority of Irish 
men and woemn will not touch a movement that is 
likely to interfere with their bread and butter, 
although all would like to belong to a patriotic 
movement in which they were safe and not likely to
be molested".^
Yet while acknowledging that most people were afraid to 
join the Irish Self Determination League,because it sup­
ported the Anti-Treaty cause7he was recommending that its 
branches turn themselves into new organizations with openly 
Republican titles. Fowler had evidently decided that 
with virtually no prospects of recruiting new members to 
the ISDL following the deportations and subsequent trial 
the League's cadre members should be preserved through 
Independent Republican Clubs until Sinn Fein had been reor­
ganized and was capable of absorbing them. His recommen­
dations were not however totally accepted for Art O'Brien 
found on his release from prison, a year later, a number 
of still functioning ISDL branches which were still loosely 
linked together even though a new organization under the 
effective control of Sinn Fein had come into existence.
3
According to Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek, there are three 
primary types of innovation that an organization can
1 Robert Frank Weiss, 'Defection From Social Movements 
And Subsequent Recruitment To New Movements' Sociometry, 
26(1963), 1-20.
2 Circular dated 21 Aug., 1923, O'Brien, Ms. 8432.
3 Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan and Jonny Holbek, Innova­
tions and Organizations , (New York, 1973), 10.
implement. Both 'Programmed' and 'Non Programmed' - 
when the organization finds itself suddently with more 
resources than it immediately needs and has to find a 
quick'way of "taking up the ensuing slack" - occur in 
organizations experiencing growth and success. But 
'Distressed Innovation' is literally forced on an organ­
ization by failure accompanied by a perceived need 'to 
do something' to alter this state of affairs. The proposal 
that the ISDL should undergo a 'decentralization1 process 
by branches transforming themselves into Independent 
Republican Clufcs was an example of 'Distressed Innovation'* 
This same process of 'Distressed Innovation' had also been 
undertaken a few months previously by the United Irish 
League, an organization if anything even more affected by 
declining membership, apathy and no sense of future dir­
ection or purpose than the ISDL. There had been virtually 
unanimous agreement from the local conventions,summoned 
by T.P. O'Connor to mobilize the Irish vote in the previous 
year's General Election that the UIL,in its present form, 
had no .future and that a fundamentally new organization 
was required. Despite the Scottish convention's request 
that members of other organizations should be invited to 
aid the formation of the new organization,'*' its birth was
confined to existing UIL members on T.P. O'Connors instruc-
2tions. Only 130 delegates, many of them representing 
virtually moribund UIL branches,attended the Leeds meeting
1 Glasgow Herald, 31 Oct., 1922.
2 Catholic Herald, 2 6 May, 192 3.
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which jointly served as the funeral of the UIL,founded 
there exactly fifty years previously and the birth of 
the new organization.
T.P. O'Connor,the only President the UIL ever had?explained
the organization's virtual lack of activity during the
past four years ;
"so long as the terrific struggle in Ireland lasted, 
it was impossible to get Irishmen in Great Britain 
to concentrate on their own affairs".
His "fear of factionalism and disputes with other organi­
zations" which "would have lingered on for years after"^ 
had, he claimed, resulted in a decision not to involve 
the UIL in any contentious public activity during this 
period. But now "we are face to face with new conditions" 
and these ,he claimed,required a new organization inde­
pendent of all British political parties, which would devote 
itself to "defending the rights and liberties, social, 
political and religious of Irish citizens in Great Britain" 
who should as "loyal British citizens (be) prepared to
2take their share in the political life of the country".
The new.organization would campaign, he said, for the peace­
ful reunification of Ireland but he strongly emphasized that 
its primary orientation should be focussed on the position 
of the Irish in Britain,rather than on Irish politics as 
the UIL had done. It was his hope that the "new organi­
zation would provide the opportunity to create a new
1 Catholic Herald, 26 May, 1923.
2 Times, 21 May, 192 3.
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Ireland in Great Britain" and as a contribution towards 
this
"he wanted to get hold<:of some of the poorer children 
in the Catholic schools when they reached the age 
of fourteen, take them away from their sordid home 
surroundings and train them in the arts and profes­
sions for four or five years". •*
While the delegates appear to have had three different
resolutions before them, each advocating a particular
strategy - Wimbledon UIL proposed a non-political Irish
Federation of Great Britain,while the North-East Lancashire
District Council strongly favoured a political organization
and the Davitt Branch wanted an United Irish Free State 
2League - it was a foregone conclusion that T.P. O'Connor's
stated preference for a non-political Irish Democratic
3
League would be ratified by the delegates. The meeting,
attended by the Lofd Mayor of Leeds, was generally non-
controversial but a Cardiff delegate observed somewhat
bitterly that
"it would only have been fitting if the Irish 
Free State Government had sent over a special 
representative to thank Mr O'Connor .and the United 
Irish League for all the organization had done 
for Ireland".
The extremely lukewarm relationship that had existed between 
the UIL and the new Irish Government was an important 
influence in determining that the new Irish Democratic
1 Catholic Herald, 26 May, 192 3.
2 Freeman1's Journal, 14 May, 1923.
3 Glasgow Herald, 21 May, 192 3.
4 Freeman 1's Journal, 21 May, 1923.
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League would refrain from involvement in Irish political 
affairs unless they specifically affected the Irish commu­
nity in Britain. And so, when early in the following year 
Cumann na n Gaedheal,the new Irish Governing Party, held its 
first Convention, the Catholic Herald emphasizing the 
significance of the event, observed; "it is the first time 
in the history of national organizations in Ireland when 
no direct representative from any branch across the water 
will be present".'*" The link between Homeland and exile poli­
tical organizations,that had dominated the organizational 
life of the Irish Nationalist community in Britain for 
half a century, had been finally severed and only the var­
ious small Republican organizations maintained a working 
relationship with parties based in Ireland.
The Catholic Herald1s hope that the new Irish Democratic 
League would be still-born were not realized but the UIL's 
offspring was a sickly infant predoomed never to reach 
maturity. Many of the delegates present at Leeds had come 
out of a sense of duty and even nostalgia to decently bury 
an organization which had lingered for years in a comatose 
state - never having recovered from the traumatic haemorr­
hage of a generation of future leaders in the War - scarcely 
aware of the swiftly changing Irish political universe.
Most returned home with no intention of doing anything much 
about establishing the new organization in their areas.
1 Catholic Herald, 26 Jan., 1924.
676
A Special Branch officer reported
"T.P. O'Connor's new Irish Democratic League has 
been launched and at the moment, its fate hangs 
in the balance, in Lancashire and the North it will 
probably receive a certain amount of support but the 
London Irish take very little interest in it".^
And seven months later he observed "as far as the mass
of the Irish population is concerned Irish National life
2
in London is almost extinct. By that time the Irish
Democratic League while making little headway in London
3
had made "fair progress "in South Wales and had set up
4twenty three branches in Yorkshire. But the real strength 
of the Irish Democratic League was, like its parent,firmly 
located in the Lancashire area and particularly in the 
city of Liverpool where even the UIL .recognizing the 
'millet' like indissolubility of ethnic identity and reli­
gious belief in a municipal micro-political scene domi­
nated by sectarianism, had reorganized itself as the Irish
5
and Catholic Democratic Federation. They reluctantly 
bowed to O'Connor's preferred name and changed the title 
of their new organization but its particularistic policies 
remained. P.J. Kelly,still nominally a Nationalist Coun­
cillor, gave up his struggle to reorganize a Pro-Treaty Irish 
Self Determination League in favour of an unsuccessful 
attempt to form a local alliance of "progressive forces"
1 ROR 208, 31 May, 1923, CP 256(23), CAB 24/160.
2 ROR 236, 20 Dec., 1923, CP 485(23), CAB 24/162.
3 ROR 228, 25 Oct., 1923, CP 430(23), CAB 24/162.
4 ROR 233, 24 Nov., 1923, CP 473(23), CAB 24/162.
5 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 23 March, 1923. ROR 204 
3 May, 1923, CP 232(23), CAB 24/160.
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uniting Nationalists, Labour and Liberals in an anti-Tory
grouping^ but Labour was already too far down the road
towards becoming the major party in Liverpool and its
relations with other Nationalist leaders were embittered
2by years of conflict to the point of "open war". Kelly
soon defected to the Labour Party and another influential
Nationalist Alderman Harford resigned after T.P. O'Connor
had insisted that his nominee William Grogan should contest
3
the Exchange Constituency. Harford had fought this seat 
in 1918 but had subsequently been passed over in the first 
1923 election in favour of the Northern Irish Nationalist 
leader Joe Devlin whom O'Connor had wanted back at 
Westminster.
O'Connor's imposition of his nominee Grogan - a man with 
a record of minimal involvement hitherto in local Nation­
alist politics - contributed substantially to the erosion 
of the local Nationalist Party infrastructure but the 
December 1923 General Election once again* revealed the 
willingness of the local electorate to support anyone stan­
ding as the 'Irish candidate'. Despite a drop of some 
2,300 in the Nationalist vote from the year's earlier 
election, Grogan managed to increase their share of the 
poll by five percent and came within two hundred votes of
4
defeating the sitting Conservative MP. T.P. O'Connor in
1 Waller, 295-99.
2 ROR 232,. 22 Nov., 1923, CP 469 (23), CAB 24/162.
3 Catholic Herald, 8 Dec., 1923.
4 Catholic Herald, 15 Jan., 1924.
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what had become an established tradition was returned again 
unopposed for his Scotland constituency fief. In a mani­
festo, almost regally addressed to "My People",he advised
them to favour the Liberals over Labour‘d but soon crossed
2the floor to support the new Labour Government. His 
gesture demonstrated that for all practical purposes - 
except in the very particularistic situation of Liverpool - 
the political future of the majority of the Irish Catholic 
community in Britain lay with the Labour Party. O'Connor 
had claimed that the introduction of Proportional Represen­
tation would give an organized Irish Party twenty five
3
seats in Parliament but as the introduction of Propor­
tional Representation never appeared a feasible hope there 
was never any reasonable possibility of creating a speci­
fically Irish Parliamentary Party outside of Liverpool.
The hope of the old Nationalists that the new Irish Demo­
cratic League might become the political voice of the 
Catholic Church in Britain was emphatically refuted by 
Cardinal Bourne, a few months after its formation, when the
idea of a Catholic Party was discussed and rejected by
4the National Catholic Congress ; and even in Liverpool 
where this suggestion met with much support it was deprived 
of any official imprimatur by Archbishop Keating's refusal 
to allow Catholic Church premises to be used for political
1 Catholic Herald, 8 Dec., 1923.
2 Ibid., 16 Feb., 1924.
3 Freeman's Journal, 19 March, 192 3.
4 Catholic Herald, 11 Aug., 192 3.
meetings.
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T.P. O'Connor was not however the sole Parliamentary 
reminder of the powerful influence the UIL had once 
exerted. Two members of that first Labour Cabinet under­
went their early political socialization in the organi­
zation that had for so long represented the interests of 
the Irish community from which they came. John Wheatley, 
the new Minister of Healthl had been the President of
Glasgow District UIL and J.R. dynes,the Lord Privy Seal,
o
first cut his political teeth in the League.J
On the backbenches there were James Sexton, the Liverpool
dockers leader, Joseph Sullivan and Jack Jones. Another
former member of the UIL elected in that snap election of
December 192 3 was John Scurr, the Mayor of Poplar, who had
been a prominent member of the-Irish Self Determination
League until the Civil War split, though he afterwards
campaigned forcibly for the release of the deportees. No
doubt there were those in the Minority Labour Government,
3
exhorted by the King to "prudence and sagacity"t who might 
have preferred to see Scurr back in the Brixton Prison,where 
he had been confined for six weeks as the leader of the 
Poplar Rebel Councillors . For the militant who wrote,
"I don't care a brass farthing whether we have a Labour 
Government or not if the game is to be played
1 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 5 March, 1923.
2 Catholic Herald, 7 June, 1924. Wheatley according to 
the Catholic Herald was born in Ireland, 9 July, 1927.
3 Nicolson, op. cit., 387.
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under the present rules constantly embarrassed the 
Government with his demands that it should retrospectively 
legitimize the Poplar Rate Revolt and finally played a 
major role in bringing the Government down by pressurizing 
the Attorney General to drop charges in a sensitive poli­
tical case. John Campbell,the acting editor of the Commu­
nist Workers Weekly, was charged with publishing an appeal
to soldiers not to allow themselves to be used in indus- 
2
trial disputes . Scurr secretly interceded on his behalf and
the charges were dropped but the affair became public
knowledge when the the Communist Party - for its own
3
reasons - revealed all the details # thus initiating a 
major political scandal. This major political row was inten­
sified after it became known that the King had demanded a 
full scale inquiry into the affair and the opposition put
4
down a motion of censure. The Government was defeated and 
obliged to go to the country having only been in power for 
ten months.
5
Labour lost 64 seats and blamed its loss of power on the
1 Socialist Review. September 1925.
2 Workers Weekly, 25 July, 1924, - the 'Open letter to the 
Fighting Forces' was actually written by Harry Pollitt.
3 The Communist Party claimed that "for the first time the 
course of justice in the law courts had been changed by 
outside political forces into a triumph for the working 
classes over the capitalist classes", Times, 15 Aug, 1924.
4 N.D. Siederer, 'The Campbell Case1, Journal of Contem­
porary History, (1974), 147-62. A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 
280-281 and 238.
5 Labour won 151 seats, and the Conservatives took 419; 
Taylor op. cit., 283.
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1
1 Zinoviev Red Scare' Letter , published shortly before
polling, but Alderman Harford claimed that the 'Letter'
had actually increased the number of Irish votes for
Labour because they knew the "Tories had forged the Zino-
vieff letter", just like they, had used the forged
2Piggott letters' against Parnell. Labour had already 
so increased its strength in Liverpool that the Nationalists 
.did not bother contesting the Exchange constituency in this 
election. T.P. 'OConnor, once more returned unopposed,
x
decided this time against issuing a manifesto - "I do
3
not see the necessity of issuing an election address" - 
but some Irish Democratic League branches actively cam-
4
paigned on behalf of Labour. Manchester ISDL however
1 The 'Zinoviev Letter', published in the Dhily Mhilf 
purported to be instructions to the British Communist 
Party from the President of the Comintern to launch a 
widespread sabotage campaign. It was undoubtedly a 
forgery, probably jointly concocted by British and 
Polish Intelligence; see Sibyl Crowe, 'The Zinoviev 
Letter: A Reappraisal1, Journal of Contemporary History , 
10(1975), 407-32. Its impact was not so much on Labour 
votes - for the party increased its vote by a million 
though this was partly due to its ninety extra candi­
dates - but on mobilizing an extra two million - who
had not voted in 1923 - votes for the Conservatives who 
also benefited from a surge of Liberal voters anxious 
to put an end to a Labour Government that had apparently 
been influenced by Communists', see Taylor, op. cit., 
282-3.
2 Catholic Herald, 1 Nov., 1924 , The Pf'ggott Letter' 
published in the' Times purported to be a letter showing 
Parnell's sympathy for the Phoenix Park assassinations 
but a Government Commission exposed it as a forgery; 
see Kee, op. cit., Vol. 2, 113.
3 Catholic Herald, 18 Oct., 1924.
4 Ibid., 1 Nov., 1924.
appealed to Irish residents in the city not to vote for 
Henderson and Clynes, the two local Labour MPs, for serving 
in a "Government which had refused to release Irish Poli- 
tical Prisoners"} but both of them retained their seats. 
Saklatvala the Indian born Battersea Communist MP, who had 
played a prominent role in the deportees release campaign, 
was aided by an ISDL campaign to mobilize the Irish vote 
in his interest. This help was also extended to George 
Lansbury,the leading left winger in the Labour Party and 
though Saklatvala lost his seat, he actually increased his
4- 2vote.
This issue of the Irish Political Prisoners was a parti- . 
cularly sensitive one for the first minority Labour Govern­
ment ,carefully chosen by MacDonald to convey an image of 
a Party determined to maintain law and order - it con­
tained two Viscounts, three Lords, a Knight and a General, 
but firmly excluded, at the King's bequest, George Lansbury
Some of these ministers had only an extremely tenuous '
4
connection with the Labour Party and two were actually
1 Times, 25 Oct., 1924.
2 ROR 234, 6 Dec., 1923, CP 476(23), CAB 24/162 and 
ROR 235, 13 Dec., 1923, CP 478(23), CAB 24/162.
3 A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 270 and 779-80.
4 S. Webb, 'The First Labour Government', Political 
Quarterly, 52(1961), 6-44. As President of the Board 
of Trade, Webb's insider memorandum is a particularly 
valuable account of the problems faced by his Government 
see Jean Bonnor, 'The Four Labour Cabinets', Socio­
logical Review , 6(1958), 37-40.
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avowed Conservative supporters."*" Labour's almost Conser­
vative fiscal policy and lack of any real interest in 
grandiose social reform programmes infuriated its left- 
wing backbenchers who were appalled that a Labour Govern­
ment seemed prepared to use the Armed Forces if necessary
2to break dock and transport strikes and would have been 
even more so had they known their Cabinet had decided to 
secretly preserve, intact, the previous Government's elab­
orate strike breaking machinery,which was to play such an
3
important part in defeating the 1926 General Strike.
In the ordinary course of events the Cabinet would undoub-
4
tedly have disregarded the appeals of the Daily Herald 
and simply ignored the calls of its left wing backbenchers,
5
as it repeatedly did on other matters / for an amnesty for 
Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath. But a complicating factor in 
their cases was the petition signed by forty Labour MPs,
1 Viscount Chelmsford, the former Viceroy of India, became 
First Lord of the Admiralty with the approval of Stanley 
Baldwin, see A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 270.
2 See A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 275.
3 See Ralph H. Desmarais, 'Strike breaking and the Labour 
Government of 1924', Journal of Contemporary History, 
8(1973), 165-78 , and also see Josiah Wedgwood, Memoirs 
of a Fighting Life , (1941) . Wedgwood was the pro­
posed Chief Civil Commissioner under this plan.
4 Daily Herald, 9 Feb., 1924.
5 See Robert Dowse, 'The Left Wing Opposition during the 
First Two Labour Governments', Parliamentary Affairs, 
14(1960-61), 80-93 and 229-43.
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only a few weeks before they won the General Election for 
its signatories included J.R.Clynes and Philip Snowden, 
now Lord Privy Seal and Chancellor respectively. Ramsay 
MacDonald, the new Prime Minister, had never been very 
sympathetic to the idea of an independent Ireland and 
informed Parliament that, "To us, as to them", (his Con­
servative predecessors), "The Treaty embodies a final 
settlement of Anglo-Irish relations made once and for.all".  ^
Indeed MacDonald was very reluctant to implement the Treaty 
agreement establishing a Boundary Commission and only did 
so after strong Free State pressure. His Government even 
opposed the Irish decisions to internationalize the Treaty 
by depositing a copy with the League of Nations and tried
to prevent the appointment of Irish Diplomatic Represen-
2
tatives with their own Irish issued credentials. During 
his 1931 administration, MacDonald unsuccessfully attempted 
to enlist the support of the King in an abortive attempt 
to prevent the Irish Free State Government from using their 
own Seals of Office and subsequently initiated a full
3
scale economic war. MacDonald however was unprepared to 
interfere in Northern Irish affairs and informed its 
Government that "the last thing I desire to do is to indu- •
4
lge in haggling or bargaining" in relation to the subor­
dinate financial position of the Stormont administration.
1 174 I-t.C. Debs 5 Col 1258 , aMacDonald on Boundary Settlement.
2 See B. Stubbs, op. cit., 114-17.
3 Ibid., 123-26.
4 Cab 7A/4/3, (NI PRO).
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MacDonald had however, while still in opposition, denounced 
the March 1923 Deportations and moreover Labour had 
officially condemned these deportations which had cul­
minated in O'Brien and McGrath's trial. It was also their 
misfortune to come to power just as the Compensation Trib­
unal, that they had in opposition forced the Government 
to establish,began its hearings. And so for several 
weeks the press carried numerous details of the ill treat­
ment of the deportees who no doubt somewhat exaggerated 
their accounts in some cases in a bid to gain increased 
compensation. The Labour Government Ministers who had, in 
opposition ;waxed eloquently about the rights of the depor­
tees to proper compensation were now privately pressurized
by their Treasury officials to make strenuous efforts to
2keep the awards as low as possible , while being forced pub­
licly into the invidious position of combatting their back­
benchers efforts to withold payment of fees to the former
3
Attorney General for his erroneous legal advice - a 
course advocated by Labour leaders themselves while in 
opposition.
All of this supplemented by a vigorous campaign of protest
4
meetings addressed by MPs like John Scurr and appeals from
1 Cabinet 31(23), 13 June, 1923, CAB 23/48.
2 Letter from Treasury Solicitor, 22 Jan., 1924, TS 27/181.
3 Times, 20 March, 1924.
4 Catholic Herald, 3 May, 1924.
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Irish Trade Unions'*" concerning prisoners originally sen­
tenced in Northern Ireland and transferred from its over-
2
crowded prisons to British jails, ensured that the Govern­
ment could not simply sweep the issues under the carpet of 
Number Ten. Playing for time it informed its irate back­
benchers that it was necessary to set up an internal in­
quiry to consider the legal position of the proposed amn­
esty and as a sign of its good faith released Joseph 
Dowling, whose release the Cabinet had been told in the 
last ever Report on Revolutionary Organizations circulated
to all Ministers, would be "welcomed by many of the Irish 
3
in England". Dowling's case showed just how sensitively
the issue of the Irish Political Prisoners was regarded in
establishment circles. A former British soldier imprisoned
4in 1918 for espionage his release had been specifically
1 "Let MacDonald and the British Labour Party live up
to the principles of International Labour and open the 
gaol gates on May Day", telegram from Dublin Trade's 
Council, Times, 26 April, 1924.
2 The number of Northern Ireland prisoners in British 
jails is not precisely known but they appear to have 
numbered at least forty. There were at least twenty 
imprisoned in Peterhead in Scotland, see the Daily 
Sheet, 6 Nov. 192 3, and another twenty are known to
have been transferred to prisons in the South of England - 
see the Metropolitan Police arrangements for this transfer 
in March 1923 - MEPOL, 2/1884.
3 ROR 238, 10 Jan., 1924, CP 21(24), CAB 24/164.
4 Dowling was recruited into Casement's ill fated Irish 
Brigade in a POW Camp in Germany and landed by U boat 
in Ireland - see the file on Dowling's trial and sub­
sequent prison correspondence - O'Brien, Ms. 8456.
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forbidden by the War Office when it reluctantly agreed that the
Connaught Rangers should be freed,.after an appeal from
Cosgrove that without this measure his "Amnesty for
British Military Offences Bill" would not be passed by the
Senate.^ And as recently as July 1923 the Cabinet had
decided not to release Dowling despite a specific request
2
from the Free State Government.
Dowling's release aroused strong feelings in the Home 
Office which drew up a position paper listing a number of
3
reasons why O'Brien and McGrath should not be released.
Arthur Henderson,the Home Secretary who had served in the 
Wartime Administration responsible for the execution of 
the 1916 Rising leaders,agreed with his civil servants' 
advice,just as he subsequently refused to reinstate the 
dismissed 1919 Police Strikers even though this had been 
officially promised by Labour when in opposition.^ Accor­
dingly he was only prepared to recommend to the Cabinet 
that O'Brien and McGrath should be upgraded to the status 
of First Division Prisoners for the remainder of their
1 Cabinet 71(22), 19 Dec., 1922 and Cabinet 72(22), 29 Dec., 
1922, CAB 23/32.
2 Cabinet Conclusion, 20 July, 1923, CAB 23/45.
3 ‘Irish Political Prisoners in Britain', Home Office Memo , 
CP 214(24), CAB 24/166.
4 'Reinstatement of Dismissed Police Officers', CP 230(24), 
CAB 24/166.
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sentence.^ But this concession only served, if anything, 
to intensify the Labour backbenchers campaign to free 
the two•for the category of First Division,with its privi­
leges of no compulsory work and better conditions, was as
near as English law has ever got to recognizing the status
2
of 'Political Prisoner1 - a category the Home Office was
3
now particularly loath to see preserved. Henderson tried
for several months to ride out the backbench discontent
but only a fortnight after assuring the House of Commons
of his intention to ignore a number of petitions received
4from Labour organizations, he recommended the Cabinet to 
release O'Brien and McGrath. His argument that the release 
of De Valera by the Free State Government now made a simi­
lar move possible in Britain/;which might substantially help
5
the progress of the Boundary Commission , appear only to 
have served as a pretext to conceal his surrender to back­
bench pressure. The other four prisoners sentenced with 
O'Brien and McGrath for specific arms offences were not 
amnestied as they had almost completed their shorter sen­
tences and several of the IRA members,imprisoned several
1 Cabinet 30(24), 7 May, 1924, CAB 23/47 and Home Office 
letter to Geraldine O'Brien, O'Brien Ms. 8427.
2 The category of First Division Prisoner was established 
under Section 40 of the 1877 Prison Act.
3 CP 214(24), ibid.
4 175 H.C. Debs 5. Col/ 2450f
5 Cabinet 43(24), 22 July, 1924, CAB 24/48.
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years beforeJremained in jail until 1930.^ Henderson
claimed that he had no authority to release the Northern
Ireland sentenced prisoners as this was a matter for the
2Northern Irish Government but it was undoubtedly the 
subordinate legislature and most of these men were in 
fact released on the instructions of the British Government
3
as part of the 1925 Boundary Settlement.
1 An Phoblacht, 10 Hay, 1930 and 3 Jan., 1931.
2 Times, 25 Oct., 1924.
3 The Boundary Commission's proposal that both Northern 
and Southern Ireland should lose territory found little 
favour and the Free State agreed to recognize the 
existing frontier line in return for the reduction of 
its financial obligations under the Treaty and the 
release of the Northern Ireland sentenced prisoners
in British jails; see Cabinets 55, 56, 57 and 58 of 
November-December 1925, CAB 2 3/51, Cabinet
1(26), 19 Jan., 1926, CAB 23/53 and for the Irish 
see S 1810.
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CHAPTER 23
The Death of the ISDL: Murder or Euthanasia?
1
Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath stepped out of Brixton^ into 
a barrage of allegations - and recriminations. They emerged 
to find a very different political scene from the one 
they had involuntarily left the previous. July. Then there 
had been a moribund Pro-Treaty rSDL and a much reduced but 
still functioning Anti-Treaty ISDL with a few Sinn Fein 
clubs scattered across England; now the Pro-Treaty ISDL 
had apparently gone out of existence, while much of the 
surviving Anti-Treaty ISDL membership had joined the new 
Irish Freedom League founded by some of the ISDL Emer­
gency Committee officers and Sinn Fein club members.
Art O'Brien subsequently wrote that he emerged to find the
Republican Movement in England had completely disinte- 
2grated and while this was certainly somewhat of an ex­
aggeration, his own personal position in the Republican 
hierarchy had been subject to a devastating series of 
attacks as a result of his imprisonment in July 1923. 
O'Brien's salary as Republican Representative in London
3
had been stopped and . then a further sign that this
action had been taken not merely because of hi& inability 
to continue his duties was provided by the decision of 
the newly appointed Republican Government, in August 1924
1 Times, 24 July, 1924.
2 O'Brien Ms 8460.
3 S1605 (SPO).
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i.e. after O'Brien’s release, to terminate his appoint­
ment as an overseas Representative of the Irish Republic.^ 
Brian Hannigan who,had temporarily replaced O'Brien Was 
now confirmed as his successor.
The Irish Freedom League,formed in London early in 1924 , 
appears largely to have been Hannigan's initiative, pre­
sumably acting on instruction from the Republican leader­
ship in Ireland. In its first policy statement the new 
League appealed to "all lovers of freedom in Great
Britain" for their aid in •’’'assisting to secure the Inde-
2
pendence of the Irish, nation". From his prison cell 
O'Brien immediately wrote to a friend condemning the new
3
organization and the following month,along with McGrath, 
issued a statement claiming that the new organization 
could not do anything the ISDL was incapable of doiAg. But 
O'Brien clearly identified the very different nature 
of the new organization when he subsequently complained;
"A Republican title for the organization was heatedly 
refused and .the constitution of the new organization was
'5
drafted studiously avoiding any mention of the Republic". 
The organizers/’Of the new Irish Freedom League justified
1 Gaughan; Stack, op. cit. , 219.
2 Freeman's, jou r na 1 , 1 Feb. , 1924. Times, 12 Feb. , 1924.
3 Letter 8 Feb., 1924. O'Brien Ms 8433,
4 O'Brien Ms 8427.
5 O'Brien to Sinn Fein Head Office, Dublin, 5 May, 1925,
Ms 84 31.
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their actions by claiming that Justice Swift's remarks r0n 
the probable illegality of any organization openly sup­
porting an Irish Republic,required the dissolution of 
the ISDL in favour of a new organization constitutionally 
so defined that it would be within the law. Yet Joe 
Fowler,the Vice President of the Irish Freedom League} 
had advised the remaining ISDL branches that they should 
transform themselves into autonomous Independent Republi­
can Clubs. Fowler appears to have held the opinion that 
the outlook. for: the Republican movement both in Ireland 
and Britain was now so bleak that there was now no prosr 
pect of recruiting new members^ in any numbers and the 
most that could be done w as to encourage small groups of 
dedicated Republicans to band together in the antici­
pation of better days to come.
These better days seemed to be on the way a, lot sooner 
than Fowler and Republicans generally in Ireland had 
dared to hope. Sinn Fein surprized the press., and no 
doubt itself, by winning over twice the number of pre­
dicted seats in the September 1923 Dail General Election.^
Their 27% of the poll,giving them 44 seats in the 153 seat
/
Dail, left the Cummann na Gheadheal Government,with only 
63 seats,in a minority position and was a particularly 
impressive performance, especially considering that most 
of Sinn Fein's candidates were still in prison. The
1 Irish Independent, 5 Sept., 1923.
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Government Party had lost much, support through. its deter­
mination to pay the estimated £47 million the Civil War 
had cost^ out of its current expenditure and by its stated 
policy not to create budget deficits. Reductions in 
social welfare expenditure accompanied by tough,even
chilling, speeches that people might actually have to die
2of "starvation" cost the Government much of its earlier 
support but the unexpected rise of the Sinn Rein vote 
indicated a much stronger basic Republican bedrock sup­
port than had previously been realized.
One result of this election was' the dramatic mushrooming
of Sinn Rein from a mere 106 cumainn at the time of the
3election to 729 by November 1923. But the expenses of 
contesting the election had been very high and the further 
expansion of Sinn Rein required the employment of full 
time officials.which the organization could not finance 
by its own fund raising in Ireland,at a time when the 
Republican Movement desperately needed money to finance 
the rebuilding of the IRA and aid the dependents of the 
many members still imprisoned. So Sinn Rein reorganized 
the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish
1 MacArdle, op. cit., 861.
2 "There are certain limited funds at our disposal, people 
may have to die in:this country and may have to die 
through starvation'V Patrick McGilligan, Free State 
Minister of Healthy Dail Debates, Col. 562, (9'0ec. , 
1924)..
3 Sinn Fein Funds Case, Evidence Book 22, 7, (PRO, Dublin).
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Republic to raise funds in America, ^  Pyne claims that Sinn
Fein decided it also needed a much broader based fund
raising organization in Britain than the demoralized ISDL
and thus created the Irish Freedom League with the "primary
function of keeping the Republican Party and Government
supplied with funds which were essential if the Movement
2was to continue to function effectively".
The formation of the Irish Freedom League coincided with
an event in Ireland that momentarily led Republicans to
believe that "the death rattle can already be heard in
3
the throat of the Free State Government", In pursuance of
its rigid economy drive the Free State Government slashed
4its Army by some 43,000 in the first year after the 
Civil War. Discontent simmered throughout the Army; parti­
cularly among officers who had fought in the War of Inde­
pendence and alleged, with considerable justification,that 
the guerrilla veterans were being passed over in favour of 
the more recent recruits who had gained their military ex­
perience in the British Army. But the Army Mutiny of 1924
1 The new A. A.R.I.R. claimed 25,000 members joined in its 
first year, Irish Independent, 3 Mar., 1925.
2 Peter Pyne, 'The New Irish State and The Decline of 
the Republican Sinn Fein Party, 1923-26, Eire-ireland, 
9(1976), 33-65.
3 Eire, 29 Mar., 1924.
4 Catholic Herald, 31 May, 1924.
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involved far more than mere concern for jobs."*" It was,
essentially an attempt by the IRB to regain the loss of
political influence it had suffered since Collin's death.
The leading mutineers,who included some of the most senior
officers,indicated their sympathy for a more Republican
orientated Government. For a period a new Civil War,with
a somewhat different line up than in the previous one,
seemed all too "possible and although the Mutiny eventually
fizzled out without any any real bloodshed; the episode
resulted in the resignation of two of the most prominent
members of the Government who had appeared to sympathize
with the Mutineers1 cause. The Pro-Treaty section of the
IRB,now largely confined to National Army officers,was
dissolved by Government order and some months later the
IRA also wearying of the presence of a rival secret oath.
bound organization ordered the dissolution of the Anti- 
3
Treaty IRB, an action which both Art O'Brien and Sean 
McGrath appear to have opposed.
In the event the Irish Freedom League seems to have raised
1 T.D. Williams(ed.), Secret Societies/ °P* cit., 149,
2 Major General Liam Tobin, The Truth about the Army Crisis, 
(Dublin, 1924). Report of the Army Inquiry Committee, 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/1 and also see Boxes 69-70.
3 John O'Beirne Ranelagh, 'The IRB from the Treaty to 
1924' , Irish Historical Studies/ 20, (1976)/77), 26-39. 
Joseph. M. Curran, 'The Decline and Fall of the IRB',
Eire-Ireland, 10(1975), 14-23.
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no substantial funds for Sinn Fein and so it was dissolved
a year later. The prevailing circumstances proved highly
unfavourable for any new Irish political organization as
even the established cultural organizations were having
a very hard time. The Gaelic League in London reported
its lowest membership for twenty years with hardly any
beginners in its language classes'*- while the Gaelic Athle-
2tic Association lost a third of its clubs during 1923, 
and far fewer people than previously were now attending
3
its games. Elsewhere in England the GAA had now no clubs
left functioning in Birmingham, Manchester and Newcastle,
4hitherto strongly organized areas.
Very little material survives concerning the strength of 
the Irish Freedom League or even its activities, but the 
organization is .unlikely to have had more than a thousand 
members and probably substantially less than that figure. 
Hampstead with 150 members appears to have been its largest
5
branch. The nevr organization did manage to incorporate 
most of those former ISDL branches which had transformed 
themselves into Republican Clubs. The IFL also managed
1 London Gaelic League Annual Report for 1924, O'Brien 
Ms 8458. Freemanrs ’Jourha1 , 27 May, 1923.
2 Catholic Herald, 22 Dec., 1923.
3 Ibid., 21 June, 1924.
4 Ibid., 12 Jan., 1924.
5 Eire, 18 Oct., 1924.
to establish some-new branches in areas like Pontypridd 
where the ISDL had been such a strong force in the pre- 
Treaty days. Other ISDL branches however refused to 
affiliate to the new IFL; the six surviving branches in the 
Tyneside area pursued a virtually autonomous existence but 
branches in Fulham and Swansea which had ceased to function 
were reorganized-* by O'Brien's supporters in late 1924 .
On his release from prison, O'Brien decided he had tO/at
the earliest opportunity,counter the allegations made against
him; word of which had reached him after Brian Hapnigan and
Tomas O'Sullivan had visited his fellow prisoner Anthony
Mullarkey to inform him of De Valera's disquiet over O'Brien
3and McGrath's evidence at the trial. This policy led him
into a head-on collision with the leadership of the Republican
Movement as O'Bjrien had on his release from Brixton been
specifically instructed by their Minister of Foreign Affairs
not to make any comment until the Republican Government had
4fully investigated his conduct. De Valera himself subse­
quently wrote to O'Brien 1
"you must surely realize that the statements 
attributed to you in the public press at the 
time of your trial could have no other end than 
the destruction of all confidence in you, either 
as Republican Representative or as President of 
the ISDL.'1
1 Eire, 18 Oct., 1924.
2 Ibid., 8 Nov., 1924.
3 Memo, ‘Conversation with Anthony Mullarkey'(Wormwood 
Scrubs) - O'Brien Ms 8427.
4 See letter from O'Brien to 'De Valera 5 May, 1925. O'Brien 
Ms 8431.
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As well as accusing O'Brien of making these "unworthy and
unwise statements" De Valera also complained,
"your plunging widely into extravagant expenses 
in connection with your legal defence, not only 
without orders but in direct contravention of 
this, was equally unwarrantable
The issue of O'Brien's legal expenses was extremely contro­
versial for there does appear to be evidence indicating that 
at least the earlier expenditure3relating to the Habeas
Corpus proceedings,had in fact been authorized by the Repub-
2
lican leadership. This issue had also produced consider­
able ill feeling between O'Brien and McGrath and their fel­
low deportees over mutual allegations that the other party 
had refused to pay an agreed proportion of their compensation
3
to offset the legal costs not covered by the Tribunal awards.
In the circumstances O'Brien's action in convening a meeting 
to unify the Republican Movement in Britain, for the purpose 
of personally presenting his defence,was in effect a direct 
challenge to the Republican leadership in Ireland and was 
seen by them as a bid to appeal to the rank and file member­
ship of the various Anti-Treaty organizations in England
1 Letter 10 Sept., 1924, O'Brien Ms 8460. ^
2 P. Rutledge,the Republican Minister of Home Affairs, wrote
to the Adjutant General (IRA) advising him that the dep­
ortees should take no legal action until the "Art O'Brien test 
case is concluded" as "proceedings will be very costly"
(30 March, 1923). This letter was captured and published 
in the Freeman's Journal 11 April, 192 3.
3 "It is to be regretted that the liabilities incurred by
Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath have not been fully dis­
charged" - Irish Deportees Association,- Statement of 
Account 16 Aoril, 1925* vILB 300. 12. (NLI). For 
O'Brien's position see Obituary written by Sean McGrath 
in United Ireland, October 1949.
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over the heads of most of the local leaders. The extent 
to which a once united and strong movement had fragmented 
can be seen from the invitation list. For the ISDL alone, 
invitations were extended to the new Provisional Executive, 
which had been organized after the formation of the Irish 
Freedom League, the pre-deportations Executive Council and 
its successor the Emergency Committee, together with the 
London District Committee, almost the one and same grouping. 
The twenty-four branches known to have been still function--; 
ing prior to the deportations were also invited to send del­
egates, as were any branches still in existence at the time 
of the meeting. The Committee and branches of the Irish 
Freedom League were also invited to send their representa­
tives together with London Sinn Fein, which apparently had 
recommenced its activities after a period of inaction. 
Invitations were also extended to the 0 1 Donovan Rossa Repub­
lican Club, the Deportees Association, their Defence Commit­
tee and O'Brien’s fellow trial defendants} Such a meeting • 
was unlikely to achieve anything positive for the invitation 
list included people who O'Brien claimed were "bitterly and 
maliciously and personally opposed to the President and 
Secretary of the ISDL" and accused them of assuming control 
of the Irish Freedom League, the Ro ger. Casement Sinn Fein
2Club, the Deportees Association and their Defence Committee.
In the event O'Brien's principal opponents, Brian Hannigan
1 See Report of Meeting to Unify the Republican Movement 
in Britain (Central Hall, Westminister, Oct. 1924).
O'Brien Ms 8432.
2 O'Brien to De Valera 5 May, 1925. O'Brien Ms 8431.
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and Joe Fowler, the President and Vice President respect­
ively of the Irish Freedom League, Seamas Nunan,the Presi­
dent of the Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club,did not attend 
the meeting but they sent Thomas O'Sullivan and Fintan 
Murphy to represent their viewpoint. The meeting was a 
heated one with O'Brien claiming the ISDL had been deliber­
ately destroyed and 0' Sullivan and Murphy suggesting that 
they had three choices of action before them; the ISDL and 
IFL could merge together under one of the existing titles, 
both could end their existence and form Sinn Fein Clubs or 
they could form a totally new organization. They made it 
very clear however that whatever happened they were not pre­
pared to work in any organization having O'Brien and McGrath 
as its officers. The meeting ended inconclusively on a bit­
ter note'!' having only served to publicly highlight the bitter 
divisions that had developed between O'Brien and McGrath 
and the new Republican leadership in England. A repeat,if 
less public,rerun of the controversy occurred the following 
week at the Roger Casement Sinn Fein Club meeting when George 
Mortimer defended O'Brien and McGrath who,though members, 
had not been invited to the meeting. His stance was strongly
opposed by Father O'Connell, Fintan Murphy, P.D. O'Hart and 
2
Sean Nunan. Another member, Eileen Kennedy complained to the 
Sinn Fein Head Office in Dublin about the open hostility
3
to O'Brien . -The Cathai Brugha Sinn Fein Club in Manches-
4
ter also intimated their support for O'Brien and McGrath.
1 Report, ■ I Oct., 1924 . O'Brien Ms 8432.
2 O'Brien Ms 8431.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., Ms 8419.
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In the midst of this controversy the ISDL lost their London
premises as a result of a campaign waged against the organ-
1ization by the right wing publication the Patriot. Despite 
all of this, there were some signs that the ISDL was recrui­
ting some members from the Irish Freedom League as a result 
of an intens if ication of branch act ivities., aided by the 
decision of Eire to accent paid advertisements inserted by 
the ISDL. But at the end of 1924, Eire which had transferred 
its production to Dublin was discontinued in favour of inc­
reasing the circulation of Sinn .Fein which refused to take
2any paid advertisements from the ISDL. A letter from Art
O'Brien to De Valera complaining of this new policy went
unanswered. A letter from the ISDL Executive to Sinn Fein
Head Office in Dublin inquiring about Sinn Fein's attitude 
3 *to the ISDL did elicit the perfunctory reply "it is our
intention to organize Sinn Fein curmains. all over
Britain and so organize all Irish Republicans into one org-
4amzation m  Britain". The ISDL Executive replying "in
a spirit of friendly but frank criticism" suggested that
"whilst the Republican Movement here suffered 
very considerably from the evil results of the 
Treaty and subsequent attacks of the British 
Government culminating in the deportations of 
1923, the present deplorable conditions has been 
mainly brought about by the more recent mishandl­
ing of affairs and interference from your side of the 
water"
1 The Patriot 9 Oct., 1924.
2 10 Jan., 1925a O'Brien Ms 8431.
3 16 Jan., 1925, Ibid.
4 Sinn Fein to ISDL/ 29 Jan., 1925 , O'Brien Ms 8431.
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and requested an immediate conference between the Sinn Fein
1
and ISDL.leadership. When the Sinn Fein leadership refused 
2
this request, the ISDL Executive then demanded a proper
3reply to their earlier letters but were bluntly told that
4this, letter was "intended to be a final and conclusive reply" .
De Valera however personally subsequently wrote to Art
O'Brien and Sean McGrath informing them that,
"the state of the Republican Movement in Britain 
has been a constant cause of anxiety to us since 
July last. The differences that exist over there, 
their origin and suggested proposals for bringing 
them to an end have been considered time after time 
not only by the Standing Committee of Sinn
Fein but by the Cabinet and I have to inform you 
now that both bodies have unanimously decided that 
they will henceforth recognize but one Republican 
organization in Britain - Sinn Fein and they 
hereby revoke whatever recognitions express or 
implied, they may have at any time accorded to any 
other organization there including the ISDL."^
The specific dating of "July last" as the start of the pro­
blems encountered by the Republican Movement in Britain was
6as O'Brien and McGrath quickly retorted a definite assump­
tion that their release had sparked off the controversy and 
fragmented the Movement. But De Valera did end on a concil­
iatory note by suggesting
"it would be particularly painful were I to 
believe that any of the members of the ISDL 
who worked loyally for the cause of the Republic 
since 1919 would by this decision be cut off from 
communion with the main body there"
1 ISDL to Sinn Fein, 25 March, 1925, O'Brien Ms 8431,
2 30 March, 1925, ibid.
3 8 April, 1925, ibid.
4 5 May, 1925, ibid.
5 De Valera to O'Brien and McGrath, 20 Aoril, 1925, O'Brien
Ms 8431.
6 O'Brien and McGrath to De Valera, 5 May, 1925, ibid.
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This was a clear indication that both could expect to rem­
ain members of Sinn Fein if they agreed to the remaining
1ISDL branches becoming Sinn Fein cummains,
O'Brien and McGrath were not however impressed by De Valera's
appeal to their loyalty and bluntly informed him that
"the question of recognition or nonrecognition 
of the ISDL is in the condition of relations 
now existing, rather an academic one"
and accused the Sinn Fein leadership of an attitude
"so discourteous, so obviously hostile and so 
wanting in any frankness that if we adopted 
your suggestion we should feel rather like 
the lamb lying down by the side of the lion."
They also put forward the more pertinent suggestion that
the experience of the last few years had shown that for "a
political organization to be effective here, it must be self
contained and self controlled, though affiliated in some
2way and working m  harmony with the organization at home". 
This was an extremely important observation, but unfortuna­
tely the significance of this new evolution in thinking \ 
about the nature of the relationship between Homeland and 
Exile political organizations was lost sight of in the long 
list of complaints made by O'Brien and McGrath. It however 
became one of the guiding principles adopted by the Connolly 
Association,formed in the next decade,and which claimed to 
be the inheritor of the ISDL's mantle. De Valera very brus­
quely replied to O'Brien and McGrath's complaints of their
1 De Valera, 20 April, 1925, O'Brien Ms 8431.
2 O'Brien and McGrath to De Valera 5 May, 1925 , O'Brien 
Ms 84 31.
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1
treatment by Sinn Fein when they sought his permission to
2
publish their correspondence m  a Republican paper but by 
this time Sinn Fein had been forced itself to cease public­
ation owing to a chronic lack of funds. It is probable that 
the financial, plight of Sinn Fein in Ireland was the deci­
sive factor in the new policy of reorganizing Republican 
supporters in Britain under the banner of Sinn Feinrwith 
the intention that they should along with the American 
AARIR .- which was supplying 70% of the Irish organization's
3
finances - be primarily responsible for the Republican
Movement's financial needs. By mid-1924 Sinn Fein in Ireland
4had over a thousand branches but the process of rapid decay 
had already started; aided by the inability of the organi­
zation to generate enough funds to create the infrastructure 
necessary to maintain its earlier momentum. The policy of 
abstentionism from Dail Eireann proved unpopular with the 
electorate and as Sinn Fein failed to build on its earlier 
electoral successes (and it in fact suffered considerable 
reverses in the June 1925 local Government elections, getting
5
only 11% of the seats ) many members became demoralized and 
fell away. With Sinn Fein failing to fulfil its early pro­
mise many local IRA officers began instructing their volun­
teers to withdraw their services from an organization that
1 De Valera to O'Brien and McGrath 18 May, 1925 , O’Brien, Ms 8433
2 9 June, 1925, ibid.
3 Report (leaked) of the 1925 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis,
Catholic Herald 21 Nov., 1925.
4 Sinn Fein, 7 June, 1924.
5 Voice of Labour, 18 July, 1925.
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1
seemed to have little future. This local practice was for-
2
mally ratified in November 1925 by the Army Council. Sinn 
Fein's Director of Organization frankly admitted at its Ard
Fheis, held later that month, "the Organization is not in a
. . . . 3healthy condition and is moribund m  many areas." The
number of branches affiliated to Head Office had dropped
by over half since the previous year's Ard Fheis and only
just over 200 of the 380 branches represented were consid-
4
ered to be really functioning.
It is in this context of an organization undergoing rapid 
internal decline,in a political environment that had almost 
overnight become much more hostile, and about to lose the 
-support of its former military ally,that De Valera's bitter 
attack on O'Brien and McGrath should be interpreted. His 
action was essentially an attempt by a once powerful leader 
to reassert an authority that was being steadily eroded on 
all sides and the unpopular ISDL leaders provided him with 
an easy target for this exercise. Despite De Valera's claims 
that O'Brien and McGrath had "let the Republic down" by 
insisting from the Old Bailey dock the Republic could no 
longer be maintained by military action:They had in fact 
more or less only followed the line laid down,over a month 
before their trial, by De Valera himself in his end of the
1 Irish Independent, 27 Jan., 1925.
2 See Peadar O'Donnell There Will Be Another Day,(Dublin, 
1963) 35-6.
3 Catholic Herald, 21 Nov., 1925.
4 Voice of Labour, 28 Nov., 1925.
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Civil War message to the:
"Soldiers of the Republic, legion of the Rear­
guard. The Republic can no longer be defended 
successfully by your arms. Further sacrifice 
of life would now be in vain and continuance 
of the struggle in arms unwise in the national 
interest and prejudicial to the future of our 
cause. Military victory must be allowed to 
rest for the moment with those who have destroyed 
the Republic. Other means must be sought to 
safeguard the nation's right".^-
From its formation the ISDL had,as we have observed,incurred
the hostility of some Sinn Fein members who believed that
the new organization had been founded at the expense of Sinn
Fein. As long as the ISDL had the personal support of De
Valera their hostility remained impotent but once De Valera
turned against O'Brien and McGrath then the remnants of the
ISDL were exposed to the unleashed fury of its Sinn Fein
opponents,particularly at a time when their Irish leadership
desperately required funds which past experience suggested
might be provided from Britain.
The Irish Freedom League, intended from its formation as 
no more than a temporary half way house for Sinn Fein, imm­
ediately complied with De Valera's instructions and dissol­
ved its branches into new Sinn Fein clubs but many of its 
members refused tojoin these new organizations. Austin 
Stack,the General Secretary of Sinn Fein,travelled to Britain 
during May 1925 to supervise this process but met with a 
varying response. He managed to reorganize 16 Sinn Fein 
branches in Scotland and established a new Lancashire 
Chomhairle Ceantar to co-ordinate the new branches there.
But he was unable to persuade the Pearse and Casement Clubs 
to establish a similar London committee because of the
1 Macardle, op.cit., 856.
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factionalism that was rife in London. His overall conclu­
sion at the end of his British tour was the rather gloomy 
but realistic observation that there was "little promise
1of setting up a really great organization" in the country.
It was an observation that might even have been better app­
lied to the organization in Ireland for its position contin­
ued to deteriorate. One member accused his party's leader­
ship of showing "far too great a leaning towards the form
2instead of towards the reality" but the Sinn Fein leader­
ship were unable to ignore the reality of the Irish political 
situation for much longer. Already a chronic lack of funds 
had forced Sinn Fein to give at least de facto recognition 
to the Irish Free State by initiating legal proceedings in 
its courts to regain the organization's 1918 and 1921 elec­
tion deposits and another 10,000 dollars sent from America 
in 1921 but frozen as a result of the Post-Treaty split.
The question of de jure recognition of the Dail was forced 
upon Sinn Fein when the Boundary Commission crisis developed 
at the end of 1925. Established under the Treaty, the 
Commission had been popularly expected to transfer a consid­
erable part of Northern Ireland territory and its population 
to theFree State but the Commissioners,instead in their 
unpublished report,recommended a much smaller transfer,accom­
panied by an award of Free State territory and population 
to Northern Ireland. It was a highly embarrassing report 
for the Free State Government and most historians believe
1 Sinn Fein Funds Case, 2B/82/117. 2B/82/117 (PRO, Dublin).
2 Sinn Fein, 21 March, 1925.
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that had'it been published,and the transfer of territory
1
proceeded with,the Government would have fallen. However
both the Northern and Southern Governments agreed to ignore
the Boundary Commission findings; the Northern Government
agreed to release some of its prisoners and the British
removed some of the financial penalties imposed on the Free
2State by the Treaty. The settlement caused deep tensions
within the governing Cumman na Gheadeal party,resulting in
3resignations among its Dail representatives. A united Dail 
opposition might well have forced the vote of no confidence 
which would have resulted in a sudden General .Election but 
the majority of the opposition,belonged to Sinn Fein and 
had consistently refused to take their seats .
Sinn Fein's powerlessness was graphically revealed in this 
episode and as a consequence of the Boundary Crisis, De 
Valera decided to take his Dail seat but not the oath of 
allegiance to the British King. (This was an essential pre­
condition before TDs could vot9 in th9 Dail.). De Valera's 
Proposal was however defeated by hard line 'Republicans ;at
the special Ard Fheis convened to discuss the•Dail entry issue.
4He immediately resigned as Sinn Fern President and as
1 D. Williams, op. cit., 190. Cosgrave himself claimed
his Government would "be swept out of office" if the
Boundary Commission's proposals were carried out - 
Cabinet 55(25), 30 Nov., 1925. CAB 23/51.
2 See Cabinet 55(25), 30 Nov.;- Cabinet 56 (25) , 2 Dec,;' 
Cabinet 57 (25) , " 3 'Dec-. ; .Cabinet 59(25),. 16...Dec.? '1925;
CAB 2 3/51.
3 Mitchell, op. cit., 210-12.
4 Irish Independent, 12 March, 1926.
709
President of the Republican Government when he subsequently was
also defeated on the same issue at a meeting of Conha,irle
na dTeachtai; a body comprised of all the Republican TDs
elected since 1921 and which served as a 'shadow legisla- 
1ture'. So many Sinn Fein members joined De Valera's new
Fianna Fail party that by the summer of 1926 there were only
163 Sinn Fein cuonainn left and the organization's income
2
had been reduced by almost 85% from its 1924 level. The 
following year it lost most of its Dail seats to the new
3
Fianna Fail party in the June 1927 General Election and 
five years later,, when De Valera finally won power, the old 
Sinn Fein party had been reduced to an intransigent rump.
Britain was the area where Sinn Fein was least affected by
the 1926 split that followed the special Ard Fheis as- all
the delegates from the Scottish, Lancashire and London bran-
4ches voted against De Valera's proposal to enter the Dail.
Very few members appear to have defected to the new Fianna 
Fail party; the Roger Casement, London,branch reported that
5
only four of its members had left to join the new party, 
but this was too little to form a branch,and Fianna Fail 
never appears to have been in a position to organize in
1 An Phoblacht, 9 April, 1926.
2 O'Brien, Ms 8417.
3 For the early history of Fianna Fail seeTom Garvin, 'The 
Destiny of the Soldiers: Tradition and Modernity in the 
Politics of De Valera's Ireland', Political Studies, 26 
328-47 and Thomas P. O'Neill 'In Search of a Political 
Path: Irish Republicanism, 1922 to 1927', Historical Studies 
(1976) 167-61.'
4 An Poblacht, 16 April, 1926.
5 Ibid., 24 Sept., 1927.
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Britain though some attempts to do so were made.  ^ In London,
at least,Sinn Fein appears to have met with some modest
success and by the summer of 1927 had expanded to three bran- 
2ches , with the Roger Casement Club claiming its most success-
3
ful year since its formation eleven years before. It 
claimed a sales figure of 2,000 copies of An Poblacht a
4
month and the frequency of references in this paper to 
London Sinn Fein activities indicates that these branches 
were regarded by the organization in Ireland as playing an 
important role in the affairs of a much smaller Sinn Fein.
Members of the ISDL, who had refused to join Sinn Fein in 
the reorganization of early 1925, might have appeared to have 
offered the new Fianna Fail party its best^prospects in 
England but they had already been alienated from De Valera, 
as a result of his treatment of Art O'Brien and Sean 
McGrath ,who had resumed their former positions of President 
and Secretary of the reorganized Provisional Executive.
George Mortimer and Mrs Prosser were the Vice Presidents 
and the remainder of the positions on the Executive were 
filled by members not previously encountered in this manu­
script; Eugene O'Sullivan, Eilis ni Congaile, Maire ni 
Suillerbain and C.J. Lofmark; a further indication of the 
decline of the ISDL. By the summer of 1925 only ten
1 It appears that a few, short lived ,Fianna Fail branches 
were established in Scotland and Lancashire. See An 
Phoblacht, 24 Sept., 1927.
2 An Poblacht, 8 July, 1927.
3 Ibid., 17 Sept., 1927.
4 Ibid., 24 Sept., 1927.
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branches were submitting reports to the Provisional Executive. 
Central London with about 50 members was the largest branch 
left;followed by Fulham with 30 members. Branches in Nelson 
and Burnley were much smaller. Barrow was reduced to 10 
members while the Jarrow and Sunderland branches were barely 
ticking over, Newcastle and Birmingham ISDL then affiliated 
to Sinn Fein‘S and by mid 1926 the ISDL was virtually confined 
to London, with only the reorganized Central London - formed 
by merging two branches - remaining of an organization that 
had several hundred branches throughout England and Wales 
five years before. . One revealing sign of the League's chro­
nic poverty was a letter to a publisher from the Central 
London branch regretting that they were in a position to only
pay one pound inpart payment for a debt of only five pounds
2
and seven shillings. Most of the ISDL's activities from 
1925 onwards seem to have been orientated towards clearing 
the organization's £180 debt owed to the Gaelic League, 
as the rent for premises it had shared with them. The Gaelic 
League had itself become not only much smaller but was now 
much, less political and even though Art O'Brien remained 
its President he was unable to persuade its membership to 
formally support the reception in honour of Archbishop Mannix
3
when he returned to London in 1926. Five years previously, 
Mannix had been greeted by large crowds in every Irish area 
hethad visited throughout Britain. The much lower key rec­
eption accorded to him on his return visit indicated the
1 O'Brien, Ms 84 32.
2 19 March, 1925, O'Brien Ms 8433.
3 Catholic Herald, 3 April, 1926.
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significant down turn there had been in national sentiment
since that first dramatic visit. Only in Liverpool,where
the City Council refused the Reception Committee the use
1of St George'S Hall , was Archbishop Mannix welcomed by any
2sizeable crowds. The venue chosen for the London Reception,
Rotherhithe Town Hall, symbolically indicated the extent
to which the Irish National Movement in London had moved
3
away from the centre of Community activities . The organi­
zation of the preparations for the Reception was further 
marred by Sinn Fein efforts to exclude the ISDL from the 
proceedings.^
An attempt by the ISDL to run a ballot to clear its debts 
provoked such an extreme reaction from the Catholic Herald
5
- it made serious allegations about the misuse of funds that 
Art O'Brien was forced to start proceedings for libel. His 
legal advisors informed Diamond he had gone too far,this
time and so he was obliged to pay O'Brien £600,plus his costs,
6 v in an out of court settlement. It was the last time the
publication ever referred to the Irish Self Determination
League during the two years more the League continued to
1 Catho1ic Hera1d , 24 Oct . t 1925.
2 Ibid., 7 Nov., 1925.
3 Ibid., 14 Nov., 1925.
4 Art O'Brien to Miss M. Flannery, 22 Oct., 1925, O'Brien 
Ms 84 60.
5 Catholic Herald, 9 May, 1925 and 13 June, 1925.
6 See Irish Independent 27 April, 1926, Catholic Herald,
1 May 1926, O'Brien Ms 8433 and the transcript of Art
O'Brien vs. Charles Diamond Libel Hearing in the Sheehy 
Skeffington Papers, Ms 24,171 (1).
713
linger on. To all intents and purposes the ISDL had ceased
to be a political organization; its 'official1 political
1
goal had in Perrow's terminology been totally subordinated
to its 'operative1 goal/which was simply the clearance of
its outstanding debt to the Gaelic League. In this sense
the ISDL was still, but only just, an organization, pursuing
"continuous purposive activity of a specified kind" as def- 
2ined by Weber. But once this debt was cleared could the 
ISDL have any other purpose,sufficiently worthwhile,to jus­
tify its continued existence?
Art O'Brien answered this question in a letter read at the
May 1923 meeting of the Central London Branch - the League's
only surviving one - when he informed the small group that
the League had now finally cleared its debts i
"Now that it has been liquidated, certain energies 
of the organization could in the ordinary 
course be released for other purposes. During 
the three years mentioned (a reference to the 
proceeding review of the 1925-28 period) and 
coincidentally with our efforts to pay off this 
debt, the political situation in Ireland has
undergone very marked changes in directions which,
have further tended to depress our people and this 
renders it more difficult for Irish political 
organizations outside Ireland to devise a pro­
gramme of work which will satisfy the feelings 
of their members and tend to keep them still 
banded together".
Art suggested the ISDL should either cease to exist, or alt­
ernatively pursue a new programme of activities geared to
1 Charles Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in complex Organi­
zations', American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 855.
2 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcot Parsons (New York, 1947), 
145-46.
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increasing its membership but above all else he stressed 
"we must not allow the organization to drift and die of 
inaction". His argument in favour of ceasing activities 
centred around the fact "we are a very small body and cannot 
in the present conditions, hope materially to increase our 
membership" and because "bodies outside Ireland can only 
respond to the tune which is played in Ireland at a time 
of discord , we cannot expect to achieve any very important 
result in continuing our work at present". It was an argu­
ment clearly illustrating O'Brien's insight, gained as a 
result of some thirty years experience in Irish exile poli­
tics, that the success or failure of organizations in Britain 
were inexorably linked in an ebb and flow tide relationship 
to events in Ireland. In contrast to this realistic assess­
ment of the unfavourable prospects for the ISDL,if it did 
decide to continue its.existence, the arguments he presented 
in favour of maintaining the League were all of - a sentimen­
tal, almost nostalgic, character. "We represent the last 
remnants of a world wide Irish movement bearing the same 
name, formed for a purpose not yet achieved" and he sugges­
ted some members might think it was "desirable to preserve 
a name with such an honourable history for the future".
Finally he observed "should we disperse, there is no other
Irish political organization in London to which we can trans-
1
fer our membership": a reference to the bitter dispute
with Sinn Fein and the unattractiveness of Fianna Fail now 
set firmly on a parliamentary course.
1 Letter from Art O'Brien to the Central London ISDL Branch, 
17 May, 1928, O'Brien, Ms 84 36.
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Unfortunately no minutes of this crucial meeting of the 
Central London Branch of the ISDL survive but as the branch 
was never subsequently mentioned in either O'Brien's volum­
inous personal papers or the press, both general or politi­
cal. It is a reasonable inference that the members did accept 
O'Brien's recommendations to wind up the Irish Self Determ­
ination League which had come into existence nine years 
before,in . a blaze of publicity, flaming from a cauldron 
of activity but departed with a barely audible sigh,:r not 
a bang, leaving few traces of its existence. The Connolly 
Association which had by incorporating the subsidiary title 
"and Irish Self Determination League" into its name claimed 
a rather tenuous line of descent from the earlier organiz­
ation,- observed in.a -,1950 review of the Irish milieu in
Lancashire, "the remnants of the old Self Determination
1
League even now linger in the district". It has proved 
impossible to verify this claim but it is quite possible 
that it was a reference to one of the branches which are 
known to have opted for an autonomous existence, as an ISDL 
branch,in 1924, rather than become Republican or Sinn Fein 
Clubs. Such a branch might well still have been in existence 
even in 1950,though as a social rather than a political org­
anization^ particularly if it had its own premises serving 
as a focal point for the local community of Irish descent. 
Lancashire has become the 'Atlantis'' of Irish organizations 
in Britain, preserving them in a time warp long after they 
have ceased to exist elsewhere,as I discovered myself while 
covering the 1981 Warrington By-Election. In search of some
1 Irish Democrat, September 1950.
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'colour' of interest to an Irish readership I walked through 
a maze of terraced streets ,with names l.ike'O'Leary and Ireland ■ 
Streets bearing witness to the mid- 18th century Irish immi­
grants, who were their first inhabitants,until I saw a large 
building, painted in green, white and gold - the Irish r 
national colours - standing by itself amid a large tract 
of a recent slum clearance. It was the Warrington Irish 
National League Club, still a flourishing social club even 
though there were hardly any Irish born members left.^ Else­
where in Lancashire there are other Irish National League 
Clubs pursuing an independent existence, a century after 
their formation as part of the United Irish League's pre­
decessor and there is even a federation of Irish Democratic 
Clubs loosely linking for social purposes the remnants of
2
the network established by Michael .Davitt the Fenian leader. 
In Chapter 28 we will consider the legacy bequeathed to 
the subsequent generations of the Irish, in Britain by the 
ISDL and the UIL.
1 For a more detailed account, see my article in the Sunday 
Tribune. 12 July, 1981. ^This Warrington'.Club held a.conference to 
collect funds for Northern Ireland Relief in 1971 - Irish 
Democrat, November 1971.
2 There are 15 Irish Democratic League Clubs in Lancashire 
and Yorkshire which according to the Irish Post, 26 June 
1976 have started to take a new interest in Irish affairs. 
The Halifax Irish Democratic League Club has 7 00 members 
and was building a large extension, Irish Post, 28 Feb., 
1976. The Bradford Irish Democrat League Club claimed 
that its 1934 rule book required all members to be Roman 
Catholics when it was taken to court under the 1976 Race 
Relations Act for refusing a Hindu membership , Guardian
11 June, 19 80.
717
Part VII 'Behind Enemy Lines': The IRA in Britain, 1916- 
23
We have so far in this thesis only encountered the IRA units 
in Britain in the role- of walk-on players on a stage domi­
nated by the ISDL. But in any final balance sheet the IRA 
units in Britain played a much more important role in the 
creation of the Irish Free State than the much larger ISDL. 
Moreover it is this creation of 'indigenous1 guerrilla 
units fighting on a 'second front'in the metropolitan coun­
try that so separates and distinguishes the historical exp­
eriences and the political sociology of the Irish in Britain 
from other ethnic groups in this country. Because the amount 
and range of data concerning the IRA in Britain is so large 
and varied I have decided to group it together in a complete 
and separate section of this thesis. We have already obs­
erved some especially notable IRA operations in Britain 
but now in Chapters 24 and 25 we will place them in their 
strategical and tactical context: before assessing, in Chap­
ter 26, their effectiveness and their impact on British 
society. Finally in Chapter 27 we will complement our inv­
estigation, in Chapter 11, of the ISDL membership by exam­
ining the socio-economic composition of IRA volunteers in 
Britain.
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CHAPTER 24
Bringing The War Home: Fighting For Irish Freedom In' Britain;
1916-21.
In this section it is necessary to depart from our 
policy of focussing our analysis on the Irish in 
England and Wales and to include a consideration of 
the contribution made by the Irish in Scotland to 
the Irish military activities in Britain. For though 
the Irish Self Determination League was confined to 
England and Wales, the respective military organizations, 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Irish Republican 
Army, for operational purposes, regarded the whole 
of Britain as an integrated command,area. In particular 
the important munitions supply system, with collection 
points from Scotland to Wales was centralized in 
Liverpool and the other Northern ports as the principal 
distributive outlets to Ireland.1
1 Much of the background to the munition supply network 
was obtained from:
(a) The letters from Michael Collins to Ned Kerr,
Steve Lanigan and Peter Daly in Liverpool, Joe 
Vize in Glasgow and Sean McGrath who organized the 
system in their respective areas. These letters cover 
the period 1919-1921 and form 11 bulky files P7/A/1
to 11 in the General Mulcahy papers (U.C.D.).
A code was employed to conceal - not very successfully - 
the nature of the communications. In this code 
Glasgow referred to ammunition as "fairy tales", rifles 
as "long stories" and revolvers as "short stories" 
while in London munitions were known as "literature" 
ammunition as "leaves", revolvers as "volumes", rifles 
"bound volumes".and machine guns as "super bound 
volumes". In both codes gelignite was "soft stuff".
(b) The depositions of Edward Roche, Martin Geraghty, 
Martin Walsh, Tom McCormick, contained in File
PI7a/154, O ’Malley Papers (U.C.D.).
(c)The depositions of Hugh Early, file P17b/110,
Sean McGrath , file P17b/100, Dennis Brennan, file
contd,
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The oldest and ultimately- most important Irish 
military organization in Britain was the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, a cellular structured organ­
ization relying more on quality of personnel than 
quantity. Virtually from the moment of its origin in 
1858, the IRB had maintained a considerable presence 
in Britain. It or its offshoots had engaged in military 
activities in Britain in the 1860’s and the 1880’s,^
contd,
P17b/100, Billy Ahearne, file P17b/99, ibid.
(d) IRA Chemical Department Report (1921-1923),
P17a/29, ibid.
(e) IRA London Diary 1919-1923, file P17a/51, ibid.
1 The history of the IRB and its relationship with its 
American counterpart - the Fenian Brotherhoodlater 
to become Clan na Gael-is extremely complex and it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to delineate 
the tortuous course pursued by the IRB/Clan na 
Gael between 1856 and 1916. Splits and factions 
within the organization were not uncommon, particularly 
in England, where a strong splinter Irish National 
Brotherhood was established in the 1890's. At the 
risk of oversimplification the 1867 operations in 
England, the attempted seizure of Chester Castle, 
the Manchester Prison Van escape, the Clerkenwell 
blast can be attributed to the IRB organization 
controlled from Ireland. On the other hand the 
1884/5 Dynamite Campaign in England was basically 
. the work of the American Clan na Gael, or rather a 
faction of this. The foremost authority on the 
IRB is Leon O'Broin, who has written two books 
on this subject, Fenian Fever - An Anglo-American 
Dilemma (1971) dealing with the 1860’s period and 
'Revolutionary Underground - The Story of the IRB 
1858-19 24 (1976)*Also see for the 1884/5 campaign 
K.R.M. Short, op. cit.
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but the IRB had also long recognized the value of
infiltrating nominally- innocent organizations during
periods unfavourable for direct action:
“It watched everything, it was in everything"'1'
The apparently constitutional Home Rule Confederation
of Great Britain during the 1870's was in fact
2for a period an IRB controlled organization, while
through a London based cultural front, the Young Ireland
Society siuch famous figures as the poet W.B. Yeats
3
and Maude Gonne were drawn into the IRB,
Numerically the IRB,or its various splinter groups/
was never very strong in Britain. In 1912 it had
4
307 members in Great Britain , and by 1914 there 
were still only 250 IRB members in Scotland and 117 
in England.but these apparently insignificant figures 
should be seen in the context that there were only
5
1660 members in Ireland itself in 1914. In any 
analysis of the influence of small revolutionary 
organizations the IRB merits a high position. Control 
of the military organization, the Irish Volunteers,
1 Quoted in the Preface of O ’Broin’s Revolutionary 
Underground, op. cit. .
2 O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground, op, cit., 12.
3 Ibid; also see P.S. O'Hegarty, 'W.B. Yeats and 
Revolutionary Ireland of his Time' Dublin Magazine 
XIV (1939), 22-4.
4 O ’Broin Revolutionary Underground, op. cit., 86.
5 ' Ibid, 155.
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the cultural organizations, the .Gaelic League,* and
2
the political movement, Sinn Fein, ultimately passed 
into the hands of the IRB, often without the majority 
of members in those organizations realizing that 
they had in effect been co-opted by the IRB.
The IRB in Britain was sufficiently important to
3warrant three seats on the IRB Supreme Council. 
Recruitment was specifically orientated to sectors of 
the economy considered to be of potential military 
value. Docks and shipping lines were key areas'for 
infiltration as was the Postal Service. The young 
Michael Collins, then a Post Office clerk, was sworn 
into the IRB in 1909^ by a fellow Post Office official
1 According to Major Price the Director of Military 
Intelligence, British Army in Ireland Headquarters 
Staff: "They (the IRB) have obtained practically 
full control of the Gaelic League and the Gaelic 
Athletic Association." See Minutes’ of Evidence 
Given to the Royal Commission on the Rebellion in 
Ireland, Col. 8311 (1916), 58. O'BrOi-n goes even 
further than this stating that the IRB so controlled 
the Gaelic League that they were able to appoint as 
League organizers men,%who didn't even speak Irish"' - 
Revolutionary Underground, op. cit., 164-5.
2 Similarly Frank O'Connor claimed that at the import­
ant 1919 Sinn Fein Ard F.eis (annual conference) ,
a considerable number of "delegates' were IRB 
members "who didn’t know until they were told what 
areas they were representing." - Frank O'Connor 
The Big Fellow, (Dublin, 1965), 181.
3 The three 'British' representatives of the Supreme 
Council which ordered the 1916 Rising were Dick ■ 
Connolly (Southern England), Joseph Gleason (Northern 
England) and Pat McCormick (Scotland); see Diarmuid 
Lynch* The IRB and the 1916 Rising, (Cork, 1957),,28.
4 Rex Taylor, Michael Collins (1958), 45-46.
>
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Sam- Maguire. Maguire became such a valuable intelli­
gence agent at a time when virtually all military and 
Police communications went via the mails that Rex Taylor 
stated "He more than any other man had made Collins, 
without Sam Maguire, Michael Collins was lost."1 a 
Southern Irish Protestant never even suspected by the 
British Authorities, Sam Maguire died too soon after 
the War of Independence to leave any written account 
of his exploits, so it is impossible to determine 
precisely the accuracy of Taylor's comments. But 
one indication of his influence in the Irish Republican 
Intelligence sphere is that he was able to supply 
Collins with the new 1920 RIC Police cypher two days 
after it was issued and within four days local units
in Ireland had received this, as the case of Terence
2
MacSwiney showed. Maguire was not the only IRB agent
in the London Postal Service. Dick Connolly,the IRB
Supreme Council member for Southern England,ran another 
3
network. Later in the struggle, Crompton Llewellyn
Davis,the Solicitor General for the Post Office,
4
supplied information to Collins .
1 Rex Taylor, Assassination (1961), 180.
2 Rex Taylor, Assassination, op. cit., 180, also see
Liam O'Doherty, 'Important Participators with the 
Leaders, 1918-21' Capuchin Annual (1976), 112-17.
3 Leoin O'Broin - Revolutionary Underground, op. cit., 161 
"Half the sorters opened letter:for us,. at one time
1 had copies of eleven thousand letters1 - deposition 
of Billy Ahearne, P17/B/99 .
4 Margery Forster Michael Collins; the Lost Leader
(1971), 101. Crompton Llewellyn Davis may have been
the,high level penetration,agent code named 'L' who
is referred to on various occasions in the Art
O'Brien Papers.
Considering the sta,te of the penetration of the Posta,! 
Services in London and other areas by the IRB, it 
was somewhat ironic that in 1920 British Intelligence, 
starved of information in Dublin;devised an intelli­
gence gathering scheme centred on the London Sorting 
Office, where Sam Maguire was employed. Leaflets 
distributed in Dublin asked for information to be
sent to the London Post Office with the guarantee
1
that the sender’s name would be protected.
The extent to which the IRB directed intelligence 
operation in Britain aided the Germans in the First 
World War is difficult to ascertain. British Govern­
ment records contain considerable speculation but
2virtually no hard facts. A search using the Times 
Index for trials involving Irish persons in Britain 
suspected of collecting information for the Germans
1 The scheme involved what was then considered to be
a security safeguard; in that the information 
letter containing,the sender's name and address if
they wished to collect any rewards, was to be 
placed inside an outer envelope addressed to "some 
well disposed . person or known business address in 
England1 . These recipients would then forward the 
inner envelope addressed to D.W. Ross,Post Restante 
GPO London. See the Times, 16 September, 1920.
2 A White Paper intended to show the existence
of a Sinn Fein/German plot, Documents Relevant 
to the Sinn Fein Movement Cmd. 1108 (1921) 
could only show a link between Roger Casement- 
and Kuno Meyer, the former Liverpool University .
Professor of Celtic Languages,as evidence of 
German'intelligence1 operations aided by the 
Irish in Britain. According to Robert Brennan 
Allegiance (Dublin, 1950), 171, German Intelligence 
did enquire as to whether the London volunteers 
were in a position to destroy power plants and 
railway junctions in England.
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produced only one such, trial and that the Inconclusive
case of evaluating the extent of air raids in London.'1'
And recently there has been speculation that an Irish
network in London supplied the information that enabled
the German Navy to sow mines along the route taken by
HMS Hampshire which was carrying Lord Kitchener to 
2Russia.
The arming of the 1916 Insurgents with one notable 
3exception, was largely the work of the IRB organization
in Britain. In one four month period in 1914 they
4
sent 675 rifles to Ireland. :We have already investi­
gated the IRB formation of the Irish Volunteers in
1 In 1918 a 36 year old London, Irish born engineer 
was sentenced to six months imprisonment for 
collecting information on Air Raids in London; see 
Times, 13 May 1918 and 20 May, 1918.
2 This was suggested on a BBC Radio Four programme
on the 'Sinking of HMS Hampshire1 (part of a series
titled 'Famous Sea Disasters'), transmitted on 27
February, 1978 and repeated on 2 March, 1978. Sean
MpGrath ;the London IRA Intelligence Officer,stated 
that Sam Maguire had agents in the Home Office and 
the Admiralty; see his deposition, P17/B/100 .
3 The 'Asg^rd' Howth Gunrunning episode, several
hundred rifles were purchased in Germany by a London 
Committee, mostly Anglo-Irish (ie. of the Ascendency) 
organized by Erskine Childers, the Clerk of the House 
of Commons and Mary Spring Rice. See Darrell Figgis 
Recollections of the Irish War (1927), 30-41, Tom 
Cox Damned Englishman - Erskine Childers (New York, 
1975) , 49 and B.Wilkinson,The Zeal of the Convert 
(Washington, 1976), 98-120. Dermot O'Brien'The 
Honourable Mary Spring Rice', Ireland-Americe Review 
(1939) , 430-9.
4 See Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland - 
Minutes of Evidence Cd. 8311, 45. Also see the
0 ’Rahilly's The Secret History of the Irish Volunteers 
(Dublin, 1915), 16.
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England in 1913/14 and their subsequent role in the
1916 Rising. After the Rising despite suffering
casualties, the IRB organization in Britain remained
basically intact, though the Volunteer organization
was allowed to lapse. Arms smuggling and intelligence
collection did not require many people; indeed the
larger the size of the organization the greater the
risk of penetration by agents of the State. There
was, also, as we have seen, the need to create a
fund raising organization in Britain to look after the
needs of the 1841 internees though most of these were
held for less than a year 1 and the 123 sentenced 
2
prisoners captured in the Rising. Fund raising 
schemes also acted as a transmission belt for recruits 
into the expanding Sinn Fein organization in Britain 
and later into the new Irish Self Determination League. 
From time to time a munitions seizure,usually of explos­
ives, indicated that Irish activists in Britain had 
once again resumed their traditional role of supplying 
material to their revolutionary counterparts in Ireland.
In December 1917 a consignment of explosives being
carried by two 16 year old Glasgow boys was inter-
3 4cepted, there was a similar case in March, 1918 and
four men and four women were discovered at Ardrossan
1 & 2 Figures given in' Documents' Relevant to the Sinn 
' Fein Movement Cmd, 1188 (1921), 14-15.
3 Times, 18 December, 1917.
4 Times, 23 March, 1918.
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to be in possession of a large quantity of explosives,
detonators and fuses later that year.1 Sean McGrath, who
had joined the IRB in 1916, was convicted in early 1919
of possessing fourteen revolvers,evidence being given
to the court that he had previously purchased a very
large number of cartridge cases for charging in a
2'home ammunition factory'. Earlier another individual 
who later became prominent in the ISDL, a stockbroker’s 
manager C.B. Dutton had also been sentenced for arms 
offences."1
Following Sean McGrath's release from prison, he, on 
instructions from Michael Collins, reformed the London
4
Volunteers in October 1919 at a meeting attended by 
Art O'Brien in his capacity as Dail Eireann Representative. 
While in some areas the Volunteer organization had never 
really folded, the decision to reform suggests that 
even at that date consideration was being given to a 
more offensive course of action.
5
The IRA/Volunteers did not supplant the older IRB, as
1 Times, 18 Oct., 1918.
2 Freemans Journal, 13 Jan.,1919.
3 See O'Brien, Ms. 8457, and C.B. Dutton Papers, Ms.
17489(NLI).
4 London IRA diary, 17a/5l. 200 Volunteers in 1919,
and the deposition of Edward Roche,P17a/154. The 
Liverpool company had 100 Volunteers when it was 
reactivated in June 1919; P/7/A/1, Liverpool.
5 Both terms were used interchangeably at this point of 
time.
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such, with IRB activists like Bean McGrath as the IRA 
Intelligence officer for Britain and Collins as GHQ 
Director of Intelligence, the Volunteers were very
firmly under IRB control. It is likely that the IRB 
with a wealth of experience behind it and''several failed 
insurrections as a cautionary remirider of the problems 
inherent in open warfare with a much stronger enemy, did 
not wish to commit its British organization per se to 
overt offensive military activities. There was also 
the not unimportant propaganda factor of legitimacy.
The 'Army of the Republic'1 even if only belatedly 
officially recognized by Dail Eireann conveyed a much 
more prestigious impression than a mysterious, secret, 
oath bound organization. 0-Connor’s argument that IRB 
arms smuggling operations required only a small number 
of personnel but that open military activities necess­
itated an IRA in Britain can not be empirically subst­
antiated. Previous IRB operations in Britain like 
2Chester Castle had involved relatively large numbers.
1 In 1919 there were well organized strong "IRB centres
in London, Liverpool, Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester
and Glasgow"; see a ’Joint Memo on the Situation in 
Ireland’ by Lord French (Lord Lieutenant) and Mr 
MacPherson (Chief Secretary), GT. 8227. CAB 24/89.
See also Colonel Michael O ’Leary on the Liverpool IRB, 
An t Oglach, Autumn, 1966.
2 On the 11 Feb. 1867,1,200 Irish Fenians travelled,
from all over Britain to Chester where they intended
to seize the arsenal kept in the castle there and
use the weapons to stage a 'rising'. Upon learning 
that their plan had been discovered they dispersed 
but 150 crossed over to Dublin to participate in the 
abortive insurrection. See Leon O ’Broin, Fenian 
Fever, op. cit., 126-139.
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The IRA in Britain was probably created by the IRB for 
reasons of self interest, and a recognition that the 
traditional concept of the IRB as the military leader­
ship of the Irish struggle was increasingly coming under 
attack. Dail Eireann's establishment as the elected ass­
embly of the Irish people seemed to quite a few of the 
new revolutionary leaders to have precluded any future 
role for the IRB, a view most definitely not shared by 
that organization. Sixty plus years of existence had 
created its own dynamic momentum and, in any case, the 
IRB's constitution, while paying a token homage to the 
concept of democracy, had much more in common with the 
Bolshevik's perspective of power than that of political 
parties like Sinn Fein. Whatever the reasons, by mid- 
1920 the IRB had 'sponsored' the formation of IRA units 
in the principal Irish centres in Britain. Most of these 
IRA volunteers in Britain : remained inactive throughout 
1919 and almost all of 1920, though a considerable 
number of the London Volunteers had paraded, in full 
uniform at the funeral of Terence McGwiney. The poten­
tial power of the organization was however dramatically 
demonstrated in Manchester in October, 1919. The
imprisonment in Britain of many Irish cadres arrested in
Ireland1, including members of the Dail., had resulted in 
a number of escapes. A TD in the Dail had in fact
demanded to know what''machinery existed for releasing
2the imprisoned Irish in England", and Collins with
1 . In 1919 there were 225 Irish,internees in Britain; see
the ■ Report of the Prison Commissioners' for England 
and Wales Cmd. 9 72, (1919)  ^ 10 . ~
2 Dail Eireann Proceeding, op. cit., Vol. 1, 1919-21,
31.
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Boland had absented themselves from the very first
Dail session1 in order to help the escape of the ''two 
2
Presidents' from Lincoln Jail.
The escape of Austin Stack, TD, Piaras Besali and four­
teen others from Strangeways Prison introduced a new
3
element. Whereas in Lincoln and Usk outside aid by
the IRB, had largely been a matter of helping to hide
4the escapers once they had got away, at Strangeways. 
outside help was the key to the whole plan. Securing a 
warder, with handcuffs supplied by a Manchester Irish
5
policeman , the prisoners escaped over ladders placed 
against the wall by waiting men while people passing by 
."who tried to interfere were temporarily detained by 
small 'Sinn Fein' patrols at either side of the street'*.
1 To cover their ’Lincoln exploit', both Boland and 
Collins were marked as present by the clerk of the 
First Session of the First Dail; see Robert Kee,
The Green Flag', op. cit., Vol. Ill, 63. (The 
escape occured on the 3 Feb., 1919) .
2 Sean McGarry the IRB President was according to that 
organization's constitution the 'President of the 
Irish Republic' . Earaon De Valera was the President 
of the Irish Republic as elected by Dail Eireann, ■>. 
members of which were titled TD
3 Joseph Me Grath TD, and Herbert Mellowes TD and two 
other Irish Political Prisoners escaped from Usk
Prison on the 24 Nov., 1919; see the Times, 25 Nov., 1919.
4 The Usk escapers were helped by the Liverpool IRB,
Steve Lanigan, who worked in the Custom House, found 
them a boat to travel to Ireland; see 'IRA Jail- 
breaks 1918-22, (Tralee, ND) ,34. De Valera was hidden 
in Sheffield and Manchester, in a priest's house, 
before going to Ireland; see Rex Taylor, Michael 
Collins , op. cit., 112.
5 Richard O'Muirthile Memoir, 7/52 and see Piaras 
Besali, 'Michael Collins', (New York, 1926), 360-72.
6 'Sinn Fein', the English Press and indeed official 
Government documents tended to attribute all
contd,
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operation to
breaks and, cer.t- 
1
IRA members 
belatedly a
Cabinet Paper advised that Irish prisoners in England
2be kept under a strong military guard, and commented 
that ;
''Outside the prisons they have well organized influ­
ential and wealthy friends to devise and assist 
their attempts at e s c a p e 1! 3
A few months later the Cabinet was strongly advised to
transfer all Irish internees for the benefit of prison
4
discipline as well as security reasons to military 
5camps.
For political reasons it was however considered impossible
'incidents1 to Sinn Fein, a practice, commencing with 
their description of the *1916 Sinn Fein Rebellion1 
though in fact Sinn Fein had no part as such in that 
event.
1 Times, 27 Oct., 1919, the escape took place on the 
25 Oct., 1919.
2 The twenty Olgaigh personnel were drawn from the 
Liverpool and Manchester units. See IRA Jail breaks 
1918-22, op. cit., 106.
3 An'Army guard had in fact been mounted in Wormwood 
Scrubs (London) Prison, since early 1919, where Irish 
internees were also held; see MEPOL 2/1952.
4 CP 145. CAB 24/93.
5 The Governor of Wormwood Scrubs wrote to the Prison 
Commissioners complaining of:
"The gravest effect on the staff, seeing as they 
do, day by day the Governor brow beaten and 
insulted by defiant men".
CP 678. CAB 24/98.
Thus the Times graphically described the 
a readership not accustomed to mass jail 
ainly not to operations involving twenty 
taking over a Manchester street. Rather
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to transfer the internees to military custody.
Strangeways did however mark the highpoint of Irish
Prison escapes in the period under consideration. The
development of actual hostilities impeded any further
operations on that scale. The 1920 Hunger Strike in
Wormwood Scrubs affords us an indication of the size of
the aid operation beyond the prison walls. Many of
the internees were temporarily sent to outside hospitals
to recover, and shortly afterwards Cabinet Ministers were
somewhat amazed to discover that “77 were at large in
London".^1 To secrete this number of people obviously
required a considerable organization. The fact that
this series of prison escapes did not interfere with
the now well established munitions shipments to Ireland
was an additional indication of the strength of the
Irish military organization in Britain. During 1919-1920
the British Cabinet was several times provided with
evidence of the '’steady stream of arms going secretly
ii 2
over to Ireland principally in the form of revolvers,
3
undiminished by the odd arrest and inadequate sentences. 
Concern was expressed that non-Irish people were becoming 
involved in these shipments, the Sailors, Soldiers and 
Airmen’s Union (a particularly worrying development for
1 Conference of Ministers, 28 May, 1920. Cab,. 33 (20).
CAB 2 3/21.
2 Quoted in ROR 37, 15 Jan, 1920. CP 458. CAB 24/96.
3 Thomas Carrol of Liverpool, believed to be one of 
the organizers of the arms shipments, was sentenced 
to three months imprisonment for the possession of 
loaded firearms'. Survey of Revolutionary Movements 
in Great Britain 1920 T  CP 2455. CAB 24/116.
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the authorities) and members of the World Workingmens 
Union (Wobblies)^However the Cabinet were relieved to 
find that the attempt of Capt. John White of the Irish 
Citizen Army to get the Glasgow based International 
Union of Ex-Servicemen\ to form a Volunteer Corps to
help the ’Irish fight for freedom” had not been very
. n 2 successful.
Evidence that the IRA in Britain would4at some time 
in the future, go over to offensive operations increas­
ingly began to appear in the weekly Cabinet Intelligence 
reports. There were indications that the IRA in London
were planning to mount a raid on a Bank of England 
3
bullion van, and reports as vague as certain Sinn
4
Feiners are beginning to talk of armed outrage” had 
two months later solidified into the firm conviction 
that
“If an outbreak on a large scale were to occur 
in Ireland or a national strike took place in 
this country, there would be outrages by the 
Sinn Feiners”. 5
In December 1919, the Cabinet was informed that a Sgt.
Bruton of the RIC was being transferred to the "Secret
£
Service Department in this country” , evidently to
1 See. ROR. 9, 26 June, 1919. GT 7566. CAB 24/82 
CAB 24/118.
2 ROR 28. 6 Nov., 1919. CP 70. CAB 24/92.
3 ROR 32. 4 Dec., 1919. CP 256. CAB 24/94.
4 Ibid.
5 ROR 40. 5 Feb., 1920. CP 579. CAB 24/97.
6 Conference of Ministers. Cabinet 10(19), 3 Dec., 1919.
CAB 23/18.
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improve their surveillance operations of the Irish 
there.
The situation in Scotland was regarded as being partic­
ularly worrying. The Volunteers there ever since their 
reformation in April 1919 had pursuedan alarmingly high
public profile policy, combatting the police at a
2
Glasgow meeting, and engaging, unlike their English 
counterparts, in open drilling as in May 1920 when they 
were reported as openly drilling in the Bothwell Public
3 .
Park. The Cabinet discussed a report from the Secretary
4of State for Scotland dealing with 'illegal drilling in 
Scotland' in which he stated that several thousand ex- 
servicemen who had joined Sinn Fein were drilling. A 
warning that if large scale arrests were made, the 
police in Scotland might not be able to cope with the
5
situation considerably alarmed the Cabinet. Such 
public drilling and the searching of pedestrians by 
armed i r a  members at Glasgow outdoor meetings presumably 
further contributed to public disquiet, particularly in 
a region where traditional'sectarianism periodically
1 FROR, 7 April, 1919. GT 7091. CAB 24/77. A letter 
to Michael Collins however implies that Volunteers 
there were reformed in February 1919. See Mulcahy 
Papers ,P 7/A/ll.
2 Following the police banning of a Glasgow Public 
Meeting (28 April, 1920), 'B’ Co. Irish Vols, had as 
a unit fought with the police. See A Survey of
of Revolutionary Movements in Great Britain' 1920.
CP 2455. CAB 24/118.
3 Ibid.
4 CP 1973. CAB 24/112.
5 See Cabinet Meeting of the 21 Oct.,1920, Cabinet 
59 (20) , CAB 23/23.
6 ROR 50, 15 April, 1920. CP 1086. CAB 24/103 -
contd,
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flared into open confrontation. One hundred Volunteers
were observed practising !battle manoeuvres1 at 
1
Carmunoch, a few days after the most serious incident
in Scotland to date, had occurred. Two police officers
had interrupted a "score of men armed with rifles,
bayonets and pistols", who were trying to break into a
Bothwell TA Hall; one policeman was wounded when fire
2was opened on them.
At the subsequent trial of seven men the jiidge referred 
to the Sinn Fein conspiracy in Scotland that "had
3
succeeded in capturing a considerably following". The
Bothwell incident, because of its unplanned circumstances,
cannot be classified as an offensive action. However
its occurrence probably influenced the development of
a new offensive strategy for the British units of
Oglaigh na Eireann. An IRA GHQ analysis of the fighting
up to July 1920 concluded that in Ireland:
"no matter what strategy we may adopt we will 
ultimately be beaten in a military sense'! 4
an IRA Co. guarded a 5,000 strong Glasgow Public 
meeting, and regular searching of people was reported 
in ROR 80, 3 Nov., 1920. CP 2089. CAB 24/114.
1 ROR 80, 13 Nov., 1920. CP 2089. CAB 24/114.
2 Times, 29 Oct., 1920.
3 Times, 10 Feb., 19 21. Four men were sentenced to
terms of 8 to 10 years, three were acquitted. Also 
see Michael Collins correspondence with Glasgow IRA,
P7/A/8.
4 IRA GHQ Documents, undated, sent by the Chief
Secretary of Ireland to the Cabinet, and circulated
as CP 821. CAB 24/100, and see Giovanni Costigan,
'The Anglo-Irish Conflict, 1919-1922: A War of Inde­
pendence or Systemize'd hurder'V University Review,
V (19 6 0) , 64-36.
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Given this admission that the IRA was incapable of 
winning the war, its objective therefore was essentially 
to survive as a fighting force for as long as possible 
in the hope that the British forces Would' (.eventually 
realize that they too could not win a military victory. 
Central to both armies perspectives was the question of 
public support. The British strategy hoped to turn the 
population against the IRA, the Republicans ideally 
sought to produce a sentiment of war weariness among 
the British population which would force their Government 
to commence negotiations. »
Despite the presence of the various peace/withdrawal
movements in Britain, Michael Collins, probably the
single most influential IRA policy maker, observed that,
"English morale could not be broken by propaganda. 
He was firmly convinced they had no friends 
in England!'1
Given a situation where there was little hope of a
mass support or withdrawal movement developing in
Britain, the logical military analysis was that the
commencement of offensive operations "in the heart of
2the enemy lines* could not adversely affect the peace/ 
withdrawal movement to any significant extent insofar 
as their potential contribution to the ending of the 
war was already of very minor proportions.
1 * Dail Eireann Debates, Vol. 1, 214-5.
2 Rory O'Connor used this expression, quoted in
E. Brady, 'Ireland's Secret Service iri England , 
(Dublin, 1930).
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To a guerrilla' army coming under ever increasing pressures 
on the Irish front, the logical answer was the opening 
of a "second front’ in the enemy’s homeland where, as 
we have observed, there already existed a reasonably 
effective Irish military organization. Such a conclusion
i
•was moreover reinforced by the history of previous 
Irish struggles in which operations were carried out in
Britain itself, the 1860’s Fenian incidents and the
1 2 1884/5 Clan na Gael ’dynamite campaign'. Cathal Brugha’s
response to the British attempt to impose conscription
3m  Ireland was similar to that of O ’Donnovan Rossa’s 
response to the coercive legislation of a previous 
generation, the destruction of the legislature/ministers
4
responsible. Brugha's plan was, however, more complex. 
With four volunteers, he secretly crossed over to England 
and with eight other men provided by Ned Kerr from 
Liverpool they prepared to shoot the entire British
5
Cabinet the moment conscription was introduced.
1 During the 1885 campaign, the Tower of London, 
Westminster Hall and the House of Commons itself were 
all bombed on the same day, see Leon O ’Broin,
Revolutionary Underground, op. cit., 31.
2 Then Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, later Dail 
Minister of Defence.
3 O ’Donnovan Rossa, the Clan na Gael leader sentenced 
to a long term of imprisonment for his part in the 
1884/5 bombing campaign. His funeral in Dublin in 
August 1915 was the first major demonstration by the 
revived IRB and the oration by Patrick Pearse became 
one of the most famous speeches in Irish history.
4 O'Donnovan Rossa planned to spray the House of Commons 
with osmic gas, see; T.N. Brown, Irish' American 
Nationalism , (New York, 1966), 67.
5 Eoin Neeson, Life and Death of Michael Collins ,
(Cork, 1966), 95; but Michael Collins opposed the plan 
and Brugha was forced to call off the operation, see • 
Leon O'Broin, Michael Collins■, (Dublin, 1980), 75.
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British Intelligence only too aware of the historical
precedents, (one Intelligence branch owed its origin to
1
earlier Irish military activities ), had by early 1920
decided that such activities were now very likely to
2re-occur in Britain in the foreseeable future. One 
report believed the IRA in London alone to be suffi­
ciently strong enough to be capable of launching a 
’London Rising' in April 1920. During the long drawn- 
out hunger strike of Terence MacSwiney, the Cabinet was 
on several occassions furnished with intelligence 
assessments that some form of reprisals in Britain, if
4
MacSwiney died, could be expected. It was feared that
5the King himself would be attacked and extensive pre­
cautions were taken throughout the country for some
/T
days after MacSwiney's death. No such activity did 
occur, partly because of the publicity value of a large 
public funeral march for MacSwiney in London, and of 
course because the authorities were in a high state of 
readiness. MacSwiney!s death was however a contributory 
factor in commencing active operations the next month in 
England. The actual decision regarding military off­
ensive operations in Britain appears to have been taken
1 The Special Branch was originally formed as the 
'Special Irish Branch’in 1883 to deal with the then 
Clan na Gael bombers in England.
2 See ROR 46, 18 Mar., 1920. CP 902. CAB 24/101,
and ROR 48, 30 Mar., 1920. CP 1009. CAB 24/103.
3 ROR 4 6 (ibid).
4 See ROR 69, 26 Aug.,1920, CP 1809. CAB 24/111,
and ROR 73, 23 Sept., 1920. CP 1885. CAB 24/111.
5 ROR 70, 2 Sept., 1920. CP 1830. CAB 24/111.
6 Ibid.
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at a conference of senior IRA officers held in Dublin 
during the weekend of the 13/14 November, 1920.1 Reports 
were received of the growing efficiency of the recon­
structed British Intelligence system and in particular 
of the arrival of a new group of officers known as the
1 Cairo Gang1,. It was decided to eliminate as many
2Intelligence agents as possible on the same day. The 
other main subject was ’Reprisals’, unofficial'British 
Reprisals, eg , the 'burning of Ballbriggan' and Cork
3
had now evolved into an officially sanctioned policy 
of burning houses, farms etc., owned by Republican 
supporters. Such Reprisals if they continued might 
well result in declining support for the IRA, and indeed 
this seems to have been the hope of the British Govern­
ment., in authorizing that strategy. This '“Reprisal Policy' 
had already been condemned by influential sectors of 
English opinion. The Times declared them to be a,
''National disgrace that must fill English readers 
with a sense of shame. We are in reality employing 
lawlessness and disorder as a means of counter­
terror ismV^
The IRA however considered that more than verbal protest 
was necessary. Rory O ’Connor who as well as being 
Director of Engineering held the appointment of OC 
Britain pressed the meeting to agree to his offensive 
strategy in Britain which as documents captured a
1 C.D. Greaves, ' Liam Mell'owes and the Irish Revolution , 
(1971), 223.
2 Ibid.
3 Cab. 79A(20), 29 Dec., 1920. CAB 23/23, and Jones, 
op. cit., 41.
4 Times, 30 Sept., 1920.
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week later ^show he had heen working on for some time.
There was considerable opposition to his request, not 
however on questions of its justifiability etc. but on 
practical grounds. Several of the officers present 
had direct departmental interests in Britain, which 
we have observed was a very important factor in the IRA's 
logistical system. Sean Russell,the Director of Munitions, 
had recently visited the Midlands to establish a net­
work to purchase components for the. manufacture of 
grenade cases etc.. James O'Donovan ,the Director of 
Chemicals, obtained considerable raw material supplies
from Britain and had an actual 'chemical plant' manu-
2facturing explosives, in London. Next to O'Connor
however, the officer most concerned with Britain was Liam
3
Mellows who had been born in England. As Director of
Purchases, Mellows was responsible for GHQ’s supply of
4arms, and ammunition, much of which came to Ireland 
from America and Europe. He realized the offensive
1 Published in '.the Times, 26 November, 1920.
2 See. IRA Chemical Department Report (1919-1923) - 
PI7a/29, O'Malley.
3 Mellows was born at Ashton-under-Lyne on 25 May,
1892, see Greaves, op. cit., 30.
4 All munitions purchased were officially the sole res­
ponsibility of GHQ. In practice many local units sent 
over their representatives to Britain to act individ­
ually thereby causing confusion, endangering supply 
methods and even forcing prices up as rival units out­
bid each other. Collins' letters to his agents contain 
frequent criticisms of these "unofficial" operations, 
while later during the Civil War O'Malley made 
similar criticisms in his report on 'Arms Sales' - 
P17a/49. Strictly speaking, Collins himself should 
not have been involved in arms purchases but as chief 
of the IRB he effectively controlled that organi­
zations's officers even when acting in an IRA 
capacity.
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operations substantially increasing Police activity
X
might seriously jeopardise his logistical operations. 
Furthermore there were in places considerable tensions 
between the older IRB logistical operators and the newer IRA 
volunteers.^
Collins as Director of Intelligence also had important 
interests but belietotfcg that important agents like 
Sam Maguire and John Chartres operated in such a manner 
that they would be unaffected by increased surveillance 
etc., he agreed to O'Connor’s plans though he opposed 
the suggestion Brugha again put forward to eliminate 
the British Cabinet. As a compromise to Mellows’ 
opposition, it was decided that offensive operations 
would not be undertaken in Scotland for the present.
Ten days later the British public learned of the extent 
of O ’Connor’s preparatory work; documents captured a 
few days previously in Dublin, revealed a plan of 
wholesale devastation. In Manchester the Stuart St.
Power Station, which supplied power to many coal mines 
as well as factories,was to be attacked by seventy men 
who would proceed literally to demolish the machinery, 
the intelligence officers having previously conducted 
a detailed reconnaissance of the power station under
1 Logistical - employed in the sense of acquiring 
munitions, storing them and then arranging for their 
shipment to Ireland.
2 PI7a/49.
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the guise of a ’visiting party’. * The operation’s
engineering experts had in fact familiarized themselves
with similar machinery in a Dublin power house. In a
subsidiary operation thirty men were to destroy the
Clayton Vale Electricity Pumping Station. Simultaneously
operations were to be mounted in Liverpool, but here
the electricity generating plants were considered to
be too well protected. Instead another hundred men
using 800 lbs. of gelignite were to destroy the
dock gates and hydraulic pumps operating these, thereby
effectively closing down for a considerable period, the
Port of Liverpool. While these plans sound almost
too fantastic to be credible, all the information
that I have collected indicates that the IRA could
have mobilized the two hundred men required for
these operations from their units in Lancashire and the
2
Tyneside area .
The scope of the plans did however appear to be too 
incredible for even the authorities to take seriously. 
They were accordingly obliged to witness on the night 
of the 27/28 November, 1920, the arson of 15 ware­
houses and timber firms in the Liverpool dock area, 
causing over two million pounds' worth of damage. Yet 
even this was only the implementation of the secondary 
’Dock operation plan'. Diversions suggested included 
I'l 135 H.C. Debsw. 5 Cols. 506-7 and P17b/110.
2 The subsequent arson operation of the 27/28 November 
1920, which was itself only part of the original 
planned operation, involved the mobilization of 130 
volunteers from the Liverpool area; see the deposi­
tion of Hugh Early, P17b/110, O'Malley.
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numerous fires in cotton a,nd other warehouses half an
1
hour before the other operations. A man who tried
to help the police chase after one group of volunteers
was shot dead and two police officers were shot at
by another group at Bootle. The fires started proved
to be beyond the capacity of the Liverpool Fire Brigade
and firemen were called in from Warrington, Birkenhead
and St. Helens. On the same night a London policeman
was overwhelmed by six armed men whom he caught trying
to burn down a timber yard; they fled leaving behind
them an assorted collection of petrol cans, revolvers
2
and cotton wool.
3
That weekend’s operations in England occurred in what 
was probably the single worst week for the British 
war effort in Ireland. On the preceding Sunday, 21st. 
November in a carefully co-ordinated operation fourteen 
British officers, thirteen of whom were Intelligence
1 For an account of the Liverpool Operation see; Early 
ibid; .letters to Michael Collins from Ned Kerr,
Steve Lanigan and P. O ’Daly, P7/A/3, Mulcahy;
Times 29 and 30 November, 1920; Liverpool Post and 
Mercury, 29 November, 1920.
2 Times, 30 November, 1920; also see Transcript of 
Tria1 of 0 1 Sullivan, Moran, Kenny,. Greeny t Central 
Criminal Court, Crim 1/190.
3 Ironically IRA GHQ following the capture of their 
plans had tried to call off the operations fearing 
that their units would be trapped in the security 
clampdown they expected. Collins sent an agent
to England -"certain plans made by some members 
of the ISDL had to be cancelled” - but his instruc­
tions were disregarded. See J.A. Gaughan, Memoirs 
. of Constable Mee (Tralee, 1975)., 188. Also see 
Collins’ letter to Ned Kerr, P7/A/3.
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agents,1 were shot dea,d, in, Dublin. The laboriously
reconstructed Intelligence apparatus had been dealt
a crippling blow from which it never recovered. A
resulting reprisal mass shooting of spectators at a
2football match, may have influenced the timing of 
the Liverpool operation. On the morning of the 
Liverpool fires, an entire patrol of the elite counter -
3
insurgency Auxilliary force was annihilated in Co. Cork. 
Lloyd George remarked to his secretary that the scope 
of that attack in which seventeen British personnel
4
were killed marked a new dimension in the war. In 
that single week of the 2lst-28th November the twin 
prongs of British military strategy in Ireland, a new 
intelligence organization and the hitherto unchallenged 
power of the Auxilliaries, formed to stiffen a rapidly
5
decreasing RIC, were blunted. The extension of the war
1 A Vetinary Corps officer was shot by mistake. See 
Kevin Browne / They Died on Bloody Sunday (Dublin, 1970) , 
11, the Times, 22.November, 19 20.
2 The British opened fire on the spectators at a Croke 
Park football match killing twelve including women and 
children; see Sean Kavanagh, ’Bloody Sunday’ - Capuchin 
Annual (1969) and an article by Eamonn MacGiolla Iasachta 
in Misneach, December, 1920. For a fresh perspective
on the events; see T. Bowden, 'Bloody Sunday - A 
Reappraisal' European Studies Review II, 25-42 and for 
a more traditional view see Iris Prong ata Cliath 19 39 
(Dublin, 1939) .
3 The Auxilliaries, often confused with the Black and 
Tans, were experienced British officers formed into 
special RIC companies whereas the latter served as 
individual RIC replacements. For an account of the 
Kilmichael Ambush by its organizer see General Tom 
Barry's Guerrilla Days In Ireland (Tralee, 1969),34-46.
4 Jones, op. cit., 41.
5 By May, 1920,RIC resignations were running at a 
rate of 200 a week, compared to 25 in 1914. See 
Jones, op. cit., 17.
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into Britain itself must have Been of considerable
psychological importance to a populace who had been
vividly provided with evidence that their Prime Minister’s
confident declaration made earlier in that month, ■’'We
1
have murder by the throat” , was as empty,of sustaining 
factual evidence,as the roofless warehouses of the 
Liverpool dock side.
The' Times sought to reassure its readership that "It.
2is not believed the campaign will last long". The
Government while banning the Manchester TSDL conference
endeavoured to minimize the seriousness of the situation,
in its public comments. The Home Secretary assured
Parliament that the police had sufficient powers
under the Defence of the Realm Acts to combat the IRA
in Britain though he admitted that when the legislation
expired “it may be necessary to come to Parliament
for further powers"  ^ Privately the Government’s
Intelligence advisors recommended that ’‘Internment
4
appears to be the only solution.® Even before the 
Liverpool operation the Government had been so sufficiently 
alarmed at the probable IRA capacity to cause trouble 
as to ban the public from the Westminster Abbey funerals 
of the dead Intelligence officers, shot in Dublin. They
1 Times'  ^ 10 November, 1920.
2 Ibid, 30 November, 19 20.
3 Ibid, 2 December, 1920.
4 ROR 83, 2 December, 1920. CAB 24/116.
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feared gunmen would take advantage of the cover prov­
ided by large crowds. Interestingly the public were 
permitted access to the funerals of those agents who 
were Catholics held in Westminster Cathedral where 
!,a great crowd is not expected'* ;j this was perhaps 
an indication of the differential reaction among the 
Catholic and Protestant communities in England to the
deaths of the thirteen Intelligence operatives. A
2Cabinet Emergency Committee was established to
consider the security of Government/buildings and
recommended a ban on public admission to Parliament.
3
Barriers were hastily erected across Downing.St.
During December there were however no further offensive 
actions in Britain. The inevitable arrests that followed 
the Liverpool fires considerably dislocated the logistical 
supply system between Britain and Ireland; the arrested 
included the IRB leaders Ned Kerr and Steve Lanigan 
It was necessary for Liam Mellows to travel over to 
England to reorganize the logistical organization.^
Two men were arrested in Glasgow for the attempted
1 Cabinet minutes, 25 November, 1920. Cabinet 62 
(Conclusion 20). CAB 23/24.
2 This Committee consisted of the Home Secretary, the 
Secretary of State for War, the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland, the GOC London Military District, the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner and Sir Basil 
Thompson of the Home Office Special Intelligence 
Directorate .
3 For their detailed reports see Cabinet Papers 
2167 and 2183. CAB 23/23.
4 Greaves, op. cit., 227-228.
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purchase of rifles from a soldier1 but of greater
importance was the arrest of the Liverpool IRA adjutant
Henry Coyle, seized in Scotland along with three
2
hundred and forty pounds of explosives. Apart from
these upsets, the lack of offensive activity during the
last weeks of 1920 may have been due to the abortive
peace negotiations held in London between Lloyd George
and Archbishop Clune of Perth (Australia).in which Art
O'Brien served as the communication channel between
3
London and Dublin. While the British police raided
4ISDL offices and detained lower ranking officials,
Art O'Brien, known to the Cabinet to be involved in
5
the importation of munitions, was on the Home Secretary's 
instructions provided with two police bodyguards to
g
protect him from attack by anti-Irish elements.
The opening month of 19 21 was similarly quiet with only 
one significant action at Salford where a police officer 
was shot when he interrupted, men carrying arms to a
1 Times, 9 December, 1920. .
2 Ibid, 7 December, 1920  ^ see also Colonel O'Leary
'The Liverpool IRA' An tOglach.Autumn and Winter, 196 6.
3 For a report of this episode see Tom Barry, op. cit., 178.
4 Times, 2 December, 1920.
5 The 'Survey of Revolutionary Movements in Great Britain
1920’ (CP 2455. CAB 24/118) circulated to Cabinet
Ministers; claimed that Art O'Brien's bank accounts 
were financing the import of arms.
6 Thomas Jones, op. cit., 44. Home Secretary Shortt 
in:' fact here refers to O'Brien as "the leader of 
the Irish extremists"
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new dump.1 Surveying operational activity to date,
the O.C. Britain, Rory O ’Connor, complained of the
limitations imposed on his strategy by the Republican
leadershipranxious to avoid civilian casualities /' A
considerable amount more could have been done in
Liverpool were 1 allowed a freer hand. My instructions
were to carry out these operations in a way which will
cause the least amount of unemployment... exactly the
2opposite: is required." He was concerned about the 
standard of training, or rather lack of it,' of his 
volunteers in Britain, and believed that only relatively 
small scale actions could be undertaken. February 
saw the start of a campaign directed against ’soft’ 
targets utilizing relatively untrained personnel but 
which nevertheless fitted into the IRA’s overall 
strategy of countering British reprisals in Ireland. With 
the particular exception of Dublin, most of the guerrilla 
activity in Ireland occurred in the rural areas.
British official reprisals therefore were mostly inflicted 
on small communities and individual farms. Farm houses 
and crops were burnt on a large scale, so the IRA 
decided upon similar activity in England. Twenty hay
1 ' Times, 3 January, 1921 and CP 2415. CAB 24/114.
2 Extracts from Document titled ’Operations Abroad’ 
produced in Parliament after its capture.133 H.C.Debs.
5, Col 632-3.Michael Mackin, Vice-Commandant Jarrow
. IRA company, says that O'Connor who lived for a short 
period in 1920 in Jarrow called off the planned 
destruction of the Tyne Railway Bridge as the 
operation was likely to cause civilian casualties - 
Irish Press, 2 4 June, 1970.
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ricks were fired in the Croydon area on the 7th February, 
1921y1 the Cabinet Intelligence advisor reported that 
a campaign directed against rural targets in areas
almost, denuded of a regular police presence would ube
\
difficult to deal with, for nothing is easier than to
2
fire ricks or cut a telephone wire." An earlier 
intelligence report commented that an informant stated 
that Sean McGrath/the TSDL Secretary and London Intelligence 
Officer,had declared "outrages that will really get
3
publicity will be carried out" McGrath was shortly 
afterwards deported and in a thinly veiled press 
statement directed against the ISDL, Scotland Yard 
claimed an '‘Irish political organization in London is 
being urged by the violent faction of Sinn Fein in 
Ireland to commit outrages in London and other parts
4
of the country." Arson attacks were made, with
5
varying degrees of success on seven Lancashire mills.
In pursuance of the already observed Republican Govern­
ment limitations on emigration from Ireland, the 
Liverpool IRA units, despite police precautions, entered 
several boarding houses and seized the passports and 
money of would be emigrants to America. An intelligence
g
report estimated that thirty armed men were employed
1 Times^ 8 February, 1921.
2 ROR 94, 24 February, 1921. CP 2631, CAB 24/120.
3 ROR 93, 17 February, 1921. CP 2602, CAB 24/120.
4 Times, 21 February, 19 21,
5 Ibid, 4 February, 19 21.
6 ROR 94, 24 February, 1921. CP 2631. CAB 24/120. Also
see letter from Daly to Collins outlining the plans for 
the operation in P7/A/4, and one by Hugh Early who 
took part in the operation, P17b/ll0.
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in what the Times described a,s a rsid which''revealed
wonderful organization and exceptional executive ability."
A few days later, following a series of arson attacks
on farm property in Lancashire and Cheshire during which
2shots were fired at one farmer, the police were
issued with signal rockets to be fired as a warning when
3
arsonists were observed in the area.
In the last days of February and the first week of 
March, 1921 the arson campaign was extended to the 
Tyneside area; in Newcastle there was an attempt to 
destroy an oil refinery and a mill ‘owner was injured
4
when he tried to prevent his premises being attacked.
At Crosby a farmer shot and wounded one arsonist.
Subsequently an attempt was made to shoot him and his
5
farm premises were burnt. Three farms belonging to
the relatives of a 'Black and Tan1 officer were burnt
6to the ground in the Liverpool area. An informant 
was reported as stating that, "there won't be many
7
more fires, wait until we start on the railway signals"-.
1 Times^ 21 February, 1921. This series of simultaneous 
farm fires was designed to creat a 'ring of fire' 
around Liverpool, see Early, Pl7b/110.
2 Times, 21 February, 1921,
3 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 21 February, 1921, 
Manchester Evening News, 14 March, 1921.
4 Times, 7 March, 1921.
5 Ibid, 25 May, 1921.
6 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 12 March, 1921.
7 ROR 98, 23 March, 1921. CP 2765. CAB 24/121.
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The arson campaign wa,s however intensified during the 
first weekend of April: in a co-ordinated operation 
involving fifteen armed men, four hotels, two office 
blocks and a warehouse were damaged in Manchester with 
one police officer shot. Acting on information from 
an agent provacateur a late Saturday night raid on the 
Erskine St. Irish Club resulted in a gun battle in which 
one IRA member was killed, another volunteer and three 
police officers were wounded. Twenty arrests were 
made, but another forty men escaped,via a ladder placed 
against a back window as a precaution, in case of such 
a contingency. Twelve pistols, grenades, ammunition 
and explosives were found hidden on the premises.'1'
2
Following the discovery of the body of Vincent Fovargue, 
shot through the head on Ashford Golf Links,the London 
ISDL offices were raided and McGrath's replacement - 
Fintah Murphy deported. It was revealed at the 
inquest that Fovargue had last been seen alive at a 
Fulham ISDL dance the night before he was shot.
Fovargue was believed to have been a British Intelligence 
agent with the mission of penetrating the British IRA 
Brigade; as part of an elaborate cover operation he 
had 'escaped' from a Dublin police lorry a few months 
before.*^
1 Manchester Evening News, 4 April, 1921 and ROR 100 
7 April, 1921. CP 2811, CAB 24/122.
2 Vincent Fovargue a Dublin IRA member who had 
'escaped' from custody in Dublin, was believed by the 
London IRA to be a British agent.
3. Times, 4, 5, 6 and 21 April, 1921.
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That same weekendr an organized ’Window Scratching1
campaign was commenced, 400 plate glass windows were
damaged in Liverpool, in a repetition of the Fenian
actions some forty years before\Wholesale window
scratching occurred throughout the month of April,
across Britain. By the 22nd over 1,500 windows had
been damaged in London alene. Windows scored
with 1R 1s (for Republic) were reported in Birmingham,
Swansea, Barry, Devonport, Walton-on-Thames, Gravesend,
St. Albans, Sheffield, Worcester, Preston, Bournemouth,
Leeds, Aldershot, Glasgow, where a thousand windows
were damaged in one weekend, Nottingham, Guildford,
2
Cambridge, Portsmouth and Southsea. The Home Office 
Intelligence Department correctly surmized that the 
window scoring campaign was the work of groups of
3
women. There were also incidents of acid attacks
4
on London pillar post boxes.
Another new development in the month of April was the 
disruption of telephone communications by the destruc­
tion of poles and wires, which commenced in the Jarrow
1 Times,4 April, 1921. Scoring windows with a sharp 
instrument structurally weakens them to the point 
where they have to be replaced.
2 See reports in the Times (issues of 21st, 22nd, 25th, 
26th and 27th of April, 1921) also the debate on 
this issue in Parliament, 141' H.C. Debs 5 Col. 170.
3 ROR 102, 21 April, 1921. CP 2859. CAB 24/122.
In the London IRA Diary, P17a/51, O'Malley, beside 
the 'window scoring' account is the pencilled comment 
"unofficial"
4 ' Times, 26 April, 1921.
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area.'1' The level of IRA activity in the Tyneside region
had by then reached the point where the Cabinet was
informed that the
" Lord Mayor of Newcastle was recruiting Special 
Constables for the express purpose of dealing 
with the Sinn Fein difficulty in the neighbour­
hood of Newcastle.,! 2
These reinforcements would certainly have been necessary
if IRA plans to form semi-permanent mobile ’flying 
3column’ rural guenilla units in the West and the East 
of Scotland regions and in the hilly border regions in
4
the North of England had been activiated. Scotland 
and the potential IRA strength there had, as we have 
observed, always been a source of concern for the 
authorities. As a result of the disruption of the 
Tyneside munitions supply operation following the 
commencement of offensive operations there, Liam 
Mellows had successfully argued against offensive 
activities in Scotland fearing that the all importaht 
explosives procurement would be substantially impeded. 
Frank Ca,rty the O.C. of the Sligo Brigade while on an
1 Times 11 April, 1921;also see 'Secret Report' Advisory 
Committee on Deportation of Edward Brady .TS27/140.
2 Home Secretary; Memorandum presented to Cabinet 
18 (21). CAB 23/23.
3 IRA 'flying columns' were semi— permanent mobile units 
usually consisting of 20 to 40 volunteers operating 
in rural areas in Ireland; see Commandant General 
Hogan 'The Origin of the IRA Flying Column1, An 
Cosantoir VI (1946), 621-6.
4 The subject was discussed at an IRA conference of 
officers held in Edinburgh in April, the details 
were reported to the Cabinet in ROR 102, 21 April,
1921. CP 2859. CAB 24/122.
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purchasing visit to Scotland was arrested in Glasgow.
The local IRA commander ignoring Mellows' advice decided
on a direct rescue attempt. Twenty-five men were
mobilized on the 4th of May, 1921 to ambush the prison
van taking Carty to court. In the heavy exchange of
fire that ensued one police detective was killed and
another wounded. Twelve of the IRA participants in
this gun battle were arrested in a Catholic church and
following the arrest of Father McRory, the priest
in charge,rioting developed to such an extent that the
Army had to be called in to guard the police station.
Eventually twenty-four persors were charged in connection
with the armed attack and another fourteen with rioting.'1'
Mellows1 worst fears were quickly realized for in the
follow-up operation, explosives, and arms dumps were
2discovered in eight towns in the West of Scotland.
Throughout the course of the war in Ireland, the members 
of the RIC had,through a combination of fear and 
dislike for their new role,been resigning in ever 
increasing numbers. By July, 1920,weekly resignations
3
were running at about twenty times the number in 1914, and
1 Sources employed in this reconstruction. Times (5th, 
6th, 9th of May 1921 and 9th of August, 1921) ; C.D. 
Greaves Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution
op. cit., 231-33. John Maclean who was very sympathe­
tic to the IRA however suggested the attack had 
been the work of agent provocateurs" .The Socialist 
12 May, 1921.
2 Times, 11 August, 1921 for report of trial.
3 560 RIC resigned in June/July, 1920. See Barry, 
op. cit., 37.
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few replacements came forward in Ireland itself.
Instead the depleted ranks of the RIC were replenished 
with recruits from England. IRA mail raidsin Ireland1 
and the IRB London postal interception operations 
produced a number of addresses of RIC relatives in 
England and a large scale reprisal operation was 
ordered. The Times of Monday, 16 May, 1921 reported 
that on the previous Saturday night there had been 
'‘Irish raids in England, shooting and burning in London, 
Liverpool and St. Albans" with a “large number of armed 
and masked men involved.1'
In seven incidents in London, the homes of RIC relatives
were attacked,three were burned, and three occupants
were shot, one of whom subsequently died. An Auxilliary
and his wife were shot in St. Albans, while in Liverpool
2six houses were burnt. Commenting on these incidents
3
a Times editorial was headlined “From Bad to Worse".
Six men were subsequently deported from London on
4
suspicion of involvement in these raids. Thirty 
targets were attacked in the Teesside area on the 21/
22 of May resulting in the destruction of lorries
1 Tom Barry, op. cit., 83.
2 See IRA Diary, P17a/51; Early P17b/110/ for
Liverpool incidents; Dennis Brennan, ibid and Billy 
Ahearne,Pl7b/99,participated in the London operations.
The Morning Post, 7 May, 19 21 estimated that no 
less- than 160 men were involved in these operations.
3 Times , 1.8 May, 1921.
4 Times, 21 May, 1921.
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a saw mill, and a railway bridge.'1' But the president
of the Wallsend ISDL Council was arrested while
burning a motor boat shed. Several days later a raid
2
on the Liverpool army barracks was foiled. A raid 
on a Manchester shed showed the extent of the IRA 
logistical procurement operation in the Lancashire 
area, 2,583 high explosive charges, 618 detonators,
1,719 rounds of ammunition, twenty-five rifles and
3
four pistols were found and the Cabinet were sub­
sequently informed that "War material reaches Ireland
a 4from Manchester in considerable quantities.
Nineteen volunteers were arrested drilling in Dumbarton-
5
shire, while others got away . Another two men
in Scotland were jailed for the theft of 348 lbs. of
£
explosives from a colliery, while a police officer 
was shot in Middlesborough when he stopped four men 
who fled leaving behind a bag containing seventy lbs. 
of explosives."^
The promised offensive against the railway system
1 Times, 23 May, 1921. ROR 107, 28 May, 1921 CP 2979. 
CAB 24/123.
2 Times, 2 5 May,1921.
3 Manchester Evening News, 27 May, 1921.
4 ROR 108, 2 June, 1921, CP 3010. CAB 24/125.
5 ROR 109, 9 June, 1921, CP 3034. CAB 24/125.
6 Times, 25 June, 1921.
7 Ibid, 4 June, 1921.
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commenced with the destruction \ o f fifty railway signal
1
wires around Liverpool on the 3rd of June, and was the 
main form of sabotage activity during that month.
2Police fired on men on the railway lines at Dartford 
and two days later following attacks on three London 
suburban railway stations an IRA volunteer was wounded
3
m  a gun battle at a Bromley police road block. There
were further arson attempts on London railway installations
on the nineteenth of June and in Manchester a signal
man was shot during the destruction of two signal 
4
boxes. But by early July, 1921 negotiations for a 
truce were well advanced and there was little military 
offensive activity in Britain. The only possible IRA 
incident, that I have been able to trace was the 
discovery of a length of fuse wire found lying outside 
a Government office in Regents Park which was believed
5
to be a foiled sabotage attempt.
There were however a number of trials, at the Old Bailey: 
the four involved in the Bromley gun battle of the
6previous month received ten to twelve year sentences
1 But in this operation after the gun battle with 
the police,five of the participants were captured 
leading to Collins to declare: "The losses are very 
heavy, it is really too bad, so little gained" letter 
to P. Daly, 17 June, 1921, P7/A/5.
2 Times, 18 June, 1921, report of incident on the 16th.
3 Ibid.
4 Manchester Evening News, 20 June, 1921.
5 Times, 2 July, 1921.
6 Ibid, 4 July, 1921 and trial transcripts CRIM. 1/190,
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and at Newcastle three men received five to seven years
for arson1 while at Chester another four were convicted
of telephone wire cutting and the illegal possession 
2
of arms. The truce in Ireland which came into effect
at midday on the eleventh of July, 1921, was according
to the Times report marked at the trial of the Manchester
19 arrested in the Erskine St. raid, when
"as the clock struck twelve 'Captain Harding1 
leapt to his feet, commanded "shun1 where 
upon all the prisoners stood to attention for 
a few minutes until after a Gaelic command, 
they resumed their seats'.'3
The principal prosecution witness was an agent prova,cateur 
4
named Murphy; sixteen of the defendants were found 
guilty and sentenced to three to twenty years imprison­
ment.^
During the period of offensive activity from the 
Liverpool fires of 28 November, 1920 to the truce, 
there were 164 acts of inceridiarism and nine attempted 
acts of arson. There were four gun battles in which 
shots were exchanged between IRA volunteers and the 
police, in the course of which each side suffered one 
fatality with four wounded police officers and two 
wounded volunteers. One civilian and one volunteer 
were wounded in two gun battles involving the same
1 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 4 July, 1921,
2 Manchester Evening News, 8 July, 1921.
3 Times, 12 July, 1921.
4 E. Brady, op. cit., 11.
5 Times, 16 July, 1921.
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farmer on separate occasions. In the twenty-one other
shooting incidents, three civilians were killed, six
others and three police officers were wounded?1 and one
man named George Tilson, who had been ordered out of
Cork by the IRA. for ’ spying' was found with his throat
cut in the toilet of the Fishguard train when it reached 
2
London. I will, assess in Chapter 26 whether this IRA 
campaign in Britain fulfilled any of its objectives and 
consider the role played by the IRA Cumann na m Ban and 
the IRB in Britain in the creation of the Irish Free State.
1 Statistics compiled from the' Times reports , Reports 
on Revolutionary Organizations in Britain and the 
IRA Diary, op. cit..
2 Times, 21 February, 19 21.
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Comrades Yesterday, Enemies Today; The War of the Brothers, 
1922-23.
The cessation of IRA offensive operations did not mark
an end to organizational activities, it merely reverted to
its pass-November 1920 primary logistical role in
supplying munitions. Activities in that sphere were
greatly increased as many IRA leaders believed the Truce
was only a temporary lull, which afforded the opport-
1
unity for the strengthening of their forces. A British
Intelligence report in August 1921 observed that* "Arms
purchases in England and Scotland have been stepped 
2up.” An accidental blast in a London IRA explosives
factory killed Michael Mclnerney and a month later
Michael Hickey who worked in the Woolwich Arsenal was
killed while trying to steal explosives from shells. He,
4his wife and son were all ISDL members.
1 Martin Walsh, a London volunteer recalled that when he 
met Collins in London during the truce he »*gave orders 
to expedite the transmission of supplies1', P17a/154 .
The quantity of arms imported into Ireland, mostly 
from Britain, between July and December of 1921 was 
much greater than in the previous twelve months. See 
S.M. Lawlor 'Ireland from Truce to Treaty: War or 
Peace?', Irish Historical Studies XXII (1980), 49-64.
And according to Mulcahy, the number of IRA volunteers 
increased from 30,000 in July 1921 to 75,000 in December 
1921 - P7A/27 and P7A/32
2 ROR 119, 18 August,1921,£P 3252 CAB 24/127.
3 Report IRA Chemical DepartmentPI7a/29.
4 ROR 124, 22 September,1921.CP 3333. CAB 24/127.
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Britain in the summer of 19 21 was crisscrossed by IRA/
IRB agents seeking munitions. At the trial of one
he was stated to have said* "We want anything from
1
a spring to a cannon.” One mission led by Ernie O'Malley 
purchased over three tons of explosives base used
. \ ■ i
in the manufacture of cheddite which after being
stored in London warehouses was shipped to Ireland
2
labelled nglass with care.1’
Michael Collins took time off from the treaty negotia­
tions to establish two new explosives factories in
3
London and to reorganize the units there. Inevitably
some of this activity was exposed by the British Authorities
and Collins was somewhat embarrassed at a Treaty
Negotiation session when the 'Cardiff' issue was
4revealed by Lloyd George. This affair, said the trial 
prosecutor, involved . a "highly organized system
5
for procuring arms and ammunition".
1 Times 22 December, 1921.
2 Srnieo'Malley The Singing Flame, op. cit., 28.
Cheddite is manufactured by mixing potassium chlo­
rate, DNT and castor oil over a low heat. It is a 
medium power blasting explosive.
3 ROR 129 27 October, 1921,CP 3451 CAB 24/129. In a 
letter to Daly (5 October, 1921) Collins stated
"I don't suppose all my time will be taken up with 
Conference work. It certainly will not, if I can 
arrange it" P7/A/7.
4 See Frank Pakenham Peace By Ordeal, 138 and Jones 
Whitehall Diaries, op. cit., 145.
5 Times 29 October 1921.. Also see letter Daly to 
Collins (18 October, 1921) P7/A/7.
761
Even more embarrassed than Collins was the ISDL; 
ten of whose members including their Tyneside organiser, 
Richard Purcell, and their South Wales organizer Joseph 
Connolly were arrested. Along with other regional ISDL 
leaders they had constructed a logistical network 
stretching from Newcastle to Cardiff. The police 
found twenty-six weapons in one church, three hundred 
and fifty-five lbs. of explosives in another and 
discovered evidence that the group had sent machine 
guns to Ireland. Some of the equipment had been 
purchased, the rest was the product of raids on 
magazines. The theft of a hundred and fifty lbs. of 
gelignite from a Welsh colliery had resulted in the 
discovery of the ring. Eight were subsequently sent­
enced to from one to fourteen years at a series of 
trials.1
Despite the arrests the IRA seemed to have little
difficulty in recruiting replacements for its logistical
operations. An intelligence assessment revealed
that since the truce "the IRA in Great Britain has
been making strides and that itspower and influence
among certain class of Irishmen in this country is 
2
increasing." The IRB were also reported as having
1 ' Times ‘29 October, 11, 17 November, 1921 .
2 ROR 133, 1 December, 1921 CP 3526, CAB 24/131.
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substantially increased their membership in Britain.1
An attempted raid on Perth prison was foiled by the
2
police who surprised the raiders.
The most audacious operations of this first truce
period were the raids on Chelsea and Windsor Army
Barracks in which with the aid of an Irish Guards
sergeant four Vickers and two Lewis machine guns were
3taken along with fourteen rifles. The cabinet were
informed that with the exception of the soldier, all
involved were ISDL members. They were also told that:
®from many parts of the country, reports are 
coming in of wholesale chemists receiving orders 
from Ireland for chemicals which could be ^^ 
used for the manufacture of high explosives”
The previous week the Cabinet had been informed, "Arms,
ammunition and explosives are undoubtedly being shipped
in not inconsiderable quantities to Ireland."5
The seizure of ten Thompson submachine guns in Liverpool 
at the end of November and another, eight at the same port
1 . ROR -13.5, 15 December, 1921 CP 3561, CAB .24/131 arid
according to Ahearne , P 17/B/99, the IRB in London 
had doubled its size to 60. The Liverpool IRA even 
with its heavy casualties had doubled its size 
from its formation in 1919 see; P7/A/1 and P7/A/7.
The London IRA in this period was 200 strong see 
IRA Diary P17a/51 .
2 ROR 135. Ibid.
3 Times 3 December, 19 21.
4 ROR 132,24 November, 1921, CP3090, CAB 24/131.
5 ROR 131, 17 November, 1921,0? 3492, CAB 24/129.
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in January 1922 , ^ substantially thwarted IRA, plans for
a large scale importation of this new automatic weapon,
first used in action by the IRA and destined to become
'the weapon' identified with the IRA for the next fifty 
2
years. Importation of this type of automatic weapon
i
must have been particularly alarming for a government
which did not issue one to its own army for almost
another twenty years. Another thirteen persons were
arrested following the seizure of arms and explosives
3
in a Glasgow parochial hall. But the IRA in Britain 
was strengthened by the return to its ranks of many of 
the prisoners, sentenced in the pre-truce period
4
following their release in February 1922.
After the Dail’s seven vote margin acceptance of the 
Treaty the IRA had divided on the issue but the cleavage 
was as yet imperfectly defined and over the next six 
months the fragmented elements would shift their position 
and coalesce with previously opposing forces and in 
some cases split again on new lines of separation. The 
majority of the IRA GHQ staff had accepted the treaty but the 
departmental heads who had rejected it had extremely
1 ROR 134, CP 3538. CAB 24/131. and ROR 139, 19 Jan.,
1922 , CP 3639 . CAB 24/132. Also see letter, Daly to 
Collins, (1 Dec., 1921) ,P 7/A/7.
2 For an account of the IRA’s adoption of the Thompson, 
see J. Bowyer Bell, ’The Thompson Sub-Machine Gun
in Ireland, 1921', The Irish Sword, VIII, (1967),
98-108.
3 ROR 137, 5 Jan., 1922, CP 3600, CAB 24/131.
4 Times, 13 Feb., 1922.
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close organizational interests in Britain. Mellows was
Director of Purchases, O ’Connor,the OC British Command,
O ’Donovan, the Director of. Chemicals, Russell the
Director of Munitions and they formed in January 1922
a Military Action Committee/later to be renamed the
Military Council.'1' The domination of the IRA’s British
offensive and logistical operative units by opponents
of the Treaty inevitably influenced many otherwise
doubtful volunteers to declare against the Treaty.
Intelligence operations were however controlled by
Collins: unquestionably the single most influential
Treaty supporter and his personal influence ,combined
2with his effective leadership of the TRB , was sufficient 
to ensure that the new Free State had reliable under­
cover military units of its own in Britain, notably in 
the traditional 1RB centres of Glasgow, Liverpool and 
London. That the situation was confused, that the 
personal loyalities of senior officers were regarded as 
doubtful or at least uncertain is indicated by an epis­
ode even before the Treaty was signed when Cathal Brugha's 
arms buying mission were instructed to have no contact
1 Greaves, op. cit., 285.
2 Florence O ’Donnoghue however suggests that less than 
one percent of IRB members actually knew that Collins 
had become Head Centre, Irish Press, 13 Feb., 1964. 
The IRB was organizationally speaking neutral until 
the publication of the new Free State constitution. 
IRB members who were TDs had a free choice in the 
Treaty ratification debate, see The' IRB and The 
Treaty , an IRB statement dated 12 Jan., 1922, (NLI). 
However the majority of IRB Supreme Council members 
favoured the acceptance of the Treaty including a
a majority of those who were on the IRA GHQ Staff 
(of the 13 GHQ officers, eleven were IRB members).
See John 0 ’Beirne-Ranelagh, 'The IRB from the Treaty 
to 1924' , Irish Historical StudiesjL8(March 19 76) , 
26-39.
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with Sean McGrath, even though he later emerged as one 
of the anti-treaty military leaders in Britain.
Though the available evidence is often of a very frag­
mented nature, ambiguous,and at best has to be treated 
with reservation.it would appear that by April 1922, the 
majority of IRA volunteers in Britain had declared 
against the Treaty, but there was still a considerable 
element who were determined to remain neutral. The 
proscription of the Army Convention in March 19 22 by 
the new Provisional Government ensured that only Anti- 
Treaty delegates from Britain attended and voted for 
the Army to revert to its former independent role, 
owing allegiance only to its own executive. This repud­
iation of all political control had repercussions in 
Britain: annoyed by the failure of the ISDL to denounce 
the Treaty a group of London volunteers visited the
2ISDL head office and threatened to *rblow the place up*1 . 
And a Lewisham ISDL branch meeting was disrupted by a 
dozen armed men who fired shots before they forcibly 
removed one man, in what British Intelligence reported
3
was a general "sauve qui peut11 . Not unsurprizingly 
that branch soon folded', other similar disturbances, 
many simply the product of boredom among volunteers 
who found difficulty in reverting to a peace time non-
2 ROR 153, 27 April, 1922, CP 3952. CAB 24/136.
3 ROR 152, CP 3945, CAB 24/136.
766
offensive role, resulted in the court martials of 
1
offenders. Despite these internal problems within the IRA,
Churchill was by early April sufficiently alarmed to ,
notify the Cabinet that;
"In the event of a collision between British 
Forces and the Republican Government or even 
upon the mere establishment of a Republican 
Government serious outrages might take place 
in this country**. 2
The previous month the Government had been informed
that upersistent quests for arms in this country,
indicates trouble of a serious nature in Ireland at no
3
very distant date'11. After the clashes between Pro and 
Anti-Treaty forces in Athlone and Annaca,rty in April 
1922, the need for munitions on the anti-treaty side 
became sufficiently great as to risk their English organ­
ization in a series of raids on magazines. A foiled 
raid on a Birmingham arms factory in early May 1922 
uncovered the primary logistical network operated by 
Mellows. Eleven men were arrested in Birmingham,
4
Liverpool, Yorkshire and London, but the organization 
was still sufficiently strong to launch a co-ordinated
1 ROR 156;18 May, 1922, CP 3983. CAB 24/136.
2 Para 9c of Churchill’s note in Cabinet Conclusions
23(22). 5 April, 1922. CAB 23/29.
3 ROR 149,3 March, 1922 CP 3917. CAB 2.4/136.
4 Times 6 May, 1922 and ROR 154,4 May, 1922, CP 3960.
CAB 24/136. Most of the men arrested were some­
what surprisingly given bail and when their trial 
was called, the Prosecution asked for the charges to 
be dropped as some of the men, he said, were now
in prison in Ireland and others were fighting for the 
Free State Government, Manchester Guardian, 2 December,
1922.
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series of raids the following month. During the first 
weekend in June 1922 explosives were seized from ten 
collieries and magazines in Lancashire.1
A fortnight later an incident occurred;the origin of 
which, due to its ramifications, has since been the 
source of much controversy and argument. Ostensibly
the assassination of Field Marshal! Wilson on his door-*
step on the 22 June 1922 appeared to be the action of
Republicans opposed to the Treaty. Certainly the
British Government were so convinced of this (or rather
they wanted to believe this) as to issue an ultimatum
to Collins either to attack the Republican Headquarters
in the Four Courts or else the British Army would inter-
2
vene and the Treaty would be regarded as nullified.
In fact ironically the British Government had sought 
to compel the very men responsible for Wilson’s death to 
revenge what the Times declared to be an ’Outrage 
unparalleled in the modern history of this country1.1 
The appearance of four Times editorials on the 
assassination issue in the week of the incident is an 
indication of how deeply that event affected British 
public opinion. Therefore it is all the more important 
that an historically accurate account of the incident
1 Manchester Evening News ROR 159,15 June, 1922,
CP 4040. CAB 24/136.
2 Cabinet Minutes. 36(22) 22 June, 1922. CAB 23/29.
3 Times, 23 June, 1922.
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and its origins be established. Most British historians
1 2of this period, Middlemass, Mowat in particular, have 
however dismissed the incident as an apparently 
independent action, by the two involved but in doing 
so they have ignored a wealth of evidence from many
3
other sources. Soon after Wilson's shooting rumours
of a Collins/IRB involvement began circulating in
Ireland and one participant at the centre of events,
O'Malley, believed that Griffith's cerebral hemorrhage
was the result of the shock occasioned upon learning
4
that Collins was’implicated. A projected British 
Government report of the incident never materialized 
when the investigators discovered that Collins had
5
in fact ordered the shooting. With Collins by now
1 Middlemkiass records without comment Jones' belief 
that the men who shot Wilson were l!not members of 
the IRA*1 - Whitehall Diaries, 213.
2 C. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars (1955), 70, claims 
Dunne and O'Sullivan were "not connected apparently 
with any wing of the IRA."
3 Other sources employed in this account of Wilson's 
death were: (a) Sean MacGrath deposition P17/B/100;
(b) Dennis Brennan ibid; (c) Billy Ahearne P/17/B/99 
O'Malley) (d) Irish Times 20 May 1961; (e) Transcript
of the trial of Dunne and O'Sullivan CRIMI/204.
4 E. O'Malley, Singing Flame, op. cit., 152. He 
also observed that rtTwo of Collins' trusted men had 
been in London before the shooting took place" ,
85. See also Robert Briscoe For the Life of Me 
(Dublin,1959), 165 where he states of Dunne and 
O'Sullivan “They may have been acting on orders of 
the IRB."
5 Rose Killean in the course of her evidence to the 
Irish Deportees Claims Compensation Committee did 
state that Wilson's death was the result of Dunne 
and O'Sullivan acting on Free State orders, but her 
claim was not published in any major Enqlish publication. 
See TS27/187, 21.
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dead and regarded’ as a gallant British ally, such a 
publication might have proved extremely embarrassing 
to the British Government.1 In his book Assassination 
Rex Taylor quotes what may be taken as the official 
Free State Army line, on the incident: '’About a fort­
night before Wilson was removed from the scene of 
operations, word was conveyed to Sam Maguire to carry 
out the instructions. This order was issued by Michael
Collins as Director of Intelligence. The order was
2
promp.tly executed.f’ Why Collins risked so much to 
have Wilson killed (discovery of his plan could quite 
conceivably have produced' war between Britain and the 
Free State) can never .be rationally explained . One can 
perhaps understand why Wilson the man who had effectively 
masterminded the Curragh Mutiny and thereby foiled 
the implementation of the Home Rule Bill; who had pro­
hibited MacSwiney's Dublin funeral;' wlio- had vetoed Kevin Barry’s
3
reprieve; and who now led the B Specials., should be the sub 
ject of a Collins1 execution order. What is
much more difficult to fathom is Collin behaviour 
after the event. Instead of trying to obscure all 
signs of his involvement he ordered one of his staff
1 See my article in the Sunday Tribune, 27 June, 1982.
2 Letter to Taylor quoted in Assassination, op. cit.,
116, by a Free State Intelligence officer.
3 Wilson after leaving the British Army, where he had 
risen to the rank of Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, became a Unionist MP and security advisor
to the new Northern Ireland Government.
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officers to go to England to try and secure Dunne and 
Sullivan’s escape through the bribery of warders. When 
this failed he sent over Joe Dolan, a man regarded as 
Collins’ closest confidant and at that time a senior, 
Free State officer either to take hostages or to attempt 
a jail break from the outside. An attempt to kidnap 
the Prince of Wales was foiled arid though twenty two men 
were mobilized to break into Brixton the non-arrival 
of the promised explosives thwarted this also. This 
last plan had involved one of the most incredible 
secret negotiations ever undertaken in Irish history.
At the height of the Civil War Collins had asked his 
opponent, Liam.Lynch, the Chief of Staff of the Republican 
forces,to lend him the services of some of the London 
IRA volunteers under Lynch's command. Lynch not only 
agreed but sent one of his staff officers, Billy Aher n e t 
to organize the London operation,furnished with a 
Collins' 'safe conduct pass' through the Free State 
lines.
It is now generally accepted that Wilson’s shooting and
the resulting British pressure was not in fact the match
2
that sparked off the Civil War; that had been inevitable
1 See (a) R. Taylor, op. cit., 127-128. (b) an exchange
of correspondence between participants in the various 
plans and members of the London IRA in 'the columns of 
the Sunday Press, 27 Sept., 4 Oct., 11 Oct., 1953.
(c) Remembrance , London Memorial Committee of Ex- 
IRA and Cumman na Mban, (no date of publication) for 
an account of the events summarized.
2 The actual incident that 'started' the Civil War, if 
such conflicts can in fact be attributed to a single 
event, is now taken as the.seizure of General O'Connell, 
the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Free State Army, by a
.raiding party from the Four Courts Garrison which led 
to the shelling of that institution.
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from the moment the Treaty was signed. If however 
Wilson’s death is now regarded by historians as a 
relatively minor event, albeit one with interesting 
implications, the incident’s significance cannot be under^- 
estimated by the sociological researcher. The 
difficulty of evaluating accurately the involvement 
and attitudes of the Irish in Britain during that period 
can be seen in the micro context of that one incident.
The Irish born British Field Marshal : was shot by two 
ex British soldiers now IRA volunteers who 'Vere 
Londoners, both living at home with their parents 
and there was no evidence that they had ever been to 
Ireland in their lives."1 That single incident,so 
apparently simple in outline,yet fraught with complications 
for the political sociologist,-should itself be suff­
icient to prevent the formulation of any wide gener­
alizations about the response, of the Irish in Britain 
towards events in Ireland.
For many of the Irish in Britain and in particular in
London, life proved somewhat difficult in the period
immediately following Wilson’s assassination. ISDL
members were particularly badly affected.Eighteen were
2
arrested in the first post-incident raids. Mrs Eadie,
an ISDL head office clerk and secretary of the Central
London branch,was subsequently jailed for the possession
3
of incendiaries. An emergency Cabinet meeting was told
1 R. Taylor, Assassination.
2 Times 27 June, 1922.
3 Ibid 30 June, 1922.
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by Police Assistant Commissioner Childs that,
“Thirty dangerous Irishmen were under observation 
by the police in London. These persons were 
mostly'concerned with the ISDL'/-*-
The position of many Irish persons employed in the
Civil Service must have been jeopardized for when it
was learnt that O'Sullivan was an employee of the
Ministry of Labour the Cabinet ordered: “Departments
2 'should make enquiries as to Irish born employees" 
Churchill's fear of "serious outrages'* occurring in
3
Britain did not materialize (except for one bank raid ) 
for a number of reasons. The capture of many of the 
Republican leaders in the Four Courts/including Rory 
0 ’Connor; severely impeded communications between 
Republican Headquarters or what remained of it,as it 
transversed the roads of Southern and Western Ireland 
and their units in Britain. Though the British Command 
had already been removed from O ’Connor's control 
during the post March Convention Army reorganization 
and put under the command of the First Eastern Division,
1 Cabinet Conclusion. 36(22) Appendix III of 22 June, 
1922. CAB 23/30. Elizabeth Lazenby later tried to 
implicate Art O'Brien in the assassination in her 
book, Ireland A Catspaw (1928), 135.
2 Cabinet Conclusions CAB 38(22) Appendix I of 
23 June, 1922. CAB 23/30.
3 A Manchester bank was raided by a local IRA unit 
(whether this was authorized or not is unknown) 
see Manchester Evening News, 23 June 1922 and two 
men were subsequently jailed for 10 years for 
this offence, ibid, 30 November, 1922.
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in Ireland, communications were still difficult.
Ernie O'Malley O.C. of Ulster and Lenister of which
the First Eastern was a constituent element was to find
it difficult enough to co-ordinate the action of the
Dublin units,as he moved constantly through that city
on the run,let alone administer the far reaches of his
1
command in Britain. Volunteers from Glasgow, Liverpool, 
London and Tyneside made their way over to Ireland
2
individually or in small groups to fight in Ireland
but a Liverpool officer who went in search of instructions
for a new offensive in Britain "couldn't get anything
2
definite from anyone in authority and left in disgust^.
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Four 
Courts the Republicans could not afford to launch a 
British offensive with all the increased surveillance 
that would produce. The decision not seriously to- 
contest with the Free State forces,.for the control of 
Dublin left the Republicans initially controlling large 
areas of territory in the South, West and North, but 
with no secure communications between these. It was 
often easier to send a courier from Cork to Dublin
1 O'Malley's reports, memos and letters to his Chief of 
Staff,present a vivid account of the difficulties
of organizing activities ih a large part of Ireland 
and Britain from within a tightly controlled Dublin; 
P7a/8l.
2 ROR 163,13 July, 1922. CAB 24/138. A report by the 
Director of Intelligence (Free State Army) mentions 
that three Scots were among the persons captured in 
the Four Courts ;see Report 15/6/1923, P17a/182.
And ROR 165,undated,CP 4132..CAB 24/135. Hugh Early 
recalled that a Liverpool volunteer was executed by 
a Free State firing squad in Tuam see P17b/110.
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or Belfast via Cardiff or Liverpool than by a land 
route through Free State territory.
When in early August the Republicans tried to disrupt 
the advance on Cork by launching a large scale attack 
on the Dublin communications system, the hundred and 
sixty volunteers involved travelled to Dublin from 
Cork via Liverpool. The apprehension of a courier 
resulted in the capture in Dublin of all involved in 
that operation.'1'
The Republicans who initially believed that they could 
hold the Waterford"Limerick line given the availability 
of sufficient munitions, failed to realize that the poss­
ession of’ Dublin (the largest port in Ireland) had 
presented the Free State with the necessary shipping 
to mount a series of landings in the rear of their lines. 
Munitions were however in short supply, O'Malley was
not exaggerating much when he stated ''We had little
2ammunition, practically no explosives." Since the
bulk of Republican explosives had been left behind 
3
m  Dublin. With the abandonment of the last Republican
1 ROR 169,24 August, 1922.CP 4171. CAB 24/138. Letter 
(18 August 1922) from Lynch, Chief of Staff to O'Malley 
on why the 'isolate Dublin' operation failed - P7a/8l. 
And in a later operation - the attempt to blow up the 
Oriel House Dublin Intelligence Hq., the arms and some 
of the volunteers involved came from England. See Free 
State Army Director of Intelligence Report P17a/182.
2 See O'Malley The Singing Flame, 169, also letter from 
Lynch to O'Malley on lack of explosives hampering 
operations.
3 5 October 1922,P7a/8l. The central munition dump of the 
Republican forces was located in the Four Courts; see 
IRA Chemicals Department Report, P17a/2 9.
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garrisoned towns in mid-August and, with the reversal 
to guerrilla warfare, sabotage operations against economic 
targets, the source of Free State tax revenue became 
the paramount strategy. Deprived of the use of any port 
the supply of arms, ammunition and explosives had to 
be funnelled through the Free State controlled ports, 
in smuggling operations which depended on a high 
volume of traffic for any chance of success. The West 
coast American traffic was too limited in scale to 
afford the importation in any significant quantity or 
with any regularity of the direly needed munitions. As 
in the War of Independence, these, whether they 
originated in America or on the continent, had to be 
shipped via the busy Britain - East Coast of Ireland 
routes.1 Hence the Republican leadership could not 
when they still appeared to have a chance, if not of 
actually winning the struggle, at least of waging a 
protracted guerrilla struggle to a stalemate, permit 
any offensive strategy by their British units which 
would impede these vital logistical operations. These 
procurement operations were now much more difficult
1 See the Free State Government evidence on munitions
smuggling centred in Britain, given to a British Labour 
Party Delegation; Parliamentary Labour Party Report On 
The Irish Deportations (1923). And a Free State Army 
Intelligence report which stated that arms were being 
sent from Antwerp, Hamburg, and the USA to Liverpool 
and from there to Sligo, Feni.t, Cork and Dublin. See < 
Intelligence in Britain 1922/2 3 P17a/182. After the 
fall of the Four Courts, urgent purchases of chem­
icals for explosives manufactures were madd in Britain. 
See IRA Chemical Department Report, P17a/29 and 
letter from O'Malley to Lynch, 28 July, 1922,
P7a/8l; Report Arms Sales, P17a/49.
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to undertake. Some people formerly involved in the
earlier struggle, were now in the Free State forces
and used their knowledge of the old Irish port smuggling
procedures to thwart the new operations. The British
Authorities were provided by their former adversaries with
all the necessary details relating to the British end
of the logistical routes. Three Free State Intelligence
officers were posted to Liverpool to help the police
combat Republican arms smuggling there.1 But despite
their efforts the British Cabinet were informed in
November, 1922 that "‘the traffic in arms still goes on
although greatly hampered by Police and Customs 
2
authorities. "
Periodic seizures gave some indication of the scale 
of the logistical operations; a Free State boarding 
party discovered three machine guns, twenty rifles 
and three thousand five hundred rounds of ammunition
3
on board a Glasgow/Sligo steamer. And four Republicans 
were jailed in Scotland for arms procurement in the
1 See Report of the Advisory Committee in the Case of
Mary Leonard (Brixton Prison, 7 May, 1923) , TS 27/183.
The Free State Executive Council meeting of the 13 
January 192 3 instructed Commandant General O'Hegarty/ 
the Director of Intelligence,to improve liaison and 
information sharing with the British \ P7/B/245.
Also see Department of Intelligence file 'Irish in 
Britain1. P7/B/378. And 'Intelligence in Britain', 
particularly letter of 14 December, 1922 from the 
Director of Intelligence To Commander in Chief on the 
necessity of increasing the number of intelligence 
officers stationed in Britain, P17a/182.
2 ROR 182, 30 November, 1922, CP 4337. CAB 24/139.
3 Times, 7 October, 1922.
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same week as that find,1
As the scale of warfare in Ireland was gradually
reduced in size; with the Republican forces incapable
of mounting much more than an ambush or a hit and run
raid; as demoralization increased following the
adoption by the Free State of a policy of summary
execution; so the potential contribution of the Republican
forces in Britain became all the more important,
constituting the last untapped reservoir of Republican
2military strength. At the end of 1922 Pa Murray,who 
had been appointed to the vacant position of O.C.
3Britain,arrived in England with several staff officers
1 ROR 176,12 October, 1922 CP 4282. CAB 24/139. And ROR 
185,14 December, 1922.CAB 24/140.
2 As soon as the first phase of the Civil War - the 
battle for the cities of Dublin and Cork, was over, 
Lynch began to take an active interest in the IRA 
units in Britain. On the 12 September, 1922, he wrote . 
to O'Malley on the need to ensure that the British 
units were well organized for "I am only to anxious
to have the organization perfected to meet certain 
eventualities)' P7a/8l. The importance of the British 
units is further indicated by the fact that at the 
first Array Executive meeting to be held since the 
start of the Civil War, the meeting of 17 October, 1922 
the agenda included as item 8 "Action if and when in 
Britain" and while no firm decision as to offensive 
action was then taken it was emphasized that the 
British organization was very important ; 'Minutes 
of Army Executive', P17a/12.
3 Pa Murray, the O.C. 1st Bt. Cork, Brigade was: appointed 
O.C. Britain on 27 September, 1922. Liam Deasy, Deputy 
Chief of Staff,wrote to the Adjutant of the 1st 
Southern Division requesting that the Division provide 
an Adjutant, Engineer and Chemist for "duty in England" 
(Field Hq. 30 November, 1922,P17a/51). Also see 
Director of Intelligence (Free State Army) Reports of 
15 June, 1923, P17a/182. After the capture of O'Malley 
it appears that the position of O.C. Britain reverted 
for a period to the office of the Director of Purchases, 
Sean Moylan. See 'The Chief of Staff's Report' , Frank 
Aiken, 10/8/1924, P17a/12, until Murray was appointed.
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and British Intelligence soon noted ’'Underground
Republican activities in England and Scotland are
1
on the increase.1’
The restrictions on offensive activities in Britain were 
considerably relaxed, Glasgow volunteers who in 
September were restricted to ’getting information on 
those joining the Free State Army with a view to having
o
them, shot when they . land in Dublin";*' now commenced
a series of shooting incidents against suspected Free
State agents  ^ who launched their own retaliatory 
3
operations. In turn the Scottish Police, already
concerned about sectarian clashes in the city and
clearly not prepared to tolerate the extension of the
Irish Civil War to their own volatile area, swiftly
struck back. A raid on a Glasgow hall uncovered a
munitions dump and resulted in the arrest of twenty-
eight people including the O.C. and the Second in
4Command of the Glasgow IRA. Another person captured 
in this raid gave a glimpse of the ' secret war1', fought 
in the back streets of Glasgow and Liverpool in the 
winter of 1922-23,between the IRA and Free State 
Intelligence agents, when he told the court that he
1 ROR 186, 21 December, 1922, CP 4375. CAB 24/140.
2 ROR 174, 28 September, 1922, CP 4242. CAB 24/139.
3 ROR 188, 11 January, 1923, CP 15(23). CAB 24/158.
4 Freemans Journal, 13 January, 1923. ROR 189, 18
January, 1923, CP 26 (23). CAB 24/158.
had penetrated the Glasgow IRA,on the instructions 
of his superior officers in the Free State Army who
Xhad ordered ('a certain person in Glasgow to be shot”-.
Three more people were arrested in Liverpool following
2the discovery of another arms dump- there and a month
later a search of an Irish ship in the port revealed
twelve drums of chemical explosives and twelve thousand
3rounds of ammunition. But another police success m
Stockport injured the Chief Constable, an Army Colonel
and several others when explosives they were examining
4
blew up in the Police station.
By February, 1923, it had become apparent to even
the most determined IRA officers in Ireland that they
were losing the war; the Dublin Brigade had effect-
5ively been reduced to a few active service units and
the Southern Command, the most important individual
IRA formation,was down to only 800 volunteers with its
O.C. predicting the imminent defeat of his units
unless the pressure on his area could be relieved
6by increased activity elsewhere. But the neighbouring
1 Catholic Herald, 20 January, 1923. Poblacht ha. h- 
Eireann, 31 January, 1923.
2 ROR 188, 11 January, 1923, CP 15 (23). CAB 24/158 
and P7/B/84.
3 Times, 25 October, 1922.
4 Manchester Evening News, 4 December, 1922.
5 Captured correspondence published in the Freemans 
Journal, 9 April, 1923.
6 Captured correspondence.published in the Freemans 
Journal, 9 April, 1923.
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units were themselves not very optimistic of their
ability to continue the fight much longer.1 Yet
Liam Lynch was still confident that provided he
could secure more munitions i especially ammunition -
2"Many guns are dumped for want of stuff", his units 
could be relied upon to launch a new co-ordinated 
offensive that might yet force the Free State Government 
to seek a non-military end to the Civil War. His 
arms purchasing teams on the continent and in the 
United States were instructed to send all the ammun­
ition in their foreign dumps at once to Britain where 
there '’’are many channels for shipment-1'to Ireland.
Lynch had also planned an even more vital role for his 
units in Britain than merely supplying munitions for 
a new offensive in Ireland. They themselves were to 
launch a widespread sabotage campaign with the 
intention, no less than, forcing the British Army 
back into the Irish conflict, as De Valera clearly 
indicated**
“One big effort from our friends everywhere 
and I think we would finally smash the Free 
State. Our people have a hard time of 
suffering before them and we have of course 
to face the possibility of the British forces 
ccming back and taking', up the fight where the others
1 But all the O.C.s of the units concerned, the Cork 
and Kerry Brigades, were prepared to fight on until 
they were defeated, see Freeman'.s Journal, 9^ Apr . , 1923.
2 Captured correspondence Lynch to Sean Moylan in 
America and published ibid 23 March, 1923.
3 Ibid 16 March, 1923 .
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lay it down - But God is good!"1
In a last ditch gamble Lynch,with the active backing 
2of De Valera , was hoping to draw the British back into 
the conflict with the intention of persuading the Free 
State Government to sue for a negotiated settlement ; 
otherwise the IRA campaign in Britain would continue 
with the risk of an infuriated British Government 
intervening militarily. And perhaps Lynch even believed 
that a return of the British Army might somehow result 
in a rapprochement . of many of the old IRA members 
serving in the Free State Army with the Republicans.
For, whatever of these motives Lynch believing "his 
forces in England were sufficiently well organized 
and equipped to undertake operations in specific areas^ 
issued the necessary operational orders at the end 
of February, stressing that "days now count in this
it 4
matter, start at once.
Unfortunately for Lynch’s final gamble, the Free State
1 De Valera to McGarritty. February 6, 1923, Ms 17,440,
McGarritty Papers (NLI).
2 De Valera advised a big first strike and a subse­
quent series of widespread operations in Britain, see 
Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill Earnon De 
Valera (1970), 213.
3 O'Donnoghue, op. cit., 281.
4 Letter produced by the Prosecution at the trial of 
Art O'Brien et al and quoted in the' Times, 16 
June, 1923.
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army was equally aware o f  the vital role IRA units in
Britain were to play in the IRA’s spring offensive .
They had already drawn up long lists of IRA personnel
in Britain whom they wanted the British authorities
1to try for supplying munitions to Ireland. The British
postal monitoring service was also intercepting Liam
Lynch’s communications to Kathleen Brooks, the Highgate
school teacher, who served as his 'post box" with the 
2O.C. Britain. As a result of their combined efforts, 
the British and Irish authorities ensured that all 
the ambitious Republican plans came to nothing in 
March, 1923. The month started badly for the IRA
3
with the seizure of another munitions dump in Liverpool 
and British Intelligence foiled, a week later, a plot 
to bring in a million rounds of ammunition from
4
Hamburg to Ireland through Glasgow and Liverpool .
This was the shipment the IRA in Ireland had placed
great hopes on. While the following week the London
5
Police seized 142 ’Peter the Painter' pistols
1 P7/B/84, P17a/195 and the Papers of Hugh Kennedy,
the Free State Attorney General, P4/11/9 (UCD).
2 See the evidence of the Post Office Special Invest­
igation Branch officer on intercepting mail: given 
at the trial of Art O'Brien et al and published in 
the Times, 16 June, 1923.
3 ROR 195, 1 March, 1923, CP 136.(23). CAB 24/159.
4 ROR 196, 8 March, 1923, CP 144 (23). CAB 24/159.
5 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166 (23). CAB 24/159.
The Mauser 1898 model semi-automatic pistol was 
dubbed 'Peter the Painter1 after its use in the 
1913 Sidney Street siege by a 'Russian anarchist1' 
who in fact was probably an Okhrana agent provo­
cateur.
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which would have been invaluable for a renewed IRA
offensive in Dublin.1 But the most crucial and
decisive action in foiling the planned IRA campaign
in Britain was the series of nationwide arrests
during the weekend of the 10th-l2th March and the
2subsequent deportation to Ireland of 110 people.
The arrests and deportations - as we have observed 
elsewhere in this thesis - were subsequently declared 
illegal and compensation had to be paid to the deportees 
but the action certainly totally disrupted the t r a plans 
and probably helped to shorten the Civil War. Some 
senior IRA officers in Britain managed to escape
3
the dragnet, possibly as the result of advance
information, but a communication from the O.C. Britain
to Lynch revealed the extent of the arrests,
“All officers arrested in Liverpool, Newcastle » 
The O.C. and Adjutants in Glasgow as well 
as most of the Battalion officers. The O.C. 
Birmingham and two London Company Captains 
also arrested.
A situation that induced Lynch's Operations officer to
1 Despite its heavy weight the powerful Mauser 
1898 model was a highly sought after weapon by 
the IRA: as the addition of its combined wooden 
holster/butt and a twenty round magazine converted 
it into a very effective carbine, ideal for close 
range combat.
2 ROR 197, 15 March, 1923, CP 151 (23). CAB 24/159.
3 Patrick Murray O.C. Britain, William Ahearn, O.C. 
London and Seamas Reader, Second in Command IRA 
Scotland. Ibid.
4 Captured Correspondence, published in the Freemans 
Journal, 11 April, 19 23.
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enclose his own memorandum with the O.C. Britain's
communication to the effect that ’’the chances of
operations in Britain are now negligible if not
altogether impossible."1 But Lynch also hopefully
noted that;despite the arrests and the removal of most
of his strike force in Britain to internment in
Ireland, the basic munitions supply network was still 
2
functioning - a fact testified by the Dublin Police
when they discovered in early May "a ton of explosives
3
recently arrived from Britain." The British Cabinet 
were informed by their Intelligence Adviser
“the deportation of the Republican leaders 
has had a good effect inasmuch that it has 
thrown their organization out of gear at 
a very critical moment: for months past 
they have been gathering their forces so 
as to put their full weight behind the blow 
to be struck against the Free State this 
Spring. Prominent Republicans in Ireland 
admit that it is now or never with the 
Republic and say that all will be over by 
June next.
Another indication that British Intelligence had
penetrated the IRA in Britain was provided by a
series of raids in mid April when an attempt was made
5
to organize new IRA active service units in London. 
But the Cabinet’s Intelligence officer was wrong in
1 k Freeman's Journal, 11 April r 1923.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, 19 May, 1923.
4 ROR 198, 22 March, 1923, CP 166 (23). CAB 24/159.
5 Daily Express, 13 April, 1923. Freemans Journal/
14 April, 1923. ROR 202, 19 April, 1923, CP 202. 
CAB 24/160.
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his assumption that the Civil War would drag on until
June. Lynch had been counting on a morale boosting
IRA campaign of largescale destruction in Britain to
exhort his 8,000 remaining troops into one last
offensive and now he faced almost irresistible pressure
from his officers to end hostilities. On April 10,
Lynch was fatally wounded and his successor as Chief
of Staff, Frank Aiken, ordered the IRA to suspend
1
all offensive action from the end of the month in 
an unsuccessful bid to negotiate peace terms with the 
victorious Free State Government. When they refused 
to take part in any official negotiations, Aiken then Sim-' 
ply ordered his troops to "dump their arms1 on May
In Britain the IRA units decided to keep a very low
public profile until the deportees - many of whom were
IRA members - had obtained their compensation for 
3illegal arrest but this policy did not prevent a whole­
sale reorganization,especially in the intelligence 
4
sector. Reorganization was however hampered by the 
tensions that developed between IRA members released 
from Irish prisons and those who had not travelled 
over to participate in the Civil War. These disputes 
particularly affected the Scottish IRA to the point
1 O'Donoghue, op. cit., 308-10.
2 Irish Independent, 29 May, 19 23.
3 RDR 216, 26 July, 1923, CP 347 (23). CAB 24/161.
4 ROR 206, 17 May, 1923, CP 249 (23). CAB 24/160.
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where a Special Brunch officer complainedr
"The IRA in Scotland appears to be quite 
out of hand and it is very difficult to 
keep up with the continual changes being 
made ir\ both the Brigade and Battalion 
staffs1!1
This factionalism reached its peak following the
recriminations over the abortive Peterhead prison
2
escape in October, 1923 and its effect was to so
disrupt the IRA in Scotland that an intelligence
assessment decided,
uno danger is to be apprehended from that 
direction at present, they appear to be 
more inclined to ahoot each other than 
any one else there
These internal problems,almost inevitable in an 
organization that had suffered a disastrous defeat 
and appeared to have little prospects in the fore­
seeable future, paralleled the splits, tensions and 
personal arguments which effectively ended the 
existence of the Irish Self Determination League.
To some extent the sources of these internal tensions
inside the IRA units in Britain were located in the
long standing problems of the relationship between the
4
IRA and the IRB, and following the IRA decision to 
disband its older but now much weaker rival, in
5
November, 1924, the situation somewhat improved
1 ROR 225, 4 October, 1923, CP 412 (23). CAB 24/162.
2 ROR 231, 15 November/1923, CP 465(23). CAB 24/162. 
P7a/87a, Mulcahy.
3 ROR 233, 29 November, 1923, CP 473 (23). CAB 24/162.
4 ROR 208, 31 May, 1923, CP 256 (23). CAB 24/160.
5 Patrick Murray, the former O.C. Britain who had 
become Adjutant General of the IRA issued instructions 
to disband the rump of the Anti--Treaty IRB in
contd,
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so that the end of the year IRA ’battle order’ listed
seven units in Britain, considered as reasonably 
1
efficient.
But by this time the IRA in Britain had become a 
shadowy force, little known,even inside the Irish 
community ,save for the occasional discovery of an arms 
dump and the publicity generated by subsequent trials. 
A situation that was to continue until fifteen years 
later when the IRA recoranenced offensive activities 
in Britain.
contd,
November, 1924, see Raneleagh, op. cit., 38.
1 P17a/51.
2 In February, 1925, Jeremiagh O ’Leary, described 
by the Police as an IRA Intelligence Officer,was 
convicted with a civil servant of stealing naval 
dockyard plans, see Catholic Herald, 14 February, 
1925. And in 1928 there were two London Court 
cases involving the possession of arms by known 
IRA members, during which it was alleged that 
funds for arms purchases had been obtained through 
the Soviet Narodny Bank in London, see Times,
20 March, 20 April, 12 June, 1928 and the Catholic 
Heraid, 31 March, 7 April, 1928.
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"England is not susceptible to intimidation11: \ An Assess­
ment of the IRA campaign in Britain.
Thrs is probably the most difficult section of my thesis 
to write. It involves an objective evaluation of what is 
to many a very subjective phenomenon - one that has a 
very emotive orientation. I seek here neither to justify 
or condemn the indidents outlined in the preceding two 
sections. My purpose is simply to evaluate the extent 
of their contribution towards the creation of an inde­
pendent Irish state and their impact on British society 
in general and the Irish community in particular. 
Clutterbuck1s observation that;
"Whether the guerrilla is a hero, or a terrorist 
lies in the eyes of the beholder a
is an apt expression of my viewpoint. For most people 
guerrilla warfare is at best something not quite respec­
table and usually a form of combat to be condemned out­
right, with a strong belief that its participants should 
be treated in a manner different to that of those invol­
ved in a more conventional form of warfare/
The format of warfare may have changed substantially from
1 Times,"29 Nov., 1920.
2 Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla, 
(1973), 143. .. . .
3 Neither the Hague or Geneva Conventions recognize guerr­
illas- as prisoners of war.
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the feudal epoch but the ethics of warfare , the very 
concept of the ’rules of war’, have altered little since 
the period when warfare was regarded as the supreme 
social activity to be enacted within a relatively rigid 
code of conduct. The ideological barriers that so 
limited Du Gueschin1 in his campaign to liberate France 
from English rule still remain strong today though the 
material circumstances have changed so much. Even when 
the ideology of warfare has been modified to accord with 
changed conditions subtle evocations of the original 
feudal code of ethics remain. For two generations the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood recruited, organized and 
trained for open battle against the English army, envis­
aging a set piece encounter with banners flying,trumpets 
blowing etc. When it came in the 1916 Rising in Dublin, 
the result was a military defeat; of such shattering 
dimensions that a repeat engagement was never contemplated. 
The 1919-1921 War of Independence was a guerrilla.war, 
yet even in this the feudal code was clearly visible in 
the public reaction. A clear distinction was made between 
the exploits of the flying columns', engaging in small 
scale rural warfare of a semi-conventional nature and 
the urban actions , primarily involving the elimination 
of enemy intelligence agents and unfriendly Irish people,
1 DuGueschin was the French Constable who, following 
the defeats of Crecy and Agincourt, advocated a 
guerrilla type struggle. Through this he regained 
control of considerable tracts of territory but the 
opposition of those who believed he was flouting the 
’rules of war’ ensured that no other French leader 
followed his example.
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The former are glorified irv soug, the latter ignored, 
though therh's was probably the more important contri­
bution from the military point of view.
The most concise expression of the strategy of success­
ful guerrilla, warfare, the motto of the ■ Jeune Ecole
‘’Shamelessly attack the weak; shamelessly fly 
from the strong'/2
so contradicts our socialized concept of how war should 
be waged that it requires a conscious effort to accept 
its a.-morali-stric pragmatism To evaluate the signi­
ficance of the incidents that occurred, in Britain in 
the period under discussion necessitates a similar re­
orientation of thought, a deliberate refusal to evaluate 
guerrilla warfare by the criteria of conventional warfare. 
Whereas the latter usually has the occupation of territory 
and or the destruction of the enemy's military capacity, 
the former, particularly in the context of Irish mili­
tary operations in Britain, has neither of these strategic 
objectives, being orientated to more intangible consid­
erations, the limited destabilization of British society, and 
an overall diMnution of the morale and confidence of 
the British people to win a military victory in Ireland , 
when their own country was not immune from the attentions 
of the guerrillas. It is relatively easy to determine the 
contribution of the non-offensive operations, logistical
1 The Jeune Ecole was an 18th century group of French 
naval frigate commanders who formulated a guerrilla 
type strategy of war at sea.
2 Quoted in Arthur Campbell, Guerillas; A History and 
Analysis, (1967), 65.
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and intelligence, as opposed to the offensive incidents 
in Britain, towards the achievement of the July 1921 
situation in which the British Government was forced toi^  
negotiate with the representatives of the Irish Republican 
Army. Logistics can be simply measured in terms of 
equipment sent from Britain as a proportion of that . 
employed in Ireland.
Without the eleven hundred ’Howth Rifles' purchased by
the Childers/Rice committee in London, or the munitions
supplied by the IRB in Britain,1 the insurgents of 1916
would have been virtually unarmed> and without the
2
Lanarkshire explosives they would have been bereft of 
even their homemade bombs and grenades. The Irish logistical 
operation in Britain made the 1916 Rising possible.
Without the munitions supplied by them it is likely there 
would have been no Insurrection. In the War of Inde­
pendence the munitions supplied by or through the IRB in 
Britain were crucial. Probably the most military effect­
ive area of Republican strength in Ireland was Co. Cork.
Its Third West Cork Brigade had one of the best unit 
combat records, yet as late as mid-1920 its entire
1 For details of the importation of munitions into 
Ireland from Britain, see; Naval Intelligence Report,
The Political' Situation in Ireland, CP 100, CAB 24/
92, and Minutes of Evidence - Royal Commission on 
the Rebellion in Treland, Cd. 8311, (1916), 4 and 46.
2 130 lbs of explosives were stolen from a Lanarkshire
colliery in January 1916 and sent to Dublin; see 
ibid., 121.
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armament consisted of 35 rifles and 20 pistols with thirty
and ten rounds of ammunition per weapon respectively.^
The thirty four rifles seized in a Liverpool police 
2
raid would effectively have doubled the number of weapons 
held by the most important Republican unit in Ireland. 
Appendix 5 , a photocopy of the amount of arms dispatched
from London alone,graphically illustrates the extent and 
significance of the munitions network in Britain in a 
better manner than anything I could write.
Intelligence is vital in any form of warfare but even more 
so in guerrilla warfare where accurate information as to 
the opponents plans and intentions can often substan­
tially redress the unfavourable physical and material 
balance of forces. The IRB,as we have already observed, 
had penetrated the British postal system at different 
levels from Compton Llewlyn Davis,the Chief Solicitor 
in the Post Office who personally supplied information, 
on a friendship basis, to Michael Collins,to the various 
networks run by men like Sam Maguire. Through these 
networks, Terence MacSwiney , the Lord Mayor of Cork and 
OC of the city's IRA brigade,was able to have in his 
hands the new RIC cipher only four days after it was 
compiled in London. At a time when radio was still not 
considered a reliable means of communication and certainly 
not a 'secure' one, virtually all communications between 
the British Army and RIC in Ireland with London were sent
1 Tom Barry, op. cit., 14.
2 Times, 30 May, 1920.
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through the postal system. Anybody with a list of 
’interesting* addresses and working in the postal sorting 
department was literally handling intelligence gold 
dust'. A man like, Dempsey, "the man from Clapham",who 
worked as a travelling sorter on the Hollyhead to London 
mail train and who bmdled all the 1 interesting looking" 
letters into a bag which he handed to Liam Moore when 
the train stopped briefly at Willesden Junction,on the 
outskirts of London,was more valuable to the IRA than 
an entire company,probably even a , battalion of volunteers. 
The letters were taken by Liam Moore, nominally an 
employee in the Irish Self Determination League Head off­
ice to an IRA Intelligence officer who copied the rele­
vant details and then handed them to Sam Maguire and
his IRB sorters for insertion back into the normal postal 
1
system. An almost foolproof arrangement which must have
been an intelligence gold mine. By these means Michael
Collins learnt the names of six British Intelligence
2officers even before they had arrived in Ireland. The 
IRB,as we have already observed,had agents in the prin­
cipal Government Departments including the Home Office,
3
the Irish Office and the Admiralty. And according to 
Liam Ahearne; a Welsh MP who had provided very useful 
information, furnished the London IRA with the necessary
1 This reconstruction is based on a personal interview 
with the widow of Sean McGrath who couldn't remember 
Dempsey's "the man from Clapham,las she called him - 
first name.
2 P7/A38.
3 I 7/B/100.
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information to plan the assassination of Lloyd George 
himself; the Truce forestalled this particular plot.1 
The IRA in London and Liverpool appear to have deve­
loped useful contacts within the police forces in 
2these areas while an Irish barmaid working m  a public jhouse 
near Scotland Yard was credited with foiling a plan 
to capture Collins, Mulcahy and Brugha when she over­
heard a conversation with a group of detectives who
3were being transferred to Dublin. The IRA m  Britain
were responsible for 'two firsts' ; they sent so much
munitions to Dublin that a special 'O' Company,formed
entirely of dockers, was formed to deal with the 
4
material and they purchased the first aircraft of
5
the fledgling Irish Army Air Corps.
1 P 17/B/l00
2 Collins in a letter (19 January, 1920) to Ned 
Kerr (Liverpool) mentioned that his London organ­
ization was in contact with a CID officer, P7/A/1 
and Kerr subsequently informed Collins he had 
established a very productive contact with a 
Liverpool police sergeant; see Memo 46a. 29 September, 
1921. P7/A/7. Billy Ahearne claims the IRA had
4 agents inside Scotland Yard; see P17/B/99 and 
a police raid in 1924 on a London IRA dump discovered 
comprehensive lists of Scotland Yard personnel and 
the names and career details of many Irish born 
police officers see the Freemans Journa1, 16 April, 1925.
3 See O'Doherty, op. cit., 114-15.
4 See Martin Walsh deposition, P17a/154.
5 The IRA in London purchased an ex RFC plane to
enable Michael Collins to get out of London in
the event of the Treaty negotiations collapsing; 
see, T.C. Kelly-Rogers 'Aviation in Ireland - 1784
to 1922', Eire - Ireland VI (1971), 3-17.
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The contribution made by the IRB and the IRA in Britain
in the munitions and intelligence fields is relatively
easy to demonstrate but it is much more difficult to
evaluate the impact of their offensive operations for
this involves a qualitative rather than a quantative
measurement. Bowyer Bell, the foremost historian of
the IRA,has I believed failed to make this type of
assessment when he bluntly dismissed the impact of IRA
operations in Britain,
(they)''failed to effect a real campaign of retaliation 
in England despite a rather impressive Liverpool 
dock fire';1
but Mowat has to a certain extent looked beyond the
actual incidents and recognised that they may have
had a wider though less tangible effect,
"the IRA's rather feeble attempts at terrorism 
in England may also have moved opinion by bringing 
the war home to the people, even though they 
amounted to little more than the burning of a 
few warehouses in Liverpool and a few hayricks 
at the Wirral"^
We have already observed a claim by a British Intelligence
officer that the "'farm fires in Lancashire and Cheshire
3
are causing great alarm and uneasiness in the area” .
And for his part; Denis Brennan,while frankly acknow­
ledging the relatively small dcale nature of his London 
IRA unit's activities, expressed his satisfaction that 
"the papers play up to our little acts tremendously1'.^
1 Bowyer Bell, op. cit., 38.
2 C. Mowat, op. cit., 76-7.
3 ROR 97, 17 March, 1921. CP 2740. CAB 24/121.
4 PI7/B/100.
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This I believe is a very important statement and subst­
antially explains why Bell and to a lesser extent 
Mowat have failed to appreciate the real significance of 
IRA actions in Britain during 1920-21. Acts of violence 
undertaken for political reasons can have many motivations 
and assume many different forms1 but all have one thing 
in common; they are committed to draw attention to a 
cause and so their success or failure is inextricably 
linked to publicity or the lack of media coverage.
Major General Clutterbuck,an academic with considerable
personal experience of counter insurgency methodology,
has succinctly analysed guerrilla warfare as essentially,
2
Ha propaganda war supplemented by a shooting war*1 . So 
from this perspective the location of the action is often 
far more important than the actual nature of the incident 
itself. Guerrilla warfare and in particular, its urban 
variety,is basically a ’staged1 affair, enacted in an 
arena chosen by the guerrillas to maximize publicity 
while demonstrating the impotence of the Government to 
combat them. Urban guerrilla warfare has acquired its
1 For a further exploration of this topic see, Eugene 
Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of 
Political Violence, (1969). Martha Grenshaw, ’The 
Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism', Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 16(1972), 384-96. Ze'evluiansky, 
’Individual Terror: Concept and Typology', Journal
of Contemporary History, 12(1977), 43-63.
2 R. Clutterbuck, op. cit., 98.
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present importance, in the perspective of liberation
movements; even though the tactical environment is often
not the most suitable operational area and certainly
usually not the safest for the participants, primarily
because of the ready access to media coverage. A
Guatemalan guerrilla who argued,
"If we put even a small bomb in a building in town 
we could be certain of making the headlines in 
the press. But if the rural guerrillas liquid­
ated some thirty soldiers there was just a small 
item in the back page"1
illustrates the importance of media coverage while an
interview with an Algerian ALN leader dramatically
indicates the necessity of evaluating guerrilla warfare
by qualitative rather than quantitative criteria:
"Is it better for our cause to kill ten of our 
enemies in a remote village where this will not 
cause comment, or to kill one man in Algiers 
where the American press will get hold of the 
story the next day'.' 2
Lack of publicity actually led the NLF in Aden to abandon
their struggle in rural areas in favour of more intensive
3
operations in the city itself.
A detailed reading of the Times between November 1920 
and July 1921 reveals that time after time the incidents 
in Britain were given much more prominent coverage than 
events committed in Ireland even though, these were
1 Camilo Catano, 'Avec les Guerrillas de Guatemala', 
Partisans, July., 19 67.'
2 Jacques Duchene, Histoire du FLN , (Paris, 1962), 263.
3 See Abdul Fatah Ismailif, 'How we liberated Aden1,
Gulf Studies, April, 1976. , 6.
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usually more significant militarily.1 It was not so
much the tiny number of Irish inflicted fatalities -
seven as compared to the 1,260 killed in German air and
2naval attacks on Britain in the First World War, as 
the very fact they occurred.at all, even though this was 
not a deliberate policy; for "Volunteers engaged in this 
work were instructed not to take life except in self
3
defence1' . Rory O'Connor in fact complained unsuccessfully 
that,
•the officer in charge should not be tied down 
by considerations such as preserving the lives 
of enemy subjects**.^
Material limitations, all the explosives obtained in 
Britain were required for use against the thick walled 
RIC barracks in Ireland, and operational restraints 
stemming from a lack of trained personnel, dictated the 
tactical parameters which resulted in arson becoming the 
primary form of sabotage. Fire was also symbolic of the 
reprisal burnings of Irish farm property by the British
1 Since I originally drafted this chapter, there has 
been a considerable upsurge of academic interest in 
the relationship between political violence and thd. 
media see, Richard Clutterbuck, •The Media and Political 
Violence , (1980). Paul Wilkinson (edt), British 
Perspectives on Terrorism ,(1981), and his earlier 
work, Political Terrorism, (1974).
2 See the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Breaches of the Laws of War , CP 1813. CAB 24/111, 
359-61 .
3 D. McArdle, op. cit., 370.
4 Captured document on 'Operations in Britain' produced 
in Parliament.135h.C. Debs. 5, Cols. 533
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forces and these operations were conducted in rural areas 
because of the parallel with reprisals in Ireland and 
especially in agricultural districts where the police "are 
not numerous'.'1
The lack of a national unified police force in Britain,
substantially reduced the effectiveness of the measures
taken against the IRA. In 1919 there were 56 separate
county police forces and 129 town/borough forces in
England and Wales, while Scotland was divided into 31
2county and 29 town/borough forces. Many of the IRA 
sabotage operations and in particular those against 
the communications system took place on the territorial 
boundaries of police forces thereby uncreasing their 
chances of avoiding capture. There was also in 1920 a 
much smaller number of police specializing in political 
activities than there are today. One M 15 report reveals 
that there were only 436 members of the Special Branch in
3
Britain in 1920. The Metropolitan Police,as might be 
expected,had the greatest Special Branch establishment 
with 137 officers in 1921^ as compared to 114 in 1914~*
1 ROR 94, 24 Feb., 1921. CP 2631. CAB 24/120.
2 Statistics obtained from: Report of HM Inspectors 
of Constabulary 1919 , Cmd. 542, (1919),.
and 'Scottish Police Report 1919 , Cmd. 971(1919).
3 Information extracted from a letter from Col. Kell, 
director of MI 5, thanking Special Branch officers for 
their cooperation during the World War, filed in
HO 45/10892/35729.
4 Home Office Report, Reorganization and Augmentation 
of CID and Special Branch , HO 45, 11000/223532.
5 MEPO 2/1643.
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and only 43 in 1909.1 The Special Branch had in fact 
been originally formed in 1883 to combat the Clan na 
Gael bombing faction of the IRB. Even this figure 
proved insufficient to deal with the potential threat 
posed by Irish Republicans and, following the assass­
ination of Field Marshal Wilson-when 150 uniformed 
police officers were attached to the Special Branch for 
'Protection Dutiest the Home Secretary was advised that
"priorities will have to be clearly drawn otherwise there
2
will be a severe shortage of police". With insufficient 
police to provide protection for potential personal 
targets the police had little hope of guarding adequately 
the 23,000 magazines, licensed stores and registered
3
premises which were used to keep explosives. The IRA,
as shown earlier, had few problems in raiding these
stores literally when they chose. The Lord Mayor of Newcastle
i
was forced to recruit Special Constables to protect areas
4
from the IRA. Nor could the Government employ its 
traditional last resort, the Army to combat the IRA in 
Britain. Troop shortages in 1921 were so critical that 
not only could the guard at Woolwich Arsenal - which
5we have observed was a source of munitions for the IRA -
6not be increased, but some stores had actually to be
1 MEPO 2/1297.
2 CP 4108. CAB 24/138.
3 See HM Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report, 1920', 
Cmd. 1324, (1920) , 5.
4 Cabinet Meeting, 12 April, 1921. CAB 23/25.
5 Cabinet Meeting, 22(21), 9 April, 1921. CAB 24/116.
6 War Office Memorandum, July, 1921. CP 3189. CAB
24/126.
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left unguarded.'1’ The potential IRA threat to these
military stores was considered so great that just before
the Truce the Home Secretary proposed a Special Defence
2Force of 2,000 should be raised to guard them. A year 
before this the Cabinet had been warned that the;
"Garrison in Britain is well below the 30,000r r
Bayonets considered necessary for Internal 
Security duties*,‘ ^
and this was during a period of intensive undustrial
militancy fuelled by the recent victory of the Bolsheviks
in Russia. Kendall ha£ described,
"the crisis which British society faced between 
1918 and 1920 as probably.the most serious since 
the time of the Chartists*: ^
In April 1921, the Government was faced with a possible 
new 'Triple Alliance Strike1, and with 51 Infantry 
Battalions in Ireland was obliged to suffer the diplo­
matic embarrassment of withdrawing the four battalions 
from Silesia,
“the risk at home from Sinn Feiners, communists 
and other dangerous elements was sufficiently 
great to necessitate their return"5
1 We earlier observed that a member of the ISDL was 
killed while trying to extract explosives from shells 
in the Woolwich Arsenal where he was employed. There 
was also an English socialist cell there that supplied 
the IRA with munitions; see ROR 187, 4 June, 1923,
CP 4(23). CAB 24/158, and ROR 191,'1 Feb., 1923,
CP 74 (23)’. CAB 24/158, for accounts of resultant 
trials.
2 Home Secretary’s Memorandum, Protection of Munitions , 
7 July, 1921, CP 3110. CAB 24/126.
3 British Military Liabilities , 15 June, 1920,
CP 1467. CAB 24/107.
4 Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 
1900-1921 , (1969), 187.
5 Cabinet 17(21), 4 April, 1921. CAB 23/25.
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Throughout 1920-1921 Ireland was a constant drain on
the resources of the. British Army. The reinforcements
planned in the event of the failure of the pre-truce
talks meant that,
" only a very small number of troops would be 
left in this country to support the police in 
case of emergency. Under the present programme 
the Scottish Command would be denuded of regular 
troops‘1 1
Yet only two months previously the Scottish Solicitor
General had warned the Cabinet that Irish Republicans
were actively helping the rioting Lancarkshire miners who
were on strike, but that no soldiers could be sent to
quell them for all the available troops were required
in Glasgow where ,la well organized armed body of Sinn
2
Feiners existed", necessitating the use of troops to
stop one Republican riot. In these circumstances an
Intelligence report that the,
MSinn Feiners are openly elated at the coal 
strike and boast that the Volunteers are strong 
enough to take and hold G l a s g o w ' ^
though obviously exaggerated must have caused the Govern­
ment considerable concern. The Clydeside in .the 1917-
4
21 period certainly lived up to its name 'Red Clydeside’. 
This the most militant industrial area in Britain had
1 Cabinet 55(conclusion 2), 29 June, 1921, CAB 23/26.
2 Cabinet 22(21), 9 April, 1921, CAB 24/116.
3 ROR 77, 2 Oct., 1920, CP 1997. CAB 24/112.
4 For a detailed account of- the Clydeside in this period
see Nan Milton; John MacLean (1973), and Joan Smith, 
Harry McShane, ( 1978 ) .
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a very influential Clyde Workers Defence Committee 
which was "more or less an Irish body".1
The military situation in Britain was actually worse than
it appeared for no less than seven of the twenty eight
infantry battalions available for use in Britain were
Irish units and the Cabinet was informed that it was,
"doubtful whether these ordinary Irish battalions 
are to be depended upon for aid to the civil 
powers ^
Nor could the bulk of the British Army, stationed in
Ireland be considered sufficiently reliable for use in
all circumstances in Britain. The GOC in Ireland,
General Macready , reported that his soldiers were
disillusioned by anti-war propaganda in Britain, and
even by debates in Parliament concerning their conduct 
3m  Ireland.
Discontent was rampant within the British Army and some­
times burst out into violent protests, a thousand
4soldiers carrying red flags rioted in Aldershot, a
5
police officer was killed by rioting soldiers in Epsom.
A Royal Navy Reserve Battalion.sent to pump out strike
fr
hit mines in Newport mutinied and raised the red flag.
1 ROR 53, 6 May, 1920. CP 1239. CAB 24/105.
2 ROR 67, 12 Aug., 1920, CP 1772. CAB 24/110.
3 23 May, 1921, CP 2695. CAB-24/123.
4 ROR 105, 2 May, 1921, CP 2938. CAB 24/123.
5 A Survey of Revolutionary Feeling During 1919 ,
Special Report No. 13, CP 462. CAB 24/96.
6 ROR 105, 2 May, 1921, CP 2938. CAB 24/123.
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The British Army in 1921 was a very different organization
from 1914. The wave of patriotism which saw twenty per
cent of the traditionally militant miners volunteering
for the army in 1914 alone1 vanished in. the holocaust of
the massed frontal attacks of the Somme and Passenchendale.
Three quarters of a million dead, a million and a half 
2
wounded or at the individual level the family in 
Sheffield that had seven sons killed in action and another
3
two wounded transformed traditional concepts of alleg­
iances and loyalties. There were no mass mutinies on the
scale of the French 1917 revolt, but individual units
4rebelled to an extent not usually appreciated. By 
1921 the British Army could not be considered reliable 
in all contingencies and industrial militancy reached 
heights never again equalled. Even the police stuck in 
1919 and in Liverpool "where there is a strong disorderly
5
Irish element" rioting in the policeless city caused
1 Kendall, op. cit., 149.
2 John Terraine, The Mighty Continent, (1976), 116.
3 Catholic Herald, 24 Aug., 1918.
4 See Winston Churchill, The World Crisis , Vol. IV,
(1929), 53-62. Tom Wintringham,/ Mutiny , (1936), 
310-330. F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections ,
(1930) , 241 , and David Lamb, Mutinies: 1917-1920, (ND) . 
One indicator of the increasing disciplinary problems 
of the British Army was the ratio of military police
to soldiers. This increased from 1 MP to 330 soldiers
in 1914 to 1 to 292 in 1918; see David Englander and
James Osborne, 'The Armed Forces and the TATorkinq Class' ,
Historical Journal, z±^l9/8), Sy3-621. Also see
A.E. Ashworth, 'The Sociology of Trench Warfare',
British Journal of Sociology, 1?(1968),’ 407-23.
5 ROR 15, 7 Aug., 1919. GT 7933. CAB 24/86. For the 
1919 Police Strike see, A.V. Sellwood, Police Strike, 
1919 , (1978). G.W. Reynolds and A. Judge, * The' Night 
the Police Went on Strike',(1968), and Ron Bean,
'Police Unrest, Unionization and the 1919 Strike in 
Liverpool',Journal of Contemporary History, 15(1980), 
633-53.
£2m damage.
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The preoccupation of the Government with this revolutionary 
upsurge can be seen in the very existence of the weekly 
and sometimes daily Reports on Revolutionary Organiza­
tions . A penny discovered in South Wales and stamped 
"Puppet King" resulted in a full scale investigation in 
an attempt to discover its origins,1 while great attention
was paid to a group of *'500 young hooligans" known as
2
the ’Red Guard’ in Scotland. In previous periods of 
acute conflict or potential danger the Government had 
responded by increasing the size of the Special Constab­
ulary, and in 1920 preparations were made for their large
3
scale arming, and the raising of new auxiliary formations,
the Special Defence Forces. But even these were not
immune to the germ of subversion. The Secretary for War
warned that considerable numbers of,
"Sinn Feiners and militant miners were enlisting 
in the Defence Forces with a view to deserting 
with their arms'! 4
Lacking the numerical strength to quell any sizeable 
insurrection, doubtful as to the reliability of the 
security forces under its command, the Government in 1921 
found that with the formal "termination of the war" it
1 ROR 2, 7 May, 1919,"GT 7218. CAB 24/79.
2 ROR 82, 23 Dec., 1920. CP 2169. CAB 24/115.
3 See Preparation for Emergency. Arming of Loyal
Citizens , 31 March, 1920, CP 796. CAB 23/21. 1000
rifles were to be held at each Regimental depot to 
arm "loyal citizens11 .
4 Cabinet Meeting, 19(21). CAB 23/25.
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was about to loose virtually all its legislative powers 
to deal with, the industrial militants and political 
subversives. Sections 42, 51, 53, and 55 of the wartime 
Defence of the Realm Act gave the Government carte blanche 
powers to suppress and seize any publication, search any 
premises, arrest and intern any individual without hind­
rance from the courts. The Home Office warned that these 
powers,
1,have been and continue to be essential to the 
efficiency of the action taken by the Police 
to deal with Sinn Feiners in England and with •> . 
Bolshevik troubles and revolutionary activities "
and stressed the necessity of adequate replacement legis­
lation.
The Cabinet was concerned to hear that the IRB were in 
contact with Russian agents in London who were rather
naively believed to be coordinating a master plan of
2subversion; that they were working with the 'Wobblies’' 
(Industrial Workers of the World) a particularly
3
feared syndicalist organization, and that IRA members 
in London were organizing the unemployed to raid labour
4
exchanges. Much of the Cabinet’s fear about a 1comming 
revolution’ was self generated. The British workers as 
an entity never showed the four requirements: revolutionary
1 Home Secretary's Memorandum, Declaration of Term­
ination of the War , 30 June, 1920, CP 3136. CAB
24/126.
2 ROR 40, 5 Feb., 1920, CP 579. CAB 24/97.
3 ROR 18, 25 Aug., 1919, GT 8082. CAB 24/87.
4 ROR 95, 31 March, 1921, CP 2667. CAB 24/120.
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consciousness, class identity., total opposition to the
existing socio-economic system and a perception of an
alternative form of social organization that Michael
Mann maintains are necessary for the emergence of a mass
movement that seeks to fundamentally change society.1
Large scale industrial militancy was a relatively short
lived phenomenon: in 1918 there were 1,252 strikes
resulting in six million working days lost, a year later
2,500,000 workers struck in 1,400 separate strikes which
dramatically raised the number of lost working days to
2
thirty four million but by 1923 the total had sharply
3
fallen to ten million as the post war recession began 
to bite. Yet unemployment,which reached two million in 
mid-1921, never really redicalized the workless who bene­
fited from the new extension of unemployment insurance to 
cover most industrial categories. Lloyd George was 
surely the only European leader who paradoxically sought 
to defuse a potential General Strike situation not by 
reminding the leaders of the Triple Alliance of the might 
of the State but of its weakness,
”We are at your mercy, the army is disaffected 
and cannot be relied upon'.’4
And Lloyd George could take such a gamble, unthinkable
1 Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action among the
Western Working Class, (1973) .
2 Tom Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain, (L977), 
117.
3 A.J.P. Taylor, op. cit., 216.
4 Quoted in Aneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear , (1952),
2 0 .
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in France or Germany because he knew that the social 
democratic pragmatic Trade Union leaders did not seek 
fundamental socio-economic change.
In Germany industrial militancy went far beyond the issue 
of wage rates with large groups of armed workers seizing 
and temporarily controlling much of the Ruhr. This type 
of direct action, challenging the power of the state 
itself, was quite foreign to British working class trad­
itions as a result of their very different historical 
evolution.1 Only on the Clydeside and in Liverpool did 
industrial militancy express itself in clashes with the 
police and these were areas with large Irish communities, 
containing many people socialized to regard political 
violence as a legitimate tactic in certain circumstances, 
for even the United Irish League paid homage to the 
’pikemen of the 1798 Rising and the abortive 'l867 Fenian 
Rising’ . So intelligence reports about ’’Glasgow Sinn
2Feiners who are closely connected with labour extremists1’ 
clearly worried Cabinet Ministers who knew that Glasgow 
was one of the strongest IRA centres in the country and 
a place where Republicans seemed to have had little 
trouble in shipping arms to Ireland. A similar situation 
existed in Liverpool,where the dockers defied their union 
leadership and came out in a political strike to pressure
1 For an account of the relatively tranquil evolution 
of British politics see, Tom Critchley, The Conquest 
of Violence, (1970).
2 ROR 116, 28 Aug., 1921, CP 3179. CAB 24/125.
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the Government to release IRA prisoners. Periodic dis­
coveries of arms in these volatile areas were reminders 
to Ministers, that at least in these two cities, there 
existed the necessary equipment and determined men to 
make possible the formation of armed workers’ groups.
So every act of IRA sabotage in Britain was a vivid 
reminder to the Government of the presence of a poten­
tially extremely dangerous new dimension to industrial 
militancy and social unrest, particularly as hard core 
revolutionaries like John MacLean maintained very good 
relations with their localvIRA units. For the Govern­
ment and much of the population the primary significance 
of IRA military activity in Britain was that it was 
occurring in a country which,not withstanding the social 
tensions and growth in industrial militancy, was still 
such a relatively peaceful society that the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner reviewing IRA activities in his 
1921 Report could state,
‘'Apart from these cases of a kind which it is 
hoped will never re-occur, crimes of violence 
continue to be remarkably few in number^ 1
The foreigness of the IRA campaign in the context of
British society was emphasized by Justice Swift at Art
O ’Brien’s trial,
l*No doubt it came as a shock to the Jury to learn 
that in connection with this movement, England 
had been parcelled out into military areas
At the start of the IRA campaign, the Times warnedJ'Sinn
1 Report of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cmd. 
1699, (1921),14-15.
2 Times, 5 July, 1923.
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Fein“ should "clearly understand that England is not 
susceptible to intimidation".* Yet the columns of the 
press repeatedly revealed the fear the IRA had generated 
by its activities with even anti-IRA public meetings
2
being cancelled for concern of possible IRA retaliation ,
while the police were unable to persuade witnesses to some
3
incidents to come forward and give evidence.
The overall impact of IRA activity in Britain 1919-23
should not be seen simply in quantative terms, but rather
qualitatively, as a new manifestation of political unrest
which embodied the potential of fundamentally changing the
traditional nature of protest in Britain. Some Irish
writers have sought to dismiss the significance of IRA
offensive actions in Britain during the 1919-21 period
by arguing they were essentially counter-productive in
that they interferred with the logistical and intelligence
operations, but this argument: which resembles the constant
disputes between the different demands and requirements
of the various British Intelligence and covert operations
4agencies during the Second World War , was largely
1 ' Times, zy Nov,, ‘1920.
2 "I understand that in some places, meetings on the 
Irish question which have been called, have been 
abandoned, owing to the fear that they would bring 
about Sinn Fein reprisals in the neighbourhood",
Richard Dawson Report No. 18. 18 April, 1921, D. 9895.
3 Times, 7 June, 1921.
4 Intelligence collection essentially requires a rela­
tively quiet environment,if it is to be conducted in 
the most effective manner, but direct covert and sabot­
age operations necessarily attract attention which may 
result in the exposure of intelligence networks. So 
there was constant organizational disputes between SIS 
and SOE over their respective tactical needs and
contd,
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motivated by a desire to enhance the reputation of 
Michael Collins, the Intelligence and Logistics supremo, 
at the expense of Rory O ’Connor,the officer in charge of 
directing IRA operations in Britain and a Civil War 
opponent of Collins.1
IRA objectives in Britain were extremely limited ,
essentially they sought to respond to British reprisals 
2
in Ireland and in the context of our discussion: the 
verdict must be that the IRA did manage to make a reason­
ably effective response. Their activity in Britain 
undoubtedly aroused considerable feelings of hostility 
towards the Irish living in Britain which took many forms. 
In Rochdale this hostility evolved into a movement,
“which has for its objective the organizing of 
the cotton workers to refuse to work with Irish 
people, whom they are certain are responsible 
for the fires'.’^
However as it is impossible to separate the hostility 
which arose from these specific incidents, frcn the general 
discontent stemming from the Irish anti-conscription 
campaign and the inability of the British army to crush 
the IRA, I will discuss this topic in the overall conc­
lusion of my tnesis.
operations;see’ David Stafford, ’The Detonator Concept: 
British Strategy. SOE and European Resistance After 
the Fall of France’, Journal of Contemporary History,
10 (1975) , 185-217, and M.R.D. Foot, Resistance, (1978) , 
158-60. There were even tensions between the prisoner- 
of-war escape organization, IS 9(D) and SIS who were 
concerned at the length of its networks and the number 
of helpers involved. See Airey Neave, Saturday at MI 9, 
(1969).
1 See Frank O'Connor, op. cit., 178, and Piaras Beasalsi, 
op. cit., 161.
2 Ernie O'Malley, op. cit., 137,is very emphatic that 
this was the strategic objective of the IRA campaign 
in Britain.
3 ROR 94, 24 Feb., 1921. CP 2631, CAB 24/120.
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CHAPTER 27
IRA Volunteers in Britain; A Socio-Economic Proflie.
We have already examined the socio-economic composition of 
the ISDL branch membership (as recorded in the organization's 
1922 branch census) and the leadership cadre (those deported 
in 1923). We will now consider the socio-economic compo­
sition of the participants in the Irish military campaign 
in Britain. Most of the male participants were volunteers 
in Oglaigh na h Eireann (IRA) and most of the women belonged 
to the Cumman na m. Ban organization. Some were however 
merely Republican sympathizers but these were only engaged 
in providing facilities, accomodation . for arms dumps, safe 
houses, and transport arrangements on the logistical side 
of operations. Our principal sources of information for 
our analysis of the socio-economic composition of those 
participating in the Irish military campaign in Britain 
are derived from trial reports as published, principally, 
in the Times, British and Irish Government intelligence 
reports and a list of the volunteers in a London IRA 
company. As a number of those listed as participants in 
military activities, notably in the list of convicted per­
sonnel, were deported in 1923 there is therefore some over­
lap with our earlier analysis of the socio-economic compo­
sition of the ISDL leadership cadre.
813
Table 1. Occupational Analysis of 57 Convicted Persons,
Involved in Irish Military Activities in England 
and Wales 1918-1923^
Occupation As % of total N
Manual 58 33
Skilled/Supervisory as
% of Manual 27 9
Non-Manual 4 2 24
Professionals as % of
Non-Manual 42 10
Table 2. Occupational Analysis of South London IRA 
Company (1923)^
Occupation As % of total N
Manual 63 17
Skilled/Supervisory as
% of Manual 18 3
Non-Manual 37 10
Professional as % of
Non-Manual 10 1
As only one of the convicted persons was female, it is not 
necessary to make separate tabulations for males and females 
as we did for^the ISDL membership. The average age of the
1 See Appendix 3 for full details.
2 See Appendix 4 for full details.
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C
convicted was 29 yeats. but with, an average, age of 19.8 
2
years the South London IRA volunteers were very much 
younger than the former. Comparing these two tables with 
Tables 5 and 6 (Chap 11 ) in our earlier socio-economic 
analysis of the ISDL branch membership and leadership cadre, 
we can readily observe that the manual/non-manual distri­
bution of the convicted and IRA volunteers was much closer 
to that of the leadership cadre than the rank and file 
membership of the ISDL. The skilled/supervisory and un­
skilled division of the manual convicted and IRA volunteers 
was however closer to the ISDL rank and file membership 
than the•leadership cadre though the percentage of pro­
fessionals among the convicted was considerably higher than 
that in the ISDL leadership cadre.
Five of the ten professionals among the convicted were 
teachers (all male) and the other professionals included 
a solicitor, two engineers, a journalist and a chemist.
There was also one student among the convicted but two 
of the IRA volunteers were college students and their offi­
cer commanding was a teacher. Eight of the convicted and 
seven of the IRA volunteers were clerks, but two of the 
convicted clerks were former Metropolitan police officers 
dismissed for striking. At least three of the convicted 
ran their own businesses. The relatively high, proportion of 
professionals, particularly teachers, and white collar 
workers among the convicted and IRA volunteers is confirmed
1 Ages given for 53 individuals.
2 Ages given for 2 6 individuals.
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by other evidence. An/intelligence report concerning 16
men arrested in London and suspected of taking part in
IRA activities in 1921, said "for the most part they belong
to the lower middle class, minor civil servants and
teachers etc.".'*' And Mr Justice Lash when sentencing a
teacher, a clerk and a cable operator at the Old Bailey
for IRA activities remarked, "it was almost incredible that
men of the prisoners education and apparent ability should
2have even contemplated so grave a crime".
The high non-manual/lower middle class socio-economic com­
position- of the IRA in England 1918-23 as shown in Tables 
1 and 2 may in fact actually underestimate this strata 
as a result of the type of source material utilized. In a 
large hierarchically structured guerrilla organization, like 
the JRA those most likely to be arrested and convicted, 
and thus feature in Table 1, are the personnel involved in 
offensive or combat type operations and the quartermasters 
and others involved in the provision of arms dumps and 
logistical operations concerning the transport of munitions. 
Personnel with the type of intellectual ability associated 
with those non-manual occupations requiring literacy and 
numeracy tend to be engaged in the specialist tasks of 
intelligence collection, evaluation and operational plan­
ning which do not normally involve them in actual offensive 
operations or bring them into combat type situations. Such
1 ROR 106. 19 May, 1921. CP 2952. CAB 24/123.
2 Times, 19 Feb., 1921.
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specialist officers are usually to be found at battalion 
or brigade rather than at company level and hence again 
are unlikely to feature in personnel lists as used to tab­
ulate Table 2. I make this observation because most of 
the recent research attention on European guerrilla groups 
has tended to focus on the smaller new left, anarchist and 
ultra right groups who tend not to be organized on the 
rigid military hierarchical pattern adopted by the IRA.
In many of these groups,especially the new left and anar­
chist groups there is a pronounced tendency not only to 
oppose the elitism associated with, the standard military 
type mode of organization i.e., a hierarchical structure 
of graded officers, and rank and file, but to create an 
'ultra democratic1 structure whereby all, regardless of 
their ability or specialism are e x p e c t e d  to participate 
in offensive or combat type operations. A popular saying 
among Belfast IRA volunteers "horses for courses" / .indi­
cates their very different perspective of how a military 
organization can best utilize its personnel. And so as the 
specialist, Intelligence Officers (IO's), and Engineering 
Officers (explosives, electronics etc.) may often only 
handle arms during their basic training, and sometimes 
not even then, they are much less likely to be 'caught red
handed1 as it were and hence not figure in the trial reports
used to construct Table 1.
Ever since Lucien de la Hodde, a French police agent, for­
mulated in 1850 his nine category typology of
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revolutionaries'^ the question of what motivates revolu- ■ 
tionaries and particularly those who actively attempt to 
realize their ideals has fascinated historians, political 
scientists, psychologists and sociologists; unfortunately 
with very few tangible results to show for their research * 
This however is perhaps just as well for many researchers 
have like Hodde approached the problem - the very use of 
that term of course indicating a distinct value judgement — 
with the intention of being able to provide data of use to 
the state forces to counteract revolutionaries and frus­
trate their activities. Lombroso, a late 19th century stu­
dent of revolutionary movements believed he had established 
a causal link between the violent anarchism of Southern 
Europe and pellagra, a protein deficiency particularly pre- 
valent among the largely cereal eating Southern Europeans. 
Today, of course ,no researcher worthy of that status , would 
even entertain such a hypothesis yet equally nonsensical 
hypotheses have been advanced to explain why some people 
become armed revolutionaries today. Women>in particular, 
are especially prone to this type of 'research1. Thus,accor­
ding to the psychologist Lothar von Balluseck,women guerrill-
i
las often tend to be “rebelling against their father's autho­
rity, are aggressive, try to be more masculine than their 
male comrades and in the process loose their sex drives
1 Lucien de la Hodde, Histoire de Societies Secrets, (Paris, 
1850), and also see Martin Waldman, 'The Revolutionary
as Criminal in 19th Century France', Science and Society, 
37(1973/4), 31-43.
2 E. Lombroso, II Delitto Politico e la Revoluzioni,
(Torino, 1890).
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and become infertile". ^ L n  this statement we have virtually 
the entire range of Freudian cliches except for the penis 
substitute and no doubt some researcher will soon advance 
the hypothesis that the Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifle 
serves as the penile substitute for women guerrillas. And 
lest it be thought that only a man could seriously advance 
such a ridiculous hypothesis, a Professor Helga Einselle 
is on record as claiming that women guerrillas in the pro­
cess of disregarding their female inhibitions (whatever
2that implies) become "irrational". Both these researchers 
seem to consider the German Red Army Faction, the Italian 
Brigate Rosse, as typical of all women guerrillas and see 
women guerrillas as a phenomenon of recent origin. But
3
many women belonged to the 19th century Russian Narodniks
4
and the Jewish groups fighting the British in Palestine.
The vast majority of these appear to have subsequently led 
'normal' lives once the desired changes they fought for 
had been accomplished. No one to the best of my knowledge 
has yet investigated the growing involvement of women in 
the current guerrilla warfare in Ireland but my own impres­
sionistic account of the considerable number Of women IRA, 
Cumman na m Ban and Irish National Liberation Army
1 and 2 Both these quotes are from a feature on "How to
Spot the Terror Girls", Daily Mirror, 20 Sept., 
1978.
3 See Ivan Avacumovic, 'A Statistical Approach to the 
Revolutionary Movement in Russia', The American Slavic 
and East European Review, April , 1959, 183-200.
4 See Guela Cohen, Women of Violence: Memoirs of a Young
Terrorist 1943-1948, (1966).
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volunteers that I have known totally contradicts Balluseck 
and Einselle's opinions; they are feminists yes but also 
very feminine.
Nielson has advanced a frustration-aggression hypothesis 
to explain the psychological factors responsible for re­
cruitment into the. IRA.'1' In the same vein of analysis Watson 
quotes British, Israeli,American and Korean studies of 
military personnel that appear to indicate certain defi­
nite psychological traits in that category of person termed 
2
a ’fighter1. Bakunin in his ’Revolutionary Catechism1
postulated the concept of the revolutionary as the totally
dedicated individual,the man "with no interests but rev-
3
olution", the "man apart from society". And the novelist
Leon Uris has vividly expressed the belief that a minority,
and it is a very small minority of people possess the type
of personality so strong that they will fight regardless
of the hopelessness of the situation:
"He who is left in that ghetto is the one man 
in a thousand in any age, in any culture who 
through some mysterious working of forces 
within his soul will stand in defiance against 
any master. He is that one human in a thou­
sand whose indomitable spirit cannot bow. He 
is the one man in a thousand who will not walk 
quietly to the Unschulglutz. (Assembly point for 
the Warsaw Jews en route to Treblinka).
McCormack has focussed on the motivations of
1 S.L. Nielson, Intergroup Conflict and Violence, (Bergen, 
1971), also see H.L. Nieburg, Political Violence, (New 
York, 1969).
2 Peter Watson, War On The Mind: Military Uses and Abuses 
of Psychology, (1978), 345.
3 Bakunin, Principles of Revolution. (New York, 1964).
contd.
1 2 revolutionaries as have mos:t psychologists but the
social psychologist Davies sees the recruitment of revolu­
tionaries as a response to the 'gap1 between their expec­
tations, ideals and the societal reality. His'J Curve'is
an ambitious attempt to formulate a generalized explanation
3
of why revolutions succeed and fail. This issue has also
4
deeply preoccupied many political scientists and socio­
logists, who have themselves even been blamed by one Old
5Bailey Judge for the emergence of armed revolutionaries. 
Relative Deprivation^ias been a particularly favored socio­
logical concept to account for the growth of political
7 8violence in Ireland and America yet as Pinard observes
contd
4 Leon Uris, Mila 18, (1964), 405-6.
1 T.H. McCormack, 'The Motivations of Radicals', American 
Journal of Sociology, 56(1950), 17-24.
2 See Y. Alexander and S. Finger, Terrorism; Inter­
disciplinary Perspectives, (Maidenhead, 1977).
3 James Davies, 'The J Curve', in D. Graham and T. Gurr 
(eds.), The History of Violence in America, (New York, 
1969).
4 See T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princetown, 1970), Henry 
Bienen, Violence and Social Change; A )Review of Current 
Literature, (Chicago, 1969). and Peter Calvert, A Study 
of Revolution, (1970).
5 Mr Justice James in sentencing a number of alleged Angry 
Brigade members in 1973 said, "Undoubtedly a warped under­
standing of sociology has brought you to the state in 
which you are" quoted in Christopher Dobson and Ronald 
Payne, The Weapons of Terror, (1979), 59.
6 See W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social 
Justice, (1966).
7 See Derek Birrell, 'Relative Deprivation as a Factor in 
Conflict in Northern Ireland1, Sociological Review, 
20(1972), 317-43.
8 Doris Wilkinson, 'Political Assassins and Status Incon­
gruence', British Journal of Sociology, 21(1970), 400-10.
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"deprivation does not necessarily and often does.not generate
action" Laqueur quotes a massive study of political
violence in 84 countries that concludes by observing,
"political instabiliy is curvilinearly related 
to the level of coerciveness of the political 
regime: the probability of a high level of poli­
tical instability increases whith mid levels of 
coerciveness, insufficient to be a deterrent to 
aggression but sufficient to increase the level 
of systemic frustration".2
Counter insurgency researchers dispute the extent to which 
socio-economic conditions and ideological convictions in­
fluence armed revolutionary participation. Larkin,the 
British psychological warfare expert in the. 1950's Malayan 
campaign,argued that people joined the MRLA purely for
3
material and not for ideological reasons but Molnar ,who 
has studied 24 guerrilla wars,strongly suggests that socio­
economic factors and ideological convictions are both imp-
4
ortant while Halperin has called revolutionary guerrilla
warfare "a vigorous reaction against economic stagnation
5
and social putrefication". Brigadier Michael Calvert,a 
counter insurgency expert who founded the Malayan Scouts 
(the direct ancestor of the 22nd SAS), after conducting a
1 M. Pinard, op. cit., and also see Joseph Roucek, 
'Sociological Elements of a Theory of Terror and Violence', 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 21(1962), 
165-72.
2 Walter Laqueur 'Interpretations of Terrorism', Journal 
of Contemporary History, 12(1977), 1-42.
3 Quoted in Watson, op. cit., 348.
4 Andrew Molnar, Human Factor Considerations of Insurgen­
cies , (US Army, Washington, 1970).
5 Ernst Halperin, Terrorism in Latin America, (Beverley ■ 
Hills, 1976), 7-8.
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wide ranging study of the mobilization process in guerrilla 
warfare,concluded by observing it is impossible to formu­
late any generalized pattern of motivation or environmental 
factors conducive to involvement.  ^ It is a conclusion 
shared by laqueur:- who frankly confesses "the search for a 
terrorist personality is a fruitless one" and observes after 
evaluating a mass of available studies "all that can be 
said with any degree of confidence is that terrorism was 
(and is) a pursuit of young people and that in most other
respects the differences between terrorists are more pro-
2nounced than the features they may have in common". I 
share that conclusion although I reject the highly value 
orientated,subjective.term 'terrorist', believing like 
Major General Clutterbuck that "whether the guerrilla is
3
a hero or a terrorist lies in the eyes of the beholder".
My supervisor has suggested after reading the preliminary 
draft of this section that I have not been successful as 
a sociologist in presenting an adequate sociological ex­
planation for why people join the IRA particularly its 
units in Britain. The problem is that, unlike most socio­
logists, I have known quite a number of IRA and INLA 
volunteers both in Ireland and Britain. And hence findlit 
impossible to construct an adequate typology of these 
individuals or even to isolate in any meaningful sense
1 Mars and Minerva, (Regimental Journal of the SAS)',June, 
1975.
2 Walter Laqueur .Terrorism, (1977) , 129-30.
3 Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla, 
(1973), 143.
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the factors involved in their personal mobilization pro­
cess. For some the decision to join was primarily the 
result of ideological convictions , the culmination of a 
political socialization process ^ For others the decision 
to join was not made in such a positive manner but rather 
as a counter-reaction to social and economic in­
justice and discrimination /together with, the repressive 
activities of the police and armj. Many have entered the 
Castlereagh Interrogation Centre^ in Belfast without any 
strong political convictions and have left days later with 
the firm intention of joining the IRA. A few joined for 
personal kicks, for them the IRA was just a bigger gang; 
but this type of individual tends now to be weeded out by 
the much more stringent selection procedures employed in 
recent years. A few of those convicted and serving prison 
sentences for political activities would have probably 
ended up in prison as ordinary criminals had they not 
joined the IRA or INLA but the vast majority would not have. 
Their occupations covered the entire range of the socio­
economic spectrum from unemployed to owning their own
businesses, from labourers to priests; their educational
2
levels ranging from elementary school to postgraduate.
The IRA has been a fact of life in Ireland for several 
generations; the insurrectionary tradition from which it 
springs, for centuries. "Many Irish radicals deplore the
1 See Peter Taylor, Beating The Terrorists?, (1980).
2 Also see Brigadier Frank Glover, Northern Irelandr Future
Terrorist Trends (Published by N.I.H.Q., Lisburn, 1979 but
distributed by the Belfast Brigade IRA). This very frank
assessment of the IRA was intended for a very limited, top
level circulation but.one copy, numbered no. 39, fell into
the hands of the IRA who have made it available to inter­
ested parties.
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existence of the IRA, for they say it draws the best young 
men of every generation into its ranks.1.... the IRA-Irish 
Republicanism is a creed. You may disbelieve it, discredit 
it, say what you will about it; in the end it will elude 
all your best efforts to destroy it".  ^Dr Cronin the writer 
of this statement speaks with the considerable authority 
of a political scientist and historian who himself is a 
former IRA Chief of Staff (1956-58).
The material used to complile Tables 1 and 2 does not permit 
an assessment of the extent to which the IRA membership in 
Britain was not born in Ireland but all the indications 
point to a high second and third generation involvement as
in the case of the ISDL. If so history seems to be repea-
/
ting itself. The first Chief of Staff of the Provisional 
IRA was Sean MacStiofain, born in London as John Stephenson. 
The two permanently London based members of the last IRA 
active service unit to be arrested in Britain were both 
English born women in responsible white collar jobs. It 
would seem that the IRA ,has embarked on a conscious stra­
tegy of entrusting its logistical operations; the provision 
of safehouses, dumps etc., to second generation people who 
are thus immune from deportation under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act.
1 Eire-Ireland, 6(1971), l'?7.
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Part VIII A Community Apart?: The Irish in Britain and
the War of Independence
In this final section of my thesis I will attempt to answer 
several questions: was the response of the Irish in Britain 
to the events of 1916-21 unique in the historical experi­
ence of the Irish in Britain or have there been similar up­
surges of interest in Irish politics? Have any other eth­
nic communities found themselves vin a similar position to 
the Irish in Britain during their War of Independence and 
if so, did they respond in a similar manner. In Chapter 
28 I will explore the evolution of Irish politics in Britain 
in the last 60 years but as my primary purpose is to illu­
strate the ebb-flow sentiment tide of organization develop­
ment this will inevitably restrict my investigation to par­
ticular periods and organizations. In Chapter 29 I will 
conclude this thesis by comparing the attitudes and respon­
ses of the Irish community in Britain, during their War of 
Independence, to the Jewish and Cypriot communities in 1.. 
Britain and the Algerians in France when these groups found 
themselves in a similar position to the Irish. The lack 
of published studies of these groups has forced me to do 
my own research which of'necessity focusses on certain i 
themes. Finally I will reconsider, in the light of my 
research, some of the theoretical perspectives examined in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
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Chapter 28
The Inheritance of the ISDL and the UIL: Irish Politics
in Britain 1928-1983
Art O'Brien never again involved himself in any Irish, poli­
tical organization in Britain after the dissolution of 
the Central London TSDL Branch. The traumatic events of 
1923-25 left him an embittered man, brooding over his former 
colleagues' defections from the ISDL. His alienation from 
political organizations was so great he refused to accept 
the Presidency Of the Roger Casement Repatriation Committee., 
when it was formed in 1935,unless the Committee dissolved 
itself and formed a new organization excluding all poli-
I
tical groupings. As O ’Brien had feared the presence of 
Sinn Fein members in this Committee prevented any effec­
tive appeal to the British Government concerning the re­
patriation of Casement's remains and also ensured that 
the Fianna Fail Government adopted a cautious attitude 
towards the organization; fearing it could be taken over
by its opponents and used in a new anti-Irish Government
2
campaign in Britain. O'Brien's invitation to become the 
Committee's President did however indicate that he still 
retained a certain popularity in the Irish community in 
Britain, sufficiently strong for the Irish High Commissioner 
in London to advise his Government not to proceed with
1 See the correspondence of the Roger Casement Repatriation 
Committee, Ms 10,222 (NLI) and its Minute Book, Ms 9516.
2 Casement's remains were repatriated by the 1966 Labour 
Government.
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its plans to bankrupt O'Brien in a bid to enforce jud­
gement against him for the Dail funds spent during the 
Civil War, as according to Dulanty this action would cer­
tainly anger many Irish people in Britain.^ De Valera him­
self when he came to power in 1932 ignored a suggestion 
that O ’Brien shouldfapearhead a new Irish Government pro­
paganda drive in Britain but was subsequently persuaded 
to appoint O'Brien as Irish Ambassador to France and Spain, 
1935-36. O'Brien in retirement opposed De Valera's anti — 
IRA, Offences Against the State Act in 1939 and drifted
into the proto-Fascist AUtiri na Aiserqe (Architects of
2Resurrection) organization. This "devoted soldier of 
Ireland" was buried with full military and governmental
3
honours in Dublin in 1949.
Unlike his close colleague, Sea,n McGrath remained acti­
vely involved'i.in the Irish political milieu in Britain 
after the dissolution of the ISDL. A leading member of 
the Old IRA Association he devoted much of his energy to
having Field Marshal Wilson's assassination recognized as
i 4an official action executed on Michael Collins order.
He also contributed occasional] articles on Irish history
1 'Notes of Conversation with Dulanty', O'Brien Ms 8427.
2 Alitiri was composed mostly' of Gaelic League members
who favoured a militant anti-partitionist strategy. 
O'Brien was never a Fascist as such.
3 See the President of Ireland's oration, Irish Press,
13 Aug., 1949.
4 Irish. Democrat, Feb., 1948.
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to the Connolly Association papers, Irish Democrat/
Freedom although deeply suspicious about their communist 
links. Sean McGrath refused to become involved in the Anti* 
Partition Leaaue established in 1938, largely through the 
initiative of Fianna Fail emissaries.^ The combination of 
the 1939-40 IRA Bombing Campaign in Britain and the Second 
World War effectively forced the new organization on to 
the shelf for the duration of hostilities. With the return 
of peace the APL aroused .itself from its six year long 
slumber but it might well have remained just another small 
Irish political organization,with poor prospects, had not 
events in Ireland provided it with a forceful relaunch; 
that almost overnight catapaulted it into the forefront of 
the Irish community in Britain.
After 16 years of uninterrupted office Fianna Fail was 
finally forced out by an uneasy coalition of former IRA 
members, sufficiently alienated by De Valera's executions 
of their comrades to ally themselves with their old Civil 
War foes. Unable to agree on economic policies the new 
Inter-Party Government decided to play the nationalist card 
by mobilizing "all the moral energies of the Irish people
oat home and abroad towards bringing Partition to an end".
A similar appeal 30 years before had resulted in the birth
1 See the~ Irish Post, 17 Oct., 1980 and 9 Sept., 1978.
2 Dail Debates 114 (1949), 3; and see Patrick Keatinge 
The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, 1973) , 
179 and -272.
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of the Irish Self Determination League and now hacked up 
by the unprecedented support of both Government and 
Opposition (Fianna Fail was certainly not going to permit 
Fine Gael to steal its ’republican' clothes and so De 
Valera was quickly dispatched on a barnstorming speaking 
tour of Britain) the Anti-Partition League literally 
blasted into orbit. Old ISDL leaders,like Sean McGrath/ 
found their earlier personal experience of meteoric organi­
zational growth, in demand once again. McGrath became the 
General Secretary of a much revitalized Anti-Partition 
League. . It quickly established branches in areas devoid 
of all Irish activity for many years and recruited an 
influx of members,just as the ISDL had done in its heyday.^"
Moreover the political environment appeared so much more 
favourable than 30 years previously. In place of an un- 
challengable right wing coalition there was now a Labour 
Government,in such, strength, that it dominated Parliament, 
and could normally expect to win divisions with majorities 
of a hundred or so. But once again history repeated itself; 
Lloyd George built the Partition wall and Labour in 1949 
reinforced it with, armour plating. Its Government of 
Ireland Act 1949 guaranteed the continuing presence of 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom for as long as 
the Stormont Parliament so wished. The Labour Government’s
1 The Anti-Partition League had 120 branches, see Irish. 
Post, 18 July, 1981.
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reply^ to the Irish Government's decision to proclaim 
Ireland as a Republic,outside of the British Commonwealth, 
was to give the Northern Irish Unionists a 'veto' to 
prevent any political progress in Ireland towards ending 
a Partition settlement originally, only reluctantlyyaccep­
ted under the threat of war. The Act did not enjoy a
smooth progress through. Parliament; some 200 or more
Labour MPs are estimated to have voted against or ab-
2stained on their Government's measure. According to Gordon 
it was probably the biggest backbench revolt on a non- 
British issue of that Parliament, even surpassing the
3
divisive Palestinian votes. The revolt was not however
confined to the backbenchers, as five junior ministers
resigned rather than support what their Home Secretary
claimed was a "very great and generous act towards 
Ireland".^
The Anti-Partition League's, response to Labour's, gene^- 
rosity was to promise "energeti.c measure to ensure that 
Labour MPs who support such a proyision would not receive
1 For the background to the Labour Government's attitude 
to the new Republic-of Ireland see the Cabinet Minutes 
in CAB 21/13 and the Northern Ireland Cabinet records 
CAB 9B/267/6 (PRONIj.
2 Daily Mirror, 1 June, 1949.
3 Michael Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's 
Foreign Policy 1914-1965, (Stanford, 1969), 211.
4 465 HC Debs, Col. 389.
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the support of Irish voters".^ Some local branches, in
Scotland and Liverpool, interpreted this statement as
authorization to put up anti-Labour APL candidates in
the 1950 election, mostly in areas with a very small Irish
2born population. The result was- a series of humiliatingly
3low votes for the APL candidates and the organization 
overall never recovered from this debacle. Much of 
Labour’s hostility towards the new Republic of Ireland and 
its corresponding support for the Northern Unionist regime 
stemmed from Irish neutrality in the War. Some of the APL 
leadership, notably Brigadier Gowan—Smith, now tried to 
link the ending of Irish Partition with future Irish 
participation in the new Western European Defence Alii’- 
ance at a time when the Cold War, thanks to Korea and 
the Berlin Airlift,looked like becoming a ’hot war1. 
Overtures were made towards the Conservatives and an organ­
izational ban on communist involvement in the League was 
used to expel the Connolly Association members; who had 
been very active in its activities. By the early 1950’s 
the APL had lost all its earlier momentum, dynamism and 
promise,with support steadily eroding and branches becoming 
moribund in many areas. Its sister organization in
, 1 Manchester Guardian, 3 May, 1949.
2 According to H. Nicolas/ The General Election of: 1950, 
(1951), 258, of the four areas where APL candidates 
stood in 1950, only Gorbals had a sizeable Irish born 
vote.
3 The 3 candidates polled 5,084 votes.
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Northern Ireland itself survived until the 1960’s,^ 
slowly evolving into the Nationalist Party.
But the Anti-Partition League of Great Britain lingered 
on for another 25 years after it passed its peak, albeit 
in a very truncated form. The Irish Self Determination 
League decided to disband when it finally realized that 
no one in Ireland or Britain cared whether it existed or 
not. The Irish- Government who had effectively created the 
APL however kept it artificially alive as a potentially 
useful organization^should there ever be any future up­
surge of political interest among the Irish in Britain.
The League’s organizer was given a community liason post 
at the Irish Embassy and became a regular presence whenever 
a new grouping with, potential appeared on the scene. 
Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s Irish Governments had 
seen no need to maintain a support organization in Britain. 
It was generally felt that such an organization could well 
become a two edged sword as it might be taken over by 
Republicans. The foresight of this policy reversal in 
maintaining the APL, later the United Ireland Association, 
paid ample dividends in 1969, when the growth of the Civil 
Rights Movement in Northern Ireland and the sectarian 
counter reaction against it,sparked off a new political 
interest among the Irish in Britain not seen since the 
heyday of the APL. The United Irish Association speedily
1 See T2712, T 3267, MIC 153, MIC 153, D. 1862/3, D.1862, 
D.3257 and D.1726 (PRONI).
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responded to this new development by sponsoring the form­
ation of an Irish Unity and Civil Riahts Committee to 
coordinate the fund raising activities of some 40 organi­
zations (mostly cultural and social). The existence of 
this umbrella body to a considerable extent pre-empted 
similar initiatives by various Republican groups and 
ensured that most of the funds raised for Northern Ireland 
Relief between 1969-71 did go only to groups approved by 
the Irish Government, With the dramatic downturn in the 
community’s interest in Irish, politics,following.the
comnencement of a new military campaign,the United Ireland
1
Association has been allowed to virtually lapse.
Both the ISDL and APL owed their existence and rapid 
growth to the stimuli provided by new political develop­
ments in Ireland. These external developments dramatically 
raised the threshold of political involvement in the Irish 
community in Britain. The operational environments of 
both organizations were thus effectively beyond their 
own influence to change when necessary. Both, organizations 
could cite events that effectively functioned as fire 
extinguishers dampening the fervour of the blaze that 
had fired their formation; the Treaty, Civil War and the 
Government of Ireland Act 1949. The joint experiences of 
both organizations, particularly their relatively short
1 By 1978 the United Ireland Association had been reduced 
to “a-few hundred members" in its Manchester, Sheffield, 
Leeds and London branches, see Irish Post, 9 July, 1978.
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peak periods would seem to indicate that mass membership 
Irish political organizations in Britain can only be .created 
and maintained - and then only for a short period - when 
there is a particularly high level of community interest 
in political affairs, generated by the emergence of a 
new political development in Ireland. This ebb-flow tidal 
relationship between the homeland and exile movements was 
the crucial factor in the rise and fall of both the ISDL 
and APL and the equivalent organizations throughout the 
Irish Diaspora.
The United Irish. League does not fit so tightly into this 
schemata but,unli.ke the former organizations,i.t was part 
of the British political system with both national and 
local legislative representation. Yet its successor,the 
Irish Democratic League failed, as we have already obser­
ved, to take off. By the time of its founder’s death - 
T.P. O ’Connor in 1929 - there appears to h kye been only 
IDL branches in Manchester, North. East Lancashire and 
Yorkshire; to judge from the lists of organizational 
wreaths sent.^ Irish Democratic League Councillors in 
Liverpool had four years previously reconstituted themselves 
as the Centre' Party. This development was strongly en­
couraged by Archbishop Keating eager to create a Catholic
2
defence pressure group, particularly on educational issues.
1 Catholic Herald, 23 Nov., 1929, and Liverpool Post and 
Mercury issues of 18th - 23rd Nov., 1929.
2 See Waller, op. cit., and Roberts,op. cit., for a 
detailed examination of the Centre Party.
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But its membership and supporters gradually drifted into 
the Labour Party; a process actively encouraged by Keating’s 
successor, Archbishop Downey (in 1928). Sectarian poli­
tics were to plague Liverpool's municipal life for another 
two decades but by the time of T.P. O'Connor's death,in 
1929,the principal Irish Nationalist contribution to the 
political life of their city was to have ’Catholicized’ 
its Labour Party.
Protecting the interests of the Irish, community in Britain 
and the defence of Catholic interests in general were 
the twin planks of the-IDL.' The second objective was substan­
tially thwarted by the virulent opposition of Cardinal 
Bourne - who disliked any manifestation of a high Catholic 
political profile. Yet from the mid 1920’s onwards, the 
idea of ’Catholic Power’ did gain some influential support, 
especially from converts like Charles Diamond who,increas­
ingly concerned about what he called the growth of ”commu­
nistic influence” in the Labour Party, editorally switched 
his previous blanket support for Labour to specific pro- 
Catholic interest candidates/irrespective of their party 
affiliation. As the decade proceeded the Catholic Herald 
became increasingly "Anglicized11; its coverage of Irish. 
Affairs, both in Britain and Ireland declined so substan-
3
tially that by 1928 a. reference to the "National Feastday"
1 Waller, op. cit., 323.
2 See Terence O'Keefe, 'The Catholic Press in Britain in 
the 1920's', Christus Rex, 4(1953), 25-35.
3 See Irish. Independent, 10 Feb., 1934 and 12 June, 1934.
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meant St Georges Day and not St Patrick’s Day as it would 
have earlier. It would be tempting to assert that 
Diamond, who after all had always been a convinced assi- 
milationist, had engineered this editorial shift to pre­
vent either a loss of established readers no longer inter­
ested in Irish affairs, or to attract a more general 
Catholic readership. Unfortunately the declining finan­
cial fortunes of the Catholic Herald do not substantiate 
such a hypothesis. It is however, impossible: -O' ascertain 
to what extent t h e Catholic Herald chain lost readership 
and advertizing revenue to a basic loss of interest in 
Irish and Catholic affairs,or to dissatisfaction with 
Diamond’s increasingly eccentric editorial policy, charac­
terized by virulent personal vendettas that often led him 
into the libel courts. Just before his death Diamond 
libelled Mrs Sheehy Ske.ffington - the widow of the 1916 
pacifist murdered by a British officer (subsequently found 
to be insane by his court martial). - by alleging she was 
collecting a British, pension while speaking on Republican 
platforms. After successfully winning her legal action"*"
she was forced to apply for the compulsory liquidation of
2
the Catholic Herald holding company, New Catholic Press , 
when Diamond’s executors refused to pay her libel damages.
3
The ensuing High Court case revealed the full extent of
1 See Irish Independent, 10 Feb., 1934 and 12 June, 1934.
2 See the London Gazette, 7 Mar., 1935.
3 See Sheehy Skeffington Papers, Ms 22,278, 24,171 and
24,116 for the court proceedings and correspondence.
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how Diamond, largely by his own eccentric editorial policy,
1poor business judgement in his declining years , together 
with unwillingness to delegate responsibility, had effec­
tively destroyed the business empire he himself had built
1
up from nothing.
The United Irish League and its successor, the Irish. 
Democratic League,have left few* apparent signs to enable 
future generations to visualize the extent of the influ­
ence they exerted on the Irish community in Britain for 
half a century. Outside of Scotland,where former Irish
nationalist supporters played a major role in fostering
2the development of modern Scottish Nationalism? tradi­
tional Irish, nationalist support in Britain was largely 
absorbed into the Labour Party. Vet I would argue that 
the particularistic form of Catholic nationalism as pursued 
by the UIL has continued fo exert an influence in British 
politics in the shape of the' Knights of' St' CoTumba. Largely 
based on the pattern of the older established' Knight's of 
St CoTumbanus in Ireland^? a Catholic equivalent of free­
masonry but with an organizational structure owing much
3
to the Irish Republican Brotherhood's passion for secrecy.
1 Raced with a decline in newspaper revenue of over half 
between 1924-1932, Diamond squandered his remaining 
resources on a paper mill which constantly lost money.
2 See H.J. Hanhan, S c o t t i s h  Nationalism, (1964), 21.
3 Evelyn Bolster (a nun) has written the official history 
of the Knights of St Columbanus, (Dublin, 1979). Her 
conclusion that the Knights have not operated as a 
covert political pressure group is not however one 
that many Irish, journalists would share.
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The Knights of St Columba'*' started off in Glasgow with
2only 22 members in 1922. The following year they ;establi- 
shed an outpost in Liverpool where all six of the founding 
Knights were Irish Nationalist Councillors. By 1923 when 
they established their first Council in London the Knights
3
had already 13,000 members and increased to 20,000 only
4
three years later. It is perhaps not totally coincidental 
that the Knights of St Columba first emerged in the tradi­
tional Irish Nationalist strongholds in Britain,or that 
prominent nationalists were involved in the formation of 
their local councils, or th^t their period of rapid expan­
sion coincided with the declining Irish interest in poli­
tical organizations in the aftermath of the Treaty and 
the Civil War. Formed to protect Catholic schools and 
morality the fiercely anti-communist Knights have effec­
tively functioned as the right wing equivalent of the 
Militant Tendency in the Labour Party, particularly in
5
areas with a high Irish Catholic membership, such as 
Liverpool where T.P. O ’Connor’s successor David Logan was
1 It may be of some significance tha,t St Columba was the 
Irish missionary who brought Catholicism to Scotland.
2 See W.J. Loughrey, Knights of St Columba, (Glasgow,
1969) - an official Knights’ publication.
3 Catholic Herald, 24 May, 1924.
4 See Lawrence Seglias, Knights Errant; First Fifty Years 
of Council 128 (South West London), (1975), another 
Knights' publication.
5 In 1925 an Irish Labour League in Cardiff wa,s formed under 
the influence of the Knights to "protect Catholic inter­
ests", Catholic Herald, 24 Sept., 1927, it subsequently 
merged into the Labour Party.
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one of the first recruits to the Knights,
The Knights of St Columba have sought throughout their 
existence to keep the Irish in Britain firmly on the right 
of the political spectrum. The Connollv Association have 
endeavoured, not so successfully, to direct their inter­
ests in the opposite direction. I have already remarked, 
several times,on the extremely tenuous claim that the 
Connolly Association is the direct successor to the Irish
Self Determination League. Unfortunately Jackson has
1
given credence to this claim , which, is really little more
than a tactical attempt to camouflage its real origins.
The Connolly Association in fact evolved out of the
L o n d o n  Branch, of the Republican Congress, formed in 1933
2by left wingers who had failed to radicalize the IRA and 
the Irish. Section of the League Against Imperialism,as 
the Connolly Clubs (named after the Irish Republican 
Socialist leader). Shortly after their formation in 1938 
they published the first issue of Irish Freedom which 
continues as the Irish. Democrat. A technically well pro­
duced publication it has for over 45 years appeared every 
month, except when a fortuitous Luftwaffe bomb destroyed 
the July 1941 . issue,in which the paper switched to suppor­
ting the war,in line with the Communist Party reorien­
tation in the aftermath of the invasion of Russia,. It 
has provided a platform for writers of the calibre of
1 See George Gilmore, The Irish Republican Congress (Cork, 
1974).
2 J.A. Jackson, op. cit., 125.
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Sean O ’Casey, Liam Flaherty' and Donal MacAmlaigh together 
with a consistently high standard of political journalism 
of a pronounced left wing orientation.
Jackson has also chosevyto strongly refute the persistent 
claims that the Connolly Association is a "Communist Party
iationis history and its prominent members strongly sug­
gests that it amply fuffls- Clew’s typological identifi^
Association, including virtually all its leaders,were 
either members of the Communist Party of Great Britain or 
its Irish equivalents. That is not to say that the 
Connolly Association has always slavishly followed the 
Communist Party line; the Association supported Ireland’s 
right to remain neutral during the Second World War, though 
this did produce some tensions among the more pro-Soviet 
members. The Connolly Association and the .Irish Democrat 
shares the same relationship with the Communist Party
3as the Union of Cypriots In England and their paper Verna.
Diligent and consistent soliciting of the Irish vote in 
Britain for Labour has ensured that the Connolly Association
1 J.A. Jackson, op. cit., 126.
2 Clew, op. cit, , 93; he in fact cited the Irish. Democrat 
as an example of a publication produced by a British 
Communist controlled organization, 281.
1Front"; but a detailed scrutiny of the Connolly Assoc
2cation of Communist Front organizations. Members of the
3 See T.W. Adam, Akel: The Communist Party of Cyprus
(1975).
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is guaranteed a respectable number of Labour MPs, Peers 
and Trade Union leaders whenever it required sponsors for 
conferences on Partition etc. Quiet lobbying,rather than 
the noisy demonstrations favoured by most other Irish 
political organizations in Britain ,is the Connolly Associ- 
sation's preferred mode of operation. While Connolly 
Association members have played prominent roles in the 
Irish Labour Party on their return to Ireland,^ the Associ­
ation has generally supported Fianna Fail,as the most 
progressive major party in Ireland,and opposed the periodic 
Labour Party presence in the coalition governments domi­
nated by Fine Gael (the Southern Irish equivalent of the 
Conservative Party; "'Fianna Fail as a radical populist 
party has no British equivalent.) But whatever Government 
has been in power in Dublin, the Association has consis­
tently argued against anti-Irish Government demonstrations
in Britain as "fouling their own nest by making a show of
2
their own embassy". In return Irish. Governments, parti­
cularly Fianna Fail, have adroitly refused Catholic Hier­
archy requests to officially condemn the Association as
3
a "communist organization".
This non interventionist tactic and its gradual is, tic, 
or 1 stages l / reformist strategy has often brought the
1 Both Justin Keating and Michael O ’Leary of the 1973-77 
Coalition Government had been Connolly Association 
members.
2 Irish Democrat, Jun., 1962.
3 See Bishop Farren’s claims Manchester Guardian i 13 Feb., 
1956.
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Association into conflict with, the Republican Movement 
and its British support groups. Irish Republicanism has
traditionally disliked competing organizations; parti-
\
cularly,left wing ones, during its rightist period of 
1935-65, and at times its supporters have physically 
attacked Connolly Association members.^ The Connolly 
Association has resolutely refused to retaliate in kind; 
not that its members lack the capability to do so,as some 
of its staunchest members joined after serving sentences 
in prison and internment camps in Ireland for IRA member­
ship, But after their release, and emigration to Britain, 
despairing of sterile apolitical militarism, they pre­
ferred to join a more politically orientated organization. 
These defections, of course increased Republican bitterness 
towards the Association, which generally was viewed in 
the same light as Sinn Fein regarded the ISDL. For its 
part the Association has generally condemned, but not too 
stridently, IRA military actions, as tactically incorrect 
and substitutions for popular agitation,while often being 
in the forefront of the various amnesty campaigns, espe­
cially when the military actions, have ceased.
In his argument with De Valera in 1925, Art O ’Brien had 
argued that organizations in Britain should be totally 
independent of influence and control from Ireland,
The Connolly Association has always stressed this argument
1 See Irish Democrat, Jan. and Sept., 1950 for parti­
cular nasty assaults.
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and so the unsolicited, affiliation of a Belfast branch
1
caused it considerable qualms* But the Association itself 
played a very important role in the ’politicization of 
the IRA' following the abortive Border Campaign, of 1956-1962.
Two Connolly Association members, Roy Johnson 
and Anthony Coughlan formed the Wolfe Tone Societv, which 
as an IRA ’think tank’ played a seminal role in formulating 
the post 1965 Republican strategy,of emphasizing political
agitation,, and down playing the traditional role of the
2 '
IRA. In the south of Ireland the new strategy took, the
form of land reform protests, ’fish, ins’ (on rivers owned 
mostly by foreign interests) and the occasional military 
assistance to workers involved in struggles with multi­
national companies. In the North the Republicans, threw 
their support behind the Civil Rights Movement. The first 
Irish. Civil Rights marches were actually undertaken by
3
the Connolly Association,in Britain,in the early 1960s, 
and Association members were active in the formation of
4the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, in Ireland.
1 In 1949 the Old park, Belfast, Labour Party Branch 
disaffiliated from the Party in protest against its 
Partitionist policy and formed a Connolly Association 
Branch, Irish Democrat, Sept., 1949.
2 See captured IRA reorganization documents reproduced in 
Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland' in
1969, Cmd 566, Vol. 2, 53, (Belfast, 1972).
3 Cf. from London to Liverpool, Birmingham and Nottingham.
4 See Vincent Feeney, ’Westminster and the Early Civil 
Rights Struggle in Northern Ireland’,' Eire-TreTand, II 
(1976, 3-13.
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The strategy of encouraging discontented Catholic workers 
and unemployed and their socio-economically frustrated 
middle class on to the streets in 1968/69 was a resounding 
success as such;but it had failed to adequately predict and 
prepare for the ensuing Protestant counter reaction. The 
few IRA units in Belfast were consequently unable to do 
more than provide harrassing fire against the armed Protes- 
tant mobs;who followed the RUC armoured cars when they att­
acked . the Falls And Ardoyne areas on the night of August 
14th, 1969.^ In the recriminations: that followed, few 
Belfast volunteers will ever forget the shame of the wall 
slogans proclaiming "I Ran Away’1 painted by angry Catholics,
who did not realize that their traditional defence force
2
had been deliberately deprived of arms ; to ensure they 
would not engage in military offensive actions and thus 
disrupt the implementation of the nev strategy. Inevitably 
when the IRA split in the aftermath of this humiliation, 
the new Provisional Army Council, mostly composed of the 
older and more right wing elements, specifi.cally singled out 
the Connolly Association strategists as the authors of 
the demilitarization policy and accused the Association
3
of deliberately fomenting the split. ' This, as most .
1 See Violence, ibid., and Farrell, op. cit. 257-63,
2 For years Belfast volunteers were told by the IRA GHQ 
staff that there were no arms left in the Southern 
dumps but they were literally deluged with weapons in 
the immediate aftermath of the August Pogroms and these 
arms could only have come from existing Southern dumps.
3 ' An Pobiacht, Feb., 19 70.
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of the present left wing leadership of the IRA today
privately admit, was not true. The Connolly Association
in fact condemned the hasty speed with which the new
strategy had been foisted on the Republican Movement and
2tried to promote a re-unification. Subsequently as the 
former ’Official Republicans’ have 'de republicanized'
3
their image; the Connolly Association has become much 
more sympathetic to the emerging left wing Provisional 
IRA’s conceptualization of an all embracing ’people’s 
war’ for the national a,nd economic liberation of Ireland.
Connolly Association members helped to form the Campaign
for Democracy in Ulster in 1965, a mostly Labour Party
4 '
grouping, and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
(NICRA) but subsequently opposed the establishment of
5
its offspring in Britain. The Association also opposed
1 Irish Democrat, Dec., 1970.
2 Ibid., May, 1971.
3 The'Officials’ have gone through the elaborate pretence 
of disbanding their military wing and have turned their 
Sinn Fein into the Workers Party which supports both 
the existence of N. Ireland and Irish membership in the 
EEC. Both Coughlan and Johnson severed their connection 
with the'Officials* and a subsequent split led to the 
formation of the Irish Republican Socialist Party and 
the Irish National Liberation Army who opposed the^Qffi*- 
cials' new strategy.
4 It had the support of 64 MPs.
5 NICRA established 13 branches in London a,nd a few others 
elsewhere in Britain. The Connolly Association was 
however involved in the creation of local Civil Rights, 
and Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland 
branches.
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the creation of Peoples Democracy branches in Britain, 
Peoples Democracy, the largely student based radical wing 
of the Civil Rights Movement was regarded with deep sus­
picion by the Connolly Association as a Trotskyist ultra
2leftist grouping. Its most influential leaders were mem-
3
bers of the tiny Young Socialist Alliance, a grouping 
closely linked to the small Marxist,London based/Irish 
Workers Group: a grouping of older former IRA volunteers 
and younger intellectuals. The Irish. Workers Group, of 
whose existence, njost of the Irish in Britain were totally 
unaware of, is a textbook example of the vastly dispropor­
tionate influence a tiny exile group can sometimes exer-
4cise on homeland politics.
The Connolly Association subsequently accused Peoples
1 Peoples Democracy established a branch, in London and 
most of the finance for its dramatic 1969 electoral 
intervention came from British student groups.
2 Irish Democrat, Oct., 1970.
3 I was a member of the Young Socialist Alliance but was 
too young to be involved in the Irish Workers Group.
Paul Arthur, The Peoples Democracy, (Belfast, 1974) is 
a participant observation study by an author who was a 
member of neither organization.
4 The Irish Workers Group was closely involved in the 
formation of Saor Eire, a left wing military group/ 
utilized by Fianria Fail Government Ministers in 1969-70 
to send arms to Northern Ireland. The IWG ideology has 
subsequently influenced the left wing leadership of 
the Provisional IRA while the British and Irish Commu­
nist Organization, an IWG splinter group,has subsequently 
influenced some Northern Irish loyalist leaders with its 
'Two Nations' perspective.
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Democracy of escalating the pace of the Civil Rights
struggle to the point where a loyalist backlash became
inevitable in August 1969. The events of the summer of
19 69 in Northern Ireland generated a dramatic upsurge of
interest among the Irish in Britain. But once again the
Connolly Association was largely bypassed, its gradualist
strategy being overtaken by the pace of events. The Irish.
Workers Group organized solidarity strikes on several
1
London building sites and sponsored the formation of
the Irish Solidarity Campaign,backed by most of the non-
Communist Party left wing in Britain. Connolly Association
attempts to form an umbrella organization for the Irish 
2in Britain were brushed aside by the activities of the 
Irish. Unity and Civil Rights Committee, the successor of 
the Anti-Partition League which a generation before had 
also so effectively displaced the Association. This Commi­
ttee’s fund raising activities were however soon surpassed
3
by the revitalized Republican support organizations,
Clann na h Eireann (Officials) and Sinn Refn (Provi.sionals) . 
Both organizations experienced an influx of new recruits 
(particularly the Provisionals) as the street rioting 
against the RUC gave way to guerrilla warfare against the 
British troops sent in to bolster the Northern State
1 Irish Militant, Sept., 1969.
2 ' Irish Democrat, June,1969.
3 While the size has obviously fluctuated there have always 
been IRA units in Britain and support organizations, 
sometimes not always with obviously Republican titles ,
in Britain since 1919. See IRA Adjutant General's 
Report on the Organization in Britain, (.1938) , McGarrity 
Papers, Ms 7544, (NLI),
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forces.
As widespread guerrilla warfare erupted in the North of
Ireland, the Connolly Association found itself,along with
the declining purely Civil Rights groups in Britain , soli-
citing signatures for a Petition calling for a new Bill
1of Rights in Northern Ireland while the Provisionals were
openly soliciting money to buy arms to overthrow that
state. The Connolly Association gained only a relatively
small number of new'members and little in the way of
2
additional funds. The Provisionals took several thousand 
pounds a week from London pub collections alone in the
3
71-72 period (the Officials' about half that amount) . In
f
1949 the Connolly Association could claim ,with considerable 
justification,that it had been displaced by the Anti- 
Partition League because it was too left wing. This same 
argument hardly applied to the. situation 20 years later 
when the known pro-communist Chief of Staff of the Official
1 80,000 signed this Petition, Irish Democrat, June, 1971.
2 The Connolly Association had 12 branches in 1971, see 
Irish Democrat, Oct., 1971 compared to 17 in 1944 when 
it was probably at its peak organizational period.
3 The IRA was in fact largely reequiped with money from 
Britain,not America where it took much longer to revi­
talize the traditional support organizations. As a 
person who collected funds for the Republican -Movement 
between 1971-76 I can strongly confirm that a much 
better response was achieved by openly soliciting funds 
•for arms rather than by appealing for donations for 
purely political or welfare objectives. As well as 
pub collections the Provisionals were collecting large 
sums from a whole range of activities, building site 
collections, dances and others of a not so legal nature.
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IRA was invited by a London priest^" to meet a group of
Irish businessmen here, who wished to spend many thousands-
of pounds on arms for the North. Another group of Irish.
businessmen in London employed Saor Eire as their inter-
2
mediary in a similar venture.
This period of mass interest in Republican politics was 
however short lived. 40,000 marched, mostly Irish, people
3who had never been on a, demonstration in their lives before, 
to Downing Street in February 1972 to protest against the
11k ?
British Paratroopers slaughter o f (14 Civil Rights marchers 
on Bloody Sunday C31 Jan., 1972J in Derry, But the mass 
Irish support movement in Britain collapsed almost over­
night following the bombing of the Aldershot Parachute 
Regiment Barracks later that month and the ensuing military 
campaign in Britain. Throughout the remainder of the 
Seventies there was little sizeable Irish public political
1 The religious participation in Republican activities that 
we noticed in the Twenties has continued. I know of
one nun who carried six revolvers in her bag over to 
Ireland. A priest has recently completed a 12 year 
sentence for conspiracy to cause explosions in Coventry 
and for IRA membership. Glasgow Police have a warrant 
out for a priest who left behind a large quantity of 
gelignite in his church there,while Scotland Yard believe 
that an Irish priest made the bomb that killed Airey 
Neave.
2 Another group of London Irish entrusted their arms pur­
chase funds to a British agent.
3 According to a, police radio intercept, a, senior police 
officer urgently appealed for reinforcements as the Irish 
march approached Whitehall, claiming "they are not demo 
trained" i.e. did not know how to relate to the police
on demonstrations. The march ended in a major riot.
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activity in Britain,^ with the main demonstrations being 
held by the largely British,left orientated/Troops Out 
Movement. A noticeable upsurge of interest in Irish 
politics among the Irish in Britain was however discernible 
during the recent Long Kesh Hunger Strikes which has cul­
minated in the formation of an umbrella Irish National 
Council, an Anti-Partition League style organization. 
Growing hostility towards the wide sweeping powers of 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which while significantly 
failing to impede IRA actions in Britain has resulted in 
the detention of over 5,000 people, and a counter reaction 
to strongly voiced Conservative Party demands to disen­
franchise citizens of the Irish. Republic resident in 
Britain has contributed substantially to the rapid growth 
of the new Irish In Britain Representation Group. This 
may yet achieve what the Irish Democratic League so
conspicuously failed to achieve 60 years ago; i.e. a strong
2organized Irish influence in the British political system.
According to the Connolly Association,
"if the old Irish Self Determination League 
had not been constitutionally debarred from 
entering British, politics,the. whole force of 
the British Working Class could have been 
brought against Lloyd George and Ireland 
might never have been partitioned.
1 The major exception being the 20,000 people who lined
the Kilburn funeral route of IRA volunteer Michael
Gaughan,who died on hunger strike in Parkhurst prison
in June 19 74.
2 If Britain changes to a Proportional Representation
electoral system, a meaningful Irish'ethnic vote1 may 
well emerge in Britain.
3 ' Irish Democrat, Apr.,1969.
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But we have observed/in some detail/that the British working 
class was fundamentally disinclined to exert any meaning­
ful influence on its Government's Irish policy. Ever 
since its formation in 1938 the Connolly Association has 
itself endeavoured to mobilize the British Labour Move­
ment on Ireland.But it dismally failed to prevent the 
implementation of the 1949 Government of Ireland Act 
which strengthened Partition;and on the subsequent occas- 
sions it did manage to persuade MPs to raise the Irish 
issue/they were inevitably told by the Speaker that the 
Westminster Parliament should not interfere in Northern 
Ireland issues.'1’ Similar attempts to raise the issue at 
Trade Union conferences were usually thwarted by the com­
bined opposition of the leadership and Northern Ireland 
delegates. If the ISDL had entered the British political 
arena/it would have been competing for the same strata of 
membership as the much, more experienced and entrenched 
UIL, while it would not have attracted the type of person 
who had been alienated by the UIL1s wholesale incorpor­
ation into the British political system.
An ISDL which eschewed an isolationist/exclusivist stra­
tegy and patterned itself on the Connolly Association mode 
would have been a, much smaller organization in the f920-22 
period; though it might well have survived on a,fter 1928 
and perhaps even to the present. The growth, of the pre-war
1 The abolition of Stormont in 1972 refuted this tradi­
tional argument.
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Anti-Partition League was effectively nullified by the 
onset of an IRA campaign in Britain ,while large scale 
Irish political manifestations in this country vanished 
almost overnight in the wake of the Aldershot bombing.
Yet this schemata of growth and retardation as a result 
of military canpaigns does not apply to the ISDL which 
actually expanded during IRA offensive activity in this 
country. However the 1920-21 campaign was comparatively 
short lived,unlike the present campaign which has already 
lasted a decade. Moreover the 1920-21 campaign was almost 
exclusively arson orientated and cost relatively few lives 
unlike the present campaign; destroying buildings never 
seems to incur the same hostility as taking life. The 
political environments of the two campaigns (and that of the 
1939/40) were also very different. In 1920/21 IRA actions 
were legitimized by a Government formed by the party with 
the proven largest electoral support in Ireland. That 
is not the situation today when Irish Governments have 
repeatedly denounced the IRA and its overseas support 
organizations. In 1921 many resolutely refused to be­
lieve that the concept of a separatist Northern Irish 
state was a sustainable reality. Sixty years -later^/many 
southern Irish people now question the■/ feasability ■ • ■* 
of absorbing a large hostile population. All of these 
factors have collectively operated,to ensure that all 
the post-1922 Irish political upsurges in Britain have 
never surpassed the 1920-21 period;and so the ISDL will 
very likely retain its position as the largest Irish 
political organization ever to emerge in England and Wales.
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CHAPTER 29
Conclusion. Communities at War: Attitudes and Responses
"There is a good deal of anti-Irish feeling in this country"
1
observed Lloyd George in 1921. And indeed there was;-right
across the country from London where the Pall Mall Gazette
2demanded the mass deportation of the Irish to Scotland where
3
hundreds of territorial Soldiers attacked Irish workers. '
This was perhaps not really a surprising occurrence in a
country whose religious leaders repeatedly demanded action
4to curb Irish immigration. The Church of England could
hardly congratulate itself either on a more Christian atti-
5tude than its Presbyterian counterparts. We observed in
our introductory chapter on the 'Irish in Britain 1914-19*
that the attitude to the war,of Irish people, both in Ireland
6and this country, had incurred much popular hostility. Yet 
this level of hostility was merely a heightened manifestation
1 Quoted in T. Jones, op. cit., 155.
2 Pall Mall Gazette, 10 May, 1923.
3 Catholic Herald, 21 July, 1923.
4 See Church of Scotland Report of the General Assembly 
(Edinburgh, 1924) 15. In 1928 the Cabinet officially 
considered Church of Scotland demands to repatriate Irish 
residents; see Cabinet 42(28) conclusion 10, CP 45(29),
CP 46(29) and HO 45 14634/432767.
5 See Westminster Gazette, 25 January, 1924. Bishop 
Barnes of Birmingham regularly fulminated against the 
Irish in Britain; see Church Times, 6 Jan., 1928.
6 See Harry O'Brien memoir for repeated anti-Irish 
incidents.
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1
of the prevalent anti-Irish racism , that has characterized 
British attitudes to Irish Affairs for centuries/for anti- 
Irish racism was a foundation stone of British colonialism 
in Ireland.
However rather than repeat myself by selecting already obs­
erved anti-Irish incidents or castigate the British for 
their endemic anti-Irish racism, as if this was a unique 
phenomenon,I will now try to locate it as a highly regrett­
able but understandable (in the sense of understandingyrather 
than tolerating) product of political conflict between two 
countries. This is particularly the case in the context 
of an anti-colonial national liberation struggle. We have 
already observed the wave of hostility that engulfed the 
German American community in the United States in 1917.
In France many Algerian workers were deliberately sacked
during that country's attempt to defeat the Algerian national
2 3liberation movement. Cypriot produce was widely boycotted
4
and many Jewish shops attacked during the British military 
conflicts in Cyprus and Palestine. Prejudice, though it
1 See Gilley, op. cit.; D. George, op. cit.; Lynn Hollen, 
Exiles of Erin (Manchester, 19 79); Chaim Bermant, Point 
of Arrival (1975) 40-2; and Frances Finnegan, Poverty 
and Prejudice: A study of Irish Immigrants in York, 
1840-1875 -(Cork, 1983) for a representative selection 
of works on anti-Irish racism in Britain in the last 
eight centuries.
2 Times, 24 June, 1958.
3 Times, 2 8 Feb., 1956 and Annual Reports of the Cyprus 
Government London Office for 1957 and 1958.
4 Times, 5, 6 Aug., 1947.
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may have its origins in socio-economic frustrations or his­
torical events, is essentially an irrational manifestation. 
Thus people often dislike outsiders even though their acti­
vities are in fact beneficial to the country of residence. 
Many Germans intensely disliked the Russian Jewish revolu­
tionary emigres who were effectively aiding the German
1
First World War effort and Polish troopsttemporarily sta­
tioned in Britain to recuperate after Arnhem and Monte
Cassino,were widely believed to be 'shirking the war' and
2'taking the women' of British troops serving overseas.
Groups given an initially favourable welcome because their
.active support for the colonial power has driven them into
exile, like the South Moluccans in Holland can find that
position reversed almost overnight when they try violently
to achieve their nationalist demands in their country of 
3
exile. Cuban emigres welcomed to the United States as
1 See Robert Williams, 'Russians in Germany, 1900-1914', 
Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966), 121-49.
2 E.K. Francis, Interethnic Relations: An Essay In Socio­
logical Theory (New York, 1976), 239.
3 12,000 South Moluccan soldiers who had fought in the 
Dutch colonial army against the Indonesian nationalists 
were evacuated to Holland in 1949; see H.L. Wesseling, 
'Post-Imperial Holland', Journal of Contemporary History 
15 (1980), 125-42. According to Christopher Bagley,
The Dutch Plural Society (1973), 98-107, the Dutch, one of 
the most non-racialist people in Europe, lavishly pro­
vided (in comparison to Britain) for their former colo­
nials but when the second generation of Moluccans 
embarked on a campaign of seizing hostages etc. to 
remind the world of their territorial claims, their 
actions sparked off much hostility against the whole 
exile community. See Juliet Lodge (ed), Terrorism, A 
Challenge to theState (1981), 119-45.
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1
refugees ’fleeing communism’ subsequently incurred much 
hostility when elements became involved in the drug trade
and particularly when emigre groups started to kill their
2 . . .political opponents. Similar activities by right wing
Hungarians in Canada and Croatian Utashi exiles in Australia 
have also generated considerable public hostility. Inevi­
tably the greatest hostility is generated when the ethnic 
group appears to pose a challenge to the state of residence 
itself during a conflict with the homeland or patria. Thus
after Pearl Harbour 120,000 Japanese Americans - two thirds
3of them American born - were interned, even though "not a
single documented act of espionage or sabotage or Fifth
4
Column activity was committed by a Japanese American". The 
Palmer Raids, two decades earlier,were largely motivated by a 
'Red Aliens' scare but actual immigrant organized political 
violence in the United States has been almost exclusively 
confined to Puerto Rican groups who have pursued a sporadic, 
and rather ineffectual, military campaign for the independence
5
of their country. Perhaps the Puerto Ricans in the United
1 See 'Those Amazing Cuban Emigres', Fortune Magazine, Oct. 
1966 for the early reaction .
2 See the New York Times, 23 Oct., 1976 for a more recent 
reappraisal.
3 Richard Kirkendall, The United States, 1929-45 (New York, 
1974), 222. According to the Los Angeles Times "A viper 
is a viper wherever the egg is hatched", quoted in The 
New York Times Chronicle of American Life. The Nineteen
Forties (New York, 1975), 109.
4 Quoted from U.S. Congress Report as reported in the Daily 
Mail, 26 Feb., 1983.
5 Jose Perez, Puerto Rico: U.S. Colony in the Caribbean 
(New York, 1976).
857
States are indeed fortunate -that their militant compatriots 
in F.A.L.N. have not been able to wage the type of inten­
sive armed national liberation struggle, conducted by the 
Algerian FLN and the IRA in their respective Metropolitan
countries,for the Puerto Ricans are already probably the
1least liked major immigrant group m  the United States.
Immigrants and their descendants can often become passive
hostages to fate in inter state disputes or actual conflicts.
In 1972 after the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry, almost
one in five Britons actually believed there was a realistic
prospect of a war between Britain and the Republic of 
2
Ireland and this new down-turn in the relationship between 
the two countries was reflected in a 'national stereotype' 
survey which showed' a much greater readiness to attribute 
unfavourable adjectives to Irish people than five years p're-
3
viously. A similar, but in this case literally overnight, 
change of fortunes was experienced by the British community
4
in Argentina during the Malvinas/Falklands conflict. In 
response to an unprecedented anti-British campaign, many 
in the British community formally applied to become 
Argentinian citizens: a dramatic reversal of their past
1 See Frank Bonilla, 'A Wealth of Poor 1 » Daedalus 110 (1981), 
113-76 and Catario Gorza, Puerto Ricans in the United 
States (New York, 1978).
2 Gallup Report no. 138.
3 Ibid., no. 158.
4 The Irish Government's decision not to support British 
sanctions against Argentina produced a discernible inc­
rease in anti-Irish sentiment in Britain.
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1staunch emotional loyalty to Britain. Renunciation of the 
citizenship of their country of origin or Patria is a not 
uncommon practice by immigrants and their descendants when­
ever they find their status has altered adversely. We obs­
erved that many German American organizations speedily 
'Americanized' themselves during the 1917 wave of German 
phobia while many of the Maltese living in London during 
the 1950s even described themselves as Sicilians - the trad­
itional enemies of the Maltese - to escape the widespread
public hostile identification of Maltese with prostitute
2pimping rackets. Sometimes this response leads to a con­
demnation of the Patria itself. Many in the British commun­
ity in Argentina wrote public letters denouncing the British 
counter attack on the Malvinas/Falklands: a latter day equi­
valent of the 1915 Times 'Loyalty Letters' written by German
3born residents m  Britain. Members of an ethnic community 
may attack fellow members who persist in supporting country 
of origin or Patria linked causes, judged by the majority 
community opinion to endanger their relations with the coun­
try of residence. Thus the large Irish American organizations 
which had switched from neutrality to supporting the War, 
following the United States entry in 1917,fiercely opposed 
the small Irish Progressive League which still opposed the
1 The Headline in the Sun, 24 May, 1982, "Rats Desert Us" 
was one British view of this process.
2 See Geoff Dench, Maltese in London. A Case Study in the 
Erosion of Ethnic Consciousness (1975).
3 See C .C.Aponsfield t 'Jewish Enemy Aliens in England 
During World War One', Jewish Social Studies, 18 (1956), 
275-83.
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War. Seventy years previously many Irish American soldiers
enthusiastically supported the mass hangings of the Patricos
- fellow Irish soldiers who deserted and joined the Mexican
1
army when it was invaded by the United States in 1847.
Under attack a minority community may sacrifice some of its
own members to placate societal hostility. Thus French Jewry
"one of the freest communities in the world... 
in order to secure peace from anti-semitism 
and save the community at large... was ready 
to sacrifice Dreyfus and ostracize Bernard- 
Lazare (his defender)".^
Similarly the Jewish community in Britain remained silent
on the internment of known anti-Nazi Jewish European refu-
. . 3
gees in 1940, for fear of exciting anti-semitism.
The experience of the Jewish community in Britain is parti­
cularly relevant to a political sociological study of the 
Irish in Britain as,time after time, I have heard Irish poli­
tical activists frequently lament that their compatriots 
do not react towards Ireland in the same way that British 
Jews support Israel. Throughout the 194 0s, and particularly 
between 1945-48, Jewish groups actively fought the British 
occupation forces in Palestine, inflicting considerable
1 The Patricos (Battalion of Saint Patrick) are still ann­
ually commemorated as Mexican national heroes; see Wally 
Power, 'The Enigma of the Patricos', Eire-Ireland, 4 >;
(1969), 7-12.
2 Nelly Wilson, Anti-Semitism and the Problem of Jewish 
Identity in Late 19th Century France (1978), 279 .
3 Bernard Wassertein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939- 
1945 (Oxford, 1979), 92.
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casualties Thus it was a period comparable to the Anglo- 
Irish War of Independence. The almost total lack of res­
earch on the Irish in Britain during the Anglo-Irish War 
of Independence attracted my interest when I was looking 
for a thesis research subject. I however thought it would 
be a relatively easy matter to compare the positions of the 
Jewish community in Britain, 1945-48 and the Irish in Britain 
1916-21. Once having completed my pioneering investigation 
of the Irish in Britain it woulcl, I thought^ simply be a mat­
ter of then reading the published studies of the British 
Jews during this period. I naively imagined that such stud­
ies must exist for is not the Jewish community the best 
documented minority group in Britain;’ with a wealth of his­
torical, sociological, economic, national and area,studies, 
often undertaken with the active encouragement of the comm­
unity and its well developed research-orientated institutions? 
But that very factor is the nub of the problem; most research 
on British Jews is conducted by fellow Jews, often financed
by Jewish institutions, and as I discovered, British Jewry
2would prefer to forget the 1945-48 period, when their comm­
unity was rent with divisions as a consequence of the con­
flict between their country of residence and their patria. 
1945-48 is for Jewish researchers their equivalent of the 
Irish Civil War a period to be approached only with extreme
1 223 members of the British Armed Forces were killed in 
Palestine, 1945-48. See Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments 
Depart (1971), 59.
2 Writing only 7 years after the end of this period Maurice 
Freeman (ed), A Minority in Britain (1955) totally ignores 
it while Armin Krausz's massively documented history of 
Sheffield Jewry (Jerusalem, 1980), barely notices this 
crucial period.
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caution and best left alone.
So even more intrigued by this 'missing period' I decided 
to spend some time in constructing a, necessarily impres­
sionistic picture of British Jewry and its reactions to 
Palestinian events in the 19 45-48 period by employing contemp- 
rary newspaper cuttings, Jewish publications and the memoirs 
of those active during this period. What emerged from this 
study was the impression of a very divided community; cert­
ainly one very different from the common contemporary pers­
pective of a community wholeheartedly in support of the 
Zionist cause. The Irish in Britain between 1919-21 were 
similarly a divided community, or perhaps communities is 
a better term. Most Irish born Protestants living in Britain 
and their descendants together with a not insubstantial num­
ber of Irish Catholics desired a continuation of British 
rule in Ireland. Those who desired a changed relationship 
between Britain and Ireland basically fell into two camps: 
Nationalists who wanted Irish Home Rule within some wider 
British political framework and Republicans who wanted total 
independence. The attitude of British Jewry towards Palestine 
was just as equally varied and equally divided. As a tact­
ical war measure the British Government in the 1917 Balfour 
Declaration promised a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. How­
ever the idea of an independent Jewish state did not attract 
sizeable support until the Holocaust three decades later.
The British, however, were now very reluctant to give up 
such a strategic area of the Middle East,or even to permit 
the entry of the survivors of the Holocaust lest this anta­
gonize the rulers of their Arab client states. British Jews
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were therefore faced with the same dilemma that had 'con­
fronted the Irish in Britain; should they demand the right 
of their fellow Jews to enter Palestine and thus oppose their 
Government’s policy, or even support those Jewish groups 
who had taken up arms against the British?
In 1945-48 there were about 400,000 Jews in Britain. No
more than 30,000 of these were token Zionists as defined.as
1
those who had paid the Shekalim (about ten pence) which 
gave them the right to vote for candidates in the World Zion­
ist Congress elections. Of these less than 20,000 actually 
2
voted. (These figures should be viewed in the light of the 
South African situation where the Jewish community,only a
3
quarter the size of that in Britain, sold 43, 000 shekalim. ). 
The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland claimed
4
a membership of 31,000 but many of these were en bloc syna-
5
gogue affiliations. Organized Zionism in Britain was there­
fore considerably smaller than the Irish Self Determination 
League membership but whereas the ISDL leaders and the Irish 
Exile unequivocally supported Irish military operations 
against the British occupation forces, very few Zionists
1 Zionist Review, 6 Sept., 194 6, the target set by the 
World Zionist Congress for British Jewry had in fact 
been 125,000 Shekalim, ibid., 18 April, 1947.
2 Ibid., 18 Oct., 1946.
3 Ibid., 11 July, 1947.
4 Ibid., 25 Jan., 194 6.
5 Only 94 of the 380 synagogues in Britain had however 
affiliated to the Zionist Federation, ibid., 19 Sept., 
1947.
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publicly supported their Palestinian counterpart's war 
against the British. The Zionist Federation and their sup­
porters, whom we have already observed took over the British 
Board of Jewish Deputies by rather dubious tactics, suppor­
ted the Yishuv (Jewish Assembly) in Palestine. The Yishuv
not only denounced the offensive military operations of the
1 2 Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) and Lehame Herut Israel (Lehi but
known to most British people as the Stern Gang) but even
3ordered its own much larger military force, the Haganah 
to actively collaborate with the British by handing over 
Irgun and Lehi personnel, and hounded their supporters out 
of employment. The Federation and Deputies did not really 
need the Sunday Times to advise British Jews "collectively,
4
publicly and m  language unmistakable" to denounce Irgun
and Lehi activities. They had repeatedly denounced these
"moral delinquents" and even requested the Haganah to deal
5more firmly with them.
1 Irgun, commanded by Menachem Begin, The Revolt (1979) was 
an extreme right wing, almost Fascist organization.
Its ideological leader, Jabotinsky, the founder of the 
Revisionist wing of Zionism,was called the 'Fuhrer' by 
his members in Germany where his uniformed organization 
was permitted to exist - the only Jewish one allowed to 
do so - by the Gestapo until 1938.
2 Lehi was a breakaway from the Irgun by members who dis­
liked the Irgun's initial truce with the British, during 
the first part of the Second World War. Lehi, however, 
became a left wing pro-Soviet organization.
3 The Haganah did however mount a series of sabotage opera­
tions which resulted in some British deaths in a Yishuv
authorized protest against deportations.
4 Sunday Times, 5 Jan., 194 7.
5 Jewish Chronicle, 1 Aug., 194 7.
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The Deputies support for the Yishuv's policy of working 
relatively peacefully for the creation of p. Jewish State 
was however too much for the 2,000 strong, mostly upper 
class, Anglo-Jewish Association, which withdrew its repres­
entatives on the Board in protest against its relatively
1
mild criticism of British Government policy in Palestine.
The Jewish Fellowship founded under the banner of "Jews by
2our Faith and not by our Nationality", with a carefully sel­
ected membership of 1,500,had never accepted the need for 
the Board to exist. It repeatedly supported the British 
policy in Palestine. The principal Jewish publication in 
Britain, the long established Jewish Chronicle, was extremely 
ambivalent about Zionism, even in its relatively peaceful 
Yishuv manifestation. The Federation published the Zionist 
Review ,pro-Yishuv/Haganah,but violently anti-Irgun and Lehi. 
The Jewish Outlook published by the Jewish Fellowship,fol­
lowed its parent organization's repudiation of Zionism. 
According to a 1948 survey of the reading habits of 3,400 
British Jews, 2,461 read the Chronicle, 515 the Review and
3
320 the Outlook. Only one person 'wrote in' that they had 
also read the Jewish Struggle, a pro-Irgun paper whose short 
existence perhaps indicated a basic lack of readers
1 Zionist Review, 2 May, 194 7.
2 See Jewish Fellowship leaflets, WP 15422 (British . 
Library).
3 Rose Henriques, Survey of Jewish Interests (1949), sent 
out 40,000 questionaires but only 3,400 were actually 
returned.
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1
who supported Irgun.
Irgun had a very small support organization in Britain, the
Jewish Legion, but Lehi does not appear to have had a similar
support group here. Both Irgun and Lehi followed the example
set by the IRA in conducting military operations in Britain
itself but on a much smaller scale. Lehi sent letter and
parcel bombs from the Continent to a number of prominent
2
Government and Military leaders in Britain. A five strong 
Lehi unit in London was, however, unable to assassinate 
Ernest Bevin,the British Foreign Secretary, but other Lehi 
members planted bombs in the Palace of Westminster and the 
Colonial Office which failed to explode.^ Until ;n\id~1947
4
Irgun had only one member in Britain but subsequently
a small group, led by Ezer Weizman, a recent Israeli Defence
Minister, unsuccessfully tried to assassinate General Barker,
5
GOC Palestine, m  London. Two Irgun members were subse­
quently jailed in London for trying to sabotage armoured 
cars being shipped to Iraq for use against the new Israeli 
state.^ The only serious incident involving casualties 
actually committed in Britain by Jewish groups appears to 
have been the parcel bomb killing of the brother of Captain 
Farran, an SAS officer accused of killing Jews in Palestine.
1 Jewish Struggle published only six issues between Dec. 
1945-Sept. 1946. Its coverage consisted mostly of Irgun 
trial speeches and its total lack of information on pro- 
Irgun support activies in Britain suggest there were none.
2 See Ayner (pseud), Memoirs of an Assassin,(1959), 19-20.
3 Ibid., 130-142.
4 See Samuel Katz, Days of Fire (1968), 105 and 178.
5 See Thurston Clarke, By Blood and Fire (1981), 299.
6 Ronald Howe, The Story of Scotland Yard, (19 66), 145.
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This bomb which appears to have been posted in London^ was, 
however, never publicly claimed by either Lehi - the most 
likely candidate - or Irgun. Despite the lack of military 
actions in Britain ,actually attributable to Jewish groups, 
the press made much of their reported plans and the inten-
2sive police precautions for the Opening of Parliament etc.
I have been unable to find any information about Haganah
activities in Britain, but their units undoubtedly were also
3
present in this country. Arms and munitions, probably m
4
some quantity, were certainly sent from Britain to 
Palestinian Jewish organizations.
While only a tiny minority of British Jewry supported Irgun 
and Lehi and most, vehemently denounced them, the entire 
Jewish community in Britain suffered, and quite severely 
so, as a result of their actions against British forces in 
Palestine. Lehi's assassination of the British Minister,
Lord Moyne, in 1944 substantially raised the level of end­
emic anti-Semitism in Britain. This was further intensified 
as British personnel began to die in increasing numbers, par­
ticularly in spectacular killings like the destruction of 
the King David Hotel. The reprisal hangings of two British
1 See Mars and Minerva Autumn 1982 , 5.
2 Cf. Times, 12 Nov., 1946.
3 The standard Haganah histories do not refer to any units
in Britain, it is likely that personnel from these formed 
the nucleus of the new Israel State intelligence opera­
tion here.
4 For example several fighter bombers were smuggled from
Britain to Israel in 1948; see Shimon Peres, David's Sling
(1970), 33-4. Other shipments of munitions were also 
discovered; see the Times, 10 Nov., 1948.
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1 . .
soldiers by Irgun brought this simmering tension to boiling 
point. A wave of anti-Jewish rioting swept across Britain
2in August 1947. 3000 people attacked Jewish shops in Salford
3
700 broke windows m  Eccles, a synagogue was burned in
4 .Derby. There were also anti-Jewish riots m  Glasgow,
5
Birmingham/ Hull, Blackpool, Brighton and Liverpool where 
abbatoir workers refused to supply cattle to Kosher butchers.^ 
Such rioting paradoxically played into the hands of the 
extreme Zionists who had been given dramatic proof of their 
contentions that Jews could only be safe from anti-semitism 
in their own state.
. . 7But in a country where anti-semitism. was, according to
8UNESCO/now greater than in any other country, it is not
1 See 'Anti-Semitism in Britain', Reynolds News, 27 Aoril, 
1947 .
2 Times, 5 Aug., 1947 .
3 Ibid., 6 Aug., 1947.
4 Daily Mirror, 5 Aug., .194 7 .
5 Economist, 9 Aug., 1947.
6 Liverpool Post, 6 Aug., 1947.
7 See Evening Standard 29 Sept., 1947 and C.C. Aronsfield 
'Anti-Jewish Outbreaks in Modern Britain', The Gates
of Zion, July, 1952.
8 The UNESCO survey covered Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico 
Holland, United States, Australia and France; see W. 
Buchanan and H. Cantrall, How the Nations See Each Other 
(Illinois, 1953), 140. Also see H.H. Eysenck, 'The 
Psychology of Anti-Semitism', The Nineteenth Century
and After (1948), 277-84 and James Robb, Working Class 
Anti-Semite (1954), 92. Robb, however, who did his 
field work in 1948, ignored the Palestine factor.
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perhaps so surprising that meetings called to protest against 
British actions in Palestine, never drew the size of crowd 
that the ISDL had attracted at its peak. The Zionists 
held even fewer outdoor protests; their largest London dem­
onstration in July 1946 attracted only 4,000 marchers.
This had been called by the Zionist Federation to condemn 
the mass arrests of the Yishuv leadership. It was a parti­
cularly traumatic time for JeWry as violent bloody anti- 
semitic rioting had also erupted in Poland. British Jews 
worried about the extent of anti-semitic feeling in this 
country would have been even more concerned had they known
that British SIS agents had played a major role in instiga-
1ting the Kielce riots.
Our necessarily brief but wide ranging survey of the Jewish 
community in Britain between 1945-48 reveals significant 
differences between their attitudes towards events in 
Palestine and that of the Irish in Britain to Ireland in 
1919-21. Far fewer Jews in Britain supported the groups 
actively fighting the British and there was overall a much 
lower level of public concern expressed by this community. 
While acknowledging that very large sums of money were raised 
for a wide range of Palestinian Jewish causes, it would 
be a mistake simply to interpret this as support for Zionism. 
Judaism has always emphasized 'Mitzvah1, the obligation 
to give charity, and financially aiding the resettlement 
of European stateless Jews in Palestine was a way of ensur­
ing that they did not come to England. In the same way
1 See Stewart Steven, Operation Splinter Factor (1974),37. 
SIS formented anti-semitism in Poland in an effort to 
destabilize its Government.
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the older established Sephardic Jews in Britain had finan­
cially aided the 19th century Askenazim to travel on to 
America.
Cypriots living in Britain found themselves in a similar 
situation to the 1945-48 Jewish and the 1916-21 Irish comm­
unities when Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) 
was fighting the British forces in Cyprus in 1955-59. At
the start of the conflict there were about 30,000 Cypriots
1living in Britain ,but in a bid to deprive EOKA in Cyprus
of potential recruits, the''British abolished the previous
2strict affidavit support immigration system. By 1960,
3
over 12,000 Cypriots were annually entering Britain and 
their population had more than doubled in five years. Four 
in every five Cypriots in Britain lived in the London area, 
in tightly knit communities. The four Cypriot Orthodox 
Churches in London became the principal focus of Enossis
support in Britain and one priest was even deported for
. . 4
political activity. 5,000 Cypriots greeted Archbishop
Makarios when he came to London to discuss the independence
5
settlement. This was however an unprecedented occasion.
The demonstrations during the actual conflict period were 
much smaller; 1,000 Greek Cypriots took part in a 1955
1 Times, 29 Aug., 1955 .
2 Vic George and Geoffrey Millerson, 'The Cyrpiot Community 
in London', Race 8 (1967), 278-287.
3 Robin Oakley, Cypriot Migration and Settlement in Britain 
Unpublished D Phil thesis (Oxford,1972), 33. Oakley unfor­
tunately ignores the situation of the Cypriots in Britain 
during the EOKA campaign.
4 Times, 14 June, 19 56.
5 Ibid., 23 Feb, 1959.
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1
protest march but most subsequent demonstrations were m  
the low hundreds. The pro-EOKA Cyprus Brotherhood grew 
from 400 in 1954 to 3,000 in 1960, but most of its activity 
was 'internalized' rather than public manifestations of 
support. Opposition to EOKA came from the relatively strong 
Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) in London: This how­
ever also protested against British policy. As in Ireland, 
Cyprus too, was claimed by two opposing nationalities.
The Turkish Cypriot community in Britain was much smaller
3
than the Greek Cypriots, numbering only some 8,000 in 1958/ 
but they mobilized 2,000, most in their national costume,
4
for a 'Cyprus is Turkish' march. Some Turkish Cypriots 
were killed by British troops but in general their commun­
ity in Britain strongly supported the tough British policy 
against EOKA and thus did not encounter the same degree
of hostility, racism and prejudice that the Greek Cypriots
5 Jofaced here. 79 British soldiers were killed in Cyprus,
the last major conflict involving national servicemen and
very few Brit’idi people shared Lawrence Durrell's more dis-
7passionate view of the war. Over 15,000 British people
1 Times, 29 Aug., 1955.
2 Guardian, 1 Feb., 1960.
3 T ime s , 11 Jan., 1958.
4 Ibid., 24 Feb., 1958. Other Turkish marches were equally
larger than Greek demonstrations. Membership of the
Cyprus Turkish Association rose from 300 in 1952 to
1,000 in 1958. See Nearchov, op. cit., 165.
5 Ibid., 176-7.
6 Blaxland, op. cit., 328.
7 Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons (1964).
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volunteered to replace Gree'k Cypriots arbitrarily sacked
from their jobs in the Cyprus bases.^ EOKA prisoners sent
. . . 2to British prisons staged hunger strikes but there were
no prisoner support demonstrations comparable to the Irish 
ones of 1919-21. Plans were made however for the IRA to 
train EOKA units in Britain but no operations had been car- 
ried out by the time of the independence talks.
We have, however, to look across the Channel to France to 
find a really comparable situation to the IRA's campaign 
in the metropolitan country. During the Algerian War of 
Independence, 1954-61, the Algerian-born population in France
4
of some 4 00,000 was approximately the same as the Irish
born population in Britain during their earlier War of
Independence, 1919-21. The Algerian non-first generation
population was however much smaller. Modern Algerian
nationalism in fact developed among the early 20th century
5 'emigres xn the metropolitan country, who then exported their
1 Times, 13 Nov., 1958. This was a much greater response 
than a similar appeal in Egypt several years earlier.
2 See MacStiofain, op. cit., 74-9.
3 There were however press reports concerning possible 
EOKA operations in Britain; cf. Times, 21 May, 1956. 
EOKA claimed that their plans in Britain were thwarted 
by the death of their organizer Nicolas Ioannou, whom 
they claimed was killed in 1958 by British Security ‘ . r 
who then staged a 'cover up road accident'. This claim 
is substantiated by reliable contemporary IRA sources.
4 Listener, 26 Oct., 1961.
5 See A. Heggoy, 'The Origins of Algerian Nationalism in 
the colony and in France!, Muslim World, April 1968, 
128-40.
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ideas back to the colony. Many of the newer Algerian immi­
grants to France fled Algeria, with the active encouragement 
of the French authorities/to escape the effects of a strat­
egy first worked out in Paris cafes. But there was no 
escape in the metropolitan country from the horrific colon­
ial violence. In 1954, when the modern Algerian liberation
struggle commenced, Algerian life in France was dominated
1
by the Movement National Algerien (MNA) just as the United 
Irish League had dominated Irish political life in Britain 
up to 1914 .But unlike the UIL , the MNA was not prepared quietly 
to fade away when challenged by the newer Front Liberation 
Nationale (FLN).
We have observed that UIL meetings, particularly in Scotland,
were sometimes disrupted by Sinn Fein and that a few ISDL
members used relatively minor violence against nationalist
supporters, just as some of the more militant Zionists
'terrorized' Rabbis into remaining silent on violence in 
2Palestine. But none of this remotely approaches the vio­
lence of the confrontation between the MNA and the FLN in France 
as they fought for the control of the Algerian workers in 
France.and to enforce financial contributions from them; 
Individual deaths were largely unnoticed by the press; only 
the* more sensational mass killings were reported, such as 
the 7 FLN shot dead by the MNA in a Lyons cafe,^ 15 killed
1 The MNA was able to call out 80% of Algerian workers
in Mulhouse in a 1956 political strike, Times, 4 Apr.,1956
2 Jewish Outlook, April, 194 6.
3 Times, 25 June, 1959.
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and wounded in a Paris hospital when the FLN tried to fin-
1
ish off an MNA member shot earlier. At first all the 
Algerian bodies, regularly fished out of the Seine or found 
lying in the wooded Bois de Boulougne,were the work of 
rival FLN and MNA killer squads but after 1959 a third force, 
the police, began to make their own, not insignificant,
2contribution to the ever growing pile of Algerian corpses.
Facing intensified French military action in Algeria itself, 
the FLN, like the IRA, decided to open a 'Second Front' 
in the ntetropolitan country. The FLN in the first month
3
of their active military campaign in France itself, launched
323 attacks, derailing trains, blowing up fuel dumps etc.
4
and killing 82 people. The French responded by recalling
5
13,000 police reservists, and by setting up a new Algerian 
Auxiliary policetmostly composed of former soldiers or 
Harkis, to patrol Algerian bidonVilles in France, bitterly
1 ,Times 7 April, 1961.
2 Conflicting figures have been given for the Algerians
killed in politically motivated attacks in France bet­
ween 1954-61. The Listener, 26 Oct., 1961 estimated 
3,700 dead and Horne, op. cit., 538, estimated 4,300 
but Behr, op. cit., 238, claims that 15,000 Algerians 
were killed in France in "reglements de comptes". 
Already by 1957 it was said that an Algerian was safer 
living in the Algiers Casbah than in Paris , Times, 2 
Nov., 1957.
3 See Mohamed Lebjaoui (FLN commander in France), Verites 
sur la Revolution Algerienne (Paris, 1970) and Bataille 
d'Algier Ou Bataill d'Algerie? (Paris, 1972).
4 Horne, op. cit., 318. According to the Listener, 26
Oct., 1961, 116 French civilians, 49 police officers 
and 16 soldiers were killed in France between 1956-61.
5 Times, 18 Sept., 1958.
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resented for their brutality towards their fellow country­
men tthese harkis were especially singled out for attack 
by the FLN, seven being killed in a single night in Paris.^ 
Algerians were rounded up in huge sweeps, reminiscent of
the German 1rattissages\ 15,years previously. Many were
2
deported, interned and imprisoned; others were not so for­
tunate, and were never seen alive again.
We have observed that deportations and arrests of Irish 
people in Britain between 1916-23 had certainly made size­
able numbers think twice about publicly displaying their 
support for an Irish Republic. Repression can often signi­
ficantly reduce the level of overt support but not always.
In Paris in 1961, with the MNA on the verge of extinction
and Algerian soldiers stationed in France now joining with
3the FLN to attack police patrols , the police imposed a night 
time curfew on all Algerians living in the Capital.
Algerians responded, many it is true under threat from the 
FLN, by defiantly taking to the streets. In one demonstra­
tion alone, over 14,000 including 1,000 women and 550 chil- 
4
dren were arrested and herded into emergency detention
1 Times, 24 Oct., 1960.
2 Castles and Kosack, op. cit., 343, claim that 23%.of
all prisoners in France in 1958 were Algerian. The
Times, 3 Nov., 1961 claimed there were oyer 15,000 Algerian 
political prisoners and internees in France.
3 6 Algerian soldiers were killed in one night attack 
on the Paris police, Times, 6 June, 1961. The Armee 
Organization Secrete (OA.S) had also commenced a series 
of plastiques in Paris to keep Algeria French.
4 Times, 18 Oct., 1961.
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1
centres, mostly sports fields etc. 2100 were arbitrarily
2 3deported, the rest released after appalling brutality.
The police officially claimed only 3 Algerians had been
killed in quelling this particular demonstration but an
inquiry established by the French National Assembly was
soon trying to establish just how many of the 60 Algerian
corpses, fished out of the Seine or found lying in the woods
fringing Paris,had in fact been demonstrators killed by
the police.
As bad as the Black and Tans were, their wave of terror 
in Ireland never came anywhere remotely near the horror 
inflicted on the Algiers Casbah by General Massu's para^troo­
pers or the Foreign Legion in the Bled. Just as the degree 
of repression and prejudice suffered by the Irish in Britain 
VJJ  between 1920-23 must be seen in the context of that inflic­
ted on the Algerians,who also took their war for national 
liberation to the metropolitan country and suffered infini­
tely more as a consequence. Whether the IRA in Britain 
would have reacted against the UIL supporters in a manner 
similar to the FLN's onslaught on the MNA/if the UIL had 
militantly opposed the ISDL, or even formed the British equi­
valent of the Harkis, will always remain conjecture. But 
there were sufficient cases of militant opponents executed 
by the IRA in Ireland,on not always satisfactorily proven
1 Times* 10 Nov., 1961.
2 France Qbservateur, 26 Oct., 1961.
3 Times, 8 Nov., 1961, and the Economist, 4 Nov., 1961.
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spying charges,to indicate this might well have been a real 
possibility. The decision by the UIL, repeatedly lamented 
in British intelligence reports, effectively to opt out 
of a contest with the ISDL may well have spared the Irish 
community considerable bloodshed. The situations of the 
FLN/MNA and the ISDL/UIL were not however directly compar­
able for neither the ISDL nor the UIL fundamentally chall­
enged the other’s primary objectives. Its policy of absten- 
tionism from all levels of the British political system 
ensured that the ISDL never directly challenged the UIL’s 
parliamentary or local government representation while the 
UIL had never regarded the Irish in Britain as an important" 
source of funds for its parent organization in Ireland.
In addition,whereas the MNA could argue with some justifica­
tion that its parent organization in the colony had only 
been displaced by the armed violence of its FLN rival, the 
Nationalists in Ireland had been democratically, ppliticaliy 
eclipsed by Sinn Fein before the armed struggle commenced.
So there was not the same degree of resentment on the part 
of the UIL to.the ISDL and Sinn Fein that the MNA felt for 
the FLN. Irish Nationalism was essentially a pragmatic 
accommodation to the reality of British rule and as such 
was liable to switch from its usual emphasis on constitu­
tional politics/Whenever the prospects of an armed struggle 
appeared to be particularly favourable: for as the Chief 
Secretary of Ireland observed,in 1916, of anti-British feel­
ing (it was) "varying in degree and finding different ways 
of expression but always there in the background of Irish 
politics and character".^
1 Rebellion Minutes of Evidence, Cd 8311, op. cit., 21.
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It is possible that the FLN in France deliberately invited 
police repression against Algerians in order to strengthen 
their hold on the community,in a manner similar to Cohen's 
'politics of amplification' whereby consciousness is pro­
moted by 'spiralizat ion*. ^  It is however very unlikely that 
the IRA campaign in Britain of 1920-21 was inspired by this 
type of strategy. Certainly all subsequent IRA campaigns 
in this country and particularly the present one have been 
motivated simply by the need to create a 'Second Front'.
An IRA assessment prior to the commencement of the present 
campaign recognized that their operations would inevitably 
mean 'writing off' their political wing, Sinn Fein, in this 
country and the loss of its previously substantial fund rais­
ing. Repression affects communities in different ways and J
they similarly respond to it in different ways. It is int­
eresting to observe that of our four case studies, the 
Algerians.in France and the Irish, Cypriots and the Jews 
in Britain, it was the group most repressed - the Algerians 
- who responded the strongest against the metropolitan * 
state just as Yugoslavia, the most reoressed country under 
Nazi occuoation, developed by far the largest partisan move­
ment. There is however certainly no simple causal relation­
ship to exolain why different communities in the same coun­
try respond so differently to repression. Waterbury for ■ 
example suggests that the different types of land ownership 
and socio-economic systems explain why Oaxaca was such an
oasis of tranquility compared to Morelos - the furnace of
2
the Mexican Revolution-in the early 20th century. But •
1 Stanley Cohen (ed), Images of Deviance (1971).
2 Ronald Waterbury, 'Non-revolutionary Peasants', Comparatives 
Studies in Society and History 17 (1975), 416-42.
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Trunk identifies primarily psychological reasons to explain 
why the Jews of Lodz did not emulate the example of the 
Warsaw Ghetto.^
Within a community itself the response to repression can
be as equally varied. Aberle has constructed a typology
to illustrate the variety of responses found within the Navaho
2tribe, most of which are oassive or internalized protest.
Gross delineates eight types of response to the forcible
occupation of a country but,all but one,of these involves
3
some type of collaboration. Responses can also vary within 
a micro group like a family. One of my earliest political 
socialization experiences was the sight of my father praying 
after he had been sacked from his building labourer's job 
because his employer's daughter was standing for Parliament 
as the Unionist Party candidate on a 'non-employment of 
Catholics' platform. My subsequent efforts to destroy the state 
that permitted such discriminatory practices owed much to 
that early experience: yet, when that state found itstvery 
survival was now dependent on the co-option of Catholics,
- my two youngest brothers ehlisted in its paramilitary pol­
ice force. The whole question of community and individual 
response to repression is such a complex one, involving the 
entire spectrum of political, sociological, economic, histo­
rical, cultural and psychological factors,that it is very 
unlikely it can ever be reduced to a workable typology, 
sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the many varied com­
munity and individual responses to repression.
1 Isaiah Trunk, 'Why Was There No Armed Resistance', Jewish 
Social Studies, XLII (1981), 329-34.
2 David Aberle, The Peyote Religion Among the Navaho (Chicago
1966) .
3 Gross, op. cit., 138.
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It might appear, considering the widespread 1915 attacks on
1
German property in Liverpool and London and the 194 7 on­
slaught on Jewish property, that the Irish and particularly 
their oroperty escaped very lightly, especially when one con­
siders the damage inflicted on British property by the IRA.
But paradoxically the IR^ ;while its activities endangered 
the overall societal position of the Irish in Britain, may 
well have protected it from 1947 type onslaughts on Jews.
For the known existence of IRA units, in many British towns
?
almost certainly acted as a deterrent to would-be attackers f 
of the Irish. It is interesting to observe that contemporary 
physical attacks on Irish people in England and their pro­
perty, largely the work of fascist organizations, have hever
2been directed against known Republicans.
With over 25% of all Algerian men in France actively suppor-
3ting it, the FLN had managed to mobilize an unprecedentedly 
high proportion of its target population. Certainly the 
ISDL, admittedly employing very different methods, never 
mobilized the Irish on anything like this scale. In the 
post-Treaty and early Civil War phases, Free State emissaries 
tried with a conspicuous lack of success to transform the 
pro-Treaty ISDL membership into a support organization for 
the Dublin Government. Other governments have tried and 
failed to organize their exiles into support organizations.
1 See A. Marwick, The Deluge (1973), 131.
2 For-fascist and loyalist attacks on Irish people in Britain 
see my article in Hibernia, 31 July, 1980.
3 The Listener, 26 Oct., 1961 quoted French security sources 
as claiming that 100,000 Algerians actively supported
the FLN,as opposed to merely passively paying the high 
enforced contributions extracted from most Algerians in 
France,and of these 10,000 could be used for military 
operations.
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Hitler's regime established a special branch of the Nazi
party to encourage Germans abroad to actively support the
new Germany. But despite a series of films identifying it
as a powerful menace and near hysterical reports on its Volks^ -
1bund activities the Amerika Deutscher (The Bund) was never
2
more than a tiny organization in the United States.
Mussolini even went, as far as ordering "Italian citizens 
must remain Italian citizens no matter in what land they
3
live even to the seventh generation". His attempts to 1 c
transform the existing Italian organizations in’ithe'iUnited
4
States into fascist groups deeply divided the community
5
but the Italian fascists never attracted a mass following.
A very active enforced recruitment campaign, using threats
against relatives still in Italy,did however enrol 1,200
£
of the 11,300 Italian male aliens living in Britain.
1 The UnAmerican Activities Committee claimed the Bund had
500,000 members and supporters in 1938; see Martinus 
Nijhoff, Nazi Germany and the United States (The Hague, 
1965), 120.
2 The FBI estimated Bund membership at only 6,500 in 1939; 
see Joachim Remak, 'The Bund', Journal of Modern History 
24 (1957), 38-41. According to the German Ambassador 
there were only 450 Bundists in Chicago,a city of 700,000 
Germans, 40,000 of them formally organized; see Alton 
Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere (New Haven,
1967), 86. Also see David Kahn, Hitler's Spies (1980), 
313-22.
3 Quoted in Gerson, op. cit., 109.
4 See Luciano Iorizzo, The Italian Americans (New York, 
1971), 197.
5 Ibid., 205-8. Only 1,228 Germans and 232 Italians were 
interned in the United States in 1941; see Oscar-Barck 
America since 1900 (New York, 1974), 487.
6 Figure given in Home Secretary's memorandum, 17 May, 194 0. 
WP(40)128(PRO).
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Normally ethnic groups are very reluctant to organize and . 
join homeland support organizations,especially when the 
societal environment is distinctly unfavourable. The ISDL 
did manage to do so and mobilized a much greater membership 
than the Anti-Partition League subsequently did during a 
more favourable period,that is when there was no IRA mili­
tary activity in Britain and when the Irish born population 
had almost doubled. Charles Diamond.was, we have observed, 
a convinced assimilationist and a bitter critic of the ISDL 
and Sinn .Fein in Britain., Yet a London court jailed him
for six months for writing a highly philosophical editorial
1
on the war m  Ireland. In a societal environment like that,
it is remarkable that the ISDL managed to recruit->over 38,000
members. Rex suggests that immigrant associations are func-
2
tional and beneficial for immigrants but Pearson,in his
study of West Indian activism, has found very low political
3
involvement levels. Indeed as study after study has found, 
very low levels of active political involvement in the
4
British political system overall, it does seem rather para­
doxical that the ISDL managed to enrol so many members in 
support of an organization actively fighting Britain.
1 Its title, '‘Killing to Murder", Catholic Herald, 27 DEc. , 
1919 did not reflect its contents.
2 John Rex, op. cit., 22.
3 David Pearson, 'Race, Class and Respectability', 
Sociology, 12 (1978), 491-502.
4 For a wide range of these studies see Geraint Parry (ed) 
Participation in .Politics (Manchester, 1972).
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Berry argues that political participation is socially inte­
grative^- but while participation in the ISDL may have helped 
to integrate people inside the ethnic group it could hardly
be said to have integrated them into British society. Both 
2 3Kornhauser and Berry argue that involvement in non-normative 
politics entails a high risk of social ostracism and isola­
tion within the peer group. ISDL members were, however, 
an integral part of the Irish community. While it may seem 
a very distasteful comparison one could argue that many of 
the Irish Republican sympathizers in Britain saw their posi­
tion as somewhat similar to those whose countries were occu­
pied by the Germans during the Second World War, particularly
4 5in the Channel Islands and Denmark where the occupation 
was relatively non violent. The basic conclusion of most 
of the studies dealing with wartime occupation is that the 
collaborators greatly outnumbered those resisting^ and that 
most of the people who disliked the occupation nevertheless 
did nothing, act ively, to hinder it. Thus it is not so sur­
prising that ISDL leaders repeatedly referred to sympathizers 
who would not actually join and that the number of ISDL mem­
bers who graduated into the ranks of the IRA was relatively
1 Berry, op. cit., 110.
2 W. Kornhauser in A.M. Rose (ed), Human Behaviour and Social
Processes (1962), 28.
3 Berry, op. cit., 127.
4 According to Norman Longmate, If Britain Had Fallen (1972), 
219, there was no real resistance in the Channel Islands 
but much active collaboration, so much so that its scale 
precluded embarrassing post war trials.
5 Richard Petrow, The Invasion of Denmark and Norway (1979).
6 See M.R.D. Foot, Resistance (1978).
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small:
If the ISDL flourished so strongly between 1919-21, why then
did it collapse almost overnight? According to Tobias and
Woodhouse, "the greatest shock sufferedbby revolutionary ■
movements occurs in the blossoming of revolution or in its 
1
defeat", while Wilson bluntly asserts that "frustration is
2the fate of all social movements". The ISDL experienced 
the conflicting emotions of defeat and depression, victory 
and triumph.with the signing of the Treaty in 1921. The 
top leadership regarded the imposition of Partition as a 
defeat but the majority of the rank and file membership reg­
arded the creation of the Free State as a victory,which gave 
Southern Ireland a degree of freedom they had never contem­
plated as really attainable until recently. For them Britain's : 
determination to prevent the continued existence of the 
Irish Republic, could be lamented but not opposed with any 
hope of success, and as Yeats so evocatively puts it, "too
3
long a sacrifice can make a stone of the heart". Gross
suggests that all revolts are shortlived -unless they evolve 
4
an ideology. The Anti-Treaty ISDL did however have an ideo­
logy, or at least the rudiments of one,but it was of such 
a conventionally anti— democratic nature as to appeal only 
to committed Republicans. De Valera's sharp warning that
1 Henry Tobias and Charles Woodhouse, 'The Jewish Bundists 
in Defeat', Comparative Studies in Society and History 
19 (1977), 367.
2 J. Wilson, op. cit., 360.
3 W.B. Yeats, Collected Poems (1950), 202.
4 Gross, op. cit., 82.
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1
"the majority have no right to do wrong" summed up the con­
tradictions inherent in Irish Republicanism: the assertion 
of the nation’s right to self determination, as the expression 
of the people's will, but incorporating an elitist preconcep­
tion of the parameters within which that right must be exer­
cised. In chapter 6 I observed .that the scaffold ,of self 
determination,on which the ISDL was constructed was so inher­
ently unstable it was bound sooner,or later,to collapse and 
bring down the organization with it.
Very few sociologists have investigated the manner in which
organizations finally collapse and perish as a result of
2
adverse environmental changes . It is a process with so 
many variations that it is impossible to construct an ade­
quate typology given the limited theoretical constructs 
available at present. Some organizations disappear almost 
immediately after the situation which has created them chan-
3
ges. The Keep-America-Out-of-the-War Congress which had 
enjoyed considerable support was speedily wound up after
4Pearl Harbour had made its continued existence meaningless. 
Anti-Zionist organizations, formerly quite influential in 
the British Jewish community, effectively disappeared after
1 Quoted in Curran, op. cit., 231.
2 But see S.H. Messinger, 'A Case Study of a Declining 
Social Movement1, American Sociological Review 20 (1955), 
3-10.
3 See Bartelmo J. Palsi, 'Some Suggestions about the 
Transitory-Permanence Dimension of Organizations',
British Journal of Sociology 21 (1970), 200-6.
4 See Justus Doenecke, 'Non-Intervention of the Left', 
Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977), 221-36.
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1
the creation of the Israeli State . With some organizations
their effective disappearance is, however, harder to explain
than others. No one could really have expected the Nazi 
2Werewolves to continue fighting,after the formal surrender, 
but many French people mistakenly worried that the million 
Pied Noir,who fled Algeria,would bring with them an active
3
OAS who would effectively destabilize France. Believers 
in a lost cause may however swim against the tide of opinion 
and try to create new organizations which seem doomed to 
frustration from the moment of their formation. Thus an 
effort by the Irish Unionists in London to form a new organ­
ization "to promote the reunion of Southern Ireland with 
4Britain" was doomed from its inception,but in Brazil a 
Japanese organization emerged in 1945,which not only refused 
to accept that Japan had surrendered but answered its -fellow
5
ethnic critics by launching a terror wave against them.
We have already discussed the views of Freeman and Hannan 
and of Price that,as most organizations never attain their
1 See M. Fagnon (trans.), S.S. Werwolf Combat Instruction 
Manual (Arizona, 1982 reprint).
2 M. Freeman , op. cit., 12 3.
3 See William Cohen, 'Legacy of Empire1, Journal of Contem­
porary History 15 (1980), 97-123. The OAS smuggled 20,000 
weapons back into France but only a very small number 
continued their militant anti-De Gaulle struggle. Some 
former OAS have joined the extreme right wing Spanish 
Basque .battalions..
4 D 989 A/9/20 (PRO NI).
5 See T. Maeyana, 'Ethnicity: Secret Societies and Associ­
ations, The Japanese in Brazil', Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 21 (1980), 589-608.
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stated objectives, it is much more useful to analyse their 
existence in terms of their organizational effectiveness.
The demise of an organization therefore does not necessarily 
imply that it has been a failure. All success is relative, 
and so by this criterion the ISDL was a very successful org­
anization during the 1919-21 period. In South Africa the
Ossewabrandwag (OB), formed to keep the country out of World
1
War II; ceased to exist after the war ended. Yet the OB's
existence was not a total failure for many of its members
graduated into the Broederbond, the real influence behind
2post-1949 South African Governments.
Why then did both the Anti and especially the Pro-Treaty 
ISDLs fail to build reasonably sizeable organizations, 
perhaps not necessarily using that name? The Treaty may 
have been greeted with a mixed reaction by the Irish in 
Britain but the ensuing Civil War produced nothing but des- . 
pair,leading to a near total communal alienation from Irish 
politics. With prophetic presience the Catholic Herald had 
warned:
"The day that sees the first shot fired in civil war 
between Republicans and Free Staters will witness 
such an alienation of the Irish people outside of 
Ireland as will bode ill for any further help in 
establishing Ireland's position".^
1 See George Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots (1976).
2 See Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydon, The Broderbond (Cape­
town, 1978). John Vorster, an OB leader, joined the 
Broederbond and became Prime Minister
3 Catholic Herald, 1 April, 1922.
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This indeed occurred, as we have observed, in Brittain and
1
tthroughoutt tthe Irish Diaspora, m  tihe Unitted Sttattes and in
Austtraliatwhere Bishop 0 1Farrell wrotte in November 1922:
"you can form no idea of tthe depression and humiliattion in
tthe senttimentts of tthe Irish Australians att tthe sttatte of
2
things in Ireland" We have observed that tthe attempt to 
create Fine Gheadheal,tto co-ordinate tthe Diaspora organiza- 
ttions/perished in tthe flames of the Civil War. The only 
tangible outcome of the Paris Congress, tthe Tailtteann Games 
were postponed in 1922,on account of tthe fighting and tthe 
first Games held in 1924 were marred by tthe post-war bitter­
ness, with many of tthe overseas organizing committees degen-.
3
eratting into Republican versus Free Staters confrontations.
The Civil War was the most traumatic event to occur in
Ireland during this century. The twelve months of fighting
have decisively influenced the subsequent 60 years of Irish
political life. Both Ireland's two major parties grew out
of the Civil War and even the IRA, intransigent as ever,
has constitutionally recognized the traumatic effect of that
conflict in its General Order No. 9, forbidding offensive
action against the Irish Armed Forces. Its bombing campaign
in Britain in 1939 was launched because the IRA Army Council
recognized that "Ireland has had enough and to spare of 
4Civil War". The subsequent Anti-Partition League in Britain
1 See Consul Gloster Armstrong reports;FO 371/7261.
2 Quoted in O'Farrell, Catholic Church, op. cit., 235.
3 Catholic Herald, 28 June, 19 24.
4 Wolfe Tone Weekly, 19 April, 19 39.
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was only possible because of the tacit truce between the
Irish political parties on the issue/) While all the Irish ,
community organizations, County ^and Parish Associations etc.,
formed by the post-World War II immigrants, constitutionally
forbade political involvement as the only way of organizing
1
people brought up on the politics of the Civil War.
The American Friends of Irish Freedom was able to survive 
the aftermath of the Civil War by forming the All American 
National Council "to forestall British interference in
2American concerns and safeguard American sovereignty".
A series of legal cases throughout the 1930s,on the owner­
ship of the frozen 'Irish funds1 in the United States, helped
3to maintain a diminishing FOIF interest in Irish affairs.
The rival American Association for the Recognition of the
Irish Republic, unlike the FOIF, supported the anti-treaty
cause but lost so much of its support that it, like the
American UIL in 1917, was actually forced to appeal for funds
4from Ireland to keep going. After the Civil War it was 
revitalized by Sinn Fein but lost much of its new membership 
when De Valera founded Fianna Fail. The already noted att­
empt by the Irish Unionists in London to form an organization
1 This has effectively prevented the largest Irish com­
munity organizations from functioning in the role of 
ethnic pressure groups but more recently these constitu­
tional impediments have been flexibly redefined to enable 
initiatives on the Hunger Strikes, and Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, etc.
2 S. Plain, op. cit., 2 53-4.
3 Carroll, op. cit., 208.
4 Ibid., 184.
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tlo reunite the Free State with Britain never really got off
the ground, though sporadic "drawing room meetings" were
1
held for another 15 years ; but the companion Southern Irish
Loyalist Relief Association gave itself a new lease of life,
by extending its scope to look after British ex-servicemen
in Ireland,and so managed to continue its London organiza-
2
tion until 1957. The ISDL, opposed to the Irish Government, 
found itself in 1925 repudiated by the Republican leadership 
in Ireland and so,without any external support or raison 
d 1etre,dissolved itself three years later by which time it 
had been reduced to literally a handful of members. Unlike 
the American FOIF, AARIR and the London Unionists, the ISDL 
had found itself in a cul de sac where it could not formulate 
a new strategy to prolong its existence.
Zald and Ash have suggested that "inclusive organizations' 
are much more subject to ebb and flow tide sentiment factors 
than "exclusive organizations'. They are also much more 
likely to develop faster but also to decline more quickly 
than exclusive organizations. The ISDL generally approxi­
mated to the typology of an inclusive organization. It 
owed its existence to Sinn Fein and as Zald and Ash suggest, 
an organization founded on the initiative of another is 
least likely to survive. They also suggested that organiza­
tions with specific goals are also least likely to survive
1 D 989A/9/20.
2 See its Minute Bo'ok, D989 B/l/1-4. The organization then 
transferred its office to Dublin and continued there 
until 1963.
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and this too occurred with the ISDL. The leadership of the 
ISDL was generally more radical than the rank and file mem­
bership and as a result, the organization did, as Zald and 
Ash predict, become more radical. But whereas Zald and Ash 
have suggested that inclusive organizations are more split 
resistant, in the case of the ISDL this was not so. However 
their proposition that there is a positive relationship bet­
ween organizational goal and tactical transformation is at 
least partly substantiated by the case of the ISDL. When 
the sentiment tide was flowing strongly in its direction 
the ISDL could afford to have its 'Isolationist/Exclusivist' 
orientation but with declining support we observed the ISDL 
having formal talks with the Communist Party. Zald and Ash's 
proposition that the ideal conditions for organizational 
growth are the combination of a strong sentiment base and 
low societal hostility towards the organization were only 
partly met in the development of the ISDL. There was cer­
tainly strong support within the Irish community but also 
much hostility from the broader society. British Zionists 
paying their Shekalim did not expect their contribution would 
be employed to buy arms for use against the British Army 
during the Mandate;but ISDL members must have realized that 
even funds collected,ostensibly to help the families of 
imprisoned IRA volunteers released other funds for the pur­
chase of arms: and as Lord Trevithin sternly admonished an 
ISDL fund collector "many people have been hanged drawn and
quartered for less treason than trading money to a Republican
1
fund in a Monarchy".
1 TS 27/183.
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However both the Zionist Federation and the ISDL required 
far less personal committment than the FLN. The Zionist 
Review and the Irish Exile might fulminate against -.members1 
reluctance to actively sell organizational publications or 
promptly pay their financial dues but unlike the FLN, 
'defaulting' members and supporters knew they would not find 
themselves floating, dismembered, in the Thames. The Irish 
Exile might 'advise' ISDL members to boycott British goods 
but failure to comply with this request involved no sanc­
tions; whereas Muslims in France who ignored the FLN ban 
on alcohol often found themselves, literally, drinking their 
last drink. The FLN, unlike the ISDL, sought to totally 
control the ethnic community's life in a manner similar to
the control a fundamentalist religious sect exercises over
1
its followers. Sects are classical examples of exclusive 
organizations and though both sects in particular and exclu­
sivist organizations in general are usually thought of as 
relatively small organizations, the FLN, the largest by far 
of our four case study organizations, belongs to the cate­
gory of exclusivist organizations; whereas the ISDL, Zionist 
and Cypriot organizations were definitely inclusivist, though 
occupying different places in that typological spectrum.
The growth and subsequent decline of the ISDL refutes Michel's
2
'iron law of oligarchy' and Dawson and Getty's 'natural
1 See B. Scharf, The Sociological Study of Religion (1970) 
and R. Mehl, The Sociology of Protestantism (1970).
2 Op. cit.
1
history model1 whereby institutionalization is seen as an
inevitable outcome of organizational evolution. My case
study of the ISDL therefore supports Bank's contention that
2many organizations do not undergo bureaucratization. As 
for the 1 routinization of charisma', argument, Art O'Brien 
could hardly have been described as a charismatic leader,
3
"autocratic and dictatorial" certainly/ but clearly not
charismatic. T.P. 0'Connor, who once proclaimed himself as
4the "Irish Boss m  Great Britain"- and who referred,almost
regally, to "My People" in his election manifestos, until
finding himself beyond electoral challenge, he ceased to
issue them, would seem to be a much better candidate for
a charismatic Irish leader in Britain. However his auto-.
5
cratic manner and refusal to share power, contributed sub­
stantially to the demise of the UIL. Weber argued that the
charismatic leader must bring the organization success or
6his influence will decline but T.P. 0'Connortpresiding over
the demise of the UIL, was still able to decisively influence
the formation of the replacement, the Irish Democratic league. 
. 7
Leadership plays a very important part in organizational.
1 Op. cit.
2 Op. cit.
3 ROR 164. 20 July, 1922. CP 4115, CAB 24/137.
4 Quoted in the Catholic Herald, 8 Dec., 1923.
5 John Scurr MP claimed that he left the UIL because of 
"T.P.'s Bossism", ibid., 15 Jan., 1924.
6 M. Weber, Theory of Social^ op. cit., 359.
7 See E.P. Hollander, Leadership Dynamics (New York, 19 78) 
and Alvin Gouldner and J. Charms (ed), Studies in 
Leadership (New York, 19 66).
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life particularly during the early mobilization phase and
1
subsequent goal displacement processes. Yet leaders.parti­
cularly in voluntary organizations,cannot persuade their 
followers to act in ways members consider are against their 
bes.t interests. Daniel O'Connell's appeal for money for 
the homeland organization met with much success in America 
but his plea to Irish Americans to support the abolition 
of slavery fell on barren ground; for free black labour was
perceived as constituting a threat to the socio-economic
2status of the Irish immigrants. Art O'Brien and Sean 
McGrath had considerable popularity within the Irish commu­
nity and even the personal respect of their political oppon­
ents but they could not transform this intangible asset into 
the practical assistance necessary to rebuild the post-Treaty 
ISDL.
Yet people are not always motivated by materialist interests 
and may indeed act altruisticallyfin ways opposed to their 
own individualist socio-economic interests .in pursuit of 
a societal or communal goal. James O'Connor a convinced 
assimilationist and supporter of the link with Britain 
observed "the national policy of secessation ba,sed upon the 
concept of an economic and cultural isolation from Britain 
was in its essence antagonistic to the interests of the Irish 
in Britain whom it now leaves almost voiceless in the 
Parliamentary struggles that lie before them, the struggle
1 See H.A. Nelson, 'Change in an Evolutionary Movement', 
Social Forces 49 (1971), 353-71.
2 Maurice O'Connell, 'Daniel O'Connell and Irish Americans' 
Eire-Ireland, 16 (1981), 7-15.
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against any state recognition of birth control and that for 
State aid in the erection of Catholic schools. The paradox
is that the Irish in Britain were led to support and still
1 2 3actively support the secession claim . Hickey, O'Day
4
and Scott, all support O'Connor's observations as to the
extent to which the struggle for Irish self determination
absorbed the interests of the Irish in Britain,during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.A preoccupation which
could not, as Mullin observed of Irishmen in South Wales,
at the turn of the century, conceivably benefit them in any
material sense,
"Sunday after Sunday, year in, year out, (they) 
sacrificed their only day of rest to meet in a
dingy room to discuss the affairs of; Ireland and
contribute their hard earned pence to a cause 
that brought no material benefit to them".^
It is people like these who are the essential nucleus, the 
hard core activists, who make possible the creation of org­
anizations like the ISDL and APL and who proved invaluable 
in the rebuilding of the IRA in 1970. People with the com­
mitment to organize and stay organized, no matter how unfav­
ourable the immediate societal environment, awaiting the 
external stimuli, the blast of air that will revive barely 
glowing embers; which may dramatically raise the popular 
involvement threshold level; thereby mobilizing a large
1 Times, 17 March, 1928.
2 John Hickey, Urban Catholic (1967), 158.
3 O'Day, op. cit., 125.
4 George Scott, The RCs (1967), 38.
5 James Mullin, The Story of a Toiler's Life (1921), 16.
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influx of recruits in a very short period. Such people the 
'politicos', often by the strength of their personal commit­
ment are able to keep together small local branches after 
the national organization has withered away, awaiting once 
more a more favourable societal environment. Thus a small 
group of IRB and Sinn Fein members made possible the crea­
tion of the ISDL and then kept it going in some areas long 
after it had died out elsewhere.
Yet other equally committed Sinn Fein members opposed the
creation of the ISDL, harried it during its period of mass
membership and finailly inflicted a near mortal blow on a
badly crippled organization after the Civil War. While
their own organization had conspicuously failed to mobilize
the new upsurge of political interest among the Irish in
England and Wales during 1919-21, they refused to internally
locate their failureand instead blamed the ISDL for depriving
them of recruits. As I discovered, when I took over the
leadership of London Sinn Fein in 1975, it is very difficult
to persuade members that their long established organization
is no longer suited to changed circumstances and should be
1
replaced by a new organization.
1 I quickly decided that, with so little Irish community 
support for the IRA campaign in Britain, there was no 
longer any real role for an organization so closely iden­
tified with the IRA as Sinn Fein. However traditional 
concern for the welfare of political prisoners and their 
families indicated the feasibility of establishing new 
front organizations to mobilize this interest. The old 
guard members, still dreaming of a dramatic reversal of 
fortunes and a return to the glory days of the 1970-7 3 
period,refused to accept these proposals and so I left 
Sinn Fein,along with a sizeable minority of the membership. 
This experience tends to confirm the hypothesis that 
organizations like the ISDL, which have known success 
find it much harder to adjust after defeats, failures,
contd....
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Intensely committed people often find it difficult to conduct
a reasoned dialogue with the much less committed and usually
find it difficult to comprehend the latter's apathy. Chen
Yung'sdictum that Communist Party members must exhibit
"unlimited devotion to the revolution and the Party (and)
1sacrifice unhesitatingly individual interests" bears the
same relation to most people's personal degree of political
commitment as a Trappist monk to the Catholic laity. Catholics
may admire the vocationalism and self sacrifice involved
in monastic life but few wish to emulate it or even really
comprehend such altruistic devotion. I have, several times
in this thesis ,suggested that people who involve themselves
in organizations like the IRA possess a type of personality
only found among a minority of any societal population.
2
This observation is strohgly confirmed by Inkeles while 
Bettleheim has drawn attention to the high survival rates 
of political activists in Nazi concentration camps,which
3
he attributes to the strength of their personalities.
. . . . contd
setbacks and general loss of support; whereas organiza­
tions like the Connolly Association, with their minimalist, 
short term expectations and long term gradualist strategy/ 
find it much easier to survive setbacks and make the 
necessary adjustments.
1 Quoted in B. Compton, Mao's China (Seattle, 1952), 101.
2 Alex Inkeles in Francis Hsu (ed), Psychologica1 !Anthro­
pology (Illinois., 1961).
3 Bruno Bettelheim, Informed Heart, Autonomy in a Mass Age 
(New York, 1960). Also see Barrington Moore, Injustice: 
The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (1978). My 
own personal experience, fortunately a brief one, as a 
political prisoner in a Maximum Security wing, while 
obviously highly impressionistic, confirms Bettelheim 
and Moore's observations.
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Kedward in his study of the French Resistance frankly dec-
1
lares that "a militaht is someone who is born that way".
In chapters three and four I observed that sociologists who
ignore the many psychological and individual personality
factors influencing organizational development, especially
voluntary ones, are depriving themselves of a very valuable
extra dimension for understanding organizational growth and
decline and the complex process that is mobilization.- I
2
believe that the work of social psychologists like Weiss
/
is invaluable for understanding why people join and leave 
organizations. Yet while psychologists can provide much 
useful information about the mobilization and defection pro­
cesses, it is ultimately only the sociologists, often employ­
ing historical data, who can fully comprehend the societal 
processes which create and destroy organizations: for organ­
izations are the product of societal and environmental int­
eraction. Notwithstanding the intensity of their own personal 
commitment the politicos are incapable of creating a mass 
membership organization,like the ISDL,unless the appropriate 
preconditions, favourable societal environment (preferably 
macro but certainly micro societal, i.e ethnic community) 
and high sentiment base are present. Nor can their personal 
commitment, no matter how intense, maintain that
1 H.R. Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France (1978), 158.
Like myself, Kedward does not believe that it is possible 
to create a socio-economic typology of the Resistance 
members.
2 R. Weiss, op. cit.
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organization at the same level of membership when those con­
ditions change adversely.
For this reason I have deliberately refrained from commenting
in this concluding chapter on the tactical errors, like the
resurrection of the 'secret1 constitutional rule,or the
adjournment of the April 1922 conference etc, made by the
Republican leadership of the ISDL and suggesting alternative
strategies and tactics,they could have employed to maintain
their organization. For whatever strategy they might have
adopted, the ISDL could never have been maintained after
1922 in the manner envisaged by its creators in 1919. Sadler
and Barry suggest that,
"an organization cannot evolve or develop in 
ways which merely reflect the goals, motives or 
needs of its members or of its leadership since 
it must always bow to the constraints imposed on 
it by the nature of its relationship with the 
environment"1.
Marx however expressed this dialectical process in a rather
more literary manner,
"Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make 
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given 
and transmitted from the past".^
1 P.J. Sadler and B.A. Barry, Organizational Development 
( 1970), 58. ---
2 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(New York, 1898), 15.
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Appendix 1
ISDL Branch Occupational Census Forms, classified as O'Brien 
Ms 84 32.(NLI). Branch membership by sex, age:and occupation 
(lab - labourer, hw - housewife, un - unemployed, serv - 
servant, text - textile worker).
Teeside No..1
Males 23, engineer; 29, engineer; 19, lab; 23, lab; 62, 
lab; 23, lab; 20, lab; 20, lab; 36, lab; 32, moulder; 25,
boilermaker; 45, lab; 36, lab; 22, fitter; 25, lab; 19, 
fitter; 20, fitter; 23, lab; 25, lab; 22, lab; 28, lab; 30,
lab; 34, lab; 23, lab; 28, lab; 24, lab; 21, barman; 34,
lab; 33, lab; 19, clerk; 18, un; 24, un; 45, un.
Females 18, teacher; teacher; 20, serv; 18, serv; 18, serv;
45, housekeeper, 18, serv.
Swansea No. 2
Males 43, un; 42, lab; 47, lab; 44, lab; 27, driver; 28, 
lab; 38, lab; 35, un; 39, un; 20, un; 19, lab; 34, un; 21,
un; 41, lab; 21, driver; 23, lab; 25, lab; 43, un.
Liverpool No. 14 
Males 19, shop assistant; 50, turner; 30, fitter; 25, black­
smith; 18, printer; 19, lab; 28, lab; 25, lab; 33, caretaker;
19, driver; 22, cable layer; 30, blacksmith; 30, lab; .32, 
lab.
Females 20, maid; 22, cook; 32, hw; 28, dressmaker; 18, 
bag mender; 30, book folder.
Notts and Derby No. 4 
Males 29, clerk; 31, clerk; 46, printer; 28, teacher; 48, 
lab.
Females 22, nurse.
Liverpool No. 13 
Males 51, lab; 20, book repairer; 52, stoker; 14, schoolboy; 
18, lab; 50, sawyer; 20, engineer; 18, warehouseman; 14, 
schoolboy.
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Females 46, hw; 21, printer; 21, shop asst; 43, text; 28, 
hw;- 24, book keeper; 57, hw; 33, hw; 16, cashier; 25, shop 
asst; 24, book keeper; 24, shop asst.
Cardiff No. 4
Males 52, lab; 29, lab; 50, smelter; 25, lab; 43, rail 
inspector; 27, foundry worker; 54, lab; 65, signalman.
South Wales No. 6 
Males 45, steel wrkr; 29, quarryman; 33, plate layer; 17, 
shop asst; 48, cooper; 21, quarryman; 17, shop asst; 24, 
plate layer; 20, un; 38, miner; 39, wine shop foreman; 29, 
lab; 35, tin wrker; 23, quarryman; 26, lab; 36, rail engineer; 
45, porter; .37, boiler cleaner; 48, county court officer;
14, schoolboy; 22, lab; 25,* furnace man; 19, fireman; 23, 
plate layer; 46, rail porter; 57, foreman platelayer; 26, 
carriage wrkr; 44, carpenter; 44, teacher; 26, lab; 23, lab;
30, lab; 22, rail porter; 27, lab; 49, plate layer; 25, 
insurance agent.
Females 17, un; 34, hw; 23, barmaid; 21, un; 21, un; 25, 
self-employed dress maker; 22, confectioner; 32, cook; 18, 
maid; 19, tailoress; 36, hw; 45, hw; 31, hw; 61, hw; 30, 
hw; 25, dress maker; 27, milliner; 45, hw; 17, hw; 51, hw;
42, hw, 27, hw; 37, hw; 29, h2; 40, hw; 24, GPO asst.
Pontypridd No. 2 
Males 28, miner; 55, miner; 29, engineer; 30, lab; 36,
miner; 34, miner; 36, miner; 36, miner; 47, miner; 47, miner;
47, lab; 45, miner; 36, miner; 36, miner; 36, carpenter;
27, miner; 21, lab; 45, miner; 65, foreman; 45, miner; 36,
miner, miner, miner, 22, fitter; 46, miner; 26, miner; 26,
miner; 47, miner; 29, miner; 36, miner; 47, miner; 24, factory
hand;
Females 59, hw; 42, hw; 35, hw; 20, hw; 31, hw.
Morley
Males 26, railway wrkr; 29, blacksmith; 21, miner; 19, 
miner; 52, miner; 22, miner; 45, builder; 37, text; 24, 
porter; 20, engineer; 28, lab; 19, miner; 29, driver.
Females 25, text; 58, hw; 50, hw; 22, text.
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Burnley
Males 45, lab; 43, miner; 30, lab; 22, foundry wrkr; 45,
chargehand; 33, lab; 40, chargehand; 59, lab.
Females 51, text.
Heston
Males 29, hairdresser; 30, miner, transport wrkr; 37, miner;
34, lab; 43, miner; 43, driver; 27 waiter; 4 0', rail worker;
43, docker; 20, painter; 49, lab; 28, rail porter; 43, lab;
35, electrical engineer; 38, lab.
Females 18, text; 21, typist; 23, teacher; 48, housekeeper.
Ashton in Makerfield 
Males 26, fitter; 39, miner; 39, miner; 33, miner; 44, barman. 
Females 20, shop asst; 30, text; 30, teacher; 21, text;
20, text; 37, teacher; 35, teacher; 37, cook.
Bingley
Males 23, sawyer; 43, text; 24, lab; 22, brick layer; 19,
machinist; 30, text; 17, text; 27, fitter; 23, warehouseman. 
Females 55, text; 18, text; 41, text; 20, text; 29, text;
35, text; 27, text; 25, text; 56, hw; 20, text; 20, tailoress;
26, text; 18, tailoress; 52, hw; 59, text; 22, text; 30,
hw.
North Staffs No. 1
Males Headteacher.
Coventry
Males 35, civil servant.
London No. 4 0
Males 36, naval waiter; 40, civil servant; 34, electrician;
40, hairdresser, 21, lab; 19, fitter; 20, fitter, 19, fitter;
19, lab; 19, plumber; 24, lab; 21, fitter; 19, boiler maker;
20, lab; 24, teacher; 34, electrical engineer; 47, plumber.
Females 26, teacher; 22, nurse; 18, teacher, 24, teacher;
30, teacher.
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Stockport No. 11 
Males 38, fitter; 55, text; 22, engineer; 54, lab; 56, lab; 
60, shop manager; 39, GPO foreman; 21, text; 19, turner;
18, blacksmith; 19, turner; 18, brick layer; 47, porter;
20, text; 58, lab.
Females 27, text; 37, hw.
Hulme
Males 32, teacher; 28, lab; 50, private and t'rades status 
enquiry agent; 35, secretary.
Females 18, confectioner; 26, shop asst; 18, designer; 28, 
clerk.
Mid Durham No. 2 3 
Males 27, lab; 48, lab; 33, painter; 16, miner; 23, miner;
38, miner; 31, lab; 24, miner; 26, miner; 21, miner; 21, 
miner; 28, miner; 26, miner, 48, lab.
Females 36, hw; 24, teacher.
Battersea 
Males 47, bankclerk, clerk.
Females 22, typist; 22, typist; 19, typist; 27, cigarette 
maker.
Preston
Males 30, moulder; 32, moulder; 26, coach builder; 31, 
engineer; 20, machinist; 20, boot maker; 20, spinner; 42, 
clerk; 20, lab; 30, docker; 69, joiner; 42, miner; 26, moul­
der; 22, joiner; 23, miner; 22, fitter; 19, text; 27, builder; 
32, lab; 16, text; 21, transport wrkr; 33, plasterer; 20,
baker; 37, weaver; 47, lab; 37, lab.
Females 36, text; 19, text; 23, text; 15, text; 26, text;
18 text; 44, laundress; 36, laundress; 40, laundress, 42,
laundress; 46, laundress; 28, clerk; 30, clerk.
Richmond
Males 26, salesman; 46, electrical engineer; 42, mechanic. 
Females 24, photographer; 21, supervisor; 22, clerk.
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Central London 
Males 39, plate layer; 36, captain.
Sheffield No. 3
Males 45, inspector of weights; 44, foreman; 29, rail fore­
man; 48, lab; 32, lab; 50, joiner; 49, smelter; 44, rail 
foreman.-
Females 19, warehouseman; teacher.
Barry
Males 57, painter; 48, shipwright; 38, docker; 48, docker; 
44, teacher.
Halifax
Males 41, postman; 43, moulder; 26, moulder; 19, lab; 31, 
electrician's mate; 38,- plater-: ; 24, dyer; 43, baker; 24, 
fitter; 23, joiner; 25, pattern maker; 43, corporation wrkr; 
57, stoker; 26, moulder; 23, miner; 27, baker; 21, wireman;
20, fitter; 20, baker; 37, weaver; 45, lab; 22, joiner; 22,
fitter; 32, saddler; 33, plater :; 37, lab; 16, schoolboy;
19, text.
Females 18, weaver; 15, text; 19, spinner; 37, text; 26,
spinner; 23, spinner; 26, hw; 20, confectioner; 22, confec­
tioner; 24, confectioner; 24, text; 16, spinner; 32, text.
There were two branch forms with the names at the top either 
indecipherable or torn off.
Anon 1
Males 22, fireman; 23, plate layer; 46,. porter; 57, foreman 
plate layer; 26, lab; 44, carpenter; 44, tailor; 26, lab;
23, lab; 30, lab; 22, porter; 27, lab;-49, plate layer; 45, 
fitter; 29, lab; 33, plate layer; 17, shop asst; 48,' cooper;
21, lab; 17, shop asst; 24, lab; 20, un; 39, foreman; 21, 
lab; 35, tinwrkr; 23, lab; 26, lab; 25, insurance agent; 
Females 17, un; 34, un; 23, barmaid; 21, barmaid; 24, clerk;
22, confectioner; 32, cook; 18, maid; 36, hw; 45, hw; 31, 
hw; 61, hw; 30, hw; 25, dress maker; 27, dress maker; 45, 
hw; 17, hw; 51, hw; 42, hw; 29, hw; 32, hw; 29, hw; 40, hw; 
25, dress maker.
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Anon 2
Males 28, miner; 55, miner; 29, engineer; 30, lab; 36, miner;
34, miner; 36, miner; 36, miner; 36, miner; 47, miner; 47,
miner; 47, lab; 45, lab; 36, miner; 36, miner; 36, carpen­
ter; 27, lab; 21, lab; 45, lab; 65, foreman; 45, miner; 22, 
fitter; 36, miner, miner, miner, miner; 46, miner; 26, miner;
26, miner; 47, miner; 24, miner; 36, miner; 47, miner; 24,
lab.
Females 59, hw; 42, hw; 35, hw; 20, hw; 31, hw.
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Appendix 2
The March 1923 Deportees Compensation Claims and Awards 
Listed in TS 27/182 (L - lost
Name
James Barrett 
Kathleen Barrett 
Nellie Barrett 
Kathleen Brooks 
John Byrne 
George Clancy 
Denis Connolly 
Eileen Cullinan 
Patrick Cusack 
John Curtin 
Mary Egan 
Mary Finan 
Francis Fitzgerald 
Danis Fleming 
Patrick Fleming 
Thomas Flynn 
Katherine Furlong 
Margaret Leonard 
William MbMah.on 
Jamas McNance 
Patrick O'Brien 
Denis Kelleher 
Arthur 01Hare 
Martin O'Donovan 
Joseph O'Dowd 
Martin Melony 
Henry Morgan 
Anthony Mullarkey 
Fintan Murphy
Place of 
Residence
Manchester
London
London
London
Liverpool
Manchester
London
London
Liverpool
Liverpool
London
Liverpool
London
Liverpool
Liverpool
South Shields
Liverpool
Liverpool
Manchester
Liverpool
Birmingham
London
Stockport
Liverpool
Manchester
London
London
Northumberland
London
job) .
Occupation
Broker
Housewife
Typist
Teacher
Clerk
Merchant
Porter
Dressmaker
Window cleaner
Shipyard worker
Housekeeper
Teacher
Teacher
Seaman
Coal trinmar
Electrician
Teacher
Teacher
IXbrchant
Painter
Rivetter
Teacher
Storeman
Mechanic
Merchant
Silk trader
Printer
Miner
Teacher
Claimed Awarded
£ £
1,890 435
2,000 390
2,350 410
2,440 562
680 . 410
6,110 1,300
1,600 375
1,700 425
1,500
1,740 365
2,500 490
1,650 410
1,684 505
1,594 238
2,030 560
1,540 236
340 340
1,500
5,900 836
1,713 400
1,650 390
5,000 400
1,070 460
1,730 385
1,500 405
7,820 1,500
4,619 550
1,505 293
5,030 500
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Patrick Murphy 
Peter Murphy 
Eileen Nunan 
James Nunan 
Patrick O'Hart L 
Sean 01 Mahony 
Thomas O'Malley 
Art O'Brien 
Richard O'Shea 
Thomas O'Sullivan L 
Richard Purcell L 
Mary Sheehan 
Prank Smyth L 
William Smyth L 
Nora Spillane 
John Woods 
Patrick Woods 
Thomas Woods 
Martin Mslnemey 
James McKeown 
Sean McGrath 
James MbGrath L 
Thomas McGlynn 
John Martin 
James MacNamara 
Sarah MacDermot 
John MeCann 
Maire Lively L 
Michael Galvin L 
Charles Garrety L 
John Harvey L 
Patrick Henegan L 
Edwin Hore L 
Thomas Joyce 
Thomas Kennedy L 
Maria Kileen 
John King 
Joseph Kingston 
Grace Lally 
John Leary
London Manager 1,500 400
Liverpool Newsagent 1,526 430
London Tailoress 1,570 390
London Tailor/shop 2,600 500
London Personal Secretary 2,955 675
London Manuf act urer* s Agent 20,000 1,000
Liverpool Butcher 1,740 390
London Publisher 9,361 441
Bootle Clerk 1,840 395
London Journalist 5,760 905
London Traveller 3,690 540
London Corsetiere 2,300 ' 460
Liverpool Teacher 2,200 1,250
London Civil Servant 2,050 410
Liverpool Pub Manageress 2,070 400
London Rail Foreman 1,600 410
Birmingham . Furnace Setter 1,550 350
Birmingham House Repairer 1,717 395
London Decorator 1,500 died
Liverpool Foreman Joiner 415
London ISDL Secretary 2,380 210
Manchester Foreman Cooper 1,720 415
Manchester Clerk 1,100 350
Liverpool Joiner 1,700 395
Bootle Docker 1,500 375
London Teacher 2,848 600
London Carpenter 2,215 500
Bootle Supervisor 1,675 365
London Teacher 1,800 217
London Timekeeper 2,086 550
London Teacher 4,952 626
St Helens Debt Collector 1,795 365
Liverpool Crane Driver 1,500
Jarrow Labourer 6,050 750
Bootle Carpenter 1,760 400
London Teacher 2,360 522
Durham Insurance Agent 2,160 675
Manchester Tailor 1,920 465
London Teacha: 2,350 500
Liverpool Publican 1,795 375
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Richard Leahy Liverpool Teacher 3,342 802
Francis Lee London Clerk 1,700 400
Joseph Leonard L Liverpool Joiner 2,070 425
Margaret Leonard Liverpool Teacher 1,750 550
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Appendix 3
People convicted for Irish military type activities in England 
and Wales 1918-1923^
Name
W, Prendergast 
T. McGrath 
T. Lynch 
E. Kennedy 
M. Hogan 
John Cooley 
M. Roche 
J. Cotter 
Michael Galvin 
Art O'Brien 
Sean McGrath 
Sean O'Mahony 
Anthony Mullarkey 
T . Flynn 
Patrick Fleming 
Denis Fleming 
Thomas Joyce 
H. Wrigley 
H. Friday 
H. Collins 
J. Crearra 
J. Kirwan 
G. Power 
0. Salmon
A. Dunlavey 
J. Conroy 
J. McAlinden 
W . Cogan
E. Brady 
Ned Kerr 
J. McLaughey
Age Occupation
34 Ship Steward
23 Donkeyman
32 Clerk (ex police)
57 Labourer
25 Solicitor
27 Clerk (ex police)
2 3 Army S gt.
36 Engineer (professional)
26 Teacher
50 Publisher/Engineer
40 Clerk
56 Manufacturer's Agent
35 Miner
22 Engineer
28 Sailor
23 Sailor
49 Miner
19 Clerk
Dealer
Dealer
Mechanic
29 Teacher
19 Engineer
25 Labourer
33 Miner '
25 Teacher
19 Brassworker
20 Carpenter
19 Shop Assistant
57 Docker
32 Labourer
1 Compiled from Times trial reports and Reports on Revolu­
tionary Organizations.
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W. MacElligott 19
W, Kenny 20
T. Greany 22
J. Moran 19
T. O'Sullivan 20
W. Burrow 39
Elizabeth Edie 37
Michael Maclnerney ■ 48
W. Affection 17
D. Tangley 25
J. Minihane 22
W. Robinson 20
P. .Flynn 22
J. Connolly 27
R. Purcell 30
Gilbert Barrington 31
J. Kearney 33
Michael Donnoghue 26
T. Tierney 23
E. Hayes 20
J. O'Malley 23
B. Meehan 22
C. O'Gorman 20
P. Lowe
F. Fitzgerald 38
Civil Servant 
Clerk 
Teacher 
Clerk
Cable Operator
Manager
Civil Servant
Painter
Labourer
Labourer
Docker
Student
Labourer
Journalist
Miner
Teacher
Sailor
Labourer
Sawyer
Labourer
Cleaner
Motorman
Engineer
Labourer
Chemist
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Appendix 4
Membership of South, London IRA Company'
Age
17
22
19 
21
20 
17 
19 
16 
21 
17
17
23
24 
21 
21 
21
18 
19 
19 
21 
21 
18 
21 
19 
19 
26
Average age - 19.8 yrs 
Officer Commanding 
(no age given)
Occupation
Engineering student
Stevedore
Stevedore
Labourer
Joiner's mate
Labourer
Student
Clerk
Labourer
Clerk
Clerk
Builder
Labourer
Painter
Painter
Clerk
Stevedore
Labourer
Labourer
Stevedore
Clerk
Labourer
Builder
Clerk
Clerk
Painter
Teacher
1 Listed as Exhibit 8, sedition trial,in A. O'Brien Papers 
(Ms 8419).
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Appendix 5
Arms sent from London to Ireland in 1920 (photocopy,reduced, 
of Michael Collins file DE2/530, State Paper Office,
Dublin).
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it it • •» '' -■ v. '*■ ’ n ' l 'V* • ■ ' • i ‘ . i;-.• ■ .•'’' ' ‘■'7.".'' 1' •v .>• 1 -R if le '.  r '  '• V 1:2 >i • 0.
IT 21st » 2-30 German' A u t o s ". ” ' :.q, ,0*
• II ii • 1-32 A u t o V ;   ^ : ' 7 ' ' ' . v :: ;;o.'••■ sV -0 ,
it .t ' 1  D i t t o k  .;V 1 ' * ' vie .;•( ’
It it . 350 .rounds :38'.'Auto . • . ■ . .  ’. •y t : l  1. •a. ■ 0. '• * ■}
If 27th ■ I  Machine /;GuhVi^rv •'■ •■ ■ • •,••• y-- •• . . • p, .0.
March 4 t i i -4 5  O rdihar^l;^;''-.'.........
... ; 15. 0.
it it 1 R iflQ  • | ' M -  ; .. rP* .0 ,
it 151 l  • • i -4 5  Auto. .&::Ainl:;...•; . L ,  c - ■ ' ■,.P» "o.
it it Expenses :.. .'...... .: : ■ - • If,--: ■' i'. • .'■•"■ ,7. ;,b .
it 17t i  v 1 R if le  (1917)-- - ,t-.6'.S :.o. 0.
it ii •1 Trunk,- strand ,}••• ta x i-e ,to .':. '• ••••'•' -f;--., . ; 14. 0.
it it 1 Automatio • &'• 70;:roiihds. : .... . > ; ° . o-
n it Expensea t o "-iiyVirpool-|- r.: ; ' 1 , * : K 1  »1 - -• « - ;o. :0 .
A p r il  6t i 1-45 Aut o. 1. : . •. . . ' .. ,i i-. ;  r- ’ " 10. 0.
it 9t a German A u t o g r o u n d s , . : : .  ..
'•1 •,
t 5l
10. .0. ■|
• ii l i t i 1-38 HanMerieha^hrdinary. ^ ■yir r^ 15. y.O.
ii IT 2-45 Ool t s» . { .  1. :^;rv:: -:r;' ; .v • fy. •" .' ■ o'. 0.
n It . - 1-9 m/m-'Automatio ..,:u... :. - ..• ' f f . f  . -.f ;r
i ■ .! •
■ W
•0,1 j * ■ .0
ii II • £40. rounds .AssortddV^.V:;:/ ‘ . -j -,.,1. ■>. V ' t i -
- ■ m W :
:.o. •o.
1 i
it
it
12t
it
i  . \ l r 4 5 / :j.r;,rr r 'm -f- 
.-Expenses vy v.. •/
:f v y t 10<
ib;
.-•10
;o.
■ "
* .it 20t i ’ 20 i.r if le s  . ■ • : ' ■ ! :"v I 0 ;0
ii 22n ' . . s o :  . 11..^ ..-.1!. . : f r ' . - s : i--<• ■ -I j---I' -.----■-i .
;6o;t ••o, 0
18 bh 1-45 ord inary.f.;.'.-:;.--y;- ■
1 » J*-' • 
\\. ’/■’* 10 :'0 1 i
■ . ■ r.
$
f- -,
\ ' ‘ 'v:.i ■* Xli
'. A ACCOUNT LONDON CONTINUED (2)
. - - ’ ,r . v • ■ ■ ■ ' /■ * ■ ‘ , 1 * ■ . ( * * ’
DATE''- : PAETICULAE3 .OF GOODS s. d.
1920:
Bt.Fwd. ‘ ’ ’ ' '■ Z - l / P V
Iiaroh 24 5h, ' 1 :R i f le ,  _ .. • 3 0. 0.
n tr . ‘ 1 ' \  " ‘ v-:;- ' ... ' . • ...... ----- — —
A p r il '‘17 bh, l | . ‘ . 1. 0. 0.
" 19 ;h: l '  ' ■ lV - ' ' ' ' ■ - - - --T - - -
It it •' ,.1 -45 ‘ ord inary  y . ■ '".y. - * 2m- 0. 0.
r 1 -4 5 ; & 17 rounds. .
—
—
»r .....-23 *d r
• * . < r <.■ : 1 * i.-
...^packing;cases etc.  -: .. ’ .<-• ,. 1- . •/, - . 3 . 0 . 0.
Mdy 3rd . y 1-38 o rd in a ry . & 50 r o u n d s , . y y ' • 3 *
0. 0.
" 6 th.. : P r ;.-j;i -4 5 .A  : ; ' , T I;”,:.;.;. k . z o : . , , ■ y y y .  V . ;• 1 - 5 . 5. ° J
8t h ■ \ . Expenses, - to D u b lin . • '• : . ' 5 * 0.
0.
" . 9th- ■;:V.6-45 o rd inary  . -'y- V /  ; • 21. 0. 0.
• ' *f .. ' n ,.T,. V V! l “ 4 5 • ’ • • 2« LOi 0.'
; - » r'.:* , y y y ; / '■ ' h . LO. O'.
» 1 17th *
'» • . 1 f r • \ V v' • 'J ,* •*' ’ , J .. t* * *  ^ * V' • * ft'-' I'm' - ’ •
| . i - 4 5 \ ;  ,T;. • : . ‘ ‘ j  .. 3. 0. 0.
. rt . n■j-:. .Y.‘ \ * ' ^ 1 ^ 30 .:^ ;F,^ :Oy;^ ^^  ^ • \ , i ;1: : 2. 5 . ° -
.. ii! if '•-V V. n|;;Expfln3es,reraoving^riflflS.. ■„ L2. 4.
" v 21st , U:'v rT; 0 ri )ul i i inj -“ v. 4-. •0. 0.
'r .;: 23rd i ;/ • ,-.r 1—45.; short l/and -^ dS ^le hve s w :Vjj;•'f- ' 1. LO. '0 .
. " '25 th
i >i*. •' i ;• 1 - 4 5 r o u n d s :r:'v ; : .3*/
5. o.
" 26 t h '.V- ..:-l4«45'; o rd in a ry^ ! r j . • 14. 0. 6 *
" 29th • ); i^ Iong^G erm an:rifle  &• b a y o n e t - . ' -> 3. 0. 0.
" 30th v! '• /il'iIa 'u ser:,'pistolV''';;'&r67'rounds ;v 5 . 0. 0 .
i» ir ■ ; 8 -4 5 'O rd in ary . ' ' , ,■ ■ 28. 0. 0 .
•* June 2nd ; 1 - 4 5  :f  ; y  ■ -•. ■'
15.
—
". Bhd 2 'Autom atibs. 1-45 and some round's,. 0. 0.
" , 6 th . . . v.14-45 .!.!ordinary . ' .!. 14 * 0. 0.it ii . 2 -45 J . ; " i ■ J .7 . 0. 0.
" .. 22n< •V.' 3 ^revolvers'. ' 1  ^■... 11. 0. £•
" . 23rcL. -.".v" Daggers« ..j. i.. • . L5. 6.
„ i< . ij:;. 1; R e y o i v e r . ; . ? , , !. ; 3. 0. 0.
i . . »  . r. Tools;lf or ^ ta k in g .R ifle s  ai?art: . vV*] • •. * ’ 19. 9.
n , ii ■. . . . . / • • ' E x p a n s e s ; /■ . 5. 0.
July •9th *T ^ v a ^ S h i^ ld f iv ^ v r - j^  . 1 * 0. 0.
" 11th •I-;. 1^45. - and .;‘4 0 ir  ounds-.'..:ahd j,one.^ -do z • ::rounds';303. 1 — T“— ---
"•.11th
% 15th
5-45':o rd in a ry ,■
; * 4 :• aut'oinat io s-*. &'* 1000 'rounds, ’ ■..
1 8. 
•20.
.0.
0.
0.
0.
•V.' ■ . *v‘^' Is. • , . ' ’’ 1
3.
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DATE y
t rron .■
•'•7
''i v I t ;  ■ PARTICUiABS OF .GOODS . . . £• S. d,
XwU .
' Bt ,Fwd» . ' • •.• ■ .Vy .* .•' ‘ ' \ . ;" 7 ' : •. . : •. ■. • i / I 3
July I7.t ti.: ■;, Exp e ns e s Lt o ; l i v  e rp o o 1 L L 7 ' y :• v7>7::h. 7.7,.. 7„; - 2; 10. 0 ,
n n • r 2- autos’ Arsome 'leaves;,'-' ' 1 0 . 0. 70'.!
11 "- ’ 11 • v  8 "automatios : y yy  ■; ^ 28. 0. ‘0,!
II • • U ,1 ‘o o l t ...., •!„. i * 3; 5. 'O.i
ii it , 1700 rounds Am.' i' ■, ' 11. 18. 0.;■ it. if-l- ■ Rent ;;|to woman fo r 's to r in g . 5. 0. 0 .
. "30t i 1,1000:.rouuds;Am. - 10. 0. 0 .»t . : H: .if;-1 'Autom atic.' '>■■■ ' 3 . 6 . 0 .
ii <'! »t ■• v! ,;'-r>-4- 45• o rd in ary ; -  - - ■: :.-y,, •, 12. 10. oJn Vv;*f vyj-l: lea ther^oase . ;- V •. 1 .' 17. 6 ;
Aug.,7241 i  7- '•;.':'6-45 ;;ordiiiary. •: " v,. ' -'-j- i'C , _ 21^ ‘ 0;
1 vl .::7Advanoed7to,-hoat.messengerw6’n .thei;runVI..'., , 3 . 0 . 2 i” V*26t i.7;’ H?; 2 -451: o rd in ary  and two automatics ; 7 ■  > 12.- 10.
. July .-36t] i. • -
( om itted ;J:; ii8 -3 0 3  i r aV, VVV.  . j; , ' : . V V y .i ’..; : 2 i 0; 0 .
Ju ly  '6th ;.l3aoking .fo r  ;packing. >.etc.l: \ \  • l i lo; 6.■ 1It 'tl; Fares and ..other expense s-^ - - \  . V C  - 1 i i 5;
0., ■ '»i • t'^  ii ' ..... ^:-:l-45VW ehley;/. ; ' ' ' * ’ -Vr'-? : 1 3; LOi
• ; n , • ilGarman"-AutOmatioi,' Long rahge. -& -J1-45 ,Web 1 ey
l^lVGermari^v-;:v/,.n . r,.n ■ :.-j'
10; 0; 0 ;
, ‘ YuX;:j;: "7 I**; T, 4; 0; •o.
;'''Aug'; 6thv; i •'Vr;2-45•• • W e h i e y : .. V. LO; 0.tt. ;•/? ! ..: ’ 17; 0. ° .
' • II 400 mixed ’rounds ' .3. 0; 0.
. tt * :„ .i-4 5 . c o i t i x; ; : ; ; v 5i LOi 0 .
it . • •' 1 ■Geriiian automUtip; .14', t o i i i i d s • ■ 5; 0; 0.
. ii 7 1 -3 2 v'OOlti7;Autcimatib y  ■■ . 3. LO. 0;It .Vi *!. 5 We hie y ; • { i’' 7 ‘ 3. LO. 0.“ : tt M ,, TT'Expeii’se8 . i : : T*Tj!Jv,;"' " t" '
xed. 
3; . :
8; 6 .
3e p t . ’-ls ' * ♦ .V xii;v2 »Ge rmanrAt£tbs *"i1;l-4 5 .'00 I t  ^ 11^4 5 itfeh i ey •: • 200 rail
■ ' V : : ; s - j t  •■•/.■v.' round' '» » | i ' 1^ ' . V • '• V n * »' >: , ii ' ,t4' .. : •* • j , • ' . .4, ‘t !,’» v' , • 1 -.v ' 20. LO; 0.
* ' •” 77 3?< v i  l^G erinan 'A utd 'm ati'd1 - 3 8 ordinary'r&K2.'m ills • • •
0.. i ... -* V :;>V .:3i . C J ; V C L  I-, i I V i j y  grenades .- =, •' 7; Oil
It "'"'I' It •;Vl^d5 o rd inary ' /.''&i!,l r 38• "dr di nar y7 : ;  V .., ;■' 3 . L2, 6 .|
. .it -• .H V -.ll, at i oks- - . of .g e l i g i l i t e • ; .I- 2, 9 •
" v;7tl 1 V\ ''^QuantityimixiBd. am u n itlo n i; ’ '' • Vi--' . 1 . 0. o;:
’ " '30 tl i«7 T'T:i;3 autQmatibs ,:; "ViVS’V'V’r'' !-:y- 'i •. io . LO. o .:
!• ;. .vn i'A-n ■ 2 -4 5 ^ordinary '-r < v' : ’• 5. 5. 0 .n - it. 1 -4 5 ::: : *»•: .H .. ,7 . - , • V /  '7 ■' ” 1 . 5 • 0;
!. ti n ; V| 7 5 ,5p6!'roundb • mixed ammtiriition; V.‘. v - ^ ..... 42. L4; 0.it n  * i • ii,Taxi ,.y  • :. ; ";y 7 -;‘.7"7V  7 7 i ' 6. 0.
" 18t] U 1^ -45■ ord inary  & '15 rounds. 7 • • 4 . LO. 0.
• " " -.: .15t: i . : : ••-'2-automatic is & -1-45 'o rd inary . . .1:777 7'. . . '  ' 6. 0. 0.
Oct.  5t: 1. ■' , 71-45 . Wehley ■ •, . ' i V - ' ; . - . .; ■ 3.  •LO. Q.
, • ",  7-6t: i i  : : 7 l - 4 5 ‘o rd in a ry " - :'7  ;v ;. V"; '  ;"7~;';7;} ... 4; 0 . 0.' rr V tt . ./V 2-32*..autom atios771-38 .a u t o m a t i c 7,'.-■ ' ’• 9 . 0. 0.tl ■ II ‘tjiExpenses.- . . lV C C ; 3. :.6 ,
. : n ■ • 24ti i ;■ ;-^l-38;. revo lver ;& \50 roundB;*:v' ; ; -yr:77:7t:7"': :. ‘
3. 5 9 .0;;
tt 1 r '* | 2 -3 2 /auto3; • 7 / '77';7-.- 7 6 . 0 . O.iti' . ■ ii . ; 2-45 o rd in ary . &"50 rounds 303.:'"'7;::''77.: ' 6. 15. 0;
H . , '» ■:7l-Germ an'Autom atio. .. ... ; .7 -:. ' 7 7 . / '! 5. 0. 0.
Nov.3rd :v;" l-4 5  o rd in a ry , : \7 ’' ‘'7 • ■' '3 . LO. 0.ti • . it 1-38 o rd in a ry . . -• ........' i ' ";;;7 y; 2. LO. 0.it t . ii
” 5th
; 1 ...
* if
.7, E x p e n s e s ' ‘ :.7:7- .? - -'i.7 ':v.-7;:7 7^ -; 7 ; i •
.■'. 1 German- automatic'. 1-32:'c o l t ; :, ■ \  " ■ .... 6.
8.
LO.
6^.
0.
ti ■ ti <•< expense a.":'-";"'; ■ • ' '■• •■''••'..7 7 :: • -•' * - • 1 . LO. Q.
ti n * ‘ 7112 autom atics. V . ’v:'‘ltv77 30 • 0. 0 •
n n ■; -3-45 •, o ra in tiry . ;;.rr ' :.' ' “ - . .. .,.. ..*. 9 . 2. 6.
m
\ • ■ , *
, ■ i- I>7 . , , 7 ,.7.’ /.‘V , ;* •
t ' 3 f 3 3 i
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'tt ■ it
n 6th
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i it ii
tt u
it. it
it 15 th.
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. ^ «». .
. : v -*1 f1:;' • 
':!ri
•' 2-3 2 ‘ o r l i m r y Z . r“v ' • ‘rr r r  ■>
. ,4 rifle s.. & ‘t)500Lrounda .t30.3 ' ,
100 assortedv'rounds sm all. ■
1: aut omatio Ttptf-"" t ■.' i
.; 3-45. ordinary, hir : r  r r
; •• 1^45 \  ' : ■ " ' ! •
'1—45 • *’ r"»; —-pc. -<•*
1  : ' o o l t . ^ 4 5 3 . :& ^ 6 0 ^ r p u n 4 ^ . . - . .  • - L  . •
' l .colt. J45 ^ auto', • & ;d07round,s .1" . v r  '
“1 O  • m / m  *"'• ' **’I ’1’ - r »'*'•' } v  V !  O '  * ‘ - ' . I ' V ' i  ’ t i •. i '
; 3-45 We51ey;;^  :r 7 : r ;: ' • . • .r  •;
'• ;'4-3£ -revolvers-Vor'dinary . l x r i f l e  v r r 0 ^ 1 /0 ?  
7 automatio s '&;250rounds:?for - s a m e f . r v ‘i-
‘ ; • •'
W 's .
21.
 o  £f r vsame
_ _ _   ________ _ _ _ _ _ _  „  .'O- O  . . . . . . . , - i V .
’lr-45 -o rd in aryO O  •; r  v'-T-:; ■: ~.<iv *••••• •. ...-^vr •:
■1-45 ordlcory'. ’ '! /. V
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, io.
T:;14.
£z. 2.■rSZ.
7:io..
3: .
• • V "  ; S’"1.-' ^
t’ ’ '■, ■'.... ....-ip,,
• . ■ . •; ; . • •■•'< ' •} : 
#, .>>1- 1 '
- :-!.■'■• i':' i! i’;. •
■v.fjt.
rir.
■y
M'S
r
1 v
r
....
7 . - ;
• r ,• ;
. . . . . .
i ; - ! ; . -  
' •• •*•
•' r  \ ./  ’
: - r r .
'  r  : '
. •’*. 1 i
r , \ - '
V v . .
r  :
( i1
•V
. .*.•• ■ . • 
i v l
. . . . V ’j '
! ■ • ; " ,
•: . *
y  ...
;•. .. -  ..... ■
. . . . . . . .  _
"»■
r l
ro
12
rc
IO*
KP
•o.
■ v'5 
i:C,
IPI?;
'-'0,
10,
10,
i. .> 0 ,
10.I
ft!
c
6
C
'C
••o
0
0
0
3i
■r’*
A
916
Bibliography
Primary Sources 
Archives
Ireland
State Paper Office, Dublin 
Records of:
Chief Secretary's (Ireland) Office.
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Irish Times (Dublin)
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of their citation.
